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Abstract 
 
This thesis is concerned with the development of incentives for pharmaceutical R&D, 
specifically for neglected diseases. The following approaches are adopted. The short-
term effects of the recent cost-containment reforms on seven financial indicators 
related to firms‘ R&D in Denmark, Germany, France, Japan, and the US are 
estimated. The dataset represents a panel data of financial statements of 1306 
pharmaceutical firms for the period 1997-2007. National pharmaceutical 
expenditures, population, availability of credit, patent applications, and regulatory 
quality have been controlled for.  The average treatment effects on the treated are 
econometrically estimated with before-after comparisons, two difference-in-
differences (DiD) and three matching DiD methods. Impacts of liquidity constraints 
on R&D and investment are estimated with dynamic panel methods. Using frontier 
modelling, technical production inefficiencies are estimated and tested for 
independence from the stringency of national regulation. 
The major findings of this dissertation are: R&D indicators tend to be 
persistent despite the regulatory changes; tighter cost-containment regulations appear 
not to be associated with technical efficiency or R&D intensity of firms; cash flow 
has a positive effect on pharmaceutical R&D of small and young firms, but not on 
physical investment. Improved access to clean water appears to be the most 
important factor in the reduction of the neglected diseases‘ burden; evaluation of 
R&D schemes for neglected diseases based on 17 criteria indicates insufficient 
performance of the existing proposals and a number of recommendations to design 
better incentives are substantiated. Based on this analysis, I have designed a new 
hybrid public-private partnership model for financing R&D in the form of a prize 
screening mechanism, which relies on the innovative effort of small firms by 
reducing entry barriers and moral hazard problems.
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Introduction 
 
This thesis evaluates incentives for pharmaceutical R&D by analysing such aspects 
as the market and production, liquidity constraints for pharmaceutical firms, 
regulations and regulatory shocks. These evaluations are useful for policy makers to 
design better regulations while reducing the adverse effects of cost containment 
measures. Another application of this evaluation is to design better public incentives 
for R&D on neglected diseases (NDs), which do not normally represent commercial 
interests for the industry.    
The current global financial crisis and austerity measures for public spending 
exacerbates the long run trend of rapidly rising drug development costs and R&D 
productivity decline in the industry. There is a contradiction between the objectives 
of low priced drugs and the encouragement of industry-wide R&D, which, in the 
current business model (PWC, 2007), are oriented towards large market niches and 
high prices. Governments attempting to contain pharmaceutical budgets often 
introduce various price regulations, which differ substantially across EU member 
states. I review these pharmaceutical regulations and their association with R&D 
activity.  
This thesis aims to contribute to the literature by applying econometric policy 
evaluations gauging the regulatory impact of recent pharmaceutical reforms on R&D 
and related sources of internal financing. I also empirically estimate R&D elasticity 
with dynamic panel specifications in relation to sales, profit margins, leverage and 
other firm financial indicators. My empirical estimations support the argument that 
cash flow is indeed an important determinant of R&D intensity so that providing 
liquidity should be incorporated into possible public R&D incentives for neglected 
diseases. I also attempt to evaluate a link between technical inefficiency and 
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regulations in the industry for major global drug producer countries. The estimations 
for the stochastic production frontiers are based on consideration of intangible and 
tangible assets, and the number of employees at firm level.  I find no conclusive 
evidence that technical inefficiency is associated with the stringency of 
pharmaceutical regulations at national level.  
One of the major research targets of this work is designing better R&D 
incentives for neglected diseases, which amalgamate both public and market failures. 
The World Health Organization (WHO) lists the most acute diseases specific to 
developing countries, which kill over 2.5 million people every year, and states the 
fact that many of these diseases are neglected as there is no effective drug for them. 
Because of the shallow market of medicine for neglected diseases (NDs), many NDs 
attract very little research efforts. Moran, Ropars et al. (2005) have examples in 
which some pharmaceutical companies do not want to publish drug candidates that 
could lead to progress being made on neglected diseases, as they perceived that this 
could increase public pressure on them to do. 
Although NDs are the extreme example how shallow markets of poor patients 
do not generate incentives for developing new drugs, the majority of diseases of 
developed countries are in this category too. According to an estimation of Bartfai 
and Lees (2006, pp.14,71) only 12.5% of 400 disease entities generate enough return 
on the investments of pharmaceutical firms. An example of such problem is obstetric 
conditions in maternal health, where ―the market has failed pregnant women‖ due to 
high risks, long trials and the necessary costs (Fisk and Atun, 2008, p.22). Although 
rare (orphan) diseases programs were introduced in the US, Japan, and the EU, they 
operate by allowing very high prices to be continuously charged for such drugs 
through exclusivity concessions. I evaluate the major schemes of public intervention 
 9 
 
 
to stimulate R&D for NDs and propose my own model to improve R&D incentives 
for these diseases.  
This thesis explores the dataset of financial statements of 2657 
pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical firms from 70 countries and territories for the 
period 1997-2007 obtained from the Orbis database
1
. This database provides 
comprehensive financial information about companies and it is assembled from 
various expert sources by Bureau van Dijck, a reputable consultancy. I developed a 
visual basic application program to organize these data files into a panel dataset for 
further processing into Stata. This dataset is complemented by pharmaceutical 
expenditures data from OECD Health 2007, pharmaceutical trade recorded by the 
UN, drug approval data from the US Food and Drug Administration, industrial 
associations‘ statistics, and country indicators provided by the World Bank databases 
and the World Health Organization. R&D expenditures of many firms were missing 
in the Orbis
TM
.  
I mostly use accounting data on about 1,300 firms from 15 OECD countries 
and China. Unfortunately, the Orbis data source is unable to elicit whether those 
missing data are at random. I included firm size, year, and country dummies in my 
models to account for covariates that might relate to missing data as recommended 
by Little and Rubin (2002) to obtain consistent estimates in case of covariate-
dependent dropout.  
The dissertation is organized into four chapters.  
The first chapter serves as an introduction by summarizing major 
characteristics of the global pharmaceutical markets, the costs, success rates and 
problems of drug development, and major issues with the regulations. The industry is 
characterized by segmentation of consumers, moral hazards in drug prescription, 
                                                 
1
 available at http://www.bvdinfo.com/Products/CompanyInformation/International/ORBIS.aspx 
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sales and regulation; thus the absolute importance of patenting with the related 
oligopolistic nature of the market and large marketing expenditures. The current 
business model mainly focuses on developing drugs with large sales to compensate 
for rapidly rising R&D costs and declining research productivity.   
I discuss major explanations of the R&D productivity paradox (Munos, 2009) 
of stable or declining rates of introduction of new chemical entities in spite of 
exponentially growing R&D expenditures and long periods of high profitability. The 
explanations include (i) technological complexities (Gilbert, et al. 2003; Pamolli and 
Riccaboni, 2007; Paul, et al. 2010); (ii) problems of sharing information and rising 
R&D input costs (Cockburn, 2004 and 2006; Pisano, 2006); (iii) diverted incentives 
of R&D into me-too drugs (Finkelstein and Temin, 2008), controls of R&D projects 
by marketing decisions (Cuatrecasas, 2006); lack of comparative cost-efficacy 
information (Angel, 2005; Light, 2009), short horizons for researchers and managers 
(Bartfai and Lees, 2006); (iv) patent race to block a rival entry (Tirole, 1994). This 
productivity decline is exacerbated by a large share of me-too drugs with only 
approximately 10% of drugs offering an improvement in chemical structure and 
therapy (Barral, 2004).  
One of the explanations of the productivity paradox could be the fact that 
companies do not adjust their R&D expenditures based on the aggregate share of 
new molecular entities (NMEs) on the market. I check the hypothesis that R&D to 
sales ratio depends on the shares of new or priority molecular entities and find no 
such dependence in the US. I run a Granger causality test, which suggests if a share 
of new molecular entities helps in the prediction of R&D expenditures with lags from 
three to five years. I failed to reject the nulls of no Granger causality between these 
series. 
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Then I discuss the major problems of cost containment pharmaceutical 
regulations, which might contribute to the declining R&D productivity (Danzon, 
1997; Reuben and Burstall, 2005). These major problems include a lack of 
transparency and flexibility in prescription (Puig-Junoy (2005), deficiency of cost-
benefit analysis (McGuire, et al. 2004), diverted incentives towards me-too drugs 
(Church and Ware, 2000), administration costs (Mrazek and Mossialos, 2004) and 
risks of regulatory capture (Mossialos, 1997). Negative impacts of price controls 
include increases in other health spending (Gaynor, et al. 2007), reduced innovations 
(Golec and Vernon, 2004 and 2006; Giaccotto, et al. 2005; Schwitzer, 2006; Civan 
and Maloney, 2009), the flight of research activities overseas (Gilbert and Rosenberg, 
2004) and drug launch delays (Kyle, 2007). However, some of the studies (Golec and 
Vernon, 2006; Giaccotto, et al. 2005) are not convincing for reasons such as 
improper accounting for endogenous regressors and omitted variables.   
I test the hypothesis that R&D intensity is both independent from the 
concentration of sales (oligopolization) and stringency of national price regulations 
with Pearson chi-squared and likelihood-ratio tests for eleven countries. The null 
hypothesis is that stringency of price regulations and median R&D to sales and assets 
are unrelated, and I failed to reject the null.  
Finally, I attempt to estimate stochastic technical efficiency production 
frontiers for several major countries. The idea is that stringent pharmaceutical 
regulations can reduce the productive ability of assets and limit the ability of firms to 
achieve production efficiency. I estimate the technical inefficiency at the firm level 
for each country assuming the translog production function with firms‘ operating 
revenue as the outcome and with tangible fixed assets, intangible fixed assets and the 
number of employees as factor inputs. Several specifications for the distribution of 
the technical inefficiency term have been used: truncated normal, half-normal, 
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exponential distributions, and the Battese-Coelli (1992) time varying parameter. In 
all models the idiosyncratic error term is assumed to be normally distributed. The 
estimated inefficiency levels are then tested for independence from the national price 
regulations index and from concentration of sales. I use two unconditional 
independence Pearson chi-squared and likelihood-ratio tests and I failed to reject 
random associations between these series.   
  The second chapter is the comprehensive attempt to estimate impacts of 
recent cost-containment reforms. I focus on reforms in Denmark (2001) with 
mandatory generic substitution; France (2004) with greater generic substitution, 
stricter price controls and the introduction of additional taxes; Germany (2003) with 
a cost-benefit analysis of drugs, mandatory price discounts and stricter price 
controls; Japan (2002) with greater generic substitution; and the Medicare reform 
with larger discounts on drugs for the state program in USA (2003).  As there is 
insufficient data to correctly perform all the empirical tests for firms in Italy, 
Norway, and Sweden, the reforms in these countries are considered in Attachment 6. 
The empirical evaluation of the impacts of cost-containment pharmaceutical reforms 
on the supply side of innovation activity – R&D expenditures and sources of R&D 
financing at firm level – is of particular interest but scarcely covered in the literature. 
Balancing supply and demand sides while promoting innovations has made 
pharmaceutical policy an issue of intense political debate. Most authors (Abbott and 
Vernon, 2007; Danzon, Wang, et al. 2005; Kessler, 2004; Schwitzer, 2006; Vernon, 
2004 and 2005; Sood, deVries et al. 2009) argue that price regulations hamper 
pharmaceutical R&D. Given the negative effect of cost-containment policies in the 
literature, I test the hypotheses that all cost-containment reforms reduced R&D 
expenditures, revenues, gross margin, price-to-book value, and cash flows of 
companies in the country under reform. Due to the leading role of sales in companies‘ 
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R&D decisions and the fact that ―each country‘s regulation do fall most heavily on 
its domestic firms‖ (Danzon, 1997, p.46), especially since the dominance of domestic 
sales over foreign ones for the firms in the sample, national reforms can have a 
strong impact on R&D indicators of firms located in the reformed country. 
I have chosen two outcome indicators of R&D activity: R&D expenditures 
and R&D expenditures to revenue; and four indicators that characterize internal 
funds potentially available for R&D and investment prospects of a firm: revenue, 
cash flow, gross margin, and price-to-book ratio. These financial indicators are 
suggested by the literature on R&D financing (e.g. Scherer, 2007; Vernon, 2005; 
Hall, 2002; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002).  
I assume that reforms are exogenous political shocks for pharmaceutical 
firms and that firms do not react strategically by reducing their R&D expenditures in 
advance of a reform. I use econometric policy evaluation methods to estimate the 
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) using difference-in-difference models 
(linear, semi-log, and correlated random trend specifications) and three matching 
difference-in-difference (one-to-one, 10-neighbour, and kernel bi-weighted) methods 
for robustness sake. I also control for such macroeconomic indicators as regulatory 
quality in the country, national expenditures on pharmaceuticals as share to GDP, 
patent applications, domestic credit to private sector, and population. I match firms 
by such characteristics as cash flow, price-to-book ratio, R&D intensity, revenue, 
assets, and number of employees.  
Comparing national regulations from five different sources I assigned 
pharmaceutical firms from Ireland, Austria and Finland as a control group for 
European countries. Japanese regulations resemble Switzerland most closely. Firms 
from the UK were assigned as a control group for the US firms. This choice of 
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control groups is obtained by maximization of the number of similar regulation 
practices across countries. 
Across all difference-in-difference (DiD) estimations, I see consistently 
negative impacts of the reforms on R&D expenditures in Germany. Investment 
perspectives as proxied by average Tobin‘s Q are the least affected by the reforms. 
The US and Denmark are countries where all matching DiD methods indicate 
positive impacts of the reform on R&D expenditures. In general I find that the R&D 
indicators tend to be persistent despite the regulatory shocks. 
The third chapter considers pharmaceutical R&D using dynamic panel 
models based on liquidity constraints literature. The ability to purchase resources for 
R&D is determined by the cost of capital as extracted from imperfect capital markets. 
Hall (2002) concludes that small and new innovative firms experience high costs of 
capital and even large firms prefer internal funds for the financing of R&D. Fazzari, 
Hubbard, et al. (1988) point out the key role of cash flow in investment decisions of 
firms. This chapter tests the hypothesis that cash flow has a positive impact on R&D 
intensity.  
Determination of cash constrained firms is tricky: financially distressed 
companies can be presented as cash constrained ones (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997) or 
negative cash flow can tilt the results (Allayannis and Mozumdar, 2004). The 
interpretation of a positive cash flow relationship with R&D and investment is not 
clear and can also be explained by investment expectations (Gomes, 2001), by 
managers diverting cash flow (Hubbard, 1998), by the market power of companies 
(Cooper and Ejarque, 2003), or by measurement errors in Tobin‘s Q (Erickson and 
Whited, 2000; Cummins, Hassett, et al. 2006).   
The capital structure (leverage, i.e. debt to assets) is an important parameter 
in R&D and investment decisions. Leverage often has a negative impact on 
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investment (Myers, 1977; Aivazian, Geb, et al. 2005), but the impact depends on 
Tobin‘s Q (McConnell and Servaes, 1995; Ahn, Denis, et al. 2006).  
The empirical literature related to the pharmaceutical industry finds the 
positive effect of cash flow on R&D (Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994). Grabowski 
and Vernon (2000) using data on 11 firms and Vernon (2005) for 14 American 
pharmaceutical firms on a panel dataset of four years using OLS, fixed and random 
effects panel regressions also find a significant positive impact of sales on R&D. 
However, the specifications used by Grabowski and Vernon might not provide a 
consistent estimate in case of persistence of R&D as OLS estimators are likely to be 
biased in this case.  
Assuming the persistence of R&D for a firm, I use GMM estimators for 
dynamic panel regressions of ratio of R&D or investment to total assets on a number 
of corporate indicators such as debt, stock volatility, cash flow, price-to-book ratio, 
sales, number of employees, and macroeconomic indicators of regulatory quality, 
credit to the private sector and population. I assume that it takes many years for R&D 
and investment to generate sales and cash flow so that there is no simultaneous 
feedback. Based on the literature review, I expect the coefficients for cash flow to be 
positive. 
I use system and difference GMM methods and also pooled cluster OLS and 
panel within estimators for comparison purposes. Due to the short panels, GMM 
estimators with a large number of moment conditions can suffer from the small-
sample bias so that it is wise to limit the number of conditions and instruments (Hall, 
2005). In this regard, I minimize the number of instruments and use the dependent 
variable lagged at t-2 and further lags as the GMM instrument, and year dummies are 
used as IV instruments. Alternative instruments have been also attempted 
(Attachment 7), but they do not pass the tests for valid instruments. 
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Most studies of R&D at firm level are devoted to a specific country, the 
majority belonging to the US. I use the sample of 482 firms from 15 OECD 
countries. The majority of data comes from American and British companies. My 
estimations show that cash flow has both positive and significant coefficients, which 
suggest that an additional cash flow in Euros increases R&D to approximately 56 
cents (0.56€). Similar estimations for physical investment show that cash flow seems 
to not play an important role, which suggests a principal difference between more 
risky and uncertain R&D projects versus physical investment in the industry. 
Because it is empirically hard to identify firms with liquidity constraints 
(Moyen, 2004), I use several criteria for such identification and estimate the cash 
flow coefficients for several subsamples: for small firms with a maximum of 100 
employees; for large firms with a minimum of 500 employees; excluding 
observations with negative cash flow; less than one price-to-book ratio; young 
companies established for 15 years or less; firms within the lower half range of 
dividend pay-out ratio. I use the difference GMM method for these estimations due 
to the lower numbers of moment conditions, which reduces the short panel bias in 
comparison to the system GMM (Windmeijer, 2005). The estimated sensitivity of 
R&D to cash flow is higher for smaller firms, whereas the cash flow sensitivity for 
large firms is becoming statistically insignificant. For larger firms, the debt burden 
appears to play a more negative role in their R&D. Firms with low investment 
prospects as proxied by price-to-book ratio less than one also have reduced 
sensitivity of their R&D to cash flow. New firms have higher sensitivity of R&D to 
cash flow.  
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The fourth chapter offers a policy analysis of the problem and the existing 
proposals on R&D for NDs. Most neglected diseases
2
 are neglected because they 
cannot generate enough return on R&D to pharmaceutical firms. With the exception 
of tuberculosis, these diseases mainly occur in low income countries where patients 
have low purchasing power and with malfunctioning healthcare systems. 
Approximately 2.5 million people die every year from NDs (WHO 2009, p. 3), but 
commercial and academic research is sparse. Various reasons have been advanced in 
the literature explaining why the pharmaceutical industry has not been forthcoming 
in developing NDs drugs: the small size of the markets; the corruption of drug 
procurement and misuse of drugs leading to the building of drug resistance; the 
pharmaceutical regulations are sometimes driven by political agenda; the limited 
intellectual property rights for pharmaceuticals (Kremer, 2002) and the failure of 
social insurance markets in poor countries (Farlow, 2005). Berndt and Hurvitz (2005) 
also emphasize a free rider problem where countries expect other countries to take on 
the risks and costs of a breakthrough in R&D. The NDs are the important case where 
the design and application of better incentives for pharmaceutical R&D requires 
strong public intervention and can have enormous global impact.  
I summarize the literature on regional concentration, DALYs and lives lost, 
health damages and economic costs of the NDs. The literature tends to emphasize 
poverty and problems with medical infrastructure, but I focus on such issues as 
corruption and lack of political commitment. I test two hypotheses: if sanitation, 
access to safe water, share of urban population, governance indicators, health 
expenditures, the number of nurses and per capita income have a negative association 
with the burden of all diseases and neglected diseases in particular across countries.  
                                                 
2
 as defined by the WHO: http://www.who.int/neglected_diseases/diseases/en/ 
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I use data for the year 2004 for which the most recent consistent disease burden 
estimations of the WHO (2008) are available. The OLS regressions with robust 
errors show that GDP per capita, improved access to sanitation, safe water and 
control of corruption appear to be statistically significant across most specifications, 
but government expenditures on health are not. 
Then I review the literature and discuss implementation, advantages and 
drawbacks of all major proposals for R&D on NDs in detail. Callan and Gillespie 
(2007, p.164) state that ―We do not know what optimal mix of these policies is likely 
to be… and … how to tailor different incentives for a broad range of diseases and 
treatments‖. All schemes are classified by the underlying push, pull and mixed 
incentives for R&D. A variety of proposals for public intervention have been offered 
and implemented to tackle this problem, but all proposals have essential deficiencies. 
Several attempts of bureaucratic supply of R&D for NDs largely failed due to moral 
hazard problems and the inability of donors to control R&D projects.   
The work horse of the R&D is public-private partnerships (PPPs), which are 
non-profit organizations, the majority of which are formed by small and medium 
pharmaceutical firms.  However, PPPs have such problems as lack of accountability, 
transparency, and motivation of companies (Mrazek and Mossialos, 2003; Sarewitz, 
Foladori, et al. 2004), lack of industrial experience, high dependence on in-kind 
contributions from few donors and disproportional focus on a few diseases (Moran, 
Ropars, et al. 2005; Moran, Guzman, et al. 2009), little global coordination and lack 
of consultations with recipient countries (Ziemba, 2005).   
Patents do not work well for NDs as existing purchasing power is not 
sufficient to attract commercial R&D and several pulling schemes have been 
proposed to stimulate demand. Pogge (2006) proposes the global $45-90 billion fund 
to guarantee payments for drugs in proportion to realized global health outcomes. 
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Hollis (2007) assumes that an annual $500 million would be a necessary payoff just 
for NDs. These proposals are not really feasible due to the implied scale of financing, 
estimation difficulties of the outcomes across countries and lack of long term 
political commitments and enforcement.  
The open-source projects have insufficient remuneration to compensate for 
high costs of R&D. The R&D call option proposal (Brogan and Mossialos, 2006) is 
promising, but high uncertainty of R&D process and the small market for such 
options will make it difficult to operate it. The major pull incentive has been 
proposed by Kremer, Barder, et al. (2005) in the form of advanced market (purchase) 
commitments (AMC or APC), which was agreed to be piloted by G8 countries. The 
problems of this scheme include large ($3-5billion) purchase; rewards are only 
provided for the first and maybe second inventor; patent rights are kept with the 
inventing companies; only large pharmaceutical firms have enough funds to 
participate (Light, 2005); difficulties in specifying vaccine characteristics in advance, 
the majority of the purchase will be spent on capital costs (Farlow, 2005).  
My criticism of the scheme is that the APC cost-sharing mechanism might 
not be a good signal reflecting public demand for a drug; R&D markets require 
essential search costs so that the presumption that big firms can efficiently 
subcontract with small firms for just one project can be too optimistic; and my 
estimations in chapter 3 demonstrate a low (0.36) elasticity of pharmaceutical R&D 
by sales.  
Mixed schemes such as orphan (rare) drug development programmes use 
both push incentives in the form of fast-track approval, tax credits, research grants, 
and the pulling market exclusivity for up to seven years in the US. However, orphan 
drug programmes work for markets that can maintain high exclusive prices (Trouiller, 
Olliaro, et al. 2002) and large revenues (Yin, 2008). Lack of competition (Berndt, 
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Glennerster, et al. 2007) and differences in the population of patients in developed 
and low income countries add to the drawbacks of this scheme.  
The priority review voucher proposal of Ridley, Grabowski, et al. (2006) 
grants a right for the FDA priority review of any drug in exchange for an approved 
drug for NDs and is implemented by the Food and Drug Administration 
Amendments Act in the US in 2007. The problem of this scheme is potential 
distortions for the commercial pioneering pharmaceutical innovations through a 
greater inflow of me-too blockbuster drugs, which can be stimulated by this proposal.  
The Office of Health Economics (2005) concluded that the transferable 
extension of intellectual property rights, fast track vouchers, and guaranteed advance 
purchase commitments are the most promising schemes for NDs. I summarize 
criticisms on these incentives in the literature with my evaluations.  These schemes 
basically propose large cross-subsidies with large distortions and deficiency of drug 
quality-oriented incentives for innovators.  
I systematically compare the major existing and proposed schemes for NDs 
and evaluate them according to 17 selected criteria grouped in four categories: 
efficiency, feasibility, fairness, and sustainability. Most schemes do not provide 
strong incentives to deliver quality drugs at the lowest costs. The best existing 
scheme for NDs is likely to be the proposal of Moran, Ropars, et al. (2005) with 
subsidies and grants channelled through a centralized PPP platform, which scored the 
highest. I conclude with seven features of the needed R&D process for NDs.  
The last section of this thesis presents my hybrid public-private partnership 
model (HPPP) based on prize screening incentives and discusses its advantages over 
existing proposals. The scheme is a hybrid of push and pull incentives. The scheme 
targets small companies with liquidity constraints by offering an advance payment 
and commits the second payment based on drug quality. The model uses risks and 
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costs sharing of the push schemes by offering a relatively small cash prize ($4.5-10 
million) for the selected drug candidates after the discovery phase with the following 
full subsidization of clinical trials. This must reduce entry barriers and costs of 
capital for small firms. However, the scheme supplements this with the pull incentive 
by paying the second prize in proportion to estimated drug quality revealed in 
clinical trials. The amounts of prizes are optimized through the prize screening 
mechanism design. The first prize is set to just cover the minimum expected 
discovery (pre-clinical) phase costs and the second prize is set in proportion to the 
drug quality as measured by marginal costs of the treatment per QALY saved.  
The model is calibrated for the case of tuberculosis (TB): the estimated costs 
for TB are approximately $750-900 m per successful drug in year 2000 prices. These 
costs of the proposed Program are higher than those of PPPs due to setting a 
relatively high external commercial option for firms, but essentially lower than the 
ones estimated for the APC. The proposed HPPP reduces moral hazard problems 
intrinsic to PPPs and can potentially attract in-kind contributions through greater 
transparency and accountability than PPPs.   
  
 
 
1. Market, R&D, and regulations in the pharmaceutical industry 
 
This chapter principally serves as an introduction. Sections 1.1-1.3 summarize major 
characteristics of the global pharmaceutical markets, the industrial R&D, and 
problems of regulation. Section 1.1 discusses major characteristics of the 
pharmaceutical market, risks and costs involved in the drug R&D process.  
The pharmaceutical industry has the highest ratio of R&D to net sales 
(Scherer, 2007) and it is crucial for life expectancy (Lichtenberg, 2003).  However, 
the costs of developing new drugs are rapidly increasing (PAREXEL, 2004). This 
section summarizes literature on costs, probability of success, and reasons for 
research termination of drug development by phases and by therapeutic classes. Due 
to very high potentially sunk costs of R&D, the current business model mainly 
focuses on developing blockbuster drugs for large markets with high demand. This 
section summarizes specific characteristics of the market, which include high 
segmentation of consumers and moral hazards of drug prescription, the necessity of 
patenting, the oligopolistic structure of patented medicine and the related welfare 
losses. The creative destruction equally works both through generic substitutions of 
off-patent drugs and through new, often me-too patented drugs.  
Section 1.2 summarizes explanations of the R&D productivity paradox: the 
relatively stable or declining rate of introduction of new drugs in spite of 
exponentially growing R&D expenditures and long periods of high profitability. The 
industry is unlikely to have sustained abnormal profits (Scherer, 2007; Taylor, 1999; 
Grabowski and Vernon, 2001). The decade of declined R&D productivity 
deteriorates returns (PWC, 2007) and capitalization (Garnier, 2008) of the industry 
so that the present business model may become extinct (Paul, et al. 2010). Angell 
(2005) criticizes the industry for focusing on marketing instead of innovation, lack of 
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independence of medical researchers and regulators, deficiency of transparency 
about comparative quality of drugs and their costs. But large spending on advertising 
can be dictated by the oligopolistic and monopolistic competition markets.  
The key problem is deficiency of NCEs: ―the number of new chemical 
entities is relatively stable in the last 65 years‖ (Pattikawa, 2007, p.37); a similar 
conclusion is reached by Munos (2009). The R&D productivity trend is a pessimistic 
picture of declining productivity in terms of the number of NCEs per R&D dollar 
since the 1980s. However, Scherer (2007) sees upward trends in introduction of 
NCEs and Schmid and Smith (2005) notice only a temporal R&D productivity 
slowdown. The problem of their studies is lack of filtering of fluctuations and 
business cycles.   
 The productivity decline is exacerbated by a large share of me-too drugs, 
some of them are also NCEs: about 69% of new chemical entities registered between 
1975 and 1999 had ―little or no therapeutic gain compared with what was already 
available‖ (Trouiller, Olliaro, et al. 2002, p.2188). Barral (2004) evaluated 1460 
NCEs launched in the G7 countries between 1975 and 2002 and found that only 
about 10% offered an improvement in both chemical structure and therapy. Some 
literature points out that me-too drugs are a natural process of R&D to generate cash 
flow and learning, which also improve competition and consumer satisfaction 
(Wertheimer, et al. 2001).  
 Possible explanations for the productivity paradox include (i) technological 
complexities and rising attrition rates at late stages (Gilbert, et al. 2003; Pamolli and 
Riccaboni, 2007; Paul, et al. 2010); (ii) problems of sharing information and rising 
R&D input costs and complex R&D contracts (Cockburn, 2004; 2006; Pisano, 2006); 
(iii) diverted incentives of R&D into me-too drugs with relaxed controls over 
advertisements (Finkelstein and Temin, 2008), including pressure for fast returns 
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from stakeholders, excessive focus on blockbusters, and controls of R&D projects by 
marketing decisions (Cuatrecasas, 2006); the systemic usage of a placebo instead of 
alternative drugs in clinical trials and a lack of comparative cost-efficacy information 
(Angel, 2005; Light, 2009), short horizon for researchers and managers (Bartfai and 
Lees, 2006); (iv) R&D patent race to block any rival entry (Tirole, 1994).  
One of the explanations of the productivity paradox could be that companies 
do not adjust their R&D expenditures based on the aggregate share of NMEs on the 
market. I check the hypothesis that R&D intensity (R&D to sales ratio) depends on 
the shares of new priority molecular entities in the US. I run a Granger causality test, 
which suggests if a share of new molecular entities helps in predicting R&D 
expenditures. I used several lags from three to five years, with five as the maximum 
possible given the relatively short time series available.   
 Section 1.3 discusses the problems of pharmaceutical regulations, which 
could be an important component of the declining R&D productivity. For instance, 
price controls in France and Japan effectively stimulate imitative research strategy 
(Danzon, 1997), and Reuben and Burstall (2005) claim that ―A decline in products 
from Europe is the source of the discovery deficit‖ (ibid, p.v). This section 
summarizes the major trade off between incentives for pharmaceutical innovations in 
terms of high prices on patented drugs versus public interests in cost containment and 
access to new medicine. 
The regulations are justified by normative/ethical issues and such market 
failures (Puig-Junoy, 2005) as information asymmetries between the producer and 
prescriber, moral hazard problems caused by health insurance, health externalities 
and oligopolistic markets.  The most controversial regulation in the EU is related to 
cost containment measures, mainly price regulations. In the EU, there is still a large 
variation in regulations and a small impact of cost-containing policies on savings 
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(Mossialos, et al. 2004).  Major problems include a lack of transparency and 
flexibility for patients (Puig-Junoy, 2005), motivations of national market 
protectionism (Pamolli and Riccaboni, 2007), deficiency of cost-benefit analysis 
(McGuire, et al. 2004), difficulties with optimization of price caps and related bias 
towards me-too drugs (Church and Ware, 2000), overinvestment into capital and 
R&D, high administration costs for the rate of return regulation (Mrazek and 
Mossialos, 2004), and risks of regulatory capture and inability to achieve sustainable 
cost savings (Mossialos, 1997; Danzon, 1997). The regulations may not address the 
problem at its root, which is rather information asymmetry about drugs‘ quality with 
a large share of incorrect (PWC, 2007) and misleading statements about drug quality 
in the literature and advertising (Othman, et al. 2009).  
Negative impacts of drug price controls include increases in other health 
spending (Gaynor, et al. 2007), significantly reduced R&D and innovations (Golec 
and Vernon, 2004; 2006; Giaccotto, et al. 2005; Schwitzer, 2006; Civan and 
Maloney, 2009), the flight of research activities overseas (Gilbert and Rosenberg, 
2004), and drug launch delays (Kyle, 2007). However, some of these results are not 
convincing for reasons of improper accounting for endogenous regressors and 
important omitted variables.   
The negative consequences of price regulations are not clear: Europe catches 
up with US productivity and it was even ahead in global NCEs in the period 1993-
2003 (Light, 2009); Australian and Spanish R&D productivity sometimes 
outperformed that of the UK and the US. Danzon (1997) argues that firms, doctors, 
and consumers may alter their behaviour to reduce the grip of price controls. 
Regulatory standards can force firms to target better quality R&D (Jacobzone, 2000) 
and increase demand for drugs (Katz, 2007).  
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I test the hypothesis that R&D intensity is both independent from the 
concentration of sales (oligopolization) and the stringency of national price 
regulations with Pearson chi-squared and likelihood-ratio tests for eleven countries. 
The null hypothesis is that the stringency of price regulations and the median R&D 
to sales and assets are unrelated, i.e. they are only randomly related, and I failed to 
reject the null.  
Section 1.4 presents stochastic frontier efficiency estimations for eight major 
countries. The idea is that pharmaceutical regulations can reduce the productive 
ability of assets and limit the ability of firms to achieve production efficiency. The 
share of intangible fixed assets in total fixed assets in the selected pharmaceutical 
producing countries ranges from one fifth to a quarter of all fixed assets. The 
majority of patents are not exploited (Sichelman, 2010) and often used to block rivals‘ 
R&D (Gambardella, et al. 2006). The regulations can also stimulate companies to 
establish local production, which contributes to large (PWC, 2007) production 
overcapacity in the industry. In some countries, e.g. Australia, Belgium, France, 
Hungary, and Spain, ethical drug prices are often ad-hoc negotiated between national 
health insurance (government) and the firms based on their contribution to the 
national economy (Puig-Junoy, 2005).  
I estimate technical inefficiency at firm level for each country assuming 
similar production function and using several econometric specifications for the 
distributions of the technical inefficiency term: truncated normal, half-normal, 
exponential, and Battese-Coelli (1992) time varying parameter. In all models the 
idiosyncratic error term is assumed to be normally distributed. The random effect 
specification is used for the panel frontier estimations in this section. Following the 
literature, I specify the production frontier function of inputs as the second order 
Taylor series approximation of the translog production function with firms‘ operating 
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revenue as the outcome and with tangible fixed assets, intangible fixed assets and the 
number of employees as factor inputs. I expect to see less inefficiency in the least 
price regulated markets and the highest inefficiencies in the countries with the most 
regulated markets. 
The estimated inefficiency levels then tested for independence from the 
national price regulations index and from concentration of sales. I use two 
unconditional independence Pearson chi-squared and likelihood-ratio tests and I 
failed to reject random associations between these series.  The null hypothesis is that 
the series are unrelated, i.e. they are only randomly related. The policy implication of 
this result is that price regulations do not seem constraint firms from achieving the 
highest output given factor inputs. In other words, regulations can affect R&D, but it 
might not be important for the production efficiency.  
 
1.1. Market and innovation process 
 
Pharmaceuticals as a knowledge-based industry  
In the contemporary world, the key factor of production is knowledge driven by the 
progress of science and social technology. Sociologists (e.g. Schement and Lievrouw, 
1987) have pointed out that the world has been transforming to a new stage of 
civilization – knowledge economy – where the most important resource is 
technoscientific knowledge – an amalgamation of science and production. The 
related structural changes are associated with the rise of the service sector depending 
on organizational innovations and learning (Sundbo, 1999).  
Dosi and Grazzi (2010, pp.175-179) view technologies as routine and 
summarize the following characteristics of technology as knowledge: (i) non-
rivalrous in use, (ii) an indivisibility in the use of information, (iii) high sunk cost, 
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but negligible cost of reproduction, (iv) non-decreasing returns on scale with non-
depreciation in technical terms. However, negligible costs of reproduction need 
relevant capabilities in absorbing and communication of knowledge. Pancs‘ (2010) 
growth model considers technology as endogenous to communication decisions. In 
equilibrium, there is too little communication and insufficient risk-taking. A drop in 
the cost of communication makes it more frequent, which through learning-by-doing 
enhances a virtuous circle.  
Harris (2001, p.21) emphasizes ―the role of knowledge creation and 
distribution as the primary driver in the process of economic growth‖. Harris points 
out such characteristics of knowledge as its durability, utility for future generations, 
rapid accumulation, increasing productivity of other factor inputs, and industrial 
production of knowledge with R&D. A number of studies confirmed a positive 
relationship between R&D and productivity growth at a national level (see a review 
of Ulku (2004)). Jones and Williams (1998, p.1119) conservatively estimated that in 
the US socially ―optimal R&D investment is at least two to four times actual 
investment‖ implying a huge underinvestment in R&D.  
There are however some methodological problems while dealing with 
knowledge. To account for sustained growth, modern theory needs to postulate 
improvements in technology and the increase of human capital (Lucas 2003).  
Krugman (1991) emphasised the elusive nature of knowledge flows for analysis. 
Knowledge represents a pure public good (Arrow 1962) since its use is non-rivalrous 
and non-excludable. In other words, once the cost of producing knowledge has been 
undertaken, it can be always used indefinitely and without diminishing its source.  
Knowledge is essentially a collective good even if discovered by individuals 
and companies. Individual innovation is soon becoming a part of general or global 
knowledge, and global knowledge is a basis for further individual innovations. Even 
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such a fundamental concept as the opportunity cost is challenged by a knowledge 
economy – opportunity costs usually imply fixed resource constraints, but knowledge 
can be a self-reproducing resource with multiple simultaneous users, which disables 
conventional Walrasian equilibrium consideration of knowledge.   
Knowledge (R&D) based industries are quite profitable and rapidly grow in 
the contemporary world facilitated by the international protection of intellectual 
property rights. One of such industries is pharmaceutical, where the possession of 
patents is core to profitability for the leading firms.  The global research 
pharmaceutical industry has the highest ratio of R&D to net sales (almost 15%) 
among all industries. In the US, R&D to sales ratio in ethical pharmaceuticals was 
almost seven times higher than those for average manufacturing level (Scherer, 
2007). In the EU, the pharmaceutical industry is the fifth largest industry, which 
accounts for 17.5% of all businesses‘ R&D expenditures and the top industry in 
terms of positive trade balance (EFPIA 2007). According to one estimation 
(Lichtenberg, 2003), new drugs accounted for about 40% of increased life 
expectancy in more than 50 countries from 1986 to 2000. Agrawal (1999, pp.6, 49) 
noticed that the competitiveness of the pharmaceutical industry depends largely on 
innovation abilities of firms. Her survey of chief executive officers of 45 
pharmaceutical corporations in 1992 showed that innovation was recognised as the 
single most important factor of global competitiveness.  
 
Risks and costs of drug discovery 
Although some risk ranking is possible, the discovery process is inherently uncertain 
and not exactly measurable in the Knight sense (Knight, 1921) so that no precise 
probability can regularly be assigned to the failure of a new drug project. According 
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to the European sources (EFPIA, 2007, p.18), drug discovery takes about 12-13 years 
and only one or two molecules become a drug out of ten thousand synthesized.  
According to PAREXEL (2004, p.83), the costs of developing a new drug in 
the US ranges from $608 million in 1996 by Lehman Brothers estimations, $802 
million in 2000 by the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, $880 
million in 2001 by the Boston Consulting Group, $948 million in 2003 by the Tufts 
Center for the Study of Drug Development, to $1.7 billion in 2002 estimated by Bain 
and Co. Paul, Mytelka, et al (2010) give an estimate at $1.8 billion.  
The drug discovery process has moved from random screening based on 
intuition and luck to rational drug discovery, which is based on identification of 
targets in biological processes (Attachment 1). Usually the following major stages 
are distinguished before clinical trials: synthesis, pharmacology and toxicity analysis, 
screening, animal testing, and patenting. After the application for investigating a new 
drug and authorization by government agencies, the drug discovery phase is followed 
by three phases of clinical trials: phase I – establishing safety on 20-100 healthy 
human volunteers, phase II – a small scale testing on patients with the targeted 
disease to infer efficacy, phase III – a large scale testing on patients to statistically 
conclude on drug‘s overall efficacy. In the case of successful clinical trials, the 
process is followed by official registration (approval), marketing, sales, and 
pharmacovigilance (survey of the drug while on market or phase IV), when new 
indications and side effects can be revealed (PhaRMA, 2008, p.13).  
The number of patients and the length of clinical trials depend on the 
therapeutic class. Antibiotic drugs can take 14 days, Alzheimer‘s – 24 months, 
osteoporosis – up to 48 months. Cardiovascular trials require from 30 to 400 human 
beings, about 1,000 for blood-pressure drug candidates, several thousands patients 
are required for cholesterol-lowering drugs (Bartfai and Lees, 2006, p.142).  
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According to the PhRMA estimations in 2005, the pre-human stage of R&D 
accounts for 25.7% of the total drug development costs, phase I – 5.8%, phase II – 
11.7%, phase III – 25.6%, approval – 6.9%, Pharmacovigilance (phase IV) – 13.3%, 
and 11% are not categorized (PhRMA, Annual Membership Survey 2007).  
Candidate drug attrition rates in top pharmaceutical companies depend on the 
therapeutical class (Table 1.1). Apart from biological and safety characteristics, a 
good drug candidate should have little competition with other drugs to treat the same 
disease, have a long patent expiration, have minimum rivalry for the same target 
(Bartfai and Lees, 2006, pp.113, 135, 136).  
 
Table 1.1. Failure of drug candidates in clinical trials by therapeutic class,  
percent of initial number of drug candidates 
 Antibiotic Central 
Nervous 
System 
Cardiovascular Respiratory 
disorders 
Safety failure in 
phase I 
 
85-100 
 
20-30 
 
30-40 
 
50 
Efficacy failure in 
phase II or III 
 
5-15 
 
70 
 
60 
 
50 
Source: adapted from Bartfai and Lees, 2006, p.147.  
 
Approval rates also vary strongly by therapeutic class from 0.12 for 
respiratory drugs to 0.281 for anti-infective (Table 1.2). The major causes of research 
terminations as listed by the firms in 1981-1992 were insufficient returns on 
investment or limited market (29.8-33.8%), efficacy (33-37.6%), and safety (21.4-
19.6%). The mean time to abandon the research varied between 2.1 to 4.4 years 
(Dimasi, 2001).  More than 70% of drug R&D is spent on failed compounds and 
about four-fifths of the costs represent clinical trials (Finkelstein and Temin, 2008, 
pp.66, 71). Efficacy can determine economic reasons for research termination as 
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really efficient drug can always find a niche in the market and the research was 
abandoned mainly before clinical trials or at Phase I. 
 
Table 1.2. Mean drug R&D costs and development times by therapeutic classes 
Therapeutic 
class of drugs 
Out-of-
pocket 
costs of 
clinical 
R&D 
adjusted 
for failures 
Full costs 
including 
time 
value 
Clinical 
develop-
ment, 
months 
Regulatory 
approval, 
months 
Net present 
value of 
worldwide 
sales over 
the life 
cycle of 
new drugs 
 
Predicted 
approval 
rates for 
self-
originated 
and NCEs 
Analgesic/ 
anaesthetics 
 
252 
 
375 
 
46.4 
 
15.4 
 
1080 
 
0.282 
Anti-infective 362 492 50.5 12.5 2199 0.331 
Cardiovascular 277 460 61 21 3668 0.204 
Central nervous 
system 
273 527 92.5 22.1 4177 0.230 
All classes 282 466 72.1 18.2 2434 0.172-
0.232 
Note: all costs are in million 2000 US dollars; this is a summary of 68 drugs from 10 firms; discount 
rate is 11% annual; NCE – new chemical entity.  
Source: compiled from figures of DiMasi, Grabowski et al. (2004) for the first five columns, and 
(Dimasi 2001) for the last column.  
 
 According to the Pharmaproject (cited by Biancardi (2008, p.35)), 28% of 
drug candidates are dropped due to efficacy concerns, 9% - for financial reasons, and 
44% because of strategic considerations. Drug discovery strategy is primarily guided 
by marketing, followed by costs of R&D (Graph 1).   
 
Graph 1. Pharmaceutical R&D cycle 
4. Phase I 
clinical tests, 
tens of 
volunteers
6%, P45=0.71 5. Phase II
hundreds of volunteers
0.12%, P56=0.71
6. Phase III 
thousands of volunteers
- 0.26*C, P56 = 0.31
7. Authority‘s approval
7%, P67=0.238. Manufacturing
&
Sales
Public purchase 
& regulation
9. Net Profit, 
cash flow 
(-10% to +100%)
0. Market analysis &
project selection
1. R&D
project lunch
2. Synthesis 
0.17%
3. Screening
8%
waste basket
Note: Percentage numbers show share of a stage in the total R&D costs, Pij indicates the 
probabilities of transferring from stage i to j. The data are from DiMasi, et al. (2004) and 
PWC (2007).   
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Companies often search for drugs before they establish a clear understanding 
of diseases, and such approach leads to high attrition rates of drug candidates 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2007, p. 29). Drug discovery is essentially an economic 
risk evaluation problem in conditions of high uncertainty and assymetric information.   
 
Specific characteristics of the market  
The market is highly segmented and includes such forms as (Forns and Coll 2005): 
- over-the-counter drugs where a consumer chooses the product; 
- prescription (ethical) drugs, where doctors choosing drugs are constrained by 
national health and insurance policies of the patient; 
- innovative with a new target and a chemical entity or me-too drugs with a mild 
variation of the existed active component;  
- brand-name pharmaceuticals produced by known companies with a patent versus 
generics, which are produced after patent expiration and compete mainly on price;  
- hospital dispensed drugs versus non-hospital dispensed ones; hospitals usually have 
more bargaining power due to large purchases and make more informed choices.   
Most researchers conclude that the pharmaceutical industry can emerge only 
under the patent system, which prevents unauthorized copies of new drugs and 
creates high profits for R&D (Jacobzone, 2000). The major side effect of patents is 
high prices. Baker (2008) estimates that drug patents increase prices by an average of 
300-400% above the competitive market price and the associated deadweight loss 
due to drug patents will exceed $100 billion a year by 2013.  
However, Hughes, Moore, et al. (2002) estimated that if all patent rights on 
branded drugs are eliminated in the US, consumers will benefit approximately $1 
trillion from the lower prices of medicine, but future consumers would lose over $3 
trillion in net present value through reduction in the development of new drugs. Their 
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study assumed that there is a one-to-one relationship between decreased revenue of 
pharmaceutical firms and decline in firms‘ R&D, which would lead to the same 
reduction in new chemical entities (NCEs). 
Pharmaceutical firms are often granted additional exclusivity in addition to 
the international 20 years of patent protection. To provide extra incentives to the 
industry, in 1992 the supplemental protection certificate was established in Europe to 
extend protection from five to seven years (Schwitzer, 2006, p.169). Some firms 
seem to abuse the patent system. For instance, Neelie Kroes, the European 
Commissioner for Competition, concluded her 10-month investigation in the 
pharmaceutical industry with a result that branded companies limited entrance of 
cheaper generic drugs into EU markets costing consumers €3billion (£2.5billion) for 
the period 2000-2007. The generic penetration is limited by filing patent litigation 
cases, deals with generic manufacturers and intervenes in national approval 
procedures (Telegraph.co.uk, 29 November 2008).  
Patents are not the major problem for access to many drugs in developing 
countries. Attaran and Granville (2004) have concluded that patents are rarely the 
primary barrier to accessing medicines in low-income countries: most products on 
the WHO‘s 2002 Model List of Essential Medicines are not under patent, with the 
major exception is HIV/AIDS medicines. In addition, countries can use compulsory 
licensing in case of epidemics.  
The ethical drug industry operates mainly under monopolistic and 
oligopolistic competition with strong product differentiation. Average market sales‘ 
concentrations of the top three products in the top hundred therapeutical classes for 
the period 1994-2004 was 71.5% in the EU-25, 69.4% in Japan, and 70.7% in the US 
(Pammolli and Riccaboni, 2007, p.175). For instance, almost all sales of statins were 
controlled by four firms in the US in 2003 (Schwitzer, 2006, p.27). In 2006, ten 
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companies controlled almost half of the global pharmaceutical sales and one third of 
all pharmaceutical sales concentrated on ten therapeutic classes (OECD Health 
Division, 2008, p.11). Reasons for oligopolistic completions might be rooted in entry 
barriers listed by (Gassmann, et al, 2008, p.26): large fixed costs of R&D and 
marketing, health regulation, limited distribution channels and relatively high risks of 
failure in drug development process.  
In accordance with market segmentation, there is high price variation for the 
same drug depending on the bargaining power of buyers. But the major determinant 
of drug prices is the demand for the drug, which, in turn, substantiates corresponding 
R&D and profit (Schwitzer, 2006, pp.9-10, 95-96). Drugs compete on their 
therapeutic characteristics rather than on price as demand is normally insensitive to 
price (Finkelstein and Temin, 2008, pp.29, 43). 
The pharmaceutical market can be well characterized by the Schumpeterian 
(Schumpeter, 1939) concept of creative destruction. Pharmaceutical R&D has 
complex dynamics, where companies‘ R&D, on the one hand, creates new product, 
high profit stream, and serves as a basis for future R&D, but, on the other hand, 
attracts new market entrants through innovation around and substitution of the 
product by generic firms after expiration of the patent (Scherer, 2007). For example, 
Lichtenberg and Philipson (2002) estimated that one fifth of drugs approved during 
1950-93 were no longer marketed by 1999. Generic entrance to the market often 
decreases a drug price by four fifths (Angell 2005) and this represents another pattern 
of the creative destruction.  
R&D expenditure in the pharmaceutical industry can be viewed as long-term 
risky investments with high fixed and potentially sunk costs, which can be recovered 
only with large expected sales. Civan and Maloney (2006) concluded that drug R&D 
is oriented towards major market demand, especially for patients in the world‘s 
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largest pharmaceutical market – the US. Large pharmaceutical firms focus their 
R&D on the US market, which comprises over 60% of sales for the big companies 
(Bartfai and Lees, 2006, p.138). In the US, the largest consumers of pharmaceuticals 
are rather elderly, women, and white patients (Schwitzer, 2006, pp.118-119) and 
R&D ought to be focused on these consumers. 
However, the consulting agency IMS Health estimated global pharmaceutical 
market sales at $643 billion in 2006 with a shift in growth in the marketplace away 
from mature markets to emerging ones, and from primary care classes to biotech and 
specialist-driven therapies (IMS Health, 2007). Although pharmaceutical sales grew 
more than 11% per year in 1970-2002, growth rates in recent years have been 
slowing down to 5-8% (Gassmann et al, 2008, p.v).  
Lichtenberg (2005) empirically shows that the disease composition of 
pharmaceutical R&D is strongly positively affected by the income of patients. 
According to the IMS Health Report (2007), top global therapeutic areas were 
oncologics (anti-cancer), lipid regulators, respiratory agents, acid pump inhibitors, 
antidiabetics, antipsychotics, and antidepressants; total global sales of 
pharmaceuticals were $663.5 billion, including North America (45.9% of total sales), 
Europe (31.1%), and Japan (8.8%) in 2006.   
 
1.2. Explaining the R&D productivity crisis in the industry   
 
In spite of the high costs of R&D, the pharmaceutical industry has been consistently 
the most profitable sector of the US economy for several decades. The widely cited 
report of Public Citizen (2002) questions why the average profit of pharmaceutical 
companies was 15.1% in the 1990s compared to slightly higher than the 4% profit 
rate of revenue for all Fortune magazine 500 top US companies. Scherer (1993) 
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estimated that during the period 1960-1991 pharmaceuticals had the best median 
after tax returns on stockholders‘ equity (18.4%) among Fortune 500 corporations, 
which only had an11.9% average return for the same period. In general, the top ten 
pharmaceutical companies enjoy quite healthy profit margins: the average cost of 
production contributed 24.9% of total costs, marketing and administration – 34.4%, 
R&D – 13.7%, and net profit before taxes added another 23.6% (Kaiser Family 
Foundation (2001) cited by Vogel (2007, p.74)).  
The US Congressional Budget Office (2009) states that expected profit is the 
major motivation for companies‘ R&D and about half of the industry‘s sales comes 
from blockbuster drugs. The blockbuster model of high market size, targeting 
chronic conditions and high drug prices drives innovation in the industry, but this 
basis of R&D might not be sustainable (Finkelstein and Temin 2008, pp.5,30).   
However, Scherer (2007, p.32) argues that if R&D is properly accounted as 
an investment rather than an expense, pharmaceutical companies do not have 
sustained abnormal profits. Taylor (1999, p.144) using a cash recovery method 
estimated that difference between the cost of capital and the internal rate of return 
(IRR) for a five year period was in the range from minus 3.32 to 3.47% for a dozen 
of the top American pharmaceutical companies between 1975 and 1991. The IRR 
ranged from 11.37 to 22.46 percent. This suggests that the cost of capital is rather 
equal to IRR, but some firms manage to get periods with quite high returns.   
 These high returns might deteriorate as PriceWaterHouseCoopers (2007) 
points out the following:  
- decreased or stagnated productivity in terms of number of new molecular drugs per 
invested dollar in R&D;   
- shorter patent life of new drugs as patents must be obtained before clinical trials to 
secure the property rights, but clinical trials were longer; 
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- according to the AXA Framlington firm, expiration of patents for blockbuster drugs, 
which generate over billion dollars in sales, can lead to 14-41% revenue loss for the 
leading pharmaceutical companies by 2012. 
 For the period 2001-2007, the top fifteen pharmaceutical companies lost over 
$0.8 trillion in capitalization mainly due to declining R&D productivity (Garnier, 
2008). Paul, Mytelka, et al (2010, p.204) warn that ―we may be moving closer to a 
pharmaceutical ‗ice age‘ and the potential extinction of the industry, at least as it 
exists today‖.  
Some of the major public criticisms of the big pharmaceutical companies and 
the industry are outlined by Angell (2005) and some others: 
- Firms tend to over focus on marketing, which comprised over one third of the big 
pharmaceutical companies‘ costs and employees; some promotional practices 
contradict ethical norms with misleading claims (Schwitzer, 2006, pp.105-106).  
Blech (2006, p.16) notices that the industry spends between €8-15,000 in marketing 
per doctor in Germany. Blech also accuses the industry of exaggeration in drug 
quality and the expansion of a patient base by inventing diseases such as loneliness 
and frustration. Azoulay (2002, p.586) analysing the quality and marketing moves of 
major drug producers in the H2-antagonist therapeutic class finds that ―marketing 
had a more pronounced direct effect on demand than science‖.  
- About one third of drugs in recent history originated from university or small firms, 
not from big pharmaceutical companies. According to the Cap Gemini Ernst and 
Young 2001 study, most top pharmaceutical companies have in-licensed (bought a 
license) over 40% of their marketed NCEs (cited by Gassmann et al, 2008, p.82).  
- The lack of independence of medical researchers from pharmaceutical companies. 
For example, authors of industry-sponsored studies were much more likely to find 
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essential positive effects from a drug than authors funded by non-profit organizations 
(Bodil, Als-Nielsen et al 2003, cited by Angell (2005)). 
- High spending on lobbying, for example, according to the consumer advocacy 
group Public Citizen, the industry spent about $478 million on lobbying in 1997-
2002. The research pharmaceutical industry association; Pharmaceutical Research 
and Manufacturers of America (PhaRMA) was among top ten American lobbyists by 
reported lobbying expenditures in 1998-2004 (Vogel 2007, p.12).  
- High profile cases of withdrawal of very dangerous drugs, which had been 
officially approved for marketing.  
- Deficiency of transparency about the comparative quality of drugs and their costs.  
However, large spending on advertising is typical for oligopolistic and 
monopolistic competition markets. The simplest model is a prisoners‘ dilemma 
where the firm‘s optimal strategy is to match advertising spending of its competitors 
to prevent a drop in sales even if such a strategy is not Pareto efficient (Tirole, 1994). 
Profit maximizing ratio of advertisement expenditures to sales is just a ratio of the 
elasticity of demand with respect to advertising to the elasticity demand by price 
(Dorfman and Steiner, 1954), i.e. companies must spend a lot on advertising if 
demand is sensitive to commercials.  
North American biopharmaceutical R&D totalled $55.2 billion with over 
70% accounted by the US in 2006 (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2007).  Given that the 
US pharmaceutical market is less pricewise regulated and the world‘s largest one, 
firms around the globe aspire to patent their best new drugs in the US. In this regard, 
the situation with R&D expenditures and new drugs in the US can be illustrative 
(Graph 1.2). This trend depicts so-called innovation productivity paradox that 
growing R&D has little effect on number of innovative drugs: ―A decline in 
productivity has been evident since the mid-1990s‖ (OECD Health, 2008, p.12).  
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It is difficult to measure pharmaceutical innovations because the majority of 
patents issued were based on failed drug candidates or drugs with little chemical 
innovation or therapeutic impacts, i.e. me-too drugs. The literature often uses 
approved New Chemical Entities (NCEs) as a proxy for the resulted pharmaceutical 
innovations. As with R&D expenditures, the number of NCEs is also imperfect: 
Barral (2004) evaluated 1460 NCEs launched in the G7 countries between 1975 and 
2002 and found that the majority of NCEs had a known chemical structure and only 
about 10% offered an improvement in chemical structure and therapeutical impact. 
Me-too drugs are a global phenomenon. According to some estimations 
(Bartfai and Lees, 2006, p.15), there were only 433 major chemical entities out of 
more than ten thousand registered drugs in 2002. Indeed, out of more than 50,000 
marketed drugs, the WHO classifies only 325 active ingredients (Blech 2006, p.129).  
Only 14 percent of all new chemical entities were therapeutically superior to existing 
drugs from 1997 to 2006 (Prescrire International, 2007). In Canada, only 5% of 
drugs introduced from 1996 to 2000 offered substantially better therapy (Mintzes and 
Lexchin, 2005, e.22). According to the Canadian Patented Medicine Prices Review 
Board, only 5.9% of reviewed drugs were classified as giving substantial therapeutic 
improvements in British Columbia between 1990 and 2003 (Morgan, et al. 2005).  
Mintzes and Lexchin (ibid, e.22) also cites an evaluation of La Revue 
Prescrire‘s of all new drugs and indications in France for the period 1981- 2000. This 
evaluation concluded that out of over 2,000 medicines introduced in France from 
1981 to 2000, 63% of drugs offered no therapeutic advance. In general, different 
organizations with somewhat different methods concluded that during the past four 
decades only approximately 11–15 percent of NCEs have been therapeutically 
superior (Light, 2009). According to one estimation (Bartfai and Lees, 2006, p.116), 
most of 20 best selling medicine were me-too drugs in 1985-2000.  
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The number of NCEs approved by FDA was mostly in range between 10 and 
30 between 1950 and 1995 (Cerda 2007, p.476). Rate of NCEs approval is more or 
less steady, though can vary essentially in the short run (Cockburn, 2004). The most 
likely is that ―the number of new chemical entities is relatively stable in the last 65 
years‖ (Pattikawa, 2007, p.37). However, Scherer (2007, p.5) claims that there was a 
significant upward time trend in the average number of FDA approved new chemical 
entities for the period 1970-2005. Schmid and Smith (2005) see only a fluctuation, a 
temporal slowdown in productivity and they claim that there is a steady upward trend 
in the number of priority reviewed drugs in the US for the period 1939-2004. Schmid 
and Smith assert that innovation deficit is just a myth as the rate of new drug 
applications is high and appears to be increasing. The problem of their study is that 
no proper filtering of fluctuations was applied before extracting a time trend.   
 
Graph 2. Trends in R&D and priority NCEs in the US 
Source: data for R&D costs obtained from PhRMA association web site, data for priority NCE  
drugs are obtained from the Center for Drug Evaluation (CDER) and research web site 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/rdmt/, data for 2005-2007 were calculated based on the annual data  
provided by the CDER web site. CDER is the US government agency that regulates and monitors  
the pharmaceutical research.  
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new drugs has been roughly the same in aggregate and at the level of several leading 
companies in spite of the rapid increase in R&D expenditures. Munos partly blames 
the current R&D business model for this stagnation and proposes an open-source 
R&D model. It seems that scientific progress does not develop exponentially in 
pharmaceuticals as firms are moving out of risky R&D projects into minor 
innovations promoted by high marketing expenditures.  
The number of new molecular entity drugs under priority review of the US 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) were at about the same rate of 11.6 per year 
for the period 1990-2007 in spite of exponential growth of R&D expenditures (Table 
1.3). A 40-year R&D productivity trend shows an even more pessimistic picture 
(Graph 1.3) of declining productivity in terms of the number of NCEs per R&D 
dollar since the 1980s. The share of NMEs was below 48% in total for the US in the 
period 1990-2007 and in the last five years this share was less than 30%.  
 
Graph 3. Long run stagnation of the pharmaceutical R&D productivity in the US 
 
Source: estimations based on the data of Joseph A. DiMasi, The Economics of New Drug 
Development: Costs, Risks, and Returns, The New England Drug Metabolism Group, available at 
www.nedmdg.org/docs/2008/joseph-dimasi-spring-2008.ppt, accessed on November 1, 2010. 
 
If one assumes a twelve-year drug development lag, the ratio of new drug applications to 
R&D costs had been decreasing in the US after 1975 (Pattikawa, 2007, p.42). This trend 
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is even worse as about 69% of new chemical entities registered between 1975 and 
1999 had ―little or no therapeutic gain compared with what was already available‖ 
(Trouiller, Olliaro et al., 2002, p.2188). McIntyre (1999, p.81) even detects a decline 
in NCEs in the earlier period between 1957 and 1971.  
 
Table 1.3. Productivity of R&D expenditures for new molecular drugs in the US. 
Year 
Share of 
priority NME 
in total 
approvals, % 
Share of  
all NME in 
total 
approvals, % 
Total 
PhRMA 
R&D, billion 
US$ 
Total 
sales, 
billion 
US$ 
R&D to 
total 
PhRMA 
sales, % 
1990 18.75 35.94 8.40 58.33 14.4 
1991 22.22 47.62 9.71 66.54 14.6 
1992 12.09 28.57 11.45 73.84 15.5 
1993 18.57 35.71 12.76 75.06 17.0 
1994 20.97 35.48 13.43 77.61 17.3 
1995 10.98 34.15 15.20 91.04 16.7 
1996 13.74 40.46 16.86 101.58 16.6 
1997 7.44 32.23 18.96 110.85 17.1 
1998 17.78 33.33 20.93 124.61 16.8 
1999 22.89 42.17 22.62 145.96 15.5 
2000 9.18 27.55 26.10 161.08 16.2 
2001 10.61 36.36 29.83 178.60 16.7 
2002 8.97 21.79 31.05 192.83 16.1 
2003 12.50 29.17 34.48 208.95 16.5 
2004 15.04 27.43 37.12 230.56 16.1 
2005 16.88 23.38 39.89 236.04 16.9 
2006 5.88 17.65 43.54 254.61 17.1 
2007 8.70 18.84 44.53 271.52 16.4 
Note: NME – new molecular entity drug.  
Source: data for NME are obtained from FDA Center for Drug Evaluation and Research at 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ 
DrugandBiologicApprovalReports/NDAApprovalsbyTherapeuticPotentialandChemicalType/ 
default.htm, accessed on Apr 20, 2008; sales data the source is the US Pharmaceutical Research 
Manufactures of America Association (PhRMA), Pharmaceutical Industry: Profile 2008, at 
http://www.phrma.org/files/2008%20Profile.pdf.  
 
Surprisingly, the biotechnological revolution has not changed R&D 
productivity (PWC, 2010, pp.2,7):  
- average development times and development costs are about the same, and the 
overall success rate 9.1% versus 6.7% for a small molecule;  
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- most drug candidates (74%) of biotech failed at phase III trials (see the detailed 
discussion in Attachment 1).   
Hollis (2004) argues that me-too drugs must be constrained by regulations, 
e.g. by stopping their registration after a certain period so that R&D is channelled 
into innovative drugs. It is not clear whether such measures could directly target 
some market or government failures. It is better to let the market decide while efforts 
of regulators are concentrated on full information disclosure.  
The industry as well as some literature point out that me-too drugs are a 
natural process of R&D. Perez (2010, p.187) generally emphasizes the importance of 
incremental innovations in technological progress after radical innovations. 
Wertheimer, Levy et al.( 2001) argue that me-too drugs fit to a variety of patients‘ 
needs, increase competition, and help to develop breakthrough drugs both through 
increasing technological capacity and via a cash flow for R&D. Jena, Calfee et al. 
(2009) argue that demand for me-too drugs is not affected by price decrease on the 
pioneering drug after its patent expiration for five major classes of drugs, which 
implies that me-too drugs have own market segment.  
 
Possible explanations for the productivity paradox  
To address R&D and marketing challenges, pharmaceutical firms respond with 
horizontal mergers to pool their R&D portfolios and risks, and to control distribution 
channels (Pazderka and Stegemann, 2006). There is a hope that innovation stagnation 
could be overcome with new portfolio management of drug targets, automatic testing, 
bioinformatics, genomics, and rational molecular design of drugs for specific targets. 
However, according to Pisano (2006), most of these methods are hampered by high 
technological complexities and inadequate incentives for knowledge integration.  
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It seems that drug innovations are stalled by the lack of fundamental 
knowledge about biological processes. Pamolli and Riccaboni (2007) attribute this 
phenomenon to rising attrition rates of drug candidates in phases II and III as they 
estimated the declining probability of success for the period 1990-2000. Paul, 
Mytelka, et al. (2010) also emphasize scientific problems with target validation and 
attrition rates in phase II and III clinical trials. Maybe more R&D is needed to get a 
new drug due to the increasing complexity of science. Harris (2001, p.35) points out 
that in general ―in the US, the patent/R&D ratio declined over the 1960-1990 period 
and of course productivity growth slowed‖. There is a drop in cumulative success 
rates from 14% to 8% (or one in 13 compounds entered preclinical trials) in drug 
R&D, especially in Phase III, and, as the result of this productivity decline, return on 
investment also decreased to 5% in 2000-2002 (Gilbert, Henske, et al. 2003).  
Pharmaceutical innovations are generated on the basis of a very limited scientific 
understanding and there is some satiation of these innovations based on this 
understanding (Pazderka and Stegemann, 2006).  
Cockburn (2006) points out such factors as inflation of R&D input costs and 
abandoning of drug candidates at late phases on economic grounds. Cockburn (2004) 
suggests that recent increases in R&D have been a response to the discoveries of 
thousands new targets and new biotechnology, which is becoming more complex. 
Cockburn suspects that sluggish R&D productivity can be rooted in 
commercialization of biotech science, which reduced information sharing, and in 
rising transaction costs of complex R&D contracts.  
Another explanation might be rooted in diverted incentives of R&D. 
Finkelstein and Temin (2008, p.131) state that ―the rate of new drug discovery has 
been falling. It is a sign of the dysfunction in a broken system‖. Cuatrecasas (2006) 
blames lack of leadership, pressure for fast returns from stakeholders, excessive 
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focus on blockbusters, and controls of R&D projects by marketing decisions. Hollis 
(2004) argues that me-too drugs reduce incentives for pioneering innovation by 
undermining effective patent protection of original breakthrough drugs, by absorbing 
R&D resources, and by increasing wasteful marketing. According to a study of 
McKinsey & Company (Booth and Zemmel, 2003) cited by PAREXEL (2004, p.72), 
three-quarters of blockbusters launched by top pharmaceutical companies during 
1991-2000 were against already clinically validated pharmacological targets and 
about 80% of blockbusters were comparable to the existing drugs on most attributes.  
The industry derives a rent from a lack of comparative information on similar 
drugs. Medical information about new drugs is mostly a commercial secret of the 
pharmaceutical companies, their sponsored publications are often positively biased, 
and some companies threaten independent researchers if negative information might 
be published about a product (Collier and Iheanacho, 2002).  Angel (2005), Light 
(2009) and others criticize the industry and its government regulators for systemic 
usage of placebo instead of alternative drugs in clinical trials and lack of comparative 
cost-efficacy information. Indeed, cost-effectiveness comparison of similar drugs is 
often not available to physicians (OECD Health Division 2008, p.19). In such 
information asymmetry, Finkelstein and Temin (2008, p.47) blame relaxed controls 
over advertisements introduced in the US in the late 1990s that made marketing a 
quite attractive substitute for R&D. 
The diverted incentives for R&D can be rooted in corporate management. 
Garnier (2008) sees a solution to the declining R&D productivity in better research 
project management through small scientist-led interdisciplinary team-centres with 
outsourcing. However, there could be more fundamental corporate problems. Firms 
have incentives to promote more chemical entities into Phase III to look more 
promising for investors and increase capitalization instead of the more publicly 
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efficient policy of dropping hopeless entities at earlier stages (PWCoopers 2007, p.9). 
Drug development time by far exceeds a typical four-year term of an executive in 
pharmaceutical companies, managers are seldom fully punished or rewarded for their 
invalidated decisions; the firm owners and investors can use only indirect measures 
of R&D performance such as the number of drug candidates in various phases; 
shareholders are mostly interested in short term stock prices, which might not reflect 
long run scientific issues (Bartfai and Lees, 2006, p.71). This short management 
horizon is exacerbated by the fact that approximately 80% of researchers retire or 
change their affiliation before a drug reaches the market (Gassmann, et al, 2008, 
p.56-57). In such conditions, managers can intentionally push drugs into further trials 
and prefer me-too drug development projects.  
Another explanation associated with the R&D race literature such as  Tirole 
(1994, pp.393-395) shows that a monopolist‘s profit from a patent is likely to be 
greater than the profit of a new entrant so that a monopolist prefers to maintain their 
own position through heavy investment in R&D. This leads to a patent race by 
increasing R&D to block a rival if a winner takes most of the market.  
One of the explanations of the productivity paradox could be the fact that 
companies do not adjust their R&D expenditures based on the aggregate share of 
NMEs on the market. One might expect that if currently there is a low number of 
NMEs, i.e. below the long term average, companies can respond with increased 
R&D to profit from such deficiency of innovative drugs. Next I check the hypothesis 
to determine whether R&D intensity (R&D to sales ratio) depends on the shares of 
new or priority molecular entities. I run a Granger (1969) causality test, which 
demonstrates whether a share of new molecular entities (X) helps in predicting R&D 
expenditures (Y). I use the bivariate Granger causality test, which helps to answer 
whether a share of new molecular entities (X) helps in predicting R&D expenditures 
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(Y), i.e. if knowledge of X is linearly informative about future values of Y.  It is said 
that X fails to Granger-cause Y if for all k>0 the mean squared error (MSE) of the 
forecast of      based on present and past values of Y is the same as the MSE of the 
forecast based on both present and past values of X and Y, i.e. if 
 [    |           ]   [    |                       ] for a given history of 
length s. Granger test assumes that if X helps to forecast Y, it must precede Y. The 
test is run as an OLS regression of      values on present and past values of X and Y, 
i.e. using autoregressive specification, and then using F-test to check if the 
corresponding coefficients for the lagged values of X are zero. However, the test is 
valid only asymptotically, it cannot generally infer the direction of causality between 
X and Y (Hamilton, 1994, pp.305-308).  
I have checked to determine whether the series for the Granger causality test 
are stationary with the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. Under the Null hypothesis of 
presence of a unit root, I obtained the following Dickey-Fuller test statistics with the 
corresponding p-values given in the brackets: 
RDS (share of R&D expenditures to the total PhRMA sales): -3.7182 (0.0513) 
SHPRNME (share of priority new molecular entity in total): -4.2811 (0.0229) 
SHNME (share of new molecular entity in total approvals): -5.4546 (0.0023) 
Based on these statistics, I reject the null hypothesis of unit root for SHPRNME and 
SHNME at 1% significance level and also reject the null for RDS at 10% level.   
Then I used several lags s from three to five years, with five as the maximum 
possible given the relatively short time series available (Table 1.4).  
 Based on the low F-statistics of the tests I failed to reject the nulls of no 
Granger causality between these three series, i.e. there is no Granger causality 
between the shares of a new or priority molecular entities and R&D to sales ratio. 
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Therefore I conclude that it is unlikely that the R&D intensity in the US industry is 
guided by the share of new or priority molecular entities.  Based on the low F-
statistics of the tests I failed to reject the nulls of no Granger causality between these 
three series, i.e. there is no Granger causality between the shares of a new or priority 
molecular entities and R&D to sales ratio. Therefore I conclude that it is unlikely that 
the R&D intensity in the US industry is guided by the share of new or priority 
molecular entities.   
 
Table 1.4. Results of Granger causality tests for shares of new molecular drugs 
 Lag s=5 Lag s=4 Lag s=3 
The Null hypothesis: F-Statistic F-Statistic F-Statistic 
SHNME does not Granger Cause RDS 
 
1.884  
(0.382) 
1.157 
(0.428) 
1.538 
(0.278) 
RDS does not Granger Cause SHNME  0.620  
(0.712) 
0.846 
(0.552) 
1.144 
(0.389) 
SHPRNME does not Granger Cause RDS 0.746 
(0.658) 
0.413 
(0.794) 
0.406 
(0.753) 
RDS does not Granger Cause SHPRNME 1.876 
(0.383) 
0.144 
(0.958) 
0.600 
(0.633) 
SHPRNME does not Granger Cause 
SHNME 
6.074 
(0.147) 
0.302 
(0.866) 
0.173 
(0.912) 
SHNME does not Granger Cause 
SHPRNME 
0.33820 
(0.8579) 
1.005 
(0.484) 
2.150 
(0.172) 
Number of observations 13 14 15 
Note: the series are presented in the Table 1.4. SHPRNME - share of priority new 
molecular entity in total approvals; SHNME - share of new molecular entity in total 
approvals; RDS – share of R&D expenditures to the total PhRMA sales. P-values are 
given in the brackets.  
 
It is possible that pharmaceutical regulations exacerbate the problem. Price 
controls might not fit into higher risks and costs of developing innovative drugs and 
instead reward firms‘ strategy of minor innovations. For example, price controls in 
France and Japan effectively stimulate imitative research strategy as me-too drugs are 
less costly for R&D; in Japan drug prices are purchased at discount from the initial 
price so that manufacturers must invent new drugs, often with minor innovation, to 
obtain better prices (Danzon, 1997, pp.45, 49, 51). Some authors blame 
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pharmaceutical regulations, especially in Europe, for the productivity decline. For 
example, Reuben and Burstall (2005) claim that in Europe ―negative attitudes prevail 
toward science‖ (ibid, p.xi) and that ―A decline in products from Europe is the source 
of the discovery deficit‖ (ibid, p.v), and the European industry will move to the US. I 
will consider the arguments of similar claims in the section 1.3 in detail.   
 
1.3. Effects of pharmaceutical regulations on innovations 
 
The industry has a large number of stakeholders (including doctors, pharmacists, 
patients, health care organizations, producing firms, researchers, medical insurance 
firms, taxpayers) and is a serious political concern in many countries. There is a wide 
consensus that the government must stipulate information disclosure, health and 
safety controls, provide R&D subsidies, establish government procurement for some 
deprived consumers and prevent epidemics and secure intellectual property rights to 
enable a return on innovations.  
 Normally regulations must remedy market failures or serve some 
normative/ethical purposes. Usually reasons for regulations in the industry are 
grouped as follows (Puig-Junoy 2005, pp.36-39):  
- High information asymmetries between the producer and prescriber as doctors often 
lack objective information on new drugs.  
- Moral hazard problems on the side of doctors and patients due to health insurance. 
For instance, in the US, 84% of patient services and 70% of the cost of drugs are paid 
by insurers (National Center for Health Statistics cited in Schwitzer (2006, p.7)).  
- Health externalities, e.g. epidemics. 
- The oligopolistic nature of many therapeutic submarkets.   
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In 1993, the European Union established the European Medicines Evaluation 
Agency (EMEA) to provide a single European regulation and medicine approval 
authority and a rational use of medicine. However, member states often pursue own 
regulations and independently negotiate prices with firms (Schwitzer, 2006, 
pp.241,246-248).  Mossialos et al (2004, pp.15,31) point to the large variation of 
reimbursement and positive lists for drugs in the EU and that savings from a cost-
containing policy is often short-lived. Permanand and Altenstetter (2004, p.52) claim 
that political reasons prevent unification of the EU pharmaceutical market. 
Major regulations in the OECD countries include reference pricing, cost-
sharing requirements, generic substitution, prescribing budgets for physicians, the 
government-industry price-volume agreements, and profit controls (OECD Health 
Division 2008, p.13). The most controversial regulation in the EU is related to cost 
containment measures, which are usually justified by balancing monopolistic power 
of firms with patented drugs by monopsonistic power of (state) health insurance. 
Newhouse (2004) argues that it is impossible to set a drug price which would both 
maximize current consumer surplus and future surplus from pharmaceutical 
innovation so that a compromise is needed. This compromise varies across countries.  
Major cost containment measures in the EU (Puig-Junoy 2005, pp.40-49): 
- Direct price controls, price (index) increase caps (e.g. cost based prising in Spain).  
- Reference pricing when price of a drug cannot exceed the same price (e.g. the 
average or the minimum) on the similar pharmaceutical active components in other 
markets, i.e. Germany, Canada, Spain, Greece, Portugal and Luxemburg, Portugal 
stipulates the lowest price on the same drug observed in Spain, France and Italy.  
- Prices are negotiated by state health insurance agencies based on an economic 
evaluation of therapeutic contributions of drugs (Australia, Belgium, Finland, France, 
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Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland). The problem with this regulation is the high 
costs of estimations of therapeutic contributions of a drug.  
- Firms‘ profit controls, for example, stipulation of a cap of 21% rate of return on 
capital for firms (adopted mainly in the UK).   
- Mandatory generic substitution (e.g. Norway, Denmark).   
- Positive/negative formularies usually to exclude expensive drugs.  
- Ad hoc purchase agreements with companies (Austria, France, Spain, and Sweden).  
- Budgetary caps on physicians/pharmacists (Germany, UK).   
- Large co-payments for life-style drugs (Germany).  
 Puig-Junoy (2005, pp.49-53) states that price regulations often lack 
transparency, have insufficient incentives for cost reduction, are rigid to patients‘ 
needs, and may divert R&D. The regulations might be motivated by protectionism as 
price regulation helps to survive to domestic less competitive firms (Pamolli and 
Riccaboni 2007, p.178). Reference prices are often set as a result of a bargain 
between drug patent holders and national health insurances without rigorous 
considerations to cost-benefit analysis (McGuire, et al, 2004).  
Church and Ware (2000, pp.855-856) summarize the problems of price cap 
regulations: (i) possibility of mis-targeting of the cap, which can lead to allocative 
inefficiency, (ii) the regulator must monitor and properly adjust the cap, (iii) it 
prohibits the entry of a product with high costs and this creates an incentive to reduce 
quality. Some authors argue that rate of return regulation is an inefficient measure as 
drug prices in the UK and this regulation gives the wrong incentives for 
overinvestment in capital and R&D, for cross-subsidies between various drugs, and 
higher administrative costs (Mrazek and Mossialos, 2004).  
Mossialos (1997) points out such problems as the lack of transparency in 
confidential individual negotiations with each firm, risks of regulatory capture, 
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transfer pricing and other manipulations for costs and revenue shifting. In the US, the 
industry ―works diligently to develop and influence government rules on safety, 
efficacy, and marketing to its advantage‖ (Finkelstein and Temin, 2008, p.39). There 
are also methodological problems on what to include and how to monitor costs of 
drug creation and production (Drummond, et al. 1997).   
Danzon (1997, pp.13,21-22, 26, 38-41) argues that cost based regulation is 
fundamentally arbitrary and open to political abuse and transfer pricing. Danzon also 
concludes that drug budgets on physicians are the strongest measure of controls, but 
it may lead to the substitution of quality drugs by cheaper analogues and the 
avoidance of patients with high cost diseases.  
The regulations may not address the problem at its root, which is rather 
information assymtery about drugs‘ quality. Review of medical literature shows that 
out of 45 known studies on drug treatments, one-third was then proved to be 
incorrect (PriceWaterHouseCoopers, 2007).  Analysing 24 articles with 
pharmaceutical advertisements in medical journals, Othman, Vitry, et al. (2009) 
conclude that about one-third of all the articles had at least one unsupported claim. 
Allan, Lexchin et al. (2007) analysing 24 studies related to costs of drugs found that 
physicians were not well aware of the costs of their prescription drugs.  
Pharmaceutical companies seldom conduct trials to rank their drugs among other 
therapies (Schwitzer, 2006, p.36) appropriating information rent. Some authors 
(McGuire, Drummond et al., 2004) support the idea that cost-efficiency comparisons 
of drugs, though administratively expensive, can potentially substitute many ad-hoc 
regulations with a cost-effectiveness analysis across the EU as a consistent regulatory 
method for reimbursement. Though such practice is expanding, especially in 
Germany, Netherlands and the UK, current price regulations have negative side 
effects.  
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Negative impacts of price controls   
The limitation of drug purchase can increase other health spending. Gaynor, 
Li et al. (2007) have found that increases in co-payments in the US reduces 
consumption and expenditures on prescription drugs, but increases in demand for 
outpatient care, which diminish savings from the drug expenditure reduces by one-
third.  
There are some unclear estimations of Conover (2004, p.15), who claims that 
even in the least regulated pharmaceutical market of the US, the cost of health 
services regulation exceeds $339.2 billion, and 22,000 Americans die every year 
from health services regulation. Specifically, the FDA regulations impose $49 billion 
in annual cost on society mostly through longer approval times. 
Some studies have found a great deal of sensitivity of R&D in respect to drug 
prices. Golec and Vernon (2004) argue that cheaper drug imports from Canada to the 
US would entail damages worth $ 8 trillion because of a reduction of domestic US 
sales. Giaccotto, Santerre et al. (2005) found R&D intensity elasticity of 0.58 by the 
price so that R&D expenditures rise with inflation-adjusted drug prices. They 
concluded that had the US government introduced a price control to keep 
pharmaceutical prices in line with the consumer price index (CPI) in 1980-2001, 
there would have been about one third less R&D and new drugs.  
Golec and Vernon (2006) assuming that EU price controls are responsible for 
keeping drug prices at the level of consumer price inflation, they estimated that EU 
price regulations cost approximately  $5 billion less in R&D spending, 46 fewer new 
medicines, and 1680 EU research jobs as more research is shifted from the EU to the 
US for the period 1986-2004.  
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It is argued that price controls lower R&D investment, slow down the  
introduction of new drugs, reduce EU R&D potential resulting in a jobs and talents 
flight from the EU to the US  and these outweigh any savings made through price 
controls (Gilbert and Rosenberg, 2004). Atun, Harvey, et al. (2006, pp.3, 9) 
concluded that pharmaceuticals is one of few industries where the EU has a 
competitive advantage, but it is diminishing despite the Lisbon Agenda of becoming 
the most competitive knowledge-based economy.   
Schwitzer (2006, pp.167, 239) noticed that three decades ago about two-
thirds of all pharmaceutical innovations took place in Europe, whereas it accounts for 
less than 40% at the present time. Schwitzer also states that reference pricing in 
Canada is responsible for the fact that there is no a single major research 
pharmaceutical firm there. The European industry association points to lower 
European R&D expenditures as a consequence of tight price regulations. European 
industry spent €22.5 billion on R&D in 2006 compared to €27 billion in the US, 
whereas in 1990, the EU accounted for €7.76 billion and the US only for €5.34 
billion. For the period 1990-2006, R&D expenditures increased five-fold in the US, 
whereas in EU they increased 2.9 times. Since 2002, the IMS Health data indicate 
that two-thirds of sales of new drugs were generated in the US compared with a 
quarter in the EU. In 2001-2005, the US companies invented approximately 41%, the 
EU – 34.2%, Japan – 15.4%, and other regions – only 9.4% of all new chemical and 
biological entities (EFPIA 2007, pp.4,10,17,20).  
The average global share of patents originated from the US was more than 
twice as high (57.4%) than from the EU-25 countries (24.7%) granted in the US from 
1995 to 2005. A three-year moving average global share of NMEs increased from 
30% in 1995 to 53% in 2005 in the US, while in Western Europe this share droped 
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from 30% to 10% for the same period (Pamolli and Riccaboni, 2007, pp. 
127,130,133). 
According to EFPIA data, ―for medicines containing a new substance and 
reaching the market between 1995 and 2000, first marketing in Europe occurred, on 
average, one year later than in the United States‖ (cited by PAREXEL, p.280).  
Average drug launch delays between the US and EU-25 countries was 17 months and 
more than two years between US and Japan over the period 1994-2004 (Pamolli and 
Riccaboni, 2007). Kyle (2007) concluded that price controls delay launching new 
drugs, especially in European markets that stipulate lowest reference pricing.  
 
The negative effects of price regulations in the EU are not resolute  
The amount of R&D does not necessarily reflect its quality. Europe was ahead of the 
US by global NCEs approved between 1982 and 2003, although the European share 
in world‘s NCEs was declining. In terms of NCEs per R&D expenses, Europe 
catches up with the US productivity and was even ahead in global NCEs in the 
period 1993-2003 (Light 2009, w.969-73).  
The effect of R&D productivity is not that clear either. Australia with its tight 
pharmaceutical controls was more efficient than the US in terms of generating 
priority patent filings per R&D spent in 1990-2003, although the US was mostly 
more efficient than other major countries (Pharmaceutical Industry Competitiveness 
Task Force 2005, pp.48-51). Spain, one of the most regulated pharmaceutical 
markets in the world, had a better R&D productivity than UK in 1990-2007 and than 
the US in 1992-2001 as measured by the ratio of the global share of priority patent 
filings to the global share of industry R&D (The Association of the British 
Pharmaceutical Industry 2009, p.25).  
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According to Civan and Maloney (2009, p.13) the number of drugs in the 
development for a medical condition has strong positive association with price: Price 
elasticity for the number of drugs ranged from 0.28 to 0.51 by drug class in the US. 
The major problem of these estimations is that authors use several endogenous 
regressors that essentially reflect demand such as number of existing drugs for a 
condition and their prices. In addition, firms can strategically lower prices to deter 
rival R&D attracted by high prices. The authors also used morbidity as reported by 
the WHO in ―underdeveloped‖ countries with unspecified classification.  
The problem of Golec and Vernon‘s (2006) estimations is that they use a 
simple OLS regression of firms‘ sales to assets on the US and EU price indexes and 
based their estimations on the negative sign of the coefficient for EU price index. 
The estimation of this coefficient can be biased if important variables, such as 
financial sector development, tax rates, and specific R&D subsidies are omitted from 
the regression. For example, the US and UK financial systems are based on the Stock 
Exchange, but continental Europe has a bank-based system.  
It is possible that price controls do not really work. Price controls failed to 
control drug expenditures growth in France, Germany, Italy, and the UK in 1970-
1990. In countries where physicians had incentives to prescribe, price controls were 
unlikely to work, which also led to significantly higher physical drug consumption in 
France, Italy and Germany (Danzon, 1997).  
Price controls might not be effective in achieving generic substitution. For 
example, generics represented 43% of all prescriptions in the United States in 1998, 
40% in Canada in 1996–97, about half of all prescriptions in Denmark and Finland, 
40% in Germany and the Netherlands, and 69% in the United Kingdom. Their share 
is still low in France (just over 3%), Belgium and Switzerland (Pazderka and 
Stegemann, 2006).  
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Is Europe lagging behind due to overregulation of pharmaceuticals? I test the 
hypothesis that R&D intensity is both independent from the concentration of sales 
(degree of oligopolization) and the stringency of national price regulations. I run an 
independence test for the relationship between stringency of pharmaceutical price 
regulations and R&D ratios to sales and to assets of pharmaceutical firms for 11 
countries (Table 1.5) using Pearson chi-squared and likelihood-ratio tests. 
 
Table 1.5. Some country characteristics of health care systems that affect  
access to medicine. 
Characteristics Australia Canada France Germany Italy 
Speed of approval 2 2 1 1 1 
Complexity of reimbursement 
procedure 
 
3 
 
3 
 
2 
 
2 
 
3 
Downward pressure on  
launch prices 
 
3 
 
3 
 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
Conditional/limited 
reimbursement 
3 2 2 2 2 
Level of generic penetration Medium High Low High Low 
Using pharmacoeconomics in 
reimbursement decision 
Yes 
in provin-
ces 
possible possible 
some 
drugs 
Share of population covered 
by medical insurance 
1 2 1 1 2 
Level of copayment 1 1 1 1 1 
Capped budgets for general 
practitioners 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
2 
 
1 
Influencing of general 
practitioners prescribing 
1 2 1 2 1 
Capped profit or sales rebates No possible Yes No Yes 
Private market for lifestyle 
drugs 
1 ? 1 ? ? 
Direct to consumer advertising 
allowed 
No No No No No 
Stringency of price regulations 3 3 2 2 2 
Median R&D to sales 0.297 .524 .207 .096 .103 
Median R&D to assets 0.087 .164 .158 .077 .085 
Concentration of top three 
product sales in the top 
hundred therapeutic classes, % 
? 79.4 78.18 58.87 71.49 
Note: ranking is given on scale from 1 (unlikely to significantly affect access to medicine) to 
3 (high potential for impact on access); ? – not known, na – not applicable.  
Source: the first 14 rows are adopted from The Pharmaceutical Industry Competitiveness 
Task Force (2005, p.14). The second, third and fourth rows from the bottom are my 
estimations for the median at the country level based on Orbis
 
dataset of firms for the period 
1997-2007. The last row are data from Pammolli and Riccaboni (2007, p.175).  
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Table 1.5. Some country characteristics of health care systems that affect  
access to medicine (continued). 
 
Characteristics Japan Nether
lands 
Sweden Swiss UK US 
Speed of approval 3 1 1 1 1 1 
Complexity of 
pricing/reimbursement 
procedure 
2 2 2 2 na na 
Downward pressure on launch 
prices 
1 2 1 1 na na 
Conditional/limited 
reimbursement 
1 3 1 1 2 3 
Level of generic penetration Low High Low Low High High 
Using pharmacoeconomics in 
pricing or reimbursement 
decision 
Not 
often 
some 
drugs 
Yes 
some 
times 
Indir
ectly 
No 
Share of population covered by 
medical insurance 
1 1 1 1 1 3 
Level of copayment 1 1 1 1 1 3 
Capped budgets for general 
practitioners 
1 1 1 1 2 1 
Influencing of general 
practitioners prescribing 
1 2 2 1 3 2 
Capped profit or sales rebates No No No No Yes No 
Private market for lifestyle 
drugs 
3 ? 2 1 3 1 
Direct to consumer advertising 
allowed 
No No No No No Yes 
Stringency of price regulations 1 2 1 1 2 1 
Median R&D to sales .084 .052 .714 .127 .179 .431 
Median R&D to assets .057 .064 .182 .067 .115 .169 
Concentration of top three 
product sales in the top hundred 
therapeutic classes, % 
78.25 86.24 91.60 ? 90.20 85.56 
Note: ranking is given on scale from 1 (unlikely to significantly affect access to medicine) to 
3 (high potential for impact on access); ? – not known, na – not applicable.  
Source: the first 14 rows are adopted from The Pharmaceutical Industry Competitiveness 
Task Force (2005, p.14). The second, third and fourth rows from the bottom are my 
estimations for the median at the country level based on Orbis
 
dataset of firms for the period 
1997-2007. The last row are data from Pammolli and Riccaboni (2007, p.175).  
 
The null hypothesis is that stringency of price regulations and median R&D 
to sales and assets are unrelated, i.e. they are only randomly related. I failed to reject 
the null: Pearson chi2 = 33.0 with probability = 0.32, and likelihood-ratio chi2 =  
29.53 with probability = 0.49. The same results of no association are obtained for 
sales‘ concentration and R&D intensity indicators. The result does not change even if 
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UK price regulation is categorized at level one similar to the stringency of regulation 
in the US. Although the sample is small, it is unlikely that stricter price regulation of 
pharmaceuticals decrease median R&D intensity of the national firms. 
Some evidence suggests that tighter regulatory standards may actually 
improve the quality of innovation. For example, Jacobzone (2000, p.18) suggests 
high regulatory standards force innovating firms to target their R&D on drugs of 
superior efficacy. Katz (2007) points out that regulation certifies drug quality and 
this serves as an important signal for consumers to trust drugs and demand them even 
at a high price.  
 
1.4. Estimates of technical production inefficiencies in the industry and  
their association with stringency of national regulations 
 
This section estimates production efficiency following the methodology of stochastic 
efficiency frontier models to assess impacts of pharmaceutical regulations on 
production efficiency in the industry. The section estimates the technical inefficiency 
for the dataset of pharmaceutical firms in eight major producer countries. The 
estimated inefficiencies are then assessed against pharmaceutical regulations in those 
countries. Fried, Lovell, et al. (2008) have reviewed over 200 industrial applications 
of production efficiency analysis in just a few years, but I have found no research 
addressing technical inefficiency in the global pharmaceutical industry in connection 
with national regulations.  
The pharmaceutical industry is crucially dependent on patents, brands, 
reputation, and access to distribution channels, i.e. intangible assets. R&D alliances, 
know-how, knowledge accumulated in chemical libraries and the number of patients 
using a particular company‘s drugs are important determinants of operating revenue 
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(Schwitzer, 2006). Pharmaceutical regulations can affect value and productive ability 
of these intangible assets, but international comparison of the regulation on technical 
efficiency in the industry has not yet been systemically attempted in the literature.  
Intangible assets include legally protected rights such as patents, licences, 
copyrights, royalty agreements, goodwill, industrial designs, trademarks, trade names 
and customer lists. The share of intangible fixed assets in total fixed assets in the 
selected pharmaceutical producing countries is significant: from one-fifth or a 
quarter of all fixed assets. The most important intangible assets in the pharmaceutical 
industry are patents: about two thirds of all pharmaceutical inventions would not 
have been commercialized in the absence of patent protection (Mansfield, 1986). 
Patents are a leading factor in research management and are often filed to block 
rivals by building a patent wall around their own drugs to sustain their own market 
share; they are also used as collateral - brand boosters, as a leverage in research 
partnerships, but it is very difficult to value them (Rivette and Kline, 2000). A study 
of the BTG International company (1998) (cited by Rivette and Kline (2000, p.59)) 
found that more than two-thirds of intellectual property rights were not exploited by 
the US firms.   
However, ―About half, probably more, of all patented inventions in the 
United States are never commercially exploited‖ (Sichelman, 2010, p.341). 
According to a Report for the EU Commission (Gambardella, Giuri et al. 2006, pp.II-
IV), about one third of the European patents are not used for any industrial or 
commercial purpose and about half of the unused patents are ―blocking‖ patents to 
prevent rivals from using the technology.  This Report finds chemical and 
pharmaceuticals industries have one of the high shares of unused patents.  
A 1998 survey of 150 technology-intensive firms and research universities in 
the United States, Western Europe and Japan conducted by the British Technology 
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Group (BTG) found that 12% of the organizations had more than a thousand 
unutilised patents and only 15% of entities reported no unutilised patents. 
Approximately 30% of Japanese firms reported having more than 2000 unused 
patents (cited by Kamiyama, Sheehan et al. (2006, p.9)). A survey of about 6,700 
Japanese firms found that more than 60% of Japanese patents were not being used at 
all (Japan Patent Office, 2004).  For example, Siemens and Procter & Gamble 
reported that they do not directly use about 90% of their patent portfolios (Alexy, 
Criscuolo et al., 2009). 
One of the more comprehensive surveys of business patenting by American 
and Japanese firms (Cohen, et al., 2002) found that the top reasons for patenting 
innovations were preventing of copying, patent blocking of research of other firms, 
and preventing lawsuits, whereas licensing revenue was mentioned by less than one 
third of respondents (Cohen, et al. 2002). According to PAREXEL (2004, p.47) 
referring to a Merck study, the share of revenues derived from patent licensing for 
leading pharmaceutical companies varied from 0 to 40%. Firms hesitate to sell or 
license unexploited patents as this could be an advantage to their competitors. A 
larger share of patents in total assets can also signal for larger entry barriers as 
patents might increase costs up to 40% for pharmaceutical firms, which may want to 
invent around a patent (Mansfield, Mark et al. 1981). 
Another problem affecting technical efficiency is building extra capacity to 
establish a market presence or to comply with reimbursement regulations. In some 
countries, e.g. Australia, Belgium, France, Hungary, and Spain, ethical drug prices 
are often negotiated ad-hoc between the national health insurance (government) and 
the firms based on their contribution to the national economy (Puig-Junoy, 2005). 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2007, p.37) states that ―the industry is already suffering 
from overcapacity, with utilisation rates of less than 50% at some plants‖.  
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The problem of underutilized patents and excess capacity is exacerbated by 
price regulations. In some countries, regulation of inputs, e.g. rate of return on capital 
in the UK, distorts cost-minimizing choices and facilitates to overinvestment 
(Danzon 1997, p.65). Ekelund and Perrson (2003) comparing prices of NCEs in 
Sweden and the US between 1987 and 1997 concluded that price regulations limit 
price competition of branded drugs. The imposed price constraints limit the ability of 
firms to achieve production efficiency.  
The pharmaceutical industry is global and run by multinational companies 
that often employ transfer pricing to minimize tax liabilities and strategically locate 
their enterprises. However, it is usually the case that subsidiaries are run by their own 
relatively independent management who optimize production inputs given local 
regulations. Transportation costs of drugs, especially in the EU, are small in 
comparison to the unit price so that production (not R&D) location is determined 
mainly by access to the local markets. With the exception of China, the difference in 
production infrastructure, wage, and production skills in the sample of countries is 
not large (see detailed discussion on comparative advantage in Pammolli and 
Riccaboni, 2007). Unfortunately, most data on exports in the Orbis dataset are 
missing, however, for some countries, the average share of the pharmaceutical firms‘ 
domestic sales in the available sample is dominant: 89.94% for Austria, 89.47% for 
China, 86.14% for Finland, 77.28% for France, 64.13% for Germany, 94.44% for 
Japan, 87.32% for Spain so that local price regulations matter. In the US, the share of 
domestic R&D to R&D conducted abroad ranged from 8.5% to 24% between 1970 
and 2009 and the share of domestic sales in total was about 35% from 1997 to 2009 
(PhRMA, 2010, pp. 44,50).  
I assume that all firms located in a country employ the same production 
technology and can use similar corporate management tactics. In other words I 
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assume that all firms likewise optimize production inputs under common national 
regulations. Under these assumptions, which might be quite restrictive, I can use the 
same type of production function for all firms in the countries considered.  
I test the hypothesis that greater technical inefficiency in the use of inputs in 
production is associated with stricter price regulations at national level. I estimate 
technical inefficiency at firm level for each country assuming a similar production 
function and using several econometric specifications for the stochastic frontier 
analysis. The estimated inefficiency levels then tested for independence from the 
national level of stringency of price regulations.  
 
Methodology  
The mathematical programming approach of data envelopment analysis (DEA) is not 
used in this section as it produces large inefficiency measures in the presence of 
productivity outliers, which might be caused by drug price shocks. Such shocks are 
possible under oligopolistic competition and the entrance of generics that usually 
lead to rapid price decline, but data on detailed price and commodity compositions 
for each firm are not available.   
 The major estimation approach is based on stochastic frontier models, which 
were first developed by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977). In this approach the 
disturbance term consists of two components: Usually symmetrically distributed 
idiosyncratic error component    and strictly positive technical inefficiency 
component   . T The distributions of both components are assumed (stipulated) to 
enable (quasi-) maximum likelihood estimations.  
Following the literature, the technical efficiency (     for i-th firm is defined 
as a ratio of the actual output y of the firm to production possibility frontier     :  
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where   is a vector of factor inputs for a firm i. In logarithm form: 
                                         
where      is a measure of technical inefficiency. If    is zero then    equals one, 
and production is assumed to be technically efficient. Technical efficiency of the i-th 
firm is therefore a relative measure of its output to the maximum achievable output at 
the given technology (Lovell, 1993). In other words, a firm produces less than it 
could make given its inputs if the firm were located on the technological frontier and 
this distance (multiplier) to the frontier is defined as technical inefficiency. In the 
specification above, the technical inefficiency term is scaled:          If     , 
the firm is located on the technological frontier. Both idiosyncratic and technical 
inefficiency terms are assumed to be i.i.d. and independent of each other and factor 
inputs of the model. The technical inefficiency term is usually truncated at zero and 
normally distributed, and the idiosyncratic term is assumed with zero mean. 
 The production at firm level can be written for the panel data (Greene, 2005): 
      
                 
where     is production of the i-th firm at time t,     is a disturbance with normal 
distribution      
  , and     |   |      shows deviation from the efficient frontier 
and is often assumed to be normally distributed       
  . Both    and    are 
assumed to be independently and identically distributed (i.i.d);     are factors of 
production, which might depend on time to account for technical change, and the 
time invariant component    accounts for unobservable heterogeneity not related to 
production. The     is referred to the inefficiency term and     is the idiosyncratic 
error and they both are assumed to be i.i.d. It is conventionally assumed in the 
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specification of production function that it is monotonically increasing in all factors 
of production with non-negative marginal products.  
The estimation is usually based on the maximum likelihood method that 
estimates the conditional expectation of the inefficiency      |    ,     =     - 
     developed by Jondrow et al. (1982). Usual assumptions on distribution of the 
technical inefficiency term are truncated normal     |   |,     ~       
     and 
exponential, though gamma, half normal are also widely used in the literature.  
The estimations have been conducted for the panel data of pharmaceutical 
firms for a number of countries that are leading research pharmaceutical producers, 
as well as China. In the time-invariant models, the inefficiency term     is considered 
to be independent of time. In all models the idiosyncratic     is assumed to be 
normally distributed. The random effect specification is used for the panel frontier 
estimations in this section.  
Greene (2004) notes that in time invariant models ui can absorb cross firm 
heterogeneity and this might cause some biased estimation for the inefficiency. In 
time effect models, technical inefficiency is postulated with some time dependent 
coefficient δ(t), sometimes called the decay parameter. There is a variety of models 
depending on specification of δ(t) multiplier and results depend on this choice.  In 
the popular Battese-Coelli (1992) model, which, however, does not incorporate 
varying inefficiencies due to business cycles, the inefficiency term uit is a truncated-
normal random variable multiplied by an exponentially changing function of time 
                           
        and the idiosyncratic term     is assumed to 
be i.i.d. normally distributed. If                         increases over time and 
reaches its highest (base) level in the last period, if                               .  
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Following the literature, I specify the production frontier function of inputs as 
the second order Taylor series approximation of the translog production function, 
which includes both linear and quadratic terms. This is the flexible functional form 
as translog allows changing partial elasticities of substitution between inputs and 
elasticities of scale with output and factors of production. To control for time trend, I 
added linear and quadratic time trend terms.  
The operating revenue (y) of a firm is chosen as the outcome. Omitting time t 
and firm i subscripts in the formula below, the stochastic production frontier function 
is represented as translog function of factor inputs of tangible fixed assets (ltanas), 
intangible fixed assets (linas), and number of employees (lemp): 
 
                                                                        
                
                        
                          
 
                 
                                                             
                                           
                      
 
If             and other coefficients are zero, the production function has 
constant returns to scale. The outcome and all factors are in a natural logarithm of 
their original level (Table 1.6).  For concave functions the Hessian matrix is negative 
semidefinite, which means that every principal minor of odd order is less than or 
equal to zero and every principal minor of even order is greater than or equal to zero, 
which is satisfied in all estimations. The estimated frontier production functions are 
then used to estimate the mean of technical inefficiency term     for each country 
based on assumed distributions of the inefficiency     and the idiosyncratic          .  
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Expected results and data. Pharmaceutical regulations impose additional 
restrictions on a revenue maximizing firm. As a result, firms might fail to achieve 
maximum technical efficiency depending on the constraints imposed by the 
regulatory authorities in a country.  
 
Table 1.6. Descriptive statistics of the logarithm of factor inputs 
Country statistics log 
(operating 
revenue) 
log(intangible 
fixed assets) 
log(tangible 
fixed assets) 
log(number 
of 
employees) 
Australia Observ. 
Mean 
St.Dev. 
191 
9.365  
3.453           
191 
8.406 
2.905 
191 
7.222 
2.833 
191 
4.613 
2.172 
France Observ. 
Mean 
St.Dev 
1034 
12.012 
1.661 
1034 
7.451 
2.847 
1034 
8.775 
2.351 
1034 
5.834 
1.605 
Germany Observ. 
Mean 
St.Dev 
534 
12.412 
2.210 
534 
8.625 
3.174 
534 
9.997 
   2.655 
534 
7.011 
2.060 
Japan Observ. 
Mean 
St.Dev 
415 
17.775  
1.820 
415 
12.859 
2.440 
415 
16.712 
1.842 
415 
7.205 
1.261 
Netherlands Observ. 
Mean 
St.Dev 
397 
12.368 
1.512 
397 
8.839 
2.875 
397 
9.457 
  2.404 
397 
5.861 
2.056 
Spain Observ. 
Mean 
St.Dev 
597 
18.187 
2.184 
597 
13.289 
3.045 
597 
15.318 
2.475 
597 
5.576 
1.298 
Sweden Observ. 
Mean 
St.Dev 
208 
13.093 
2.781 
208 
10.494 
2.774 
208 
10.557 
2.953 
208 
5.196 
1.796 
Switzerland Observ. 
Mean 
St.Dev 
123 
12.983 
2.792 
123 
10.881 
3.153 
123 
12.342 
2.181 
123 
7.608 
2.106 
UK Observ. 
Mean 
St.Dev 
1138 
11.401 
2.291 
1138 
9.034 
2.579 
1138 
9.393 
2.674 
1138 
5.885 
1.988 
USA Observ. 
Mean 
St.Dev 
2020 
10.182 
2.903 
2020 
9.601 
2.872 
2020 
8.916 
2.739 
2020 
5.574 
2.3202 
China Observ. 
Mean 
St.Dev 
539 
13.013 
1.296 
539 
10.144 
1.529 
539 
12.387 
1.147 
539 
7.282 
1.011 
In each cell the first quantity is the number of observations, the second is the mean, 
and the third one is the standard deviation.  
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I expect to see less inefficiency in the least price regulated markets and the highest 
inefficiencies in the countries with the most regulated markets. There should be a 
dependence between the technical inefficiency and stringency of regulation.  
 
Empirical results and discussion  
The data comes from the Orbis database (see Attachment 2 for the description). The 
estimated frontier production functions and the mean of the technical inefficiency are 
given in Attachment 3. Note that intangible assets have positive linear coefficients in 
the estimated production functions. Apart from firms in France, the frontier 
production functions are unlikely to have constant returns to scale property as 
demonstrated by the rejection of the corresponding Chi-squared test for the linear 
dependence of the coefficients (Attachement 3). To test the hypothesis of 
independence of technical inefficiency from the stringency of pharmaceutical price 
regulations I estimated the inefficiency terms (Table 1.7).  
The most liberal pharmaceutical price regimes in the UK and the US have the 
lowest inefficiency in the truncated normal time invariant random effect panel 
specification. American and British firms indeed could have less inefficiency as 
liberal pharmaceutical pricing facilitates to greater price difference between brand 
and generic drugs. This price difference then translates into greater revenue for firms 
that hold relevant patents. However, this result is not robust across other 
specifications for the inefficiency term, which might be for the following reasons. 
The Battese-Coelli time effects model imposes the same time trend for the 
inefficiency terms across all firms, which might be too restrictive for these 
estimations. Indeed, the majority of pharmaceutical firms‘ revenue comes from a few 
patented drugs with different expirations and market shares so that the intangible 
assets‘ quality can be highly heterogeneous.  
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Table 1.7. Summary of the mean technical inefficiency estimations. 
 Truncated 
normal 
time 
invariant 
 
Battese-
Coelli 
time 
effects 
 
Half-
normal 
distribution 
of 
inefficiency 
Exponential 
distribution 
of 
inefficiency 
 
Stringency 
of price 
regulations 
Concentration 
of top three 
product 
sales, %* 
Australia na .419 
(.283) 
na .593 
(.299) 
3 ? 
France .879 
(.160) 
.003 
(.003) 
.587 
(.245) 
.631 
(.264) 
2 78.2 
Germany .928 
(.078) 
.363 
(.251) 
.577 
(.321) 
.647 
(.269) 
2 58.9 
Japan .937 
(.091) 
.139 
( .084) 
.701 
(.235) 
.629 
(.339) 
1 78.3 
Netherlands .916 
(.089) 
.135 
(.121) 
.551 
(.268) 
.629 
(.269) 
2 86.2 
Spain .904 
(.127) 
.061 
(.087) 
.236 
(.278) 
.254 
(.298) 
3 75.9 
Sweden .877 
(.063) 
.184 
(.212) 
.987 
(.000) 
na 1 91.6 
Switzerland 0.938 
(.050) 
.006 
(.047) 
na .182 
(.244) 
1 ? 
UK .835 
(.202) 
.006 
(.047) 
.549 
(.180) 
.638 
(.193) 
1 90.2 
USA .772 
(.207) 
.052 
(.076) 
.638 
(.199) 
.721 
(0.171) 
1 85.6 
China .897 
(.132) 
.022 
(.029) 
.995 
(.000) 
na na 67.6 
Note: na – not available. Technical inefficiency estimated with random effect panel models. 
The means of the inefficiency terms and the corresponding standard errors are displayed in 
brackets. Truncated normal model assumes that the technical inefficiency uit is i.i.d. normally 
distributed with mean μ and truncation at zero; in the Battese-Coelli model, the inefficiency 
term uit is a truncated-normal random variable multiplied by the exponentially changing 
function of time              ; half-normal distribution of inefficiency uit  is i.i.d. normal 
with mean zero with truncation at zero; the exponential distribution of inefficiency uit  is i.i.d. 
exponentially distributed. In all models, the idiosyncratic disturbance vit is i.i.d. normally 
distributed with mean zero.  
The stringency of price regulatuions is adapted from from The Pharmaceutical Industry 
Competitiveness Task Force (2005, p.14). The concentration of sales are compiled from 
Pammolli and Riccaboni (2007, pp.169, 175) for the top three products in the top hundred 
ATC4 therapeutical classes for the period 1994-2004.    
 
 
However, this result is not robust across other specifications for the inefficiency term, 
which might be for the following reasons. Battese-Coelli time effects model imposes 
the same time trend for the inefficiency terms across all firms, which might be too 
restrictive for these estimations. Indeed, majority of pharmaceutical firms‘ revenue 
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comes from a few patented drugs with different expirations and market shares so that 
intangible assets‘ quality can be highly heterogeneous.  
Then I use two unconditional independence Pearson chi-squared and 
likelihood-ratio tests (Table 1.8). I failed to reject random associations between the 
stringency of price regulations and the measures of technical inefficiency or between 
technical inefficiency and concentration of sales.  The null hypothesis is that the 
series are unrelated, i.e. they are only randomly related. The policy implication of 
this result is that price regulations do not constrain firms from achieving the highest 
output given factor inputs.  
 
Table 1.8. Tests of independence of the mean technical inefficiency from the 
regulation index and concentration of sales 
Test Technical 
inefficiency of 
the truncated 
normal 
specification 
and regulation  
Technical 
inefficiency 
with time 
effect 
specification 
and regulation 
Technical 
inefficiency of 
the truncated 
normal 
specification 
and 
concentration 
of sales  
Technical 
inefficiency 
with time 
effect 
specification 
and 
concentration 
of sales 
Pearson chi-
squared 
2.64 
(0.85) 
7.38 
(0.28) 
11.88 
(0.45) 
10.0 
(0.26) 
 
Likelihood 
ratio 
3.54 
(0.73) 
7.27 
(0.29) 
12.5 
(0.41) 
7.49 
(0.48) 
 Note: The corresponding p-values are in brackets.  
 
The key methodological problem is that I do not observe the quality of patent 
portfolios. Evaluation of the patent quality for each firm is a quite complex task and 
requires a lot of detailed information such as market shares for specific drugs of 
every company, patent novelty and possibilities for reverse engineering. 
Time discounting of patents is also uncertain. The value of patents can 
sharply decrease if rivals innovate around and discover a better drug. For example, a 
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survey of about 50 European commercial banks (Kamiyama, Sheehan et al. 2006, 
p.20) found that none of them routinely accepts intangible assets as collateral for 
loans to new firms as the realization value of these assets is uncertain.  
One well-known accounting method to estimate intangible assets is to 
subtract the book value of tangible assets from the firms‘ capitalization, but 
capitalization depends on many factors, which may not relate to intangible assets. 
Brand loyalty is another elusive variable. Accounting for unobserved heterogeneity 
in the quality of intangible assets and technology would be very fruitful in the 
evaluation of technical inefficiency of the pharmaceutical industry, which is a 
direction for further research.  
 
 
2. Have recent pharmaceutical reforms damaged R&D?  
An econometric policy evaluation 
 
Most recent health care reforms in developed countries have been motivated 
by cost containment and budget deficits. Ageing population, retirement of baby-
boomers, democratization, demand for more equal and better health care, and 
increasing costs of pharmaceuticals (Schwitzer, 2006) have stretched government 
and social security budgets. European governments have responded to these 
challenges by constraining spending on pharmaceuticals, mandatory generic 
substitution, various forms of price controls, and other administrative measures with 
ambiguous impacts on industrial innovations and future health care.  
Balancing supply and demand sides while promoting innovations has made 
pharmaceutical policy an issue of intense political debate. On the supply side, the 
global pharmaceutical industry is experiencing rapid rising costs of new drug 
discovery, and an alarming slowdown in R&D productivity (Paul, Mytelka, et al., 
2010). This increase in costs translates across most OECD countries in an increasing 
share of pharmaceutical expenditures in total health care costs. On the demand side, 
ageing population, retirement of baby-boomers, demand for more equal and better 
health care, and increasing prices on pharmaceuticals have stretched government and 
social security budgets. The further deterioration of budget deficits by the recent 
financial crisis presses for further cost containment that might damage innovation 
prospects in the industry in the long run.  
Most authors (Abbott and Vernon, 2007; Danzon, Wang et al, 2005; Kessler, 
2004; Schwitzer, 2006; Vernon, 2004 and 2005; Sood, deVries et al., 2009) see these 
regulations as hampering the development of R&D. Cost containment reforms might 
benefit current users and payers for existing drugs, but simultaneously hamper the 
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development of new drugs for future generations and restrain the competitiveness of 
national industries by reducing the expected payoff to innovations. This welfare 
trade-off can be viewed as part of a long ongoing debate between the benefits of 
innovations associated with some market distortions, versus static market efficiency. 
As stated by Braeutigam and Panzar (1993, p.197) ―the value of price caps as 
a policy innovation for the control of natural monopoly remains an open question‖. 
In this regard, the empirical evaluation of impacts of cost-containment 
pharmaceutical reforms on the supply side of innovation activity, i.e. R&D 
expenditures and sources of R&D financing at firm level, is of particular interest and 
it is scarcely covered in the literature.  
This chapter estimates the short-term effects of the recent cost-containment 
pharmaceutical reforms on six financial indicators related to firms‘ R&D in Denmark, 
France, Germany, Japan, and the US. Due to insufficient data, proper estimations for 
the impact of reforms in Italy, Norway, and Sweden are not possible so those 
empirical results and discussion of reforms in these countries are provided in the 
Attachment 6. The dataset represents a panel data of financial statements of 
pharmaceutical firms for the period 1997-2006.  
Section 2.1 summarizes the literature review on effects of cost-containment 
regulations. A number of authors (Lakdawalla, Goldman, et al. 2009; Sood, deVries, 
et al. 2009; Finkelstein, 2008; Vernon and Golec, 2008; Abbott and Vernon, 2007; 
Schwitzer, 2006; Giaccotto, Santerre, et al, 2005; Kessler, 2004; Vernon 2004) point 
out a significant negative impact of price controls on R&D through reduced expected 
payoffs on pharmaceutical innovation, which can also increase the cost of capital for 
companies. Golec, Hedge, et al (2010) give an example of how just a credible threat 
of pharmaceutical price regulation by the Clinton administration in 1993 reduces 
firms‘ stock prices and R&D.  
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  I focus on the following five country reforms: Denmark (2001) with 
mandatory generic substitution; France (2004) with greater generic substitution, 
stricter price controls and the introduction of additional taxes; Germany (2003) with 
the cost-benefit analysis of drugs, mandatory price discounts, and stricter price 
controls; Japan (2002) with greater generic substitution; and the Medicare reform 
with larger discounts on drugs for the state program in the USA (2003). The details 
of the reforms and their expected effects are evaluated.  
I do not distinguish the nationality of the holding company because national 
regulations are applied to all companies registered and operating in a specific country. 
Markets of the countries considered are dominated by multinational firms, which can 
conduct R&D and production with transfer pricing in other countries so that specific 
national price regulations may not be very restrictive. However, given the leading 
role of sales (marketing) in companies‘ R&D decisions (see Section 1.1), numerous 
literature on the crucial role of national regulations for R&D (see Section 1.3), the 
fact that ―each country‘s regulation do fall most heavily on its domestic firms‖ 
Danzon (1997, p.46), and the market-seeking nature of foreign investment (Pammolli 
and Riccaboni, 2007, p.5), and the dominance of domestic sales over foreign ones for 
the firms in the sample, national reforms can have strong impact on R&D indicators 
of firms located in the reformed country.  
One cannot observe a firm‘s performance if reforms have not happened, but I 
can compare firms‘ performance with companies in other (similar) countries. 
Comparing national regulations from four different sources I assigned 
pharmaceutical firms from Ireland, Austria and Finland as a control group for 
European countries. Japanese regulations resemble most closely those of Switzerland. 
Firms from the UK were assigned as a control group for the US firms. This choice of 
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control groups is obtained by maximization of the number of similar regulation 
practices across countries.  
Section 2.2 describes the data, the expected outcomes, the selection of 
relevant estimation methods and indicators. Based on the literature review, I have 
chosen two indicators of R&D activity: R&D expenditures and R&D to revenue, and 
four indicators that characterize internal funds potentially available for R&D and 
investment prospects of a firm: revenue, cash flow, gross margin, and price to book 
ratio. These financial indicators are suggested by the literature on R&D financing 
(e.g. Scherer, 2007; Vernon, 2005; Hall, 2002; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). Note 
that the performed econometric policy analysis is focused on the estimation of the an 
average treatment effect on the treated. The impact on each indicator is estimated 
independently based on the available samples. The descriptive statistics of the data 
related to the specific estimation models is provided in Attachment 4. 
Given the negative effect of cost-containment policies in the literature, I test 
the hypotheses that all cost-containment reforms reduced R&D expenditures, 
revenues, gross margin, price to book value, and cash flows of companies in the 
country under reform. I assume that reforms are exogenous political shocks for 
pharmaceutical firms and that firms do not react strategically by reducing their R&D 
expenditures in advance of a reform.  
To estimate the effects of reforms, which are treatments, I use econometric 
policy evaluation methods to compare the mean values of these indicators for treated 
companies in the country under reform and untreated (control) firms. The average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is estimated using three difference-in-
difference methods (linear, semi-log, and correlated random trend specifications) and 
three matching difference-in-difference (one-to-one, 10-neighbour, and kernel bi-
weighted) methods for robustness sake. I also control for such macroeconomic 
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indicators as regulatory quality in the country, national expenditures on 
pharmaceuticals as a share to GDP, patent applications, domestic credit to private 
sector, and population. I match firms by such characteristics as cash flow, price to 
book ratio, R&D intensity, revenue, assets and the number of employees.  
Section 2.3 discusses the empirical results of the econometric policy analysis. 
In before-after estimations, no country experienced a decrease in R&D expenditures. 
DiD estimations suggest that the reform reduced R&D expenditures by 0.83% for 
companies in France and by 1.38% for the revenue of German firms, but R&D 
expenditures and R&D intensity stayed approximately the same. Across all DiD 
estimations, I see consistently negative impacts of the reforms on R&D expenditures 
in Germany and Japan and no significant changes are found for the US. Investment 
perspectives as proxied by average Tobin‘s Q are the least affected by the reforms. 
The US and Denmark are countries where all matching methods indicate positive 
impacts of the reform on R&D expenditures. In general I find that the R&D 
indicators tend to be persistent despite the regulatory shocks. Possible explanations 
for this persistency could be that (i) long term changes failed to be caught in the short 
series, (ii) R&D represents the competitive advantage and so companies might 
strategically maintain their R&D, (iii) possibilities to export to less regulated markets 
to compensate for reduced domestic sales, (iv) firms adopt/find some loopholes in 
the regulations.   
 
2.1. Country pharmaceutical reforms  
 
Across most OECD countries the shares of pharmaceutical expenditures in total 
health care costs are significant and often increasing. Pharmaceuticals contributed 
about 17% in total health expenditure in most OECD countries (OECD Health 
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Division 2008, p.10). According to the OECD Health Data as of 2007, expenditures 
on pharmaceuticals as a percent of total expenditures on health ranged from 8.9% in 
Denmark to 22.8% in Spain in 2005 (Table 2.1).  
 
Table 2.1. Total expenditure on pharmaceuticals and other non-durables,  
% of total expenditures on health 
  1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Canada 8.5 9.6 11.5 13.8 15.9 17.7 
Denmark 6 6.6 7.5 9.1 8.8 8.9 
Finland 10.7 9.7 9.4 14.1 15.5 16.3 
France 16 16.2 16.9 16 18.2 16.4 
Germany 13.4 13.8 14.3 12.9 13.6 15.2 
Iceland 15.9 16.6 13.5 13.4 14.6 13.3 
Ireland 10.9 9.9 12.2 10.5 10.6 10.9 
Italy   20.3 20.7 22 20.1 
Japan 21.2 18 21.4 22.3 18.7 18.9 
Republic of Korea  35.2 36.5 33.5 29.5 27.3 
Luxembourg 14.5 14.7 14.9 12 11 8.4 
Netherlands 8 9.3 9.6 11 11.7 11.9 
New Zealand 11.9 13.3 13.8 14.8 13.8 12.5 
Norway 8.7 9.1 7.2 9 9.5 9.1 
Portugal 19.9 25.4 24.9 23.6 22.4 21.6 
Spain 21 20.3 17.8 19.2 21.3 22.8 
Sweden 6.5 7 8 12.3 13.8 12 
Switzerland  11.3 10.2 10 10.7 10.4 
United Kingdom 12.8 14.1 13.5 15.3 14.4 13.6 
United States 9 9 9.2 8.9 11.7 12.4 
Source: OECD Health Data 2007, October 2007, available on CD. 
 
Finkelstein (2008, p.xi) argues that the experiences of Europe and Canada 
have shown that pharmaceutical price controls ―kill innovation‖. Vernon (2008, p.4) 
states that ―Pharmaceutical price regulations reduce pharmaceutical R&D spending‖.  
There are growing worries that Europe is losing its competitiveness in the industry. 
For instance, (Schwitzer 2006, pp.167, 239) noticed that three decades ago about two 
thirds of all pharmaceutical innovations took place in Europe, whereas it accounts for 
less than 40% at present time.  
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Cost containment reforms might benefit current users and payers for existing 
drugs, but simultaneously hamper the development of new drugs for future 
generations and restrain the competitiveness of national industries by reducing the 
expected payoff to pharmaceutical innovations (Vernon and Golec, 2008). 
Schumpeter‘s idea was clear that over the long run the gains to society from 
innovation are vastly greater than those associated with competitive pricing and 
Pareto optimality in the short run (Nelson and Winter, 1982).  
  
Impacts of cost-containment regulations 
Sood, deVries et al. (2009) categorize the following types of pharmaceutical 
regulations affecting R&D: 
- Global budget constraint on all pharmaceutical spending (for example, in Italy, 
New Zealand, France, Spain, and the UK); 
- Prescribed budget constraint per physician; 
- Profit caps for pharmaceutical firms (Spain and the UK); 
- Setting a maximum reimbursement level based on prices of similar drugs in other 
countries, which involves direct price controls, that set a maximum reimbursed price 
for a drug (therapeutic reference pricing); Italy and Spain introduced reference 
pricing in 2001, France and Portugal followed suit in 2003;  
- Providing incentives for doctors/pharmacists to prescribe/dispense generic drugs; 
for example, Spain introduced such incentives in 2001, Japan and Portugal in 2002.  
In the literature, most authors point out the negative consequences of such 
regulations. Schwitzer (2006, p.187) has concluded that although price controls 
might provide cheaper drugs and lower health costs, they can also hamper R&D of 
new drugs in the future. Lakdawalla, Goldman et al. (2009) estimated the impact of 
lowering American drug prices to the European levels using a microsimulation. They 
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concluded that price controls can generate short term savings, but lead to huge losses 
in future undeveloped drugs. For example, they estimated (ibid, w.147) that U.S. 
price controls would generate $8,000 of benefit, but $109,000 in loss per consumer 
aged at 55–59. These authors argue that subsidies in form of reduction of consumers‘ 
co-payment for medicine could be a good alternative to address high drug prices. 
Sood, deVries et al. (2009) suggest that the introduction of price regulations on 
unregulated market of the US would have strong negative impact on R&D.   
Golec, Hedge et al (2010) give an example of how just a credible threat of 
pharmaceutical price regulation by the Clinton administration in 1993 reduce firms‘ 
stock prices and R&D together by about $1 bn at about the same time. An evaluation 
based on data of drug candidates in research of Abbott and Vernon (2007) infer that 
cutting drug prices in the US by about half would reduce the number of compounds 
going into human trials by more than half, and this would, in turn, significantly 
reduce the number of new drugs being developed.  Danzon, Wang et al. (2005) 
analysed the marketed introduction of 85 NCEs between 1994 and 1998 in 25 
countries and concluded that pharmaceutical firms prefer delaying launching their 
new drugs in price regulated markets. The reasons are likely to be a parallel trade in 
drugs from low to high price markets and stipulated drug price comparisons between 
countries undertaken by some national regulators. This explains why companies tend 
to launch new drugs in the less regulated markets of the US, UK, and Germany.  
The report of the US Department of Commerce (2004) is critical of price 
control policies in the OECD countries which restrain spending on pharmaceuticals 
in a non-transparent way. The report estimated that price controls in OECD countries 
would lead to lower revenues from branded drugs amounting to $5-8 billion annually 
and these losses on average translate into around 3 or 4 forgone molecular entities 
every year. These results are confirmed by some other studies reviewed by Kessler 
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(2004) who summarizes that price controls mean lower profits and lower cash flows 
for pharmaceutical firms, which lead to a reduced investment. Lower expected cash 
flows decrease investment opportunities for firms as external borrowing can be more 
costly due to information asymmetry of various R&D projects (Vernon 2004). 
Reduced R&D in turn, translates into fewer innovative new product launches.  
The impacts of the popular method of price regulation in Europe – price caps 
(ceilings) – still require empirical verification. As stated by Braeutigam and Panzar 
(1993, p.197) ―the value of price caps as a policy innovation for the control of natural 
monopoly remains an open question. There are no ‗welfare theorems‘ to appeal to…‖. 
In this regard, empirical evaluation of impacts of cost-containment pharmaceutical 
reforms on the supply side of innovation activity, i.e. R&D expenditures and sources 
of R&D financing at firm level, is of particular interest and it is scarcely covered in 
the literature.  
 
Country pharmaceutical reforms  
This section analyses recent pharmaceutical reforms as major regulatory shocks for 
pharmaceutical firms in respect to their R&D activity. Reforms of pharmaceutical 
regulations in five countries have been considered for econometric impact 
evaluation. I compare the effects of cost containment reforms in the European 
countries, Japan, and also the mixed reform that have taken place in the US, which 
combines cost-containment measures with greater health insurance coverage and 
subsidies and some ad-hoc controlled trade liberalization.  
  The considered reforms (Table 2.2) include:  
- Denmark (2001) with mandatory generic substitution;  
- France (2004) with greater generic substitution, stricter price controls, and the 
introduction of additional taxes on pharmaceutical products;  
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- Germany (2003) with cost-benefit analysis of drugs, mandatory price discounts, 
and stricter price controls;  
- Japan (2002) with greater generic substitution;  
- USA (2003), the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization 
Act (so-called Medicare part D) with greater demand for pharmaceuticals and larger 
discounts on drugs for the state sponsored healthcare for the elderly.  
 
Table 2.2. Pharmaceutical reform evaluation matrix 
The reform and its main characteristics Expected effects for the 
pharmaceutical industry 
 
Denmark: in addition to a fixed price ceiling for interchangeable 
drugs, generic substitution was adopted in June 2001; this obliged 
domestic pharmacies to sell the cheapest equivalent drugs stated in 
prescriptions, unless objected by physicians. A new rule for 
substitution of medicinal products was introduced on 
2 September 2002 in the Executive Order on Prescriptions (explained 
in The Guideline N 89 from 12 September 2002) and was activated on 
30 September 2002 (Knudsen 2003).  
 
 
Greater generic 
substitution reduces the 
life cycle of patented 
drugs, hence, lowering 
expected revenue from 
drug invention  
France: the 2004 Health Insurance Reform was introduced to reduce 
drug prices and discourage advertisement inter alia. The reform 
included (Pharma, 2005; Grandfils and Sermet, 2006): 
- Higher taxation on promotion of pharmaceutical products;  
- Application of exceptional taxation for the sales of companies; 
- Introduction of reference pricing by the law on the financing of 
social security in 2003 (tarifs forfaitaires de responsabilité); this law 
stipulated public health insurance reimbursement of 70 types of drugs 
at the price level of their generic equivalents, which reduced prices;   
- Provision of financial incentives for pharmaceutical wholesalers to 
substitute branded drugs with generics;   
- Greater price controls over hospital-dispensed drugs;  
- An additional tax on sales turnover.  
Higher taxes, greater 
generic substitution, less 
reimbursement 
opportunities for branded 
drugs, reduction of prices 
for branded drugs 
compared to those of 
stipulated generic 
substitution.  
 
 
Germany, the Law on the Modernisation of the Healthcare System 
was passed in October 2003, this was introduced in practice in 
January 2004. The law was intended to moderate pharmaceutical 
expenditures and posed the following: 
- Set reimbursement limits for patented drugs;  
- Essentially increase the compulsory manufacturers' discount rate 
from 6% to 16%; this discount was introduced in 2003, and applied 
to the manufacturers‘ sales to public health insurances (SHI);  
- Enlarge the number of non-reimbursable therapeutic indications;  
- Establish a new Centre for Quality in Medicine, which will conduct 
cost-benefit analysis for all drugs;  
- Maintain the current parallel import regulation, which means that 
imported drugs can only be dispensed if their prices are at least 15% 
or €15 less than domestic ones (Worz and Busse 2005; Pharma 2004; 
Pharma 2007).  
 
The act was not welcomed 
by the German association 
of research based 
pharmaceutical firms; one 
can expect a reduction of 
sales; better public 
information on economic 
efficiency of drugs reduces 
information rents for lower 
quality products.  
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(Table 2.2 continued)  
The reform and its main characteristics 
Expected effects for the 
pharmaceutical industry 
  
Japan: the House of Representatives passed the revised 
Pharmaceutical Affairs Law on July 25, 2002. This revision is 
intended to facilitate start-up pharmaceutical companies that do not 
have production facilities in Japan. Also on April 1, 2002 drugs with 
expired patents were subject to price cuts of about 10%, whereas 
before the government did not lower reimbursement prices for such 
drugs. The government introduced incentives to health organizations 
and doctors to prescribe generic and co-payments were also increased 
(Asian Medical Newsletter, 2002).  
  
 
Lower prices and higher 
co-payments should reduce 
sales and profits 
US: in 2005 the House of Representatives passed a bill, which 
excludes punitive damages for pharmaceutical companies from acts 
of litigation if the drug has approval from the Food and Drug 
Administration (Pharma, 2005).  
The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization 
Act of 2003 has comprehensively tackled the purchase of outpatient 
prescription drugs for the first time affecting over 40 million 
Americans (Pharma 2004b). 
The Part D programme of the Act of 2003 offered a voluntary 
outpatient prescription drug benefit for people covered by Medicare. 
The programme started functioning in January 2006 and permitted a 
reduction of costs of Medicare purchased drugs.  The Act 
significantly reduces out-of-pocket spending of the beneficiaries of 
the program and foresees almost $90 billion in subsidies for 
employer-sponsored private drug insurance.  However, use of 
monopsony power by the federal government in price determination 
is prohibited. The Act allows the importation of drugs certified by the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services (Hurley and Morgan, 2004).  
 
One can expect a positive 
total impact on drug sales 
and R&D for the most 
popular drugs amongst 
Medicare clients (mainly 
pensioners). Although 
some measures of the Act 
were introduced only in 
2005 and 2006, 
expectations have been 
formed since the adoption 
of the Act. As downside 
risks are limited, this will 
encourage marketing of 
new drugs.  However, 
Acemoglu, Cutler et al. 
(2006) find no evidance 
that Medicare ever affected 
pharmaceutical innovation 
for elderly.  
 
The Medicare program comes with greater price discounts being negotiated with 
firms supplying drugs for this large program. The Act foresees the possibility for 
some form of drug re-importation. Though the importation option was blocked and 
Finkelstein and Temin (2008, pp.80-81) think the Bill of 2003 in the US does 
nothing to reduce drug prices, but subsidizes access to drugs for low income 
population. In Germany, according to the German Federal Statistics Office3, prices 
on pharmaceuticals in the statutory health insurance system decreased by 4.6% over 
the period 2004-2007. 
 
                                                 
3
 Cited at http://www.vfa.de/en/statistics/economy/ (accessed on 2 February 2009). 
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Choice of control groups  
For econometric policy evaluations, it is important to choose comparable countries 
with similar pharmaceutical regulations as reviewed in tables 1.5, 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5. 
Firms are assigned into a control group for each country reform based on similarities 
in the pharmaceutical regulations and the fact that the control country did not have a 
pharmaceutical reform for the considered period.  
 
Table 2.3. International comparison of pharmaceutical regulations 
Regulation 
A
u
st
ri
a 
D
en
m
ar
k
 
F
in
la
n
d
 
F
ra
n
ce
 
G
er
m
an
y
 
Ir
el
an
d
 
It
al
y
 
Ja
p
an
 
N
o
rw
ay
 
S
w
ed
en
 
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d
 
U
K
 
U
S
A
 
Control of 
manufacturing 
price 
  y   y  ni y     
Control of 
reimbursement 
entry 
y y y y  y y ni y y y   
Cross-country 
comparisons 
y y y y  y y ni y y y   
Reference pricing  y   y   ni y y    
Payback if volume 
exceeds target 
y   y  y y ni  y  y  
Profit control            y  
Control over 
promotional 
spending 
   y    ni    y  
Prescribing 
budgets 
    y y      y  
Pharmacoeconomic 
guidelines 
  y    y ni y     
Fixed wholesale 
margin 
y   y y y y ni   y   
Fixed pharmacy 
margin 
y y y y y y y ni y y y y  
Patient copayment y y y y y y y ni y y y y  
Control of OTC 
price 
       ni      
Control of hospital 
price 
     y y ni      
Price control y  y y  y y ni y y y   
Note: y – yes, the regulation is used; blank cell – the regulation is not used; ni – no information.  
Source: Urch Publishing (2002). ―The Guide to European Pharmaceutical Pricing and Reimbursement 
Systems‖ and Jacobzone, S. (2000). ―Pharmaceutical Policies in OECD Countries: Reconciling Social 
and Industrial Goals‖. Labour Market and Social Policy, Occasional paper 40. Adapted from Kyle, M. 
(2007). "Pharmaceutical Price Controls and Entry Strategies." The Review of Economics and 
Statistics 89(1): 88-99. 
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I focus on the OECD countries only as there is modest variation in per capita 
expenditure, consumed volume, and retail prices of pharmaceuticals in OECD 
countries (OECD Health Division 2008, p.9). The major idea of control groups is to 
compare performance of firms in the reformed country with performance of similar 
firms in the controlled countries without reform.  
The choice of counterfactuals, i.e. firms in the control group of countries, is 
based on maximum resemblances of country‘s pharmaceutical regulations. 
According to Oliver (2005), UK pharmaceutical regulations did not undergo essential 
reforms for the period 1997-2004. The same conclusion can be drawn from Hakkinen 
(2005) in respect to Finland. The choice of counterfactual countries is never perfect 
as most countries have specific pharmaceutical regulations, institutions, taxations, 
and consumption culture. I compare pharmaceutical regulations to detect maximum 
number of similarities. 
I do not distinguish the nationality of the holding company because national 
regulations are applied to all companies registered and operating in a specific country. 
Markets of the considered countries are dominated by multinational firms, which can 
conduct R&D and production with transfer pricing in other countries so that specific 
national price regulations may not be very restrictive. However, section 1.1 has 
discussed in detail the overwhelming role of sales (marketing) in companies‘ R&D 
decisions: drug discovery is essentially an economic risk evaluation problem.  In this 
regard, firms should adjust their R&D decisions due to new price (sales) regulations  
The literature review in this section and in section 1.3 demonstrates the 
importance of national regulations for R&D, which is extensively discussed both in 
the academic literature and through industry representatives. Danzon (1997, p.46) 
points out that ―each country‘s regulation do fall most heavily on its domestic firms‖. 
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Pammolli and Riccaboni (2007, p.5) notice that foreign investment of European 
pharmaceutical companies are mainly ―market seeking‖.  
 
Table 2.4. National regulations for prescription drug prices  
Country Price 
control  
at drug 
launch 
 
Reimbur-
sement 
controls 
Reference 
pricing 
Profit 
controls 
Positive and 
negative 
listings of 
drugs for 
reimbursement 
Drug 
budgets for 
prescribing 
doctors  
Austria  X X   X  
Denmark   X  X  
Finland  X   X  
France X X   X X 
Germany  X X  X X 
Ireland X X   X X 
Italy X X   X  
Japan  X  X X  
Norway  X X  X  
Sweden   X X  X  
Switzerland  X   X  
United 
Kingdom 
   X X X 
USA       
Source: Vernon J.A., Golec J.H., Hughen W.K. (2006). The Economics of Pharmaceutical Price 
Regulation and Importation: Refocusing the Debate, American Journal of Law and Medicine 32:  
175-192 (p.178). 
 
In addition, domestic sales dominate foreign ones for the firms in the sample: 
the average share of the pharmaceutical firms‘ domestic sales in the total in the 
available sample of companies is 89.94% for Austria, 89.47% for China, 86.14% for 
Finland, 77.28% for France, 64.13% for Germany, 94.44% for Japan, 87.32% for 
Spain so that local price regulations should matter. In the US, the share of R&D 
conducted abroad to the total R&D ranged from 8.5% to 24% between 1970 and 
2009 and the share of foreign sales in total was about 35% from 1997 to 2009 
(PhRMA, 2010, pp. 44,50). The Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry 
(2009) assesses that there are only four countries with free price of new drugs at their 
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launch: Switzerland, UK, USA, and partly Germany, the latter introduced a new 
reimbursement practice in 2004, which can impact prices at launch. 
 
Table 2.5. Some approaches for pharmaceutical regulation in the EU in 2003 
Countries Market 
segment 
Direct 
price 
controls 
Use of 
international 
price 
comparisons 
 
Reference 
pricing 
Conditional 
reimburse-
ment 
Co-
payment 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Austria In-patent 
Off-patent 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 NA NA 
Belgium In-patent 
Off-patent 
X 
 
X 
X 
 
X 
NA NA 
Denmark In-patent 
Off-patent 
 X 
X 
 
X 
NA NA 
Finland In-patent 
Off-patent 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 NA NA 
France In-patent 
Off-patent 
X X  
X 
X X 
Germany In-patent 
Off-patent 
   
X 
X X 
Greece In-patent 
Off-patent 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 NA NA 
Ireland In-patent 
Off-patent 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 NA NA 
Italy In-patent 
Off-patent 
X X  
X 
X X 
Netherlands In-patent 
Off-patent 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X  
Portugal In-patent 
Off-patent 
X X 
X 
 
X 
NA NA 
Spain In-patent 
Off-patent 
X X 
X 
 
X 
X X 
Sweden  In-patent 
Off-patent 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 X X 
UK In-patent 
Off-patent 
 
X 
  X X 
Note: NA – data are not available.  
Source: for the first five columns: (Mrazek and Mossialos, 2004), for columns 6-8: the UK 
Pharmaceutical Industry Competitiveness Task Force (Pharmaceutical Industry Competitiveness Task 
Force, 2005) available at http://www.advisorybodies.doh.gov.uk/pictf/2005indicators.pdf 
 
Comparing these summaries for national regulations from five different sources I 
assigned pharmaceutical firms from Ireland, Austria and Finland as a control group 
for European countries. Japanese regulations resemble most closely those of 
Switzerland. Firms from the UK were assigned as a control group for the US firms. 
This choice of control groups is obtained by maximization of the number of similar 
regulation practices across countries.  
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2.2. Data, methods, and expected results 
Outcome indicators of reforms at the firm level  
The choice of the outcome variables is informed by the following literature. Scherer 
(2001) has found high contemporaneous correlation between trend-adjusted gross 
profit margins
4
 and R&D spending in the US pharmaceutical industry over the last 
four decades. Scherer explained contemporary regression between profitability and 
R&D expenses in the pharmaceutical industry in two ways: the industry needs 
internal sources of capital from profits as they are cheaper than equity or external 
borrowings due to capital market imperfections, and also that current profits signal 
investment into research through expected profits from R&D investment. 
Using distributed lag regression technique for a sample of 111 firms from 
various industries in the US from 1950 to 1965 Branch (1974) concluded that R&D 
is affected by past profitability. Grabowski and Vernon (2000) argue that R&D by 
pharmaceutical firms depends on internal funds and used an index of profitability in 
the US industry as a whole. Vernon (2005) used cash flows and pre-tax 
pharmaceutical profit margin to explain R&D intensity. Vernon and Golec (2008) 
argue that there is a strong causal relationship between prices, profit margins, and 
R&D to sales ratio.  
Hall (2002) reviews that firms prefer to finance R&D through internal cash 
flow as the cost of external capital can be higher than the internal option for the 
following three reasons: (i) asymmetric information between inventor and investor as 
the inventor has more expertise into their own project and/or is concerned with 
disclosure of all information to rivals, (ii) moral hazard on the part of the inventor or 
                                                 
4
 Gross Profit = Revenue − Cost of Goods Sold, Gross Margin Percentage =  
(Revenue-Cost of Goods Sold)/Revenue 
 89 
inventor‘s firm management, (iii) tax deductions legislation.  Carpenter and Petersen 
(2002) highlight the problems surrounding low collateral and salvage value of R&D 
projects in R&D decisions.  
Many authors following the pioneering work of Fazzari, Hubbard, et al. 
(1988) argue that cash flow, sales, and Tobin‘s Q are necessary indicators to predict 
firms‘ investment, especially R&D. Hsieh, Mishra et al. (2003) empirically 
confirmed that a firm‘s sales and cash flows, and Tobin‘s q as proxied by ratio of a 
firm‘s market value to (tangible) assets are statistically significant for R&D at firm 
level. Himmelberg and Petersen (1994, p.41) forward a hypothesis that ―to minimize 
both the current and future adjustment costs, firms set the level of R&D investment 
in accordance with the permanent level of internal finance‖.   
Based on this literature review, I select several financial indicators that 
interrelated to R&D expenditures: R&D expenditure, R&D intensity (ratio of R&D 
to total revenue), total revenue, cash flow, gross profit margin, and price to book 
ratio (Table 2.6; Attachments 4,5). Tracking impacts of reforms on these indicators 
can help to understand changes in R&D expenditures in connection with changes in 
the internal sources of finance for R&D. All variables were expressed in a common 
currency - Euro - by adjusting for year average exchange rates obtained from the 
World Bank Development Indicators database. 
Revenue represents the income a company receives from its typical business 
activities and mainly includes sale of goods and services. I consider revenue as a 
better indicator than sales as some small research firms get a large share of their 
revenue from R&D subcontracts rather than from drug sales. As revenue is affected 
by costs of production, the next important variable is gross margin, which is defined 
as the revenue-cost of goods sold divided by total revenue. Cost of goods sold 
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includes all costs directly linked to the goods, but does not include indirect fixed 
costs such as administration, office rent, and other similar entitles. 
 
Table 2.6. Descriptive statistics of the outcome variables in Euro 
Country 
 
Number 
of firms 
R&D, 
rdep 
Research 
intensity, 
rdev 
Revenue, 
trev 
Cash 
flow, 
cashflow 
Gross 
margin, 
gmargin 
Price to 
book 
ratio,  
pbookr 
Austria 
 
15 12 
9935.08 
10520.29 
12 
1.35 
1.83 
14 
15874.93 
11635.78 
44 
16273.5 
21258.2 
12 
67.48 
8.30 
9 
3.57 
3.02 
Denmark 
 
29 62 
240190.2 
594983 
54 
.66 
2.16 
59 
1056696 
1436197 
151 
53551.1 
503604.2 
129 
44.09 
27.22 
38 
4.67 
2.63 
Finland 
 
16 9 
27255.6 
18118.58 
9 
.047 
.06 
13 
1917160 
1006104 
113 
8561895 
7351470 
31 
43.12 
19.15 
17 
37.13 
48.46 
France 
 
145 30 
575370.1 
1141864 
29 
1.78 
3.46 
97 
1244006 
4637900 
1148 
55027.4 
429760.2 
106 
52.39 
21.65 
67 
7.56 
13.85 
Germany 
 
139 173 
249744.7 
541622 
172 
.53 
1.40 
225 
2591548 
5980015 
660 
152354.1 
550434.8 
320 
54.84 
22.56 
185 
11.27 
39.51 
Ireland 
 
31 18 
145800 
154249.9 
18 
.29 
.20 
24 
408414.4 
494122.1 
54 
2952818 
1.27e+07 
118 
41.35 
35.56 
19 
6.72 
8.47 
Japan 
 
78 322 
134832.7 
227817.2 
322 
.10 
.08 
359 
1287753 
1954320 
420 
182732.8 
454906.2 
507 
54.49 
18.08 
314 
5.34 
13.75 
Switzer-
land 
 
22 63 
958670.2 
1390953 
61 
11.48 
51.51 
112 
4406306 
8073407 
133 
791846.5 
1806817 
136 
65.14 
27.69 
81 
3.08 
19.73 
UK 
 
327 344 
258942 
1046154 
325 
11.29 
63.36 
422 
1876620 
6803543 
2068 
119472.9 
1077873 
1715 
38.99 
26.82 
326 
7.99 
39.21 
USA 
 
427 2501 
86919.2 
337913.7 
2273 
12.30 
117.33 
3260 
901037.5 
4985116 
3273 
97140.88 
716926.2 
2273 
53.30 
26.74 
1904 
6.90 
49.43 
Note: in each cell the first quantity is the number of observations, the second is the mean, and  
the third one is the standard deviation; the numbers of observations for a country firms vary due to 
mainly missing data for R&D expenditures.  
 
Szewczyk, et al. (1996) find that investment opportunities as proxided by 
Tobin‘s Q can explain R&D expenditures and associated abnormal returns. I use 
price-to-book ratio, which is estimated as the company's market capitalization 
divided by its total book value. This ratio is a proxy for the unobservable marginal 
Tobin‘s Q (Tobin, 1969), which is used to reflect market sentiments regarding 
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expected market return on a firm‘s capital. To control for country heterogeneity, I 
choose several time and country specific variables (Table 2.7). 
 
Table 2.7. Descriptive statistics of the macroeconomic variables. 
 
Country Statistics Regulatory 
quality 
(regquality) 
Pharma-
ceutical  
Expenditures 
(phaspending) 
Patent 
applications 
of residents  
(patent) 
Domestic 
credit to  
private sector 
(% of GDP)  
(crtoprivate) 
Population 
total, million 
(population) 
Austria Observations 
Mean 
St.deviation 
144 
93.04 
1.01 
144 
1.19 
0.07 
144 
1863.78 
71.35 
144 
105.47 
5.03 
144 
8.07 
0.09 
Denmark Observations 
Mean 
St.deviation 
270 
97.10 
1.02 
270 
0.79 
0.05 
270 
1676.67 
153.72 
270 
111.87 
56.00 
270 
5.35 
0.04 
Finland Observations 
Mean 
St.deviation 
153 
98.29 
1.46 
153 
1.10 
0.08 
153 
2248.33 
252.10 
153 
59.07 
7.69 
153 
5.19 
0.03 
France Observations 
Mean 
St.deviation 
1168 
81.86 
1.94 
1168 
1.75 
0.09 
1168 
13590.5 
303.59 
1168 
85.79 
3.05 
1168 
59.6 
0.08 
Germany Observations 
Mean 
St.deviation 
1260 
92.28 
1.54 
1260 
1.47 
0.09 
1260 
48009.44 
1907.95 
1260 
115.08 
2.74 
1260 
82.3 
0.19 
Ireland Observations 
Mean 
St.deviation 
288 
96.53 
1.35 
288 
0.74 
0.09 
288 
897 
87.52 
288 
112.16 
22.93 
288 
3.88 
0.16 
Japan Observations 
Mean 
St.deviation 
632 
70.42 
13.51 
632 
1.46 
0.06 
632 
364608.4 
11743.6 
632 
203.79 
21.85 
632 
127.1 
0.57 
Switzerland Observations 
Mean 
St.deviation 
184 
95.64 
1.61 
184 
1.13 
0.06 
184 
1937.88 
222.52 
184 
160.87 
4.70 
184 
7.22 
0.10 
UK Observations 
Mean 
St.deviation 
2952 
97.19 
1.33 
2952 
1.07 
0.08 
2952 
19825.44 
1417.72 
2952 
137.40 
14.89 
2952 
59.3 
0.57 
USA Observations 
Mean 
St.deviation 
3852 
93.82 
1.44 
3852 
1.65 
0.23 
3852 
165279 
25857.45 
3852 
175.99 
12.47 
3852 
285.4 
7.67 
 
Gross margin is an indicator of profitability and can reflect the relationship 
between the prices of products versus their production costs; it is estimated as the 
ratio of pre-tax profit to revenue. As profitability can be affected by various accrual 
accounting practices, cash flow is a more robust indicator of the solvency of a firm 
and the associated availability of internal finance (Brealey, Myers, et al. 2007).  
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These national level variables can be viewed as exogenous and characterizing of the 
general financial, institutional, and technological environments:  
regquality – Regulatory quality in the country, the percentile rank of the country 
from the World Bank Governance Indicators for 1996-2007, available at 
www.govindicators.org. This indicator is designed to reflect institutional quality.  
pharspending – Total expenditure on pharmaceuticals and other non-durables as 
share to GDP in the country, taken from OECD Health Data.  
patent - Patent applications to show innovation activity in the country. 
crtoprivate - Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP), which reflects 
availability of credit to finance their R&D.   
population – Total population to account for heterogeneity in market size. Cerda 
(2007) argues that a larger population implies a larger market and greater incentives 
to invent new drugs.  
 
Expected results  
Drug price regulations are expected to have an essentially negative influence on 
firms‘ sales and operating margin, and this is likely to reduce R&D and other related 
financial indicators. In particular, I test the hypotheses that all cost-containment 
reforms reduced R&D expenditures, revenues, gross margin, price to book value, and 
cash flows of companies in the country under reform. Price caps and mandatory 
generic substitution reforms in France and Germany should have negative impact on 
most indicators as actual and expected cash flow from new patented drugs will be 
reduced. The impact on R&D to revenue is also expected to be negative, though if 
revenue drops stronger than R&D expenditures, this impact can be positive.   
These expectations are supported by several publications. Sood, deVries, et al. 
(2009) concluded that there was a general tendency in OECD countries to increase 
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pharmaceutical regulations between 1992 and 2004. These authors estimate that 
direct price controls cut firms‘ revenue in 19 countries studied by 16.8%, whereas 
indirect drug budget constraints reduce the revenue by 6%.  
The U.S. Department of Commerce (2004) concluded that as a result of price 
controls and the monopsonistic power of government agencies in respect to 
purchasing drugs in eleven OECD countries, aggregate drug prices were 18-67% 
lower than in the U.S. and this leads to a 25-38% reduction in revenues from the 
sales of patented drugs. In the Department‘s estimations, these lower prices 
translated in $5-8 bn less in R&D finance. Vernon (2005) simulated an expected 
profit effect and a cash-flow effect of pharmaceutical price regulations and 
concluded that if price regulations are introduced in the US, R&D expenditures 
would drop by around a quarter to one third – his sample consisted of some 14 
American firms.   
 Giaccotto, Santerre et al (2005) estimated that the elasticity ratio of R&D to 
sales by real drug prices, as measured by a ratio of drug price index to the consumer 
price index, to be 0.58. Hence, it appears that any drug price controls would lead to 
less R&D intensity and fewer new drugs. They concluded that if growth of 
pharmaceutical prices were capped by the consumer price index, the industry would 
have suffered a 30% decline in capitalized R&D expenditures between 1980 and 
2001 in the US. However, one of the problems of their study is that it uses GDP per 
capita instead of national pharmaceutical spending as a proxy for demand. Another 
problem is that their specification includes only per capita GDP, share of foreign 
sales, and drug to CPI price ratio as determinants of R&D to sales, but does not 
include national institutional and innovation activities or capacities.  
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Econometric methods 
Proper evaluation of various regulations is lacking in the literature. Less than 17% of 
cost-containment drug policy studies included pre- and post reform impacts and 
time-series considerations (Kanavos, et al. 2004). The econometric methods used 
here are based on a survey of econometric policy evaluation techniques of 
Wooldridge and Imbens (2009), Blundell and Dias (2007). The companies in the 
dataset continue to operate during the whole considered period before and after the 
reforms, which enables an evaluation of impact.  
Pharmaceutical firms can lobby against cost containment reforms or might try 
to minimize them or search for loopholes in regulations. However, the reforms are 
treated here as an exogenous political shock caused by macroeconomic or political 
actions which are deemed to be independent on firms‘ financial characteristics X. In 
this regard, a treatment dummy variable D, which is associated with a firm being 
affected by the reform, does not depend on the expected financial outcome    for a 
firm or its pre-reform outputs   , but rather on its geographic location. There is no 
self-selection bias of firms into reforms as the reforms are nation-wide and imposed 
on all firms in a country. I also assume that firms do not react strategically by 
reducing their R&D expenditures to create political pressure to reverse reform plans. 
To estimate the effects of reforms, which are treatments, on the financial 
indicators, I use econometric policy evaluation methods to compare the mean values 
of these indicators for treated and untreated (control) firms by the reforms: 
- Comparing the means of observed outcomes for a group of the same firms before 
and after reforms with t-test with different variances. This test estimates the average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATT). Although this method uses the same firms in 
different time periods (before and after the reforms) as the best counterfactuals, a 
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correct estimation of ATT can be affected by macroeconomic changes and time 
trends in outcomes, for example, due to business cycles. 
- The difference-in-difference (DiD) approach partially solves this problem of a 
common time trend by comparing the financial indicators of firms under reform with 
a control group of firms in another country. It is assumed that outcomes for the firms 
under reform would have a similar (parallel) time trend as a control group of firms in 
countries without reform. The ATT can be estimated as difference between outcomes 
for firms in reformed countries deducted by the difference in the outcome in control 
group of firms in non-reform countries before and after the reform: 
         |              |     
where E stands for the conditional expectation,      – outcomes of a financial 
indicator: a – after and b - before a reform, D is a dummy variable, which equals one 
for firms affected by the reform after the reform, and zero for unaffected 
counterfactual firms and for the treated firms before the reform.  One cannot observe 
a firm‘s performance if reforms have not happened, but I can compare firms‘ 
performance in other (similar) countries.  Then impact of pharmaceutical reforms can 
be estimated by a difference-in-difference (DiD) method as follows (Blundell and 
Dias 2007):                          . 
The impact is change in firms‘ performance under a reform deducted by 
changes in the performance of control group of firms in similar countries with no 
pharmaceutical reforms during the period; Y – financial indicator at time t, c – a 
country index.  The impact is evaluated as a fixed effect regression in the form of: 
                                                (2.1) 
where    – the financial outcome indicator of a firm related to R&D activity,    – 
fixed effect for the i-th firm,    – year dummies,     – row vector of exogenous 
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macroeconomic and institutional covariates for each country, i.e. regulatory quality 
in the country (regquality), national expenditures on pharmaceuticals as a share to 
GDP (pharspending), patent applications (patent), domestic credit to private 
sector, % of GDP (crtoprivate), and population (Table 2.7). The estimated vector of 
coefficients:   ,   ,   ; where   is a column vector of coefficients for the 
macroeconomic variables;     – indicator for a country of the reform, which takes 
zeros for the control group of countries,    – indicator for the post reform period. 
     – dummy policy variable,      =    *  , which indicates that firm i is located 
in reform country after the reform and 0 otherwise; treatment – estimated treatment 
effect coefficient, which is reported,     – white noise; c – country index; t – year 
index; i – firm index. The heteroskedasticity robust estimators are used.  
The semilog specification indicates percent change in the outcome variable 
due to the reform impact as estimated by the treatment coefficient:  
                                                    (2.2) 
As there are several years in the data before and after the reforms, I must 
adjust for the possibility of a linear time trend in the outcome variables. In this regard, 
I use the correlated random trend model of Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), which 
allows for correlation between intercepts   , time trends   , and policy dummies    : 
                                      
where    is the time trend for firm i,    – year dummy and                            
    – white noise, T - year such that panel data have at least three or more periods. 
The first difference of this model: 
                                      (2.3) 
This can be estimated with a fixed effect panel regression using the first differences 
to infer the significance and sign of the treatment coefficient.  
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However, the DiD method compares changes in mean values for companies 
in different countries without taking into consideration the specific parameters of 
firms. To account for firms' heterogeneity, nonparametric propensity score matching 
difference-in-difference estimators (MDiD) are used (Heckman et al. 1997). This 
method has been found to be quite promising for non-experimental comparisons to 
emulate an experimental design of random selection of similar subjects into treated 
and control groups (Smith, Todd, et al, 2005).  The firms are matched by propensity 
scores, which are calculated with a logit estimator as a probability of being treated, 
i.e. treatment indicator is used as outcome for matching.  
After matching of firms, MDiD calculates the difference in mean values 
between the outcomes of companies from reformed countries, and matched firms in 
the control group. Matching methods construct pairs of treated-non-treated firms and 
compute the effects of reforms based on these pair-wise comparisons. This process is 
applied to their observable characteristics X with a matching score function.  The 
following observed covariates were used in matching: cash flow (cashflowe), which 
characterize sources of finance for R&D, price to book ratio (pbookr) to account for 
market valuation expectations, R&D intensity (rdeve) to compare firms with similar 
shares of R&D to total revenue, total revenue (treve), value of assets (assetse), and 
number of employees (employs) as an indicator of size, and also squared values of 
cash flow, R&D intensity, profit and gross margins, and total assets. For the level of 
R&D expenditures, R&D intensity was also added as the control parameter. 
As it is hardly possible to specify a full set of X parameters for a 
pharmaceutical firm, I assume that the weaker version of conditional independence 
assumption (CIA) holds: 
    |           |       
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As well, firms characteristics have common support for the treated and control 
groups. I assume a common pool of knowledge and technology so that it is possible 
to compare reform affected and counterfactual firms with the same financial 
characteristics across countries.  
 In the matching specification I use only two outcome variables: R&D 
expenditures and R&D intensity while using other financial indicators to match firms. 
The matching is conducted with popular propensity score estimations as were offered 
by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) in two forms: k-nearest neighbour and kernel. The 
choice of specific matching estimators in this model has been dictated by the 
prospect of achieving the best matching between control and treated firms while 
maintaining minimum a-priori assumptions. 
After matching, I check for homogeneity of the matched firms with pseudo 
R
2
 and likelihood ratio tests, which indicate the difference in the propensity scores 
between treated firms and control companies before matching (unmatched) and after 
matching (matched). 
 The k-nearest neighbour method finds k number of the closest counterfactual 
firm-observations to match to a reform treated firm and assigns appropriate weights 
to estimate the difference in outcomes between treated and control group of firms. I 
use k=1 and k=10. Kernel matching finds counterfactuals in a designated 
neighbourhood of a treated observation and assigns an appropriate weight to all 
observations in that neighbourhood. In the nearest neighbour technique bootstrapping 
does not always provide consistent estimates (Wooldridge and Imbens, 2009). I 
sorted the data with  a random uniform distribution before running matching. The 
software code which I used is the ‗psmatch2‘ of Leuven and Sianesi (2003). I used 
ten nearest neighbour with a default probit regression and bi-weight kernel matching 
with a default bandwidth of 0.06.   
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2.3. Empirical results of the econometric policy analysis 
 
I use several methods of econometric policy analysis to compare robustness of the 
obtained results. The descriptive statistics of the data related to the specific models is 
provided in the Attachment 4 for DiD methods and in Attchement 5 for MDiD.  
 
a) The simplest method is based on before-after estimations with t-test with different 
sample variances (the descriptive statistics is in Attachment 4). These estimations 
show the reforms had no significant negative impact of R&D prospects in France and 
cash flow of firms even increased (Table 2.8). No country experienced decreasing 
R&D expenditures.  
 
Table 2.8. P-values of t-test for equal means in the samples of firms‘ indicators 
before and after the reforms. 
Indicators 
 
Hypotheses  
 
Denmark 
 
Germany 
 
France 
 
Japan 
 
USA 
 
rdepe, N obs 62 173 30 281 2459 
R&D  Ha: ≠ 0 0.172 0.708 0.311 0.876 0.071* 
expenditure Ha: > 0 0.086* 0.646 0.155 0.562 0.035** 
rdev, N obs 54 172 29 281 2231 
R&D to   Ha: ≠ 0 0.092* 0.547 0.375 0.524 0.638 
revenue Ha: > 0 0.954 0.274 0.187 0.738 0.319 
treve, N obs 59 225 97 316 3198 
Total  Ha: ≠ 0 0.529 0.607 0.220 0.719 0.108 
revenue Ha: > 0 0.736 0.304 0.890 0.359 0.945 
gmargin, N obs 125 320 106 451 2221 
Gross  Ha: ≠ 0 0.01*** 0.356 0.224 0.102 0.086 
margin Ha: > 0 0.0004 0.178 0.888 0.051* 0.957 
cashflowe, N obs 147 658 1142 376 3219 
Cash flow Ha: ≠ 0 0.077* 0.615 0.084* 0.506 0.473 
  Ha: > 0 0.038** 0.307 0.958 0.253 0.763 
pbookr N obs 38 185 67 271 1845 
Price to  Ha: ≠ 0 0.428 0.198 0.404 0.148 0.188 
book value Ha: > 0 0.214 0.099* 0.798 0.074* 0.094 
Note: Ho: diff = 0, where diff = mean (after reforms) - mean(before reforms); t-test is two-
sample unequal variance t-test. N obs - combined number of observations; p-values are 
indicated for the following alternative hypotheses: Ha: is not 0 - the difference in mean 
values is not zero, Ha:>0 - the difference in mean values is greater than zero. Significance 
levels:* - 10%; ** - 5%; *** - 1%.  
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Firms in Germany, Japan, and the US all have their stock price to book value ratios 
decreased as a result of the reforms, but without any significant negative changes in 
R&D. This might reflect general market expectations of lower cash flow due to a 
temporal decreasing trend in R&D productivity.  Before-after estimators must be 
viewed with great care as they neglect time trends and heterogeneity of firms, which 
are addressed by DiD estimations and matching methods.  
 
b) DiD method. Table 2.9 reports estimated coefficients for the treatment indicator as 
specified by the regression (2.1) in the ‗Econometric methods‘ section: 
 
                                                               
                                                          
This specification is used for all countries and all outcome variables with the 
exception of two countries. The regulatory quality variable was dropped in all 
estimations for Germany and national pharmaceutical expenditures were dropped in 
all estimations for Japan to prevent multicollinearity with the treatment indicator.  
No significant impact of the reforms on price to book ratios has been found.  The 
reforms decreased revenue and R&D of pharmaceutical firms in Germany and Japan. 
Whenever R&D expenditures were affected by the reform, total revenues had similar 
impacts. The reforms seem to have no impact in France, Denmark, and USA.  
Semi-logarithmic specifications (regression 2.2) show that the reforms 
reduced R&D expenditures by 0.83% for companies in France (Table 2.10). This 
could be associated with the reform–induced reduction of firms‘ revenue by 0.91% 
and cash flow by 0.63% in France. 
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Table 2.9. The summary of difference-in-difference estimations for  
the treatment coefficients, all variables are in levels in Euro. 
Country 
 
rdepe 
(R&D, 
thousands ) 
rdev 
(R&D to 
revenue) 
treve 
(Revenue, 
thousands) 
gmargin 
(Gross 
margin) 
cashflowe 
(Cash  
flow, 
thousands) 
 
pbookr 
(Price to 
book  
ratio) 
Denmark 31.10 
(175.90) 
-2.29 
(2.92) 
-295.21 
(624.36) 
3.82 
(4.77) 
212.68 
(1559.31) 
.60 
(5.38) 
Germany -683.60 
(320.36)***  
-9.50 
(9.21) 
-1937.88 
(1118.20)* 
-3.67 
(4.99) 
-652.63 
(548.08) 
-2.75 
(16.61) 
France 3.16  
(3.71) 
-4.12 
(7.68) 
-703.72 
(1101.34) 
 4.03 
(5.08) 
802.99 
(1025.26) 
19.28 
(20.69) 
Japan -1784.17 
(743.28)** 
-11.41 
(10.38) 
-5209.56 
(3045.58)* 
-5.15 
(13.10) 
-875.47 
(812.32) 
 12.08 
(31.06) 
USA -31.30 
(36.96) 
-20.09 
(18.95) 
-614.04 
(520.81) 
1.57 
(2.13) 
-14.14 
(55.09) 
-28.33 
(22.90) 
Note: robust standard errors are given in brackets; *** - 1% significance level, ** - 5% significance 
level, * - 10% significance level. The estimations were performed by fixed effect panel regressions of 
these outcome variables on all macroeconomic variables (treatment dummy, regquality, pharspending, 
crtoprivate, population, patent) and year dummies and robust estimations for errors. The only 
exception in the regression specification was Japan – the pharmaceutical expenditures were dropped 
due to multicollinearity with the treatment indicator.   
 
Although the reforms reduced the revenue of German firms by 1.38%, R&D 
expenditures and R&D intensity stayed about the same.  No significant changes are 
indicated for Japan and USA in the estimation by this method. 
 
Table 2.10. The summary of semi-log DiD estimations for the treatment coefficients 
Country 
 
log 
(R&D) 
log 
(R&D to 
revenue) 
log 
(revenue) 
log 
(Gross 
margin) 
log 
(Cash  flow) 
log 
(Price to 
book  ratio) 
Denmark  -.15 
(.27) 
.19 
(.40) 
-.22 
(.41) 
.15 
(.12) 
-.89 
(.25)*** 
.40 
(.53) 
Germany  -.25 
(.27) 
-.50 
(.33) 
-1.38 
(.61)** 
-.11 
(.10) 
.32 
(.32) 
-.54 
(.91) 
France -.83  
(.46)* 
.72 
(.69) 
-.91 
(.52)* 
 .18  
(.14) 
-.63 
(.26)** 
.61 
(.77) 
Japan -.31 
(.46) 
.25 
(.65) 
-2.12 
(1.31) 
 -.08 
(.22) 
.35 
(.58) 
.24 
(.73) 
USA -.05 
(.22) 
-.07 
(.30) 
-.09 
(.23) 
.058 
(.05) 
.07 
(.15) 
-.002 
(.33) 
Note: the dependent variable is in logarithm, independent variables are in levels.  
rdepe is R&D expenditures, rdev is ratio of R&D to revenue, treve is total revenue, gmargin is gross 
margin, cashflowe is cash flow, pbookr is price to book ratio. Robust standard errors are given in 
brackets; significance levels: *** - 1%, ** - 5%, * - 10%. The estimations were performed by fixed 
effect panel regressions of these outcome variables on all macroeconomic variables (treatment dummy, 
regquality, pharspending, crtoprivate, population, patent) and year dummies. The only exception in 
the regression specification was Japan - pharmaceutical expenditures were dropped due to 
multicollinearity with the treatment indicator.   
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c) DiD estimations in the model with a correlated random trend (Table 2.11) account 
for the possibility of linear time trend in the outcome indicators as specified by 
regression (2.3) in the ‗Econometric methods‘ section.  
 
Table 2.11. The summary results for the treatment coefficients in  
the correlated random trend DiD method. 
Country 
 
rdepe 
(R&D, 
thousands ) 
rdev 
(R&D to 
revenue) 
treve 
(revenue, 
thousand) 
gmargin 
(gross 
margin) 
cashflowe 
(cash  
flow, 
thousand) 
 
pbookr 
(price to 
book  
ratio) 
Denmark 72.58 
(98.05) 
.04 
(.09) 
.14 
(.11) 
-2.21 
(4.34) 
-422.22 
(714.89) 
-3.06 
(8.73) 
Germany -2324.00 
(697.44)*** 
.37 
(1.42) 
-.07 
(.09) 
7.11 
(14.07) 
-1296.52 
(1628.31) 
48.06 
(66.15) 
France 219.59 
(299.85) 
6.07 
(3.71) 
-.11 
(.10) 
1.80 
(6.87) 
-2775.97 
(2319.55) 
45.13 
(43.18) 
Japan -2589.90 
(1150.49)** 
.06 
(.06) 
-.02 
(.01) 
6.35 
(3.85)* 
-857.13 
(1142.46) 
-6.31 
(13.25) 
USA 1.73 
(42.64) 
-40.31 
(31.62) 
-8.57 
(7.94) 
3.59 
(2.72) 
-167.05 
(166.53) 
-2.85 
(7.52) 
Note: robust standard errors are given in brackets; significance levels: *** - 1%, ** - 5%, * - 10%. 
The estimations were performed by fixed effect panel regressions for the first differences of the 
outcome variables on the first differences of all macroeconomic variables (treatment dummy, 
regquality, pharspending, crtoprivate, population, patent), year dummies were included. Regulatory 
quality variable was dropped in all estimations for Germany to prevent multicollineraity with the 
treatment indicator. Another exception in the specification was Japan - pharmaceutical expenditures 
were also dropped due to multicollinearity with the treatment indicator.   
 
 
The estimations show a negative impact for the reform on R&D expenditures for 
German firms due to drop in their revenue. R&D expenses in Japan decreased. 
Correlated random trend estimations support the linear DiD results which suggest 
that the reforms had a negative impact on R&D expenditures in Germany and Japan. 
The revenue of German firms was also reduced as shown by all three types of 
estimations.  
Investment perspectives as proxied by average Tobin‘s Q are the least 
affected by the reforms. The reform reduced R&D by 0.83%, the revenue by 0.91%, 
and the cash flow by 0.63% for firms based in France. Firms in Germany lost 1.38% 
of their revenues, and firms in Denmark lost 0.89% of their cash flow. No significant 
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changes are found for the US. Assuming a linear time trend, R&D expenditures in 
Germany and Japan were negatively affected by the reforms. Across all DiD 
estimations, we see consistently negative impacts of the reforms on R&D 
expenditures in Germany and Japan and no significant changes are found for the US. 
 
d) In MDiD estimators I use two major outcome variables – R&D expenditures and 
R&D intensity (the ratio of R&D expenditures to revenue of a firm) in one-to-one 
nearest matching (Table 2.13), 10-neighbour matching (Table 2.14), and kernel bi-
weighted (Table 2.15) methods (descriptive statistics is provided in Attachment 5).   
I use firm characteristics in the pre-reform year of 2000 as observable covariates to 
match the firms from the counterfactual countries.   
The following covariates for the R&D expenditures have been used in all 
matching calculations for the US and German firms in all MDiD estimations: R&D 
to assets (rdas), R&D to revenue (rdeve), total revenue (treve), cash flow (cashflowe), 
assets (totase), price to book ratio (pbookr), gross margins (gmargin), profit margin 
(prmargin), number of employees (employs) as an indicator of size, and also the 
squared values of cash flow, R&D to revenue, gross and profit margins and total 
assets.  
For the Japanese firms in all MDiD estimations, the following covariates for 
the R&D expenditures have been used: R&D to assets (rdas), R&D to revenue 
(rdeve), total revenue (treve), cash flow (cashflowe), assets (totase), price to book 
ratio (pbookr), gross margins (gmargin), profit margin (prmargin), and also squared 
values of R&D to revenue and total assets. For France I use such covariates as R&D 
to assets (rdas), R&D to revenue (rdeve), assets (totase), number of employees, and 
profit margin (prmargin). For Denmark, R&D to revenue (rdeve), total revenue 
(treve), assets (totase), price to book ratio (pbookr) and gross margins (gmargin) 
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have been applied to match firms in Denmark with the firms in the control group of 
countries.  
The matching calculations for R&D intensity (R&D to revenue) included the 
same set of covariates for the same countries, but the R&D intensity was replaced by 
R&D expenditures. The shrinking choice of covariates for matching was dictated by 
the limited sample size available for the firms located in a specific country so that 
only the most important financial indicators have been kept.   
Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) recommend using several matching 
approaches and concluded that as the number of matching neighbours increases so 
does the bias, but the variance of the matching estimator is reduced. Matching with 
replacement reduces the bias, but increases the variance. The likelihood ratio (LR) 
test of the joint insignificance of all regressors before and after matching should be 
rejected before the matching and should not be rejected after. The pseudo- R
2
 test 
suggested by Sianesi (2004) indicates whether or not regressors account for the 
probability of treatment.  
After matching the distribution of covariates between treated and untreated 
firms are rather similar and pseudo-R squared comes out low, which indicates that 
reasonable matching quality is achieved. I observe reasonably good matching for all 
parameters as judged by LR test and pseudo R
2 
for control and treated firms (Table 
2.13, 2.14), and also by comparing the p-values for the t-test for mean difference in 
matched samples of pharmaceutical firms (Attachment 5) for companies in all 
countries with some exception for France.  
The headings of these tables indicate: ATT – average effect of treatment 
(reform) on treated companies, which is the difference between the averages for 
treated and control group of firms; LR and pseudo R2 tests indicate the difference in 
the propensity scores between treated and control companies before matching 
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(unmatched) and after matching (matched). The observations on common support 
show the number of observations available for the control (untr) group of firms and 
treated (treat) group of firms for the country under reform. 
 
Table 2.12. The outcome of the average effects for one-to-one matched firms with 
replacement on R&D expenditures and R&D intensity. 
Country Variable ATT Treated Control LR test Pseudo R
2
 Observ
ations 
     Unmat
ched 
Matched Unmat
ched 
Mat-
ched 
on  
support 
Denmark R&D 
 
R&D 
intensity 
88277 
(1.9) 
0.502 
(2.0) 
179284 
 
.872 
91007 
 
0.370 
27.72 
(0.000) 
32.54 
(0.004) 
7.62 
(0.178) 
1.55 
(0.670) 
0.234 
 
0.190 
 
0.092 
 
0.015 
Untr: 65 
Treat: 30 
Untr: 115 
Treat: 38 
Germany R&D 
 
R&D 
intensity 
-39356 
(-0.30) 
 .013 
(0.21) 
276710 
 
.168 
316066 
 
.155 
 
39.28 
(0.000) 
27.79 
(0.001) 
5.27 
(0.969) 
5.54 
(0.699) 
0.161 
 
0.112 
 
0.040 
 
0.042 
 
Untr: 201 
Treat: 48 
Untr: 210 
Treat: 48 
France R&D 
 
R&D 
intensity 
410229 
(0.36) 
.535 
(0.76) 
932856.4 
 
1.354 
522627.1 
 
.818 
27.35 
(0.000) 
32.89 
(0.000) 
8.25 
(0.143) 
8.77 
(0.118) 
0.410 
 
0.493 
0.248 
 
0.264 
 
Untr: 65 
Treat: 12 
Japan R&D 
 
R&D 
intensity 
32415 
(0.50) 
-.017 
(-0.44) 
119285.1 
 
 .097 
86869.8 
 
 .114 
67.15 
(0.000) 
59.80 
(0.000) 
14.56 
(0.149) 
7.47  
(0.382) 
0.240 
 
0.212 
 
0.027 
 
0.014 
 
Untr: 61 
Treat: 192 
USA R&D 
 
R&D 
intensity 
71859 
(1.64) 
.004 
(0.16) 
165626 
 
.178 
93766 
 
.174 
38.72 
(0.000) 
30.79 
(0.004) 
11.35 
0.581 
13.52 
(0.408) 
0.032 
 
0.026 
 
0.009 
 
0.010 
 
Untr: 406 
Treat: 468  
Note: t-statistics for average effect of treatment on treated (ATT) is reported in brackets.  
The averages for Treated and for randomply matched Control observations are shown. In the 
observations on common support column, Untr stands for the number of untreated, and Treat – for the 
number of treated observationsons. In brackets for pseudo R
2
 are shown corresponding p-values of the 
likelihood ratio test for the joint insignificance of all regressors before (unmatched column) and after 
the matching (matched column). P-values for the LR (likelihood ratio) tests are indicated in brackets.  
 
 
A significant reduction in pseudo R
2
 is also indicative of homogeneity of the 
matched firms by the chosen observed parameters. Distribution of propensity score 
for treated and control firms in France were also unsatisfactory for most of the firms. 
Quality of matching is confirmed by the results of balancing tests such as bias 
reduction and p-values for the t-test for mean difference in matched samples of 
pharmaceutical firms (Attachement 5). 
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Table 2.13. The outcome of the average effects for 10-neighbour matched firms on  
R&D expenditures and R&D intensity. 
Country Variable ATT Treated Controls LR test Pseudo R
2
 Observa
tions 
     Unmat
ched 
Mat-
ched 
Unmat
ched 
Mat-
ched 
on  
support 
Denmark R&D 
 
R&D 
intensity 
132230 
(3.15) 
0.30 
(1.51) 
179284 
 
.872 
47054 
 
 0.570 
27.72 
(0.000) 
 32.54 
(0.000) 
8.46 
(0.133) 
1.88 
(0.597) 
0.234 
 
0.190  
 
0.102 
 
0.018 
 
Untr: 65 
Treat: 30 
Untr: 115 
Treat: 38 
Germany R&D 
 
R&D 
intensity 
24450 
(0.26) 
.045 
(1.11) 
276710 
 
.168 
252260 
 
.123 
39.28 
(0.000) 
27.79 
(0.001) 
5.39 
(0.966) 
5.01 
(0.757) 
0.161 
 
0.112 
 
0.040 
 
0.038 
 
Untr: 201 
Treat: 48 
France R&D 
 
R&D 
intensity 
-493748 
(-0.86) 
1.179 
(1.80) 
932856 
 
1.354 
1426605 
 
.174 
27.35 
(0.000) 
32.89 
(0.000) 
6.41 
(0.268) 
8.49 
( 0.131) 
 0.410 
 
0.493 
 
0.193 
 
0.255 
Untr: 65 
Treat: 12 
Japan R&D 
 
R&D 
intensity 
26414.3 
(0.37) 
.009 
(0.28) 
119285.2 
 
.097 
 92870.8 
 
.089 
67.15 
(0.000) 
 59.80 
(0.000) 
15.71 
(0.108) 
10.0 
(0.188) 
0.240 
 
0.212 
 
0.030 
 
0.019 
Untr: 61 
Treat: 192 
USA R&D 
 
R&D 
intensity 
 30777.3 
(0.59) 
.012 
(0.75) 
165625.8 
 
.178 
134848.4 
 
.166 
38.72 
(0.000) 
30.79 
(0.004) 
3.57 
(0.995) 
3.89 
(0.992) 
0.032 
 
0.026 
 
0.003 
 
0.003 
 
Untr: 406 
Treat: 468  
Note: t-statistics for average effect of treatment on treated (ATT) is reported in brackets.  
The averages for Treated and for randomply matched Control observations are shown. In the 
observations on common support column, Untr stands for the number of untreated, and Treat – for the 
number of treated observations. In brackets for pseudo R
2
 are shown corresponding p-values of the 
likelihood ratio test for the joint insignificance of all regressors before (unmatched column) and after 
the matching (matched column).  P-values for the LR (likelihood ratio) tests are indicated in brackets.    
 
All countries have quite a good reduction of bias after matching and one could not 
reject equality of average values for treated and counterfactual firms by any specified 
parameter (Attachment 5). Comparing the results for all three matching methods, one 
can see a consistency in the estimated effects for Denmark and USA.   
The US and Denmark are countries where all matching methods indicate positive 
impacts of the reforms on R&D expenditures. Surprisingly enough, R&D intensity in 
Germany did not decrease. 
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Table 2.14. The outcome of the average effects for kernel bi-weighted matched firms 
on R&D expenditures and R&D intensity. 
Country Variable ATT Treated Controls LR test Pseudo R
2
 Observa 
tions 
     Unmat
ched 
Matched Unmat
ched 
Mat-
ched 
on  
support 
Denmark R&D 
 
R&D 
intensity 
50967 
(1.42) 
 0.413 
(1.36) 
140053 
 
.872 
 
89086 
 
0.459 
27.72 
(0.000) 
 32.54 
(0.000) 
10.8 
(0.055) 
1.77 
(0.621) 
0.234 
 
0.190  
 
0.139 
 
 0.017 
 
Untr: 65 
Treat: 30 
Untr: 115 
Treat: 38 
Germany R&D 
 
R&D 
intensity 
-58988 
(-0.55) 
.022 
(0.50) 
260768 
 
.168 
319756 
 
.146 
 39.28 
(0.000) 
 27.79 
(0.001) 
 1.76 
(1.000) 
2.69 
(0.952) 
0.161 
 
0.112 
 
 0.014 
 
 0.020 
 
Untr: 201 
Treat: 48 
France R&D 
 
R&D 
intensity 
-210214 
(-0.27) 
 -.224 
(-3.72) 
776927 
 
 .111 
987142 
 
.336 
27.35 
(0.000) 
32.89 
(0.000) 
5.15 
(0.398) 
2.26 
(0.812) 
0.410 
 
0.493 
 
0.310 
 
0.163 
Untr: 65 
Treat: 12 
Japan R&D 
 
R&D 
intensity 
26408 
(0.47) 
 .005 
(0.16) 
119285 
 
 .097 
92877 
 
 .092 
 67.15 
(0.000) 
 59.80 
(0.000) 
12.07 
(0.280) 
13.0 
(0.072) 
0.240 
 
0.212 
 
0.023 
 
0.024 
Untr: 61 
Treat: 192 
USA R&D 
 
R&D 
intensity 
34052 
(0.72) 
 .011 
(0.70) 
165626 
 
 .177 
131574 
 
.166 
38.72 
(0.000) 
30.79 
(0.004) 
3.77 
(0.993) 
5.80 
(0.953) 
0.032 
 
0.026 
 
0.003 
 
0.004 
 
Untr: 406 
Treat: 468  
Note: t-statistics for average effect of treatment on treated (ATT) is reported in brackets. The averages 
for Treated and for randomply matched Control observations are shown. In the observations on 
common support column, Untr stands for the number of untreated, and Treat – for the number of 
treated observations. In brackets for pseudo R
2
 are shown corresponding p-values of the likelihood 
ratio test for the joint insignificance of all regressors before (unmatch column) and after the matching 
(match column).  P-values for the LR (likelihood ratio) tests are indicated in brackets.  
 
 
Discussion of the results and conclusion 
This is the comprehensive attempt in the literature to estimate impacts of recent cost-
containment pharmaceutical reforms in five countries on R&D related indicators for 
pharmaceutical firms. In spite of the findings in the literature, I do not observe any 
consistent dramatic impact of the reforms in question on R&D related indicators in 
any of the countries analysed. According to most estimation results, such important 
investment indicators as cash flows and price to book ratios were unaffected by the 
reforms. The only consistent result across most of the methods employed is a 
negative impact of reforms on R&D expenditures in Germany, but the R&D intensity 
remained unchanged. The reforms in the US had likely positive impacts on R&D 
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expenditures and R&D intensity. The matching methods indicate a positive impact of 
reforms on R&D expenditures in Denmark and Japan. This can be explained by 
significant demand subsidies of the reform in the US, and increased incentives for 
‗me-too‘ drug innovations in Japan (Danzon, 1997) to sustain revenue stream after 
the reform.   
There might be several explanations for the observed persistency of R&D 
indicators. One reason is that drug development takes many years and I am unable to 
observe the long term changes in the variables due to a short after reform period. 
R&D is connected to specific drug development projects, which would be costly to 
terminate immediately after a regulatory shock so that a transition to  new 
equilibrium R&D expenditures might take many years. Filson and Masia (2007) 
constructed a theoretical model of a rational profit-maximizing pharmaceutical firm 
running a portfolio of drug research projects to theoretically estimate the effects of 
price controls on innovations. They found that mild adverse policy changes might not 
be noticeable for years due to large drug development lags. 
The second explanation is that R&D represents the competitive advantage of 
research firms and so companies might strategically maintain their R&D in the 
presence of adverse regulatory shocks. R&D is necessary to patent new drugs, keep 
market shares, and generally stay in business. To maintain sales for a middle-ranked 
pharmaceutical company it needs to successfully develop at least 1-2 new chemical 
entity drugs annually with average attrition rates. This translates into a need for 15-
20 clinical trials candidates or 40-80 preclinical drug candidate trials per year 
(Bartfai and Lees, 2006, p.217). A company needs 2-4 new drugs annually to 
maintain double–digit growth (Gassmann et al, 2008, p.51). 
Himmelberg and Petersen (1994, p.41) note that a large share of R&D 
expenditures account for the employment researchers with associated tacit 
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knowledge and experience. Firms must retain these competent employees by 
smoothing R&D expenditures at a level dictated by the internal finance of the firm. 
Erickson and Jaconson (1992) found that R&D expenditures are crucial for firms‘ 
comparative advantage even if the direct returns on these expenditures are low, so 
that pharmaceutical firms are unwilling to reduce their level of R&D in spite of 
adverse regulatory shocks. Some authors (Eberhart, Maxwell, et al., 2004; Connolly 
and Hirschey, 2005) found that a significant component of valuation of 
pharmaceutical firms is the expected profit from increased R&D, hence, corporations 
tend to maintain high levels of R&D.  
The third explanation can be rooted in the possibility of exports to less 
regulated countries. If governments can contain domestic markets, most European 
and Japanese firms can still export their products to the US, which is the largest and 
least pricewise regulated market. According to UNSD COMTRADE data system, all 
countries increased their exports of pharmaceuticals to the US from 1.3 times for 
Japan to 5 times for Denmark in the period 2001-2005 (Table 2.15). 
 
Table 2.15. Imports of pharmaceutical products to the US: 2001-2005. 
Imports to the US 
from 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 five year 
total 
2005 to 
2001, % 
Denmark 217.95 310.69 441.61 529.73 1093.06 2593.04 501.52 
France 1505.03 1891.33 2505.22 3288.16 3854.78 13044.51 256.13 
Germany 2294.77 2655.92 3602.79 4601.19 4974.45 18129.13 216.77 
Italy 6  24.72 572.79 652.59 931.65 1463.95 4245.70 234.34 
Japan 1382.03 1608.44 2129.51 2030.85 1799.01 8949.84 130.17 
Norway 38.30 75.29 76.4 97.94 123.19 411.14 321.63 
Sweden 607.83 751.78 1401.5 1669.77 1590.24 6021.12 261.62 
Switzerland 1093.29 1142.79 1339.27 1298.28 1507.51 6381.14 137.89 
UK 2659.46 3159.86 4525.16 4883.33 4130.14 19357.95 155.30 
Note: in million of US$ of pharmaceutical products, which are classified by international  
harmonized system of product classification, code 30.  
Source: UNSD COMTRADE data system. 
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The fourth possible explanation is that firms lobbied the legislatures to carry 
out reforms which were less harmful for their financial positions, or were able 
adopt/find some loopholes in the regulations. Firms can react in anticipation of the 
reforms so that they can act strategically by adjusting their R&D activities well in 
advance.  For the European countries, the impacts of reforms can be mitigated by a 
reduction of parallel imports from other EU countries. 
These findings should be useful for health care policymakers in OECD 
countries to design better cost-containing policies with less damaging impacts on the 
innovations. A mandatory generic substitution can reduce R&D of the national 
companies, but it seems possible to conduct cost-containment reforms without 
detrimental effects of R&D in the short run, at least in already heavily regulated 
markets. Long-term effects are not warranted and remain to be seen. 
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3. The role of liquidity constraints for R&D and investment  
in the pharmaceutical industry 
 
The ability to purchase resources for R&D is determined by the cost of 
capital as extracted from imperfect capital markets. Small firms and start-ups can be 
hindered by liquidity constraints, especially in conditions of information asymmetry 
of pharmaceutical R&D projects and imperfect financial markets. Hall (2002) 
concludes that small and new innovative firms experience high costs of capital and 
even large firms prefer internal funds for the financing of R&D. Fazzari, Hubbard, et 
al. (1988) point out the key role of cash flow in the investment decisions of firms. 
This chapter tests the hypothesis that cash flow has a positive impact on R&D 
intensity and estimates the effect of cash flow on R&D for new and small firms.  
Section 3.1 summarizes the literature on liquidity constraints for R&D and 
physical investment. Determination of cash constrained firms is tricky: financially 
distressed companies can be presented as cash constrained ones (Kaplan and 
Zingales, 1997) or negative cash flow can tilt the results (Allayannis and Mozumdar, 
2004). The interpretation of a positive cash flow relationship with R&D and 
investment is not clear and can also be explained by investment expectations (Gomes, 
2001), by managers diverting cash flow (Hubbard, 1998), by market power of 
companies (Cooper and Ejarque, 2003), or by measurement errors in Tobin‘s Q 
(Erickson and Whited, 2000; Bond, Klemm, et al. 2004; Cummins, Hassett, et al. 
2006).   
The capital structure (leverage) is an important parameter in R&D and 
investment decisions. Myers (1977) develops a model showing that high debt can 
reduce investments as cash must be used to service previous debts and as higher debt 
increases the likelihood of bankruptcy. McConnell and Servaes (1995) detect the 
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leverage has a negative impact on corporate value of the US firms with high Tobin‘s 
Q, but a positive impact on the value of firms with low Tobin‘s Q. Aivazian, Geb et 
al. (2005) find that leverage is negatively related to investment of Canadian firms. 
Ahn, Denis et al. (2006) empirically find a negative impact of leverage on investment 
for diversified firms with high Tobin‘s Q. 
Section 3.2 first reviews the empirical literature related to the pharmaceutical 
industry. Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) used fixed effect regression to estimate 
the effects of cash flow, change in sales and Tobin‘s Q on R&D expenditures and 
estimated cash flow elasticities for R&D at 0.67 and physical investment at 0.82. 
Grabowski and Vernon (2000) using data on 11 firms specify an OLS regression and 
also found positive effect of cash flow on R&D to sales ratio. Vernon (2005) 
obtained statistically significant result for 14 American pharmaceutical firms on a 
panel dataset over four years using OLS, fixed and random effects panel regressions. 
However, the specification of Grabowski and Vernon might not provide a consistent 
estimate. Corrections are needed in case of persistence of R&D as OLS estimators 
are likely to be biased in this case. Mahlich and Roediger-Schluga (2006) consider a 
dynamic model that is estimated with systems GMM for a panel of Japanese 
pharmaceutical firms and heralded a positive coefficient for cash flow.  
Assuming the persistence of R&D for a firm, I use GMM estimators for 
dynamic panel regressions of ratio of R&D or investment to total assets on a number 
of corporate indicators such as debt, stock volatility, cash flow, price-to-book ratio, 
sales, the number of employees, macroeconomic indicators of regulatory quality, 
credit to the private sector and population. Country and year dummies are also 
included. I assume that it takes many years for R&D and investment to generate sales 
and cash flow so that there is no simultaneous feedback. Based on the literature 
review, I expect the coefficients for cash flow to be positive. 
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To consistently estimate the model, I use system and difference GMM 
methods and also pooled cluster OLS and panel within estimators for comparison 
purposes. The system GMM combines the moment conditions for the first difference 
model with level moments and has less bias if the series is close to a random walk 
(Blundell and Bond, 1998). However, in short panels here, GMM estimators with a 
large number of moment conditions can suffer from the small-sample bias so that it 
is wise to limit the number of conditions and instruments. In this regard, I minimize 
the number of instruments and use the dependent variable lagged at t-2, t-3 and 
further lags as the GMM instrument, and year dummies are used as IV instruments. 
Alternative instruments have also been attempted (Attachment 7), but they do not 
pass the tests for valid instruments. 
Most studies of R&D at firm level are devoted to a specific country, the 
majority belonging to the US. I use the sample of 482 firms from 15 OECD 
countries. The majority of data comes from American and British companies.  
Section 3.3 discusses the results of estimations. Both Sargan and Hansen tests 
for overidentified restrictions indicate the orthogonality conditions of the difference 
GMM estimator failed to be rejected, which implies that the instruments are likely to 
be valid. In the difference GMM Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences, I 
reject the null of no serial correlations in errors, but failed to reject it for the second 
order AR(2) correlations, which also confirms validity of the instruments. Wald and 
F statistics reject the null hypothesis of joint insignificance of the coefficients. 
Cash flow to assets shows positive and significant coefficients, which suggest 
that an additional cash flow of Euros increases R&D to approximately 56 cents 
(0.56€). The elasticity point estimation at the median value of the R&D expenditures, 
cash flows, and assets in the sample shows that 10% growth of cash flow leads to 
3.6% growth in R&D expenditures.  
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Because it is empirically hard to identify firms with liquidity constraints 
(Moyen, 2004), I use several criteria for such identification and estimate the cash 
flow coefficients for several subsamples of observations: for small firms with a 
maximum of 100 employees; for large firms with a minimum of 500 employees; 
excluding firm-years with negative cash flow; firms with Tobin‘s Q less than one as 
proxied by price-to-book ratio; young companies established for 15 years or less; 
firms within the lower half range of the dividend payout ratio.  
I use the difference GMM method for these estimations due to the lower 
number of moment conditions, which reduces the short panel bias in comparison to 
system GMM (Windmeijer, 2005). The estimated sensitivity of R&D to cash flow is 
higher for smaller firms (0.75) than for all firms (0.56), whereas the cash flow 
sensitivity for large firms is becoming statistically insignificant. For larger firms, the 
debt burden appears to play a more negative role in their R&D decisions. If we 
exclude firms with negative cash flows, the sensitivity of R&D to cash flow is still 
statistically significant, but much smaller (0.27). 
Firms with low investment prospects as proxied by less than one price-to-
book ratio also have reduced sensitivity of their R&D to cash flow. Young firms 
have higher sensitivity of R&D to cash flow. Young firms have significant sensitivity 
of their R&D to price-to-book ratio and they seem to finance their R&D with debt 
while having a negative relationship of R&D with the number of employees, sales, 
and cash holdings 
Similar estimations for physical investment show that cash flow seems to not 
play an important role; although price-to-book ratio and the number of employees are 
likely to be positively associated with investment. This suggests a principal 
difference between more risky and uncertain R&D projects versus physical 
investment in the industry: R&D is dependent on the availability of internal finance.  
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3.1. Liquidity constraints for R&D and physical investment 
 
R&D can be conventionally viewed as a long-term investment guided in respect to 
the risk adjusted rate of return. The ability to purchase resources for R&D is 
determined by the cost of capital as extracted from imperfect capital markets. 
Theoretical models show that creditors might ration loans in the presence of high 
asymmetry of information instead of charging high risk premiums, which can depend 
on the capital structure of a firm (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
Fazzari, Hubbard, et al. (1988) reviewing the relevant literature on asymmetric 
information and capital market imperfections point out that a firm's cost of internal 
funds generated by revenue can be substantially lower than its cost of external 
finance that takes place in the form of issuing equity, bonds, or obtaining loans. Hall 
(2002) concludes that small and new innovative firms experience high costs of 
capital and even large firms prefer internal funds for the financing of R&D. 
Government polices such as price controls, approval procedures, patent protection, 
and public purchases can also affect risks associated with specifics of how the 
industry is financed. 
R&D has many features of investment as this is a result of long term 
accumulation of knowledge capital, although R&D has a much smaller variance than 
physical investment in plant and equipment (Hall and Hayashi, 1989). Hall (2002) 
summarizes several important features of R&D that can make the cost of external 
capital for an R&D project higher:  
- Asymmetric information between inventor and investor, as the inventor has more 
expertise in their own project or is otherwise reluctant to reveal information. The 
situation is exacerbated by the high uncertainty of R&D. 
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- Moral hazard on the part of the inventor or inventor‘s firm management by 
diverting funds into unnecessary expenditures.  
- Tax deduction legislation that affects servicing external debts.  
- Incomplete markets as debt-holders prefer physical assets as collateral to secure 
loans. Sunk costs of R&D are usually higher than physical investment.  
Asymmetry of information is quite high in pharmaceuticals as the quality of a 
drug candidate can remain uncertain for several years from preclinical research until 
clinical trials are mostly completed. Secrecy in pre-clinical drug discovery is 
important as first entry into a market can result in much larger profits than that which 
is generally on offer to a latecomer (Bartfai and Lees, 2006).  
Competition in pharmaceutical markets is often dynamic due to the 
introduction of new technology and substitutive new or generic products. Philipson 
and Dai (2003, p.46) estimated that competition with newly patented drugs in the US 
reduces the net present value of the original drug sales similarly or even greater than 
the entry of drugs after patent expiration. According to Gassmann et al, (2008, p.16), 
the first entrant in respect of  a class of drug usually takes a market share of 40-60%, 
the second entrant captures around 15%, whilst a third might not even recover its 
costs. According to Bartfai and Lees (2006, pp.41-42,197) if a good drug target is 
found, other companies enter the market with their drugs addressing the same target 
usually within a year. Often, drugs that enter the market secondly or thirdly in a new 
therapeutic class are chemically superior to the first and will acquire a larger slice of 
the market than that of the original innovator‘s drug.   
Pisano (2006, pp.142-143) points out that biotechnology companies usually 
have no actual final products ready and there are no financial standards to disclose 
and evaluate risks that relate to ongoing research. Although many small firms in 
innovation-driven sectors may call venture capitalists to raise capital, a drug project 
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needed to generate a 25-35% annual return in order to attract investments from 
venture capitalists (Grabowski and Vernon, 2000, p.207).  
 
Investment and R&D decisions  
Under Hayashi's (1982) assumptions about perfect competition and firms‘ 
investment decisions, average Tobin‘s Q sufficiently characterizes a firm‘s 
investment opportunities. However, pharmaceutical markets usually contradict 
Hayashi‘s assumptions such as perfect competition at product markets, linear 
homogeneity of technologies for production, and zero adjustment costs.  R&D costs 
are often sunk, patented drugs markets are segmented and usually have oligopolistic 
characteristics and tacit knowledge and skills of some scientists make it difficult to 
fire them. These factors might create a dependence upon investment and R&D 
decisions on cash flow. 
U.S. nonfinancial corporations financed more than 80% of their investment 
through internal cash flow (Myers, 2001, p.82). R&D of large pharmaceutical firms 
is financed mainly from retaining earnings (Danzon 1997, p.56). Fazzari, Hubbard, et 
al. (1988) point out the key role of cash flow in investment decisions of firms. They 
split their sample of American firms into three groups of financially constrained 
firms as proxied by dividends to income ratio and run instrumented regression of the 
investment-capital ratio. It is found statistically significant coefficients for the cash 
flow, which were larger for low dividend paying firms. 
However, determination of cash constrained firms is tricky. Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997) using annual reports of firms from the study of Fazzari, Hubbard et 
al. (1988) find that the group which was assumed to be a financially constrained one, 
in fact, shows the lowest sensitivity of investment to cash flow. Hubbard (1998) 
suggests that this could be explained by Kaplan and Zingales assigning firms into 
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cash constrained based on managerial statements and, in this case, financially 
distressed firms can be presented as cash constrained ones. However, Cleary (1999) 
using accounting ratios with multiple discriminant analysis for a sample of American 
firms that companies with high creditworthiness are more sensitive to internal funds 
than less creditworthy firms. This result supports Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
findings that investments of the least constrained firms are more sensitive to the cash 
flow. 
Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) find that Cleary‘s results can be explained 
by negative cash flow observations in Cleary‘s sample and the Kaplan–Zingales 
results are affected by a few influential observations. They explain that the negative 
cash flow is a proxy for financially distressed situations and as firms in this condition 
must afford only essential investment - cash flow sensitivity must be very low. 
Allayannis and Mozumdar find that investment–cash flow sensitivity estimates are 
similar for all firms in the financially constrained group of firms by excluding the 
negative cash flow observations. 
However, the interpretation of a positive cash flow relationship with 
investment is not clear as was evident in Gomes (2001), who argues that this 
relationship can be explained by investment expectations for a firm rather than by 
cash flow per se. Review of Hubbard (1998, p.200) suggests that ―If cash flow is 
correlated with future profitability, a link between cash flow and investment for a 
given firm over time could reflect the link between expected profitability and 
investment.‖  Hubbard also suggests that if managers use internal funds for other 
purposes other than firm value-maximizing projects, then cash flow-investment links 
can also emerge. Aggarwal and Samwick (2006) argue that managers‘ incentives to 
expand investment and operations are countered by increasing the burden of 
oversight responsibilities and this balance is not obvious ex ante. 
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Cooper and Ejarque (2003) through a model with numerical simulations 
argue that market power rather than capital market imperfections explain the positive 
relationship between investment and internal funds of firms. Erickson and Whited 
(2000) and Gomes (2001) argue that the significance of internal funds in investment 
regressions may reflect measurement error in Tobin‘s Q, which is imperfectly 
approximated by an average Q. Erickson and Whited (2000) use a higher order 
moment conditions to account for measurement error in Tobin‘s Q and find that the 
coefficient of the cash-flow variable becomes insignificant. Alti (2003) proposes a 
model to explain sensitivity of investment to cash flow for small and young firms 
through learning about their cash flow realizations.  
 Bond, Klemm et al. (2004) find that cash flow does not explain the 
investment decisions of firms if expected profitability predicted by securities analysts 
is used instead of imperfectly measured average Tobin‘s Q for a panel sample of the 
UK firms. They argue that significant coefficients for cash flow can be a result of 
measurement error in Tobin‘s Q or reflect misspecification of the basic model. It is 
pointed out that stock exchange ‗bubbles‘ or other factors that influence the expected 
future profitability of current investment. 
Cummins, Hassett et al. (2006) confirm these findings for the set of the US 
firms too. They argue that the positive and statistically significant cash-flow 
coefficient could emerge as the result of error in the average Tobin‘s Q and its 
significance disappears after controlling for analyst-based average Q. The only 
problem of this approach of using securities analysts‘ forecasts is that we do not 
know how the forecasts are obtained and if the forecasts actually include cash flow 
variables.  
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2006) using surveys of over 10,000 firms from 
80 countries find that older, larger, and foreign-owned firms report less financing 
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obstacles. It could be that cash constrained firms respond with higher levels of 
investment. Boyle and Guthrie (2003) develop a model, which explains 
overinvestment bias for small firms as future risks related to own cash flows can lead 
to funding shortages. 
 
Debt financing  
Another important parameter affecting investment and R&D decisions is 
leverage; a ratio of liabilities to total assets. The impact of this ratio is not clear both 
in theoretical and empirical literature. Modigliani and Miller (1963) show how 
corporate taxes bring a positive relationship between leverage and the value of the 
firm due to the tax shield. However, high leverage can increase the risk of 
bankruptcy. Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose a moral hazard model in which 
firms with high debt would be prone to risky investment projects due to limited 
liability: downside risks can be largely borne by external creditors, whereas upside 
returns benefit the firm more. Myers (1977) develops a model showing that high debt 
can reduce investments as cash must be used to service previous debts and as higher 
debt increases likelihood of bankruptcy. Jensen (1986) proposes high leverage as a 
tool to reduce moral hazards on the side of managers to misspend firm‘s cash so that 
managers would invest cash only if they see a high probability of getting an 
appropriate return on their projects. Hall (2002) criticizes this tool as it increases the 
cost of capital for R&D and debt repayment will likely divert cash from R&D and 
other investment.  
Szewczyk, Tsetsekos et al. (1996) find that average approximation for 
Tobin‘s Q is statistically significant in explaining abnormal returns connected to 
R&D projects, and that these returns are higher for leveraged firms. Because 
marginal Tobin‘s Q is unobservable, the average Q is proxied by price to book ratio. 
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McConnell and Servaes (1995) detect the leverage has a negative impact on 
corporate value of the US firms with high Tobin‘s Q, but a positive impact on the 
value of firms with low Tobin‘s Q. This could indicate the moral hazard problem for 
firms with low investment opportunities as indicated by Q. Aivazian, Geb et al. 
(2005) using the instrumental variable of the ratio of tangible assets to total find that 
leverage is negatively related to investment of Canadian firms.  
Lang, Ofek et al. (1996) find a negative impact of leverage on investment for 
low Q firms.  McConnell and Servaes (1995) divide their sample of firms into three 
groups based on the stock price to operating earnings per share and find a positive 
relation between Tobin‘s Q and leverage among bottom price to earnings ratio and a 
negative relation between Tobin‘s Q and leverage for firms with the top group of 
firms. Ahn, Denis et al. (2006) empirically find a negative impact of leverage on 
investment for diversified firms with high Q. 
 
3.2. Empirical methods and expected results  
 
Related empirical literature on the pharmaceutical industry  
Most studies of R&D at firm level are devoted to a specific country, the majority 
belonging to the US. Cross-country differences in capital markets and institutional 
organizations complicate uniform consideration of liquidity constraints. For example, 
Agrawal (1999, p.105) found that a large market for pharmaceuticals is associated 
with larger R&D expenditures in developed countries, but this relationship is not 
statistically significant for developing countries‘ firms. In this regard, this study 
focused on OECD countries, which are more homogeneous.  
Scherer (2007, p.39-40) noticed that in times of high abnormal profits, firms 
increase R&D to obtain a larger share of these virtuous rents, but competition over 
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these rents eventually reduces them with a subsequent decrease in R&D. Higher 
profits from innovations increase the incentives for rivals to create substitutes in the 
form of ‗me-too‘ drugs, which are similar in drug mechanism, but sufficiently 
different to not infringe the original drug patent. A patent does not fully protect the 
profit of the innovator from imitative destruction, and it does force the firm to 
disclose a lot of information about drug structure and therapy.  
Branch (1974) used a distributed lag regression technique for profit and 
patents in a sample of 111 firms from various industries for the period 1950-65 and 
concluded that R&D was positively affected by past profitability, but that R&D itself 
also positively influenced future sales and profitability. To account for firm 
heterogeneity, he normalized all variables in the regression to assets. 
Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) found a significant relationship between 
R&D and internal finance in a panel of 179 American small technological firms and 
that elasticity by cash flow for capital investment is twice as high as the elasticity for 
R&D in within-firm estimates. This difference is explained by higher adjustment 
costs for R&D associated with payments to specialists who possess critical and often 
tacit firm-specific knowledge. Himmelberg and Petersen used fixed effect regression 
to estimate the effects of cash flow, change in sales and Tobin‘s Q on R&D 
expenditures and estimated cash flow elasticities for R&D at 0.67 and physical 
investment at 0.82. Himmelberg and Petersen (1994, p.41) forward a hypothesis that 
―to minimize both the current and future adjustment costs, firms set the level of R&D 
investment in accordance with the permanent level of internal finance‖. 
Grabowski and Vernon (2000) using data on 11 firms specify an OLS 
regression of R&D divided by sales as linear function of a contemporaneous index of 
expected returns to R&D, one year lagged cash flow divided by sales, and a dummy 
variable for each firm. Their estimations generate a coefficient before cash flow that 
 123 
is between 0.12 and 0.31. Vernon (2005) later criticized this approach by pointing 
out the fact that firms have sustainably different profitability levels and 
heterogeneous expectations. He proposed the replacement of the industry profit 
margin with the current period pre-tax profit margin (pre-tax profit to sales) as proxy 
for expected profitability. Vernon obtained statistically significant result for 14 US 
firms on a panel dataset over four years using OLS, fixed and random effects panel 
regressions. 
The specification of Grabowski and Vernon might not provide a consistent 
estimate. Corrections are needed in case of persistence of R&D as OLS estimators 
are likely to be biased in this case. Hall and Hayashi (1989) empirically found 
persistency in R&D investment across a number of industries. As pharmaceutical 
R&D projects usually continue between 8 and 15 years, some persistency of R&D in 
the industry should be expected. This suggests that dynamic panel models are more 
appropriate for estimations of impacts of cash flow on R&D.  
Hall (2002) suggests using the approach of Griliches and Hausman (1984) in 
estimating the coefficient for cash flow impact on R&D by removing firm effects 
with first differencing, and thereafter estimating it with instrumental variables such 
as t-2 and earlier lags of cash flow. All of which takes place under the assumption 
that the R&D transitory component is independently distributed. If the component 
follows an MA(1) process, one must use t - 3 and earlier lags of cash flow as 
instruments.  
Mahlich and Roediger-Schluga (2006) consider a dynamic model that is 
estimated with systems GMM in regression of R&D spending divided by sales on 
sales of old and new drugs, the weighted average profit rate of the entire industry, 
and dummies for expected price regulations, and cash flows in Japan. Their 
estimations for a panel dataset of Japanese pharmaceutical firms indicate little impact 
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on sales in relation to R&D intensity and heralded a positive coefficient for cash flow 
in the range of 0.027-0.062.  
 
Empirical methods and expected results  
 
Assuming the persistence of R&D for a firm, GMM estimators for dynamic panel 
regressions are used in the following functional form:  
                    
  
 
         
    
 
                 
     
 
       
  
    
      
                                           
where     is either ratio of R&D or investment to total assets of firm i at time t; K – 
total assets of a firm; CF – cash flow; Cash – cash and cash equivalent holdings, 
which, can be a useful regressor as used by Almeida, Campello et al. (2004) who 
empirically find that financially constrained firms save more cash from their own 
cash flows. Q – Tobin‘s q as proxied by market-to-book ratio; Sales – total sales; 
Debt - total liabilities and debt; Size – a variable to control for a frim‘s size as 
proxied either by logarithm of the number of employees (lemp) or logarithm of total 
assets (ltotase), which could control for economies of scale and greater market 
information available on larger firms;   – country dummies,   – year dummies,     - 
white noise, Risk – is logarithm of ratio of a firm‘s highest stock price to its lowest 
stock price in a year, which is an indicator used in finance literature as a proxy for 
market volatility of a firm‘s assets. High volatility of a firm stock‘s price could be a 
signal for creditors of higher risks and, hence, they could demand higher risk 
premiums, which enforce dependence of the firm finance on internal cash flows. 
Bulan (2005) emphasises market uncertainty as a factor that depresses firm 
investment.  
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    term includes country specific time varying macroeconomic factors based 
on the World Bank World Development Indicators 2009 (available online): 
regquality – regulatory quality in a country, percentile rank of the country from the 
World Bank Governance Indicators for 1996-2007, available at 
www.govindicators.org; crtoprivate - domestic credit to private sector (percent of 
GDP), which reflects availability of external capital; population – total population to 
account for the market size.  
Controlling for a financial development indicator is important and credit to 
the private sector is the relevant indicator but suffers some missing data. Love (2003) 
using an Euler-equation based model and cross-sectional data for 40 countries shows 
that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow decreases with financial market 
development as the latter relaxes the financing constraints on investment. 
I assume that it takes many years for R&D and investment to generate sales 
and cash flow so that there is no simultaneous feedback to the right hand side 
variables of the regression, especially as most right hand side financial indicators are 
lagged. I also assume that R&D may not affect the lagged price-to-book ratio. Stock 
prices might depend on a number of successful drug candidates in the late stages of 
development, but this is a result of past R&D.  
Based on the literature review, I expect the coefficients for cash flow to be 
positive. This relationship should be statistically significant for young and small 
pharmaceutical firms. The coefficients for debt and risk must be negative. Carpenter 
and Petersen (2002, f59) argue that ―for high-tech firms, the limited collateral value 
of assets, together with adverse selection, moral hazard, and financial distress should 
cause the marginal cost of debt to increase rapidly with leverage‖. Higher volatility 
in stock prices creates additional risks for a firm to invest and to spend on R&D with 
a negative effect.  
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Right hand side variables are largely simultaneous with sales and a consistent 
estimation of the coefficients in this dynamic panel specification can be performed 
with an Arellano and Bond (1991) differenced GMM method and the system GMM 
method of Blundell and Bond (1998), under the assumption that εit are independent 
across firms. Implementation of the estimations is performed with Stata software 
using the xtabond2 program command as developed by Roodman (2006). 
Bond (2002) explains that a within group estimator is often biased 
downwards in panel data with small time periods, whereas the OLS levels estimator 
is biased upwards in large samples and this can be used to estimate the possible range 
for a parameter. A consistent estimation can be performed with a GMM method, 
which uses moment conditions            , where    is an instrument matrix with 
lagged values of      , k - a time lag that provides no correlation with the error term, 
k is equal to or greater than two. For example, if     is a moving average process of 
order one, MA(1), then       cannot be a valid instrument, but       and longer lags 
are still valid. If explanatory variables     are correlated with    , lags of       are 
also valid instruments and must be included into the matrix Z of instruments. Two-
step GMM estimates consistently the first difference residuals     and then 
minimizes a weighted distance of the first difference residuals from regression. If 
residuals    are homoskedastic, a consistent estimation can be obtained in the one 
step from a weight matrix (Bond, 2002).  
Blundell, Bond et al. (2000) have shown with simulations that a two-step 
estimator often has little efficiency gains in comparison to a one-step method, the 
former also tends to exaggerate t-ratios. Xtabond2 uses Windmeijer (2005) finite 
sample corrections for covariance matrix that address this problem for the two-step 
estimator. The system GMM combines the moment conditions for the first difference 
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model with level moments and has less bias if the series is close to a random walk as 
Δ      is often a good instrument for       (Blundell and Bond, 1998). I use both 
difference and system GMM.  
However, in short panels here, GMM estimators with a large number of 
moment conditions can suffer from the small-sample bias so that it is wise to limit 
the number of conditions and instruments. In this regard, I minimize the number of 
instruments and use the dependent variable lagged at t-2, t-3 and further lags as the 
GMM instrument, and year dummies are used as IV instruments. The lagged 
dependent variable is assumed to be the best instrument for itself and year dummies 
are exogenous. Alternative instruments have been also attempted (Attachment 7), but 
they do not pass the tests for valid instruments.  
 
Data 
Firm level indicators have been extracted from an Orbis
TM
 dataset of financial 
indicators for pharmaceutical companies in fifteen OECD countries (Table 3.1).  
 
Table 3.1. The shares of observations for liquidity constraint analysis  
by countries (the total sample size is 2125 observations)  
Country Observations Share, percent Cumulative 
Austria 6 0.28 0.28 
Belgium 21 0.99 1.27 
Denmark 38 1.79 3.06 
Finland 6 0.28 3.34 
France 23 1.09 4.42 
Germany 106 4.99 9.41 
Ireland 13 0.61 10.02 
Italy 11 0.52 10.54 
Japan 174 8.19 18.73 
Netherlands 23 1.08 19.81 
Norway 6 0.28 20.09 
Sweden 33 1.55 21.65 
Switzerland 43 2.02 23.67 
United Kingdom 216 10.16 33.84 
USA 1406 66.17 100 
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I use a panel data of quoted pharmaceutical firms from 15 countries for the period 
1997-2007. The value variables are in Euros (€) adjusted by annual exchange rates. 
The majority of data comes from American and British companies.  
Almost all variables are scaled by total assets for every firm. Definitions of 
the variables: 
totas – total assets in national currencies; ltotase – logarithm of total assets 
converted into Euros by average exchange rate; inta – ratio of investment to total 
assets; cashta – ratio of cash and cash equivalent holdings to total assets; cashflta– 
ratio of cash flow to total assets; saleta – ratio of sales to total assets; nsaleta – ratio 
of net sales to total assets; debta – ratio of total liabilities and debt to total assets; 
ltanfase – logarithm of tangible fixed assets in euro; tanfixase - tangible fixed assets 
in euro; rdasn – ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets, which characterizes R&D 
intensity; age – age of firm estimated as difference between a current year and the 
year of incorporation; risk – logarithm of ratio of a firm‘s highest stock price to its 
lowest stock price in a year; employs – number of employees in a firm; lemp – 
logarithm of the number of employees in a firm; pbookr – price-to-book ratio of a 
firm‘s assets, a proxy for the average Tobin‘s Q.  
One percent of tails in the distributions of R&D to assets, growth of sales, 
cash flow to assets, and price-to-book ratio were cut off to exclude dominant 
influence of outliers. The median share of R&D in cash flows of firms is 0.55: more 
than a half of a firm‘s cash flows were spent on R&D. The data have some 
persistency and most of the variance comes between groups. The average firm has 
6103 employees, relatively high stock of cash, good sales to assets (56.1%), and 
modest debt (37.1%) to assets (Table 3.2). 
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Table 3.2. Descriptive statistics of macroeconomic and firms‘ financial indicators. 
Variable Panel Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum Observations 
 
rdasn overall .151 .177 .000 1.363 2125 
R&D to between  .171 .000 1.089 482 
Assets 
 
within   .083 -.274 .807 4.408 
cashflta overall .083 .272 -.430  1.221 2125 
Cash flow between  .261 -.419 1.144 482 
to assets 
 
within   .131 - .514 .762 4.408 
cashta overall .360 .290 0 .971 2125 
Cash to  between  .292 .004 .967 482 
assets 
 
within   .106 -.159 1.002 4.408 
saleta overall .561 .459 0 4.261 2125 
Sales to between  .422 .001 3.999 482 
assets 
 
within   .170 -.579 1.812 4.408 
pbookr overall 3.799 3.958 .15  32.980 2125 
Price-to-book  between  3.088 .186 23.115 482 
Ratio 
 
within   2.732 -7.137 25.322 4.408 
debta overall .371 .207 .026 .978 2125 
Debt to between  .180 .048 .909 482 
Assets 
 
within   .110 -.174 .807 4.408 
lemp overall 6.203 2.221 0 12.025 2125 
Logarithm between  2.168 .876 11.633 482 
of employees 
 
within   .316 2.694 7.967 4.408 
risk overall .915 .642 .099 11.239 2125 
Log of max between  .448 .099 3.128 482 
to min stock 
price 
 
within   .476 -1.772 9.069 4.408 
regquality overall 90.034 7.938 23.901 100 2125 
Regulatory between  8.259 30.926 98.26 482 
quality 
 
within   1.913 78.756 99.51 4.408 
crtoprivate overall 163.463 36.177 21.277 222.277 2125 
Credit to  between  37.764 24.312 201.089 482 
private 
sector, %GDP 
 
within   9.858 109.548 215.098 4.408 
Population, overall 196 117 3.805 299 2125 
million between  120 4.013 299 482 
 within   3.985 187 206 4.408 
Note: number of within observation is T-bar – an average number of years.  
 
Many firms are multiproduct companies with different technological cycles and it 
must be understood that the company level aggregate financial indicators being used 
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here cannot capture individual products. Accounting policy may vary across firms 
and countries, for example, to optimize local taxes and depreciation allowances, but 
most accounting standards are similar across those 15 countries. I assume that 
accounting practise in these countries have not dramatically changed over the 
considered period. 
Correlation between cash flow and R&D expenditures scaled by total assets is 
0.78 across all firms in the sample (Table 3.3). This correlation (Graph 3.1) shows 
likely linear dependence between R&D expenditures in absolute terms and cash flow 
in Euros for major pharmaceutical firms in Europe, Japan, and USA. 
 
Table 3.3. Correlations between major regressors 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. rdasn 1.00           
2. inta -0.08 1.00          
3. gsales -0.12 0.06 1.00         
4. cashflta 0.78 -.10 -.10 1.00        
5. cashta -0.60 0.04 0.14 -.57 1.00       
6. saleta 0.40 -.28 -.17 0.55 -.62 1.00      
7. pbookr -0.28 -.02 0.09 -.09 0.17 -.02 1.00     
8. debta 0.10 -.30 -.09 0.09 -.37 0.37 0.29 1.00    
9. lemp 0.46 -.19 -.16 0.59 -.60 0.49 0.00 0.40 1.00   
10. risk -0.26 0.01 0.13 -.35 0.30 -.29 0.11 -.06 -.33 1.00  
11. ltotase  0.41 -.06 -.09 0.51 -.43 0.26 -.03 0.24 0.78 -.24 1.00 
 
Graph 4. R&D expenditures and cash flow of pharmaceutical firms, in Euros 
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3.3. Estimated impacts of liquidity constraints on R&D and investment 
 
Impact of liquidity constraints on R&D. The same specification was used to 
estimate the coefficients with robust standard deviations by four methods: pooled 
cluster OLS; panel within estimator; difference and system GMM (Table 3.4).     
 
Table 3.4. Regression results for R&D intensity in the global industry 
  Pooled 
cluster OLS 
Panel within 
estimator 
Difference 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
R&D to assets, rdasn at t-1  .1453*** 
(.0310) 
.0482 
(.0328) 
-.0202 
(.0458) 
-.0050 
(.0439) 
Cash flow to assets, cashflta  at t-1 .3741*** 
(.0300) 
.3391*** 
(.0280) 
 .5572*** 
(.1488) 
.5592*** 
(.1426) 
Cash to assets, cashta at t-1 -.0656*** 
(.0200) 
 .0061 
(.0239) 
.6894* 
(.3794) 
.7103* 
(.3783) 
Sales to assets, saleta at t-1 -.0706*** 
(.0192) 
-.1363 
(.0211) 
 -.2028 
(.1976) 
-.1508 
(.1840) 
Price-to-book ratio, pbookr at t-1 -.0032*** 
(.0012) 
-.0025** 
(.0012) 
 .0079 
(.0079) 
.0130 
(.0092) 
Debt to assets, debta at t-1 -.0047 
(.0218) 
-.0309 
(.0248) 
 -.1305 
(.2010) 
-.1011 
(.2460) 
Logarithm of number of employs,  
lemp  
-.0015 
(.0026) 
 -.0135* 
(.0081) 
.1319 
(.1189) 
.1363** 
(.0670) 
Risk -.0075* 
(.0038) 
-.0084 
(.0043) 
.0494 
(.0483) 
.0385 
(.0458) 
Regulatory quality, regquality  -.0005 
(.0005) 
-.0008* 
(.0004) 
-.0339* 
(.0188) 
-.0223* 
(.0123) 
Credit to private sector,  
crtoprivate at t-1 
-.00006 
(.0003) 
.00006 
(.0003) 
.0002 
(.0047) 
 .0002 
(.0025) 
Population, at t-1  -0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.042 
(0.015) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Intercept .1762*** 
(.0604) 
.4085*** 
(.1515) 
 1.0311 
(.7789) 
Year and country dummies are included     
Arellano-Bond test AR(1)    0.018 0.008 
Arellano-Bond test AR(2)   0.868 0.513 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions, p-value   0.591 0.056 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions, p-
value 
  0.966 0.995 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity 
of instrument subsets, p-value 
  0.870  0.955 
Difference test of exogenous instruments   0.953 0.995 
Wald chi2  or F-test 29697.66 15.68  95.89  137.7 
R2 (within) 0.32 0.38   
Number of firms 482 482 415 482 
Number of observations 2125 2125 1555  2125 
Note: t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Significance levels in a two-tailed test: *** at the 
1%, 0.01 level, ** - 5%, * - 10%. 
 
 132 
I fail to reject the null of Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions that the 
error term in the first-differenced equations is orthogonal to the instrument. Both 
Sargan and Hansen tests for overidentified restrictions indicate the orthogonality 
conditions of the difference GMM estimator failed to be rejected, which implies that 
the instruments are likely to be valid and not correlated with the errors. However, the 
Sargan test p-value for the system GMM estimations reject the null, but coefficients 
for the regressors are quite close to the difference of GMM estimations. Wald and F 
statistics reject the null hypothesis of joint insignificance of the coefficients.  
In the difference GMM Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences, I 
reject the null of no serial correlations in errors, but failed to reject it for the second 
order AR(2) correlations, which also confirms validity of the instruments. Because 
first-differencing introduces an MA(1) error, failure to reject the presence of second-
order serial correlation AR(2) in the first-differenced residuals suggest in favour of 
the  proper specification.  
Cash flow to assets shows positive and significant coefficients in all four 
estimations, which herald the cash sensitivity of R&D. The coefficient suggests that 
an additional Euro of cash flow increases R&D to approximately 56 cents (0.56€). 
The elasticity point estimation at the median value of the R&D expenditures, cash 
flows, and assets in the sample shows that 10% growth of cash flow leads to 3.6% 
growth in R&D expenditures.  
Pharmaceutical companies with higher cash holdings are likely to spend more 
on R&D too, but causality might be reversed: companies planning significant R&D 
projects tend to accumulate larger cash holding. Coefficients for regulatory quality 
suggest negative relationship with R&D to assets, which can be explained by the 
stringency of regulations that can discourage R&D or, perhaps, a large part of R&D 
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expenditures on ‗me-too‘ drug projects that do not provide much advancement 
therapeutically.  
 Because it is empirically hard to identify firms with liquidity constraints 
(Moyen 2004), I use several criteria for such identification and estimate the cash 
flow coefficients for several subsamples of observations (Table 3.5): 
(1) for small firms with a maximum of 100 employees; 
(2) for large firms with  a minimum of 500 employees; 
(3) excluding firm-years with negative cash flows as negative cash flows could be a 
sign of accelerating expenditures or financial distress; 
(4) firms with Tobin‘s Q less than one as proxied by price-to-book ratio, which 
implies firm-years with low investment opportunities;  
(5) for young firms with established fifteen or less years ago;  
(6) for firms with bottom half of the dividends to after tax income payout ratio, 
which is less than 0.144.  
 
Table 3.5. Descriptive statistics of macroeconomic and firms‘ financial indicators 
for the subgroups of cash constraint firms. 
Variable  small 
firms 
 
(1) 
large 
firms 
 
(2) 
Positive  
cash flows 
 
(3) 
Price-to-
book 
ratio<1 
(4) 
young 
firms 
 
(5) 
Low 
dividend  
payout ratio 
(6) 
rdasn Mean .271 .074 .059 .107 .036 .049 
R&D to St.dev. .234 .069 .055 .175 .046 .054 
Assets Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Max 1.358 .561 .814 1.086 .252 .291 
        
cashflta Mean .324 .069 .103 .073 .003 .086 
Cash flow St.dev. .322 .111 .063 .241 .151 .181 
to assets Min -.431 -.698 0.002 -.308 -.219 -1.165 
 Max 1.221 .361 .431 1.214 0.548 .290 
        
cashta Mean .560 .206 .197 .277 .197 .155 
Cash to  St.dev. .300 .174 .173 .288 .214 .159 
assets Min 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 .002 
 Max .971 .867 .953 .965 .878 .903 
 
Sales to St.dev. .465 .431 .431 .360 .531 .370 
assets Min 0.00 .030 .018 0.001 .017 .032 
 Max 3.117 4.261 4.261 1.930 2.614 2.614 
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(table 3.5 continued) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
pbookr Mean 4.667 3.765 3.297 .655 2.982 3.569 
Price-to-  St.dev. 4.816 3.732 3.220 .207 4.062 3.349 
book Min 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.22 0.32 
ratio Max 32.04 32.98 28.09 0.99 25.7 19.42 
        
debta Mean .284 .455 .394 .331 .298 .441 
Debt to St.dev. .209 .185 .186 .169 .200 .196 
assets Min .026 .056 .041 .041 .041 .062 
 Max .978 .942 .913 .839 .781 .867 
        
lemp Mean 3.653 8.375 7.339 5.764 5.011 7.735 
Log St.dev. .869 1.563 2.084 1.591 1.427 2.359 
of  Min 0 6.214 1.609 .693 1.791 2.772 
employees Max 4.605 12.025 12.025 11.716 7.581 11.652 
        
risk Mean 1.271 .644 .686 1.052 .862 .630 
Log of max St.dev. .647 .585 .534 .735 .618 .438 
to min stock Min .099 .104 .104 .156 .156 .145 
price Max 3.729 11.239 11.239 3.768 3.153 2.933 
        
regquality Mean 92.617 89.610 88.263 86.112 80.747 88.669 
Regulatory St.dev. 5.670 8.906 9.661 9.642 13.177 9.649 
quality Min 55.85 53.9 53.9 59.730 52.2 70.73 
 Max 100 100 100 100 99.51 99.51 
        
crtoprivate Mean 166.78 162.85 157.31 148.627 118.11 148.747 
Credit to  St.dev. 33.253 37.385 39.469 39.730 28.368 42.466 
private sector Min 43.237 21.277 21.277 28.747 34.919 31.402 
 Max 201.09 222.27 222.277 222.277 175.84 201.089 
        
Population,  Mean 211 182 169 160 44.1 151 
million St.dev. 118 116 117 114 16.1 123 
 Min 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 81.2 10.1 
 Max 299 299 299 299 299 299 
Observations  308 678 871 243 37 95 
Firms  125 171 258 131 19 34 
 
I check cash flow sensitivity of R&D for the following likely financially constraint 
firms using difference GMM estimations (Table 3.6). The difference GMM method 
is chosen due to lower number of moment conditions, which reduces the short panel 
bias (Windmeijer, 2005). The sensitivity of R&D to cash flow is higher for smaller 
firms (0.75) than for all firms (0.56), whereas the cash flow sensitivity for large firms 
is becoming statistically insignificant. For larger firms, the debt burden appears to 
play a more negative role in their R&D decisions. If we exclude firms with negative 
cash flows, the sensitivity of R&D to cash flow is still statistically significant, but 
much smaller (0.27). 
 135 
Table 3.6. Difference GMM estimations of R&D intensity for subsets of firm-years 
 Small 
firms 
 
(1) 
Large 
firms 
 
(2) 
Positive  
cash 
flows 
(3) 
Price-
to-book 
ratio<1 
(4) 
New  
firms 
 
(5) 
Low 
payout 
ratio 
(6) 
R&D to assets, rdasn at t-1 .0294 
(.0787) 
-.1002 
(.0785) 
-.0081 
(.0600) 
-.0533 
(.1052) 
.4353*** 
(.0619) 
-.0389 
(.1818) 
Cash flow to assets, 
cashflta at t-1 
.7482*** 
(.1944) 
 .1407 
(.1169) 
.2749*** 
(.0554) 
.3732* 
(.1967) 
.7052*** 
(.1098) 
.0936* 
(.0548) 
Cash to assets, cashta  
at t-1 
.7860 
(.4906) 
-.0625 
(.0927) 
.0953 
(.0734) 
.0132 
(.1436) 
-.2055*** 
(.0535) 
-.1075 
(.1163) 
Sales to assets, saleta at t-1 -.5636 
(.3570) 
 -.1454 
(.1083) 
.0100 
(.0780) 
-.1890 
(.1915) 
-.5457*** 
(.1034) 
-.0485 
(.0442) 
Price-to-book ratio, pbookr 
at t-1   
.0180 
(.0173) 
-.0045 
(.0034) 
-.0034 
(.0029) 
.0210 
(.0180) 
.0226*** 
(.0051) 
-.0013 
(.0022) 
Debt to assets, debta  
at t-1 
-.2430 
(.3788) 
-.1517** 
(.0653) 
.0306 
(.0536) 
 -.3473 
(.3948) 
.2424*** 
(.0851) 
-.0189 
(.0446) 
Logarithm of number of 
employees, lemp  
 
.1476 
(.1637) 
.0020 
(.0371) 
-.0012 
(.0531) 
.1184 
(.1779) 
 -.3521*** 
(.1192) 
.0339* 
(.0189) 
Risk .0278 
(.0639) 
 -.0081 
(.0198) 
.0163 
(.0193) 
 .0105 
(.0295) 
-.0137 
(.0086) 
-.0207 
(.0150) 
Regulatory quality, 
regquality  
.0234 
(.0806) 
-.0017 
(.0049) 
.0005 
(.0023) 
.0172 
(.0136) 
.0039 
(.0035) 
-.0014 
(.0022) 
Credit to private sector,  
crtoprivate at t-1 
.0066 
(.0172) 
-.0001 
(.0011) 
-.0005 
(.0012) 
.0043 
(.0046) 
.0024 
(.0018) 
.0003 
(.0012) 
Population, at t-1 -0.041 
(0.054) 
-0.0023   
(0.0043) 
0.0009 
(0.0062) 
-0.01   
(0.027) 
0.004*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.0016 
(0.004) 
Arellano-Bond test AR(1) 0.088 0.051 0.073 0.246 0.243 0.246 
Arellano-Bond test AR(2) 0.302 0.822 0.332 0.248 0.500 0.958 
Sargan test of overid. 
restrictions, p-value 
0.982 0.000 0.408 0.575 0.937 0.167 
Hansen test of overid. 
restrictions, p-value 
0.927 0.775 0.736 0.577 1.000 0.329 
Difference-in-Hansen tests 
of exogeneity of 
instrument subsets, p-value 
0.934  0.599 0.590 0.454 1.000  0.278 
Difference test of 
exogenous instruments 
0.573 0.836 0.713  0.616 0.999 0.445 
Wald chi
2
  or F-test 89.84 34.61 63.14 86.78  7537 337.7 
Number of firms 125 171 258 131 19 34 
Number of observations 308 678 871 243 37 95 
Note: R&D to assets is the dependent variable. Numbers at the top heading of the table corresponds to 
the liquidity constraint identifications used.  
t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Significance levels in a two-tailed test: *** at the 1%, 0.01 level, 
** - 5%, * - 10%. 
 
Firms with low investment prospects as proxied by less than one price-to-book ratio 
also have reduced sensitivity of their R&D to cash flow. Young firms have higher 
sensitivity of R&D to cash flow. Young firms have significant sensitivity of their 
R&D to price-to-book ratio and they seem to finance their R&D with debt while 
having a negative relationship of R&D with the number of employees, sales, and 
cash holdings. 
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Physical investment 
Mean physical investment to assets ratio is just 6.4% and cash flow indicators may 
not be as important to R&D for such small investment. The median share of property, 
plant and equipment in a pharmaceutical company‘s assets is just 19.8% and seems 
to play only a minor role (Table 3.7). 
 
Table 3.7. Descriptive statistics of macroeconomic and firms‘ investment indicators 
Variable Panel Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum Obser-
vations 
inta overall .064 .102 .000 .827 914 
investment between  .092 .000 .726 222 
to assets within   .046 -.225 .448 4.117 
cashflta overall .026 .162 -1.086  .419 914 
Cash flow between  .184 -1.086 .269 222 
to assets within   .073 -.649 .518 4.117 
cashta overall .202 .204 .00 .953 914 
Cash to  between  .221 .00 .953 222 
assets within   .071 -.137 .618 4.117 
saleta overall .678 .514 0 5.610 914 
Sales to between  .500 .001 5.319 222 
assets within   .142 -.393 1.977 4.117 
pbookr overall 3.082 3.159 .14  32.98 914 
Price-to-book  between  2.613 .17 20.33 222 
ratio within   2.013 -7.854 24.60 4.117 
debta overall .443 .215 .026 .966 914 
Debt to between  .204 .048 .946 222 
assets within   .083 .025 .962 4.117 
ltotase overall 13.065 2.053 4.594 18.281 914 
Logarithm between  2.061 4.594 17.562 222 
of assets within   .266 11.904 14.601 4.117 
risk overall .731 .524 .078 11.239 914 
Log of max between  .402 .108 3.559 222 
to min stock 
price 
within   .386 -1.956 8.885 4.117 
regquality overall 84.584 12.354 15.1 100 914 
Regulatory between  12.576 23.9 98.26 222 
quality within   2.945 64.704 99.51 4.117 
crtoprivate overall 139.8 46.418 10.493 222.277 914 
Credit to  between  47.390 13.355 201.089 222 
private 
sector, %GDP 
within   9.183 70.055 191.435 4.117 
Population, overall 118 106 1.989 299 914 
million between  111 1.993 299 222 
 within   2.401 108 128 4.117 
Note: number of within observation is T-bar – an average number of years.  
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Cash flow seems to not play an important role in physical investment decisions; 
although price-to-book ratio and the number of employers tend to positively affect 
investment (Table 3.8).  
 
Table 3.8. Dynamic panel regression results for investment 
 Pooled 
cluster 
OLS 
Panel 
within 
estimator 
Difference 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
Investment to assets, inta at t-1 .4707*** 
(.0958) 
.0189 
(.0799) 
-.1945* 
(.1070) 
.0936 
(.2742) 
Cash flow to assets, cashflta at t-1 -.0072 
(.0232) 
.0501* 
(.0267) 
-.1013 
(.1386) 
-.0856 
(.2803) 
Cash to assets, cashta at t-1 -.1225*** 
(.0313) 
-.2499*** 
(.0469) 
-.2701 
(.2023) 
 -.6830 
(.8335) 
Sales to assets, saleta at t-1 -.0255*** 
(.0097) 
-.0354*** 
(.0132) 
-.0971 
(.1144) 
.-.2374 
(.6183) 
Price-to-book ratio, pbookr at t-1   .0022** 
(.0011) 
 .0003** 
(.0011) 
.0142** 
(.0056) 
 .0129 
(.0254) 
Debt to assets, debta at t-1  -.093*** 
(.0250) 
-.0847** 
(.0375) 
-.2133 
(.1636) 
-.6675 
(1.5439) 
Logarithm of total assets, 
ltotase  
-.0026 
(.0021) 
-.0221** 
(.0099) 
.1134* 
(.0678) 
 .1362 
(.1758) 
Risk -.0009 
(.0030) 
 -.0032 
(.0040) 
.0339 
(.0280) 
-.0450 
(.0824) 
Regulatory quality, regquality  -.0002 
(.0006) 
.0001  
(.0007) 
.0022 
(.0073) 
.0097 
(.0250) 
Credit to private sector,  
crtoprivate at t-1 
-.0002 
(.0002) 
-.0001 
(.0002) 
.0028 
(.0025) 
.0063 
(.0089) 
Population, at t-1 -0.0020 
(0.0010) 
-0.0041*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.0151** 
(0.0074) 
0.0007 
(0.0319) 
Intercept .8036** 
(.3333) 
1.1101*** 
(.2807) 
 -4.6227 
(16.1188) 
Year and country dummies are included   0.051 0.503 
Arellano-Bond test AR(1)   0.377 0.925 
Arellano-Bond test AR(2)   0.542 0.431 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions, p-value   0.908 0.818 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions,  
p-value 
  0.930 0.110 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity 
of instrument subsets, p-value 
  0.512 1.000 
Wald chi
2
  or F-test 305.00 4.36 98.29 17.21 
R
2
 (within) 0.08 0.23   
Number of firms 222 222 173 222 
Number of observations 914 914 667 914 
Note: t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Significance levels in a two-tailed test: *** at the 1%, 0.01 
level, ** - 5%, * - 10%. 
 
This suggests a principal difference between more risky and uncertain R&D projects 
versus physical investment in the industry: R&D is likely to be dependent on the 
availability of internal finance in the form of cash flow. 
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Conclusion 
This paper expands previous country-focused studies of liquidity constraints for 
R&D, investment and growth of firms by (i) considering several hundred firms from 
OECD countries, (ii) using dynamic panel specification with a number of liquidity 
constraint indicators, (iii) controlling for country-specific institutional and financial 
environments. Cash flow has a positive effect of firms R&D in the sample and across 
several subsamples of definitions for the likely financially constrained firms. The 
estimated point elasticity of R&D to cash flow is 0.36 at median values and this 
effect is more significant for young firms and firms with less than 500 employees. 
Firms with low investment prospects as proxied by less than one price-to-book ratio 
or by a lower dividend payout ratio have lower sensitivity of their R&D to cash flow.   
Pharmaceutical companies with higher cash holdings are likely to spend more 
on R&D too, but causality might be reversed: companies planning significant R&D 
projects tend to accumulate larger cash holding. The uncovered negative relationship 
of regulatory quality with R&D to assets is likely to be explained by higher risks of 
R&D due to stringency of regulations as most European countries and Japan employ 
cost-containment controls to limit pharmaceutical expenditures. Cash flow seems to 
not play an important role in physical investment decisions; although price-to-book 
ratio and number of employers tends to positively affect investment.  
  
 139 
Chapter 4. Evaluation of existing R&D incentives and  
own proposal for neglected diseases 
 
Most neglected diseases
5
 are neglected because they cannot generate enough 
return on R&D to pharmaceutical firms. With the exception of tuberculosis, these 
diseases mainly occur in low income countries where patients have low purchasing 
power and with malfunctioning healthcare systems. Approximately 2.5 million 
people die every year from NDs (WHO, 2009, p. 3), but commercial and academic 
research is sparse. And even when some progress is made with the development of 
drugs which could cure NDs, pharmaceutical companies are cautious in publishing 
the results for fear of increased public pressure (Moran, Ropars, et al. 2005). 
Various reasons have been advanced in the literature explaining why the 
pharmaceutical industry has not been forthcoming in developing NDs drugs: the 
small size of the markets; the corruption of drug procurement and misuse of drugs 
leading to the building of drug resistance; the pharmaceutical regulations sometimes 
driven by political agenda; the limited intellectual property rights for 
pharmaceuticals (Kremer, 2002) and the failure of social insurance markets in poor 
countries (Farlow, 2005). Berndt and Hurvitz (2005) also emphasize a free rider 
problem where countries expect other countries to take on the risks and costs of a 
breakthrough in R&D. This is the important case where understanding, design, and 
application of better incentives for pharmaceutical R&D requires strong public 
intervention and can have enormous global impact.  
Section 4.1 summarizes the literature on funding, results and current progress 
of R&D for NDs, the burden of diseases and their exacerbating conditions in low 
income countries.  For many decades there was very poor development of new drugs, 
                                                 
5
 as defined by the WHO: http://www.who.int/neglected_diseases/diseases/en/ 
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but there is some recent progress with drug candidates due to sharply increased 
philanthropic funding, which is still insufficient. I further summarize the literature on 
regional concentration, DALYs and lives lost, health damages and economic costs of 
the NDs. Unfortunately, the WHO statistics are quite poor, incomparable across time 
and countries (WHO, 2008), and may underestimate the burden of diseases (Conteh, 
Engels, et al. 2010). This section also discusses the causes of the high burden of 
NDs, such as deficiency of medical infrastructure, lack of political commitment, 
sanitation and poverty. The literature tends to emphasize poverty and problems with 
medical infrastructure, but I focus on such issues as corruption and lack of political 
commitment.  
I test two hypotheses: if sanitation, access to safe water, share of rural 
population, governance indicators, health expenditures, the number of nurses and per 
capita income have a negative association with the burden of all diseases and 
neglected diseases in particular across countries. I use data for the year 2004 for 
which the most recent consistent disease burden estimations of the WHO (2008) are 
available. The OLS regressions with robust errors show that GDP per capita, 
improved access to sanitation, safe water and control of corruption appear to be 
statistically significant across most specifications, but government expenditures on 
health are not robustly significant indicators for the burden of neglected diseases. 
Section 4.2 reviews the literature and discusses implementation, advantages 
and drawbacks of all major proposals for R&D on NDs in detail. All schemes are 
classified by the underlying push, pull and mixed incentives for R&D. A variety of 
proposals for public intervention have been offered and implemented to tackle this 
problem, but all proposals have essential deficiencies.  
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This section discusses the reasons and gives several examples why push 
incentives and several attempts of bureaucratic supply of R&D for NDs largely failed 
due to moral hazard problems and the inability of donors to control R&D projects.  
The work horse of the R&D are public-private partnerships (PPPs), which are non-
profit organizations, the majority of which are formed by small and medium 
pharmaceutical firms and mostly funded through in-kind contributions.  Major 
problems of PPPs include lack of accountability, transparency, and motivation of 
companies (Mrazek and Mossialos, 2003; Sarewitz, Foladori, et al. 2004), lack of 
industrial experience, high dependence on in-kind contributions from few donors and 
disproportional focus on a few diseases (Moran, Ropars et al. 2005; Moran, Guzman, 
et al. 2009), little global coordination and lack of consultations with recipient 
countries (Ziemba, 2005).   
Patents do not work well for NDs as existing purchasing power is not 
sufficient to attract commercial R&D and several pulling schemes have been 
proposed to simulate demand. Pogge (2006) proposes the global US$45-90 billion 
fund to guarantee payments for drugs in proportion to realized global health 
outcomes. Hollis (2007) assumes that an annual $500 million would be a necessary 
payoff just for NDs. These proposals are not really feasible due to the implied scale 
of financing, estimation difficulties of the outcomes across countries and lack of long 
term political commitments and enforcement. The open-source R&D projects have 
insufficient remuneration to compensate for high costs.  
The Office of Health Economics (2005) concluded that transferable extension 
of intellectual property rights, fast track vouchers, and guaranteed advance purchase 
commitments are the most promising schemes for NDs. I summarize criticisms on 
these incentives in the literature with my evaluations.  These schemes basically 
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propose large cross-subsidies with large distortions and deficiency of drug quality-
oriented incentives for innovators.  
The R&D call option proposal (Brogan and Mossialos, 2006) is promising, 
but high uncertainty of R&D process and the small market will make it difficult to 
operate it. The major pull incentive has been proposed by Kremer, Barder, et al, 
(2005) in the form of advanced market (purchase) commitments (AMC or APC), 
which was agreed to pilot in G8 countries. Problems of this scheme include large 
($3-5billion) purchase, which will be translated into a smaller R&D expenditures at 
the innovators‘ level; rewards are only provided for the first and maybe second 
inventor; patent rights are kept with the inventing companies; only large 
pharmaceutical firms have enough funds to participate (Light, 2005); difficulties in 
specifying vaccine characteristics in advance, the majority of the purchase will be 
spent on capital costs, the amount of the purchase is likely to be never optimal and 
the APC stimulates satisfaction of the minimum quality requirement (Farlow, 2005).  
My criticism of the scheme is that the APC cost-sharing mechanism might 
not be a good signal reflecting public demand for a drug, R&D markets require 
essential search costs so that presumption that big firms can efficiently subcontract 
with small firms for just one project can be too optimistic, and my estimations in 
chapter 3 demonstrate a low (0.36) elasticity of pharmaceutical R&D by sales.  
Mixed schemes such as orphan (rare) drug development programmes use 
both push incentives in the form of protocol assistance, fast-track approval, tax 
credits, research grants, and the pulling market exclusivity for up to seven years in 
the US. However, orphan drug programmes work for markets that can maintain high 
exclusive prices (Trouiller, Olliaro, et al. 2002) and large revenue (Yin, 2008). Lack 
of competition (Berndt, Glennerster, et al. 2007) and differences in the population of 
patients in developed and low income countries add to the drawbacks of this scheme.  
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The priority review voucher proposal of Ridley, Grabowski, et al. (2006) 
grants a right for the FDA priority review of any drug in exchange for an approved 
drug for NDs and is implemented by the Food and Drug Administration 
Amendments Act in the US in 2007. Moran, Ropars, et al. (2005) propose to auction 
this right to finance PPPs. The problem of this scheme is potential distortions for the 
commercial pioneering pharmaceutical innovations through greater inflow of me-too 
blockbuster drugs, which can be stimulated by this proposal.  
In section 4.3, I systematically compare the major existing and proposed 
schemes for NDs and evaluate them according to 17 selected criteria grouped in four 
categories: efficiency, feasibility, fairness, and sustainability. Most schemes do not 
provide strong incentives to deliver quality drugs at the lowest costs. The best 
existing scheme for NDs is likely to be the proposal of Moran, Ropars, et al. (2005) 
with subsidies and grants channelled through a centralized PPP platform, which 
scored the highest. I conclude that the public intervention should target barriers in the 
way of a successful innovation process with a view to reducing its risks and costs, 
enhancing competition, and promoting the communication of ideas and R&D 
outcomes. I summarize the following features of the needed R&D process for NDs: 
(i) long term R&D financing; I propose G20 countries to allocate to NDs a 1% share 
of their current spending on public pharmaceutical R&D, (ii) public subsidies to 
clinical experimentation, (iii) the payoff to innovators must be based on the global 
cost-effectiveness of a new drug (Hollis, 2005; Pogge 2006), and I substantiate a 
simple formula for such comparison, (iv) R&D project insurance (Light, 2009), (v) 
transparency and accountability in exchange for public funds, (vi) network based 
research (Paul, Mytelka, et al. 2010; Pisano, 2006) to allow greater competition and 
portfolio management of parallel projects, (vii) coordination for innovators (Moran, 
Ropars, et al. 2005) through a common service platform. I am proposing the new 
hybrid scheme incorporating these recommendations in the section 4.4. 
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Section 4.4 presents my own hybrid public-private partnership model (HPPP) 
based on prize screening incentives and discusses its advantages over existing 
proposals. The scheme is a hybrid of push and pull incentives. The proposed scheme 
focuses on cost-efficient drug discovery and targets small companies with liquidity 
constraints by offering an advance payment and commits the second payment based 
on drug quality. The model uses risks and costs sharing of the push schemes by 
offering a relatively small cash prize ($4.5-10 m) for the selected drug candidates 
after the discovery phase with the following full subsidization of clinical trials. This 
must reduce entry barriers and costs of capital for small firms. However, the scheme 
supplements this with the pull incentive by paying the second prize in proportion to 
estimated drug quality of a new drug revealed in fully subsidized clinical trials. The 
amounts of prizes are optimized through the prize screening mechanism design. The 
first prize is set to just cover the minimum expected discovery (pre-clinical) phase 
costs and the second prize is set in proportion to the drug quality as measured by 
marginal costs of the treatment per QALY saved.  
The model is calibrated for the case of tuberculosis (TB). The estimated costs 
of the Program for TB are approximately $750-900 m per successful drug in year 
2000 prices. These costs of the proposed Program are higher than those of PPPs due 
to setting a relatively high external commercial option for firms, but essentially lower 
than the ones estimated for the APC. Given that the proposed Program targets high 
quality drugs and allocates the production licences of new drugs in developing 
countries into the public domain, this scheme can compete with PPPs, which are 
considered to be the current best option. The proposed HPPP reduces moral hazard 
problems intrinsic to PPPs and can potentially attract in-kind contributions through 
greater transparency and accountability than PPPs.   
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The contribution to the literature is that the proposed mechanism relies on the 
innovative effort of small firms, which play a major role in R&D efforts for NDs, by 
reducing entry barriers and moral hazard problems. The proposed mechanism aims to 
increase efficiency of the current public interventions through reducing possible 
overpayments for low quality drug R&D in the APC scheme whilst delivering 
greater financial sustainability by leveraging resources through World Bank loans, 
transparency, and global coordination of drug candidate portfolio in comparison to 
the PPPs and better incorporation of developing country needs.  
Potential problems of the proposal include an incentive for firms with sunk 
R&D costs to overstate the attributes of their drug candidate. The Program 
management should balance this by a right to contract out some independent tests on 
key characteristics of a candidate. There could be practical difficulties with accurate 
cost-benefit analysis of new drugs and it is important to build a consensus 
methodology for this analysis. 
 
4.1. Burden of neglected diseases in developing countries and its causes  
 
Neglected diseases (NDs) are neglected by research and development due to the low 
purchasing power of patients, most of whom are located in low income countries.  
Patients in developing countries often experience poverty in an environment of 
malfunctioning national healthcare. Access to affordable and effective drugs against 
diseases somewhat specific to low income countries is essential for those patients, 
but the diseases attract little research efforts by the pharmaceutical industry.   
WHO (2009a, p.3) estimates that ―More than 1 billion people are affected 
with one or more neglected tropical disease, yet these diseases remain neglected at 
all levels… Less than 0.001% of the US$ 60–70 billion spent on new drugs went 
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towards developing new and urgently needed treatments for tropical diseases‖. For 
example, less than 1% of new chemical entities approved in 1975-1997 were drugs 
for tropical diseases and only four of them were developed by commercial 
pharmaceutical companies (Pecoul, Chirac et al. 1999).  
Trouiller, Olliaro et al. (2002) based on a review of the drug approval 
authorities in the US and the EU and publications in medical journals between 1975 
and 1999 estimated that only 16 of 1393 drugs with new chemical entities were 
developed for tropical diseases or tuberculosis. An update estimation of Chirac and 
Torreele (2006) shows that out of 163 new chemical entities marketed between 2000 
and 2004, four drugs (2.5%) were for neglected diseases. This is still 
disproportionally lower than the global share of neglected disease burden in 2004 
estimated by the WHO (2008) at approximately 7%. 
However, the evidence shows that the funding situation is improving in 
recent years. In 2007 $2.5 bn was spent on R&D for NDs, of which $1.5 bn was 
contributed by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (Moran, Guzman, eta, 2009: 
142-143). According to Moran, Guzman et al. (2008, p.5) $468.4 million was spent 
on anti-malaria R&D and $410.4 million on research against tuberculosis, but R&D 
on leprosy, Buruli ulcer, trachoma, rheumatic fever, and typhoid and paratyphoid 
fever got less than $10 million in total in 2007. Their study found that the public 
sector contributed nearly 70% and philanthropic organizations another 21% of total 
R&D spending on neglected diseases including HIV/AIDS, whereas private 
pharmaceutical companies added up to less than 10%, excluding the industry in-kind 
contributions. The US government contributed more than two-thirds of the total 
public sector spending and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation contributed 84% of 
the total donations.  
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New drug projects have been committed due to these new donations. 
According to Wolters Kluwer Health's Adis R&D Insight (available at 
http://newmeds.phrma.org, accessed on 1 February 2011), there were five drug 
candidates against tuberculosis, seven against malaria, and five against dengue in 
clinical trials as of February 2011, but most other NDs had no new drug candidate 
(Table 4.1). Only a few drug candidates in the initial phases of trials exist for dengue, 
malaria, and tuberculosis, which, given the statistics for success rates might imply 
approximately one expected developed drug per disease. 
 
Table 4.1. An update for the number of drug candidates under development by 
pharmaceutical companies in the US against major neglected diseases. 
 Clinical Phase I Phase II Phase III Preregistration 
with FDA 
Tuberculosis 1 4 0 0 0 
Malaria 0 6 1 0 0 
Filariasis 0 0 0 0 0 
Hookworm 
infections  
0 1 0 0 0 
Leishmaniasis  0 0 0 0 0 
Schistosomiasis 0 0 0 0 0 
Trypanosomiasis 0 0 0 0 0 
Japanese 
encephalitis  
0 0 0 2 0 
Dengue 0 3 1 1 0 
Chagas' disease  0 0 0 0 0 
Onchocerciasis 0 0 0 0 0 
Leprosy 0 0 0 0 0 
in comparison to:      
Obesity 2 12 13 1 3 
Source: aggregation of data for American companies from Wolters Kluwer Health's 
Adis R&D Insight, per disease data are available at http://newmeds.phrma.org/ 
(accessed on February 1, 2011).  
 
Even academic research is lacking: less than 2% of all citations on PubMed, 
the U.S. national digital archive of biomedical and life sciences journal literature, 
were attributed to tropical diseases for the period 1980-1999 (Lanjouw and Cockburn, 
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2001).  Moran, Ropars et al. (2005) give examples in which some pharmaceutical 
companies do not publish drug candidates that could lead to progress being made on 
neglected diseases, as they perceived that this could increase public pressure on them 
to do so.  Moran, Guzman et al. (2008, p.8) identified 30 diseases in developing 
countries that require new medicine, but are not commercially attractive. This 
chapter considers primarily the WHO endorsed list of neglected diseases.  
 
Burden of the diseases and their causes 
Approximately 2.5 million people die every year from NDs. Because NDs are 
parasitic and bacterial infections, they potentially put the majority of the human race 
at risk (Table 4.2). Some of NDs, such as tuberculosis and malaria, have many 
patients and thus a large health burden. Comparing the global burden of neglected 
diseases in 2004 with 2001, one can see quite modest progress was made for 
tuberculosis, malaria, and Chagas disease. Most NDs had mixed or no progress for 
that period.  
Based on data from WHO (2008) I estimated that the median of DALYs lost 
to NDs was 13.1% in countries with GDP per capita less than $1000 by PPP in 
international dollars. It must be noted WHO reported burden of diseases can be 
underestimated in hypoendemic communities, which can be polyparasitised in poor 
areas (Conteh, Engels, Molyneux, 2010).  Hotez, Molyneux et al. (2007, p.1021) 
point out that only neglected tropical diseases (excluding tuberculosis) cause 
additional billions dollars of damages through decreased workers‘ productivity and 
human capital. An economic cost of disability adjusted years for malaria alone could 
be valued at 5.8 percent of the gross national product of sub-Saharan Africa if each 
DALY is valued conservatively as equal to per capita income (Report of the 
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, 2001, p.31).  
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Table 4.2. Major neglected diseases and their characteristics ranked by global burden 
Disease People at 
risk 
Regional 
concentra-
tion 
2004/ 
2001 
DALYs 
lost, 
thousand 
2004/ 
2001 
deaths, 
thousand 
Major health 
damages 
Available 
medicine 
 
Tuberculosis 
(TB) 
  
 
Over 2 bn 
people 
carry the 
bacterium; 
the 2
nd
 
dangerous 
infection 
after HIV  
 
 
Mostly 
Africa and 
South East 
Asia 
 
34,188/ 
36,093 
 
 
1,462.5/ 
1,606 
 
1.6 million deaths 
in 2005, with 
annual global 
damage of around 
US$12 billion a 
year, it costs up to 
7% of GDP in 
some countries 
 
Requires 
several 
months of 
intensive 
therapy with 
a variety of 
drugs, the 
cure is not 
guaranteed; 
increasing 
resistance 
 
Malaria 
 
More than 
0.5bn; 
40% of the 
world‘s 
population 
are at risk; 
two 
children 
statistically 
die every 
minute  
 
Mostly 
Africa and 
South East 
Asia; 
transmitted 
by 
mosquito 
 
33,941/ 
39,970 
 
888.3/ 
1,208 
 
Over 1 m death 
every year, mostly 
children; it costs 
about 1.3% of 
GDP in the 
affected countries 
 
Combination 
of therapies, 
it is 
expensive 
for poor, 
increasing 
resistance 
 
Intestinal 
nematode 
infections 
(Ascariasis, 
Trichuriasis, 
Hookworm 
disease) 
 
576-1,221 
m infected,  
4.2 bn are 
at risk 
 
Worldwide 
in warm 
regions, 
especially 
in Sub-
Saharian 
Africa, 
South-East 
Asia and 
Central 
America 
 
16,261/ 
2,349 
 
 
31.7/ 
12 
 
Nematodes 
(worms) live in 
human body and 
can cause pain, 
toxicity, cognitive 
delays, weight 
loss, and anemia 
 
Limited 
access to 
existing 
drugs, 
ineffective 
against adult 
worms 
 
Lymphatic 
filariasis 
 
120 
million 
people 
affected 
with 1.3 
billion at 
risk  
 
India and 
Africa; 
transmitted 
by 
mosquito 
 
5,940/ 
4,667 
 
0.3/ 
0 
 
1/3 of patients are 
seriously 
incapacitated, 
causes 
adenolymphan-
gitis and 
lymphedema 
 
 
Limited 
access to 
drugs, which 
tend to be 
effective for 
early 
treatment 
 
  
Leishmani-
asis 
 
 
About 350 
m at risk in 
88 
countries 
Africa and 
South East 
Asia, 
transmitted 
by parasites 
1,973/ 
1,762 
46.8/ 
51 
Leads to scarring, 
damage to liver, 
anaemia  
Drugs are 
either toxic 
or  
expensive 
 
 
(continued on next page)  
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Disease People at 
risk  
Regional 
concentra-
tion 
2004/ 
2001 
DALYs 
lost, 
thousand 
2004/ 
2001 
deaths, 
thousand 
Major health 
damages 
Available 
medicine 
 
Schistosomi-
asis 
(bilharzia) 
 
About 207 
m in 74 
countries 
 
Mostly 
Africa and 
South East 
Asia; 
transmitted 
by parasites 
 
1,706/ 
1,526 
 
41.1/ 
14 
 
Damage to the 
bladder and 
kidneys, liver 
fibrosis, cognitive 
delays 
 
Limited 
access to 
drugs, drug 
resistance 
 
Human 
African 
Trypanosomi-
asis  
 
Around 60 
m at risk 
 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
 
1,671/ 
1,333 
 
52.3/ 
48 
 
Sleeping sickness 
 
Drugs are 
toxic and 
injectable 
only 
 
Japanese 
encephalitis  
 
Up to 
50,000 
cases a 
year 
 
Asia,  
the 
mosquito-
borne virus 
 
680/ 
604 
 
11.0/ 
14 
 
Can lead to 
mortality and 
mental retardation  
 
Vaccine 
exists, but 
expensive 
 
Dengue 
 
About 1/3 
of the 
world‘s 
population 
 
Most 
developing 
countries; 
transmitted 
by mosquito 
 
669/ 
529 
 
 
18.1/ 
19 
 
 
 
Terrible flu-like 
symptoms 
 
No effective 
specific 
drugs; 
mosquito 
nets 
 
Chagas‘ 
disease 
25 m in 21 
countries 
South and 
Central 
America  
426/ 
585 
11.3/ 
14 
Cardiomyopathy 
(heart damages), 
megacolon, 
megaesophagus  
Available 
drugs has 
serious side 
effects 
 
Onchocerci-
asis 
 
90 m are at 
risk 
 
Tropical 
Africa; 
transmitted 
by 
parasitic 
worm  
 
388/ 
439 
 
0.1/ 
0 
 
Serious vision 
impairment, can 
be transmitted by 
flies  
 
An effective 
drug exists 
 
Leprosy 
 
In 2002 
there were 
about 
650,000 
cases, in 
2004 –  
410 000 
new cases  
 
Africa, 
South-East 
Asia, 
Brazil, 
mainly 
concentrat
ed in 9 
countries 
 
194/ 
192 
 
5.4/ 
6 
 
Might lead to 
permanent 
damage for skin, 
nerves, and eyes 
caused by bacillus  
 
Fully cured 
in most 
countries, 
effective 
drugs exist 
Source: Ford (2006), p.112; http://www.who.int/tdr/svc/diseases (the WHO Program for Research and 
Training in Tropical Diseases); http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/, 
http://www.wpro.who.int/health_topics/schistosomiasis/. Data on tuberculosis is obtained from 
http://www.tballiance.org/why/tb-threat.php. ―Deworming for health and development‖. The report of 
the third global meeting of the partners for parasite control, Geneva: World Health Organization, 2005. 
The additional data for population at risk, major health damages, and available medicine are from 
(Hotez, Molyneux et al. 2007). The available medicine column is adjusted with the data from Mrazek 
and Mossialos (2003). The DALYs and deaths lost are summed for the year 2004 based on the WHO 
report ―The global burden of disease: 2004 update‖, The World Health Organization, 2008, WHO 
Press, Geneva, pp.54-56; the data for 2001: The World Bank, Global Burden of Disease and Risk 
Factors, Editors Alan Lopez, Colin Mathers, et al., Oxford University Press, 2006, pp.174, 228, 452. 
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Using the same conservative evaluation and the WHO (2008) data for year 2004, I 
estimated the median share of GDP lost to neglected diseases at 7.25% for countries 
with GDP per capita less than $1000 by purchasing power parity in 2004.  
Poverty, lack of sanitation and the lack of political commitment are reasons 
that have been advocated in the literature to explain the NDs burden. The association 
between health and poverty can run in both directions. Preston (1975) finds a high 
positive correlation between the logarithm of national per capita income and life 
expectancy for low income countries. Pritchett and Summers (1996) support causal 
positive impact of economic growth on reduction in infant mortality. Poverty 
significantly reduces access to proper nutrition and health care products and services, 
and, in turn, health problems can reduce productivity and corresponding labour 
compensations. Health problems can also undermine further educational and 
professional development because a shorter life span and weaker health undermine 
incentives for long term human development. There is evidence that better health has 
an essential spillover effect in the form of increased cognitive abilities and 
productivity (Bloom, Canning et al. 2005). Lorentzen, McMillan, et al. (2008) find 
that a greater risk of death disincentives education, savings and investment and this 
largely explains poor growth performance of the majority of African countries.  
NDs might be labelled as diseases of poverty implying that rising income 
would eliminate most of the disease burden. However, Kremer (2002) has concluded 
that most improvements in global health come from technology rather than from 
income growth, while WHO (2009a, p.11) stresses the importance of good sanitation.  
Strong political commitment to prioritize healthcare is also an issue. Indeed, 
only extreme poverty and lack of governments‘ leadership can explain that the 
situation when, according to Kremer (2002, p.68): ―One in four people worldwide 
suffer from intestinal worms, although treatments only need to be taken once or 
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twice per year, have virtually no side effects, and cost less than a dollar per year‖. 
For example, deworming might increase household income by 40% in Kenya 
(Miguel and Kremer, 2004). According to data of the World Bank World 
Development Indicators (WDI), 25 to 29 (or 12-14%) out of 209 countries spent 
more taxpayers‘ money on military expenditures than on health care for the period 
2001-2005.  
Reasons for this lack of political commitment to cure NDs can be derived by 
applying some of the poor governance explanations found in the political economic 
literature (McCarty and Meirowitz, 2007): (i) relatively short political horizons of 
elected officials in comparison to long drug development cycles; (ii) the diversion of 
funds to some ―national pride‖ big investment projects; (iii) a lack of qualified cost-
benefit analysis of impact of the disease burden on the economy; (iv) the affected 
patients have little political voice. 
Lewis (2006) points out the crucial role of governance in health sector citing 
a number of surveys and some anecdotal evidence on waste and leakages of 
resources, drug overpricing and mishandling, absenteeism and corruption of health 
personnel and health care managers. Some donors are even forced to postpone health 
aid due to corruption. For example, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria has suspended more than $300 million in health assistance to Zambia in 
2010 and Sweden and the Netherlands delayed $33 million in 2009 due to suspicion 
of corruption in the Health Ministry of Zambia (Mfula 2010). Ahmed, Cudjoe et al. 
(2007) emphasize such problems as access to basic infrastructure, taxes and non-
tariff barriers for imported medicines, difficulties in contract enforcement and 
bureaucratised patenting. For example, in the low income countries unsafe injections 
bring more than $0.5 billions in additional health care costs and 1.3 million deaths a 
year (World Health Organization 2002, p.xi). 
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The data and estimation 
I check the hypothesis that sanitation, government commitments to health care, and 
per capita income have a negative association with the burden of neglected diseases. 
I use data for the year 2004 for which the recent disease burden estimations of the 
WHO (2008) are available. Unfortunately, methodological inconsistency in DALY 
estimates across time and countries provided by the WHO disables panel data 
analysis. The WHO (2008) report on the global burden of diseases gives the most 
recent comparable cross-country estimates of DALYs. Other variables have been 
obtained from the World Bank website of the World Development Indicators and the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators
6
 for 188 countries (Table 4.3).  
 
Table 4.3. Descriptive statistics of macroeconmic and health variables 
 
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Logarithm of nurses and 
midwives per 1,000 people, 
lnurses 
60 .20 1.12 -1.66 2.65 
Logarithm of public health 
expenditure in % of government 
expenditure, lhlgov 
187 2.25 .56 -.36 3.51 
Logarithm of GDP per capita, 
PPP in current dollars, lgdp 
176 8.55 1.29 5.53 11.12 
Logarithm of improved 
sanitation facilities in % of rural 
population with access, lsanita 
159 3.81 .77 1.10 4.61 
Logarithm of improved water 
source in % of rural population 
with access, lwater 
168 4.24 .39 2.40 4.61 
Logarithm of rural population 
in % of total population, lrural 
185 3.64 .73 .54 4.50 
Logarithm of total DALYs lost 
per 100,000 population, ldaly 
188 9.99 .55 9.19 11.32 
Logarithm of DALYs lost to 
neglected diseases per 100,000 
population, ldalyn 
188 5.69 2.31 .50 9.24 
The governance indicators of the World Bank: 
Voice and accountability, va 188 -.06 1.02 -2.14 1.83 
Government effectiveness, gaf 188 -.06 1.00 -2.16 2.34 
Control of corruption, cc 185 -.08 1.00 -1.79 2.43 
 
                                                 
6
 (available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp) 
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There is a negative correlation between logarithms of DALYs lost to neglected 
diseases and such indicators as access to water, number of nurses, and government 
efficiency (Table 4.4).   
 
Table 4.4. Correlation between major regressors 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. ldalyn 1.00          
2. lnurses -0.67 1.00         
3. lhlgov -0.15 0.29 1.00        
4. lgdp -0.67 0.79  0.25 1.00       
5. lsanita -0.53 0.53 0.11 0.49 1.00      
6. lwater -0.60 0.45 0.12 0.40 0.40 1.00     
7. lrural 0.45 -0.45 -0.25 0.55 -0.29 -0.20 1.00    
8. va -0.47 0.51 0.45 0.47 0.30 0.38 -0.35 1.00   
9. gaf -0.73 0.62 0.40 0.67 0.38 0.51 -0.48 0.77 1.00  
10. cc -0.76 0.61 0.39 0.61 0.31 0.52 -0.50 0.77 0.93 1.00 
Note: ldalyn, lnurses, lhlgov, lgdp, lsanita, lwater, lrural are respectively logarithms of DALYs lost to 
neglected diseases, nurses per 1,000 people, public health expenditure in total government 
expenditures, GDP per capita by PPP, improved sanitation facilities, improved water source, and share 
of rural population; va, gaf and cc are correspondingly Voice and accountability, Government 
effectiveness, and Control of corruption Governance indicators.   
  
I run the following cross section OLS (Tables 4.5 and 4.6) to see if sanitation 
and national income corresponds with the burden of diseases for NDs: 
 
                                                            
                                        
   is white noise for a country i (notations are the same as in the Table 4.3). 
The commitment to health care is proxied by the share of public health expenditures 
in total government expenditures and by the governance indicators.  
 Per capita GDP and improved access to water are statistically significant 
across most specifications. Using regression specification 4 (Table 4.5), elasticity of 
DALYs by sanitation facilities is -0.06, by access to water is -0.33, and by the 
control of corruption is -0.08. Similar estimations for the low and low-middle-
income countries show (column 5 of Table 4.5) that only GDP per capita and access 
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to safe water have significant coefficients. GDP per capita, improved access to 
sanitation, and water appear to be statistically significant across most specifications. 
Share of rural population or government expenditure on health are not robustly 
significant indicators for the burden of neglected diseases.  
 
Table 4.5. Regression results for logarithm of DALYs lost per 100,000 population  
for all causes 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Log GDP per capita 
by PPP, lgdp 
 -.205   
(.054)*** 
 -.206 
(.055)*** 
-.053 
(.069) 
 -.167 
(.069)** 
-.349 
(.066)*** 
-.190 
(.067)*** 
Log of rural 
improved sanitation, 
lsanita 
-.107 
(.060)* 
-.107 
(.060)* 
-.040 
(070) 
-.112 
(.059)* 
-.058 
(.055) 
-.106 
(.061)* 
Log of improved 
rural water source, 
lwater  
-.343 
(.144)** 
-.344 
(.146)** 
-.326 
(0.166)* 
-.331 
(.131)** 
-.242 
(.124)* 
-.337 
(.139)** 
Log of rural 
population, % of 
total, lrural  
  .063 
(.055) 
.064 
(.055) 
.078 
(.084) 
.060 
(.050) 
-.006 
(.083) 
.066 
(.055) 
Log of public health 
expenditure, lhlgov 
 .015 
(.050) 
 .153 
(.083)* 
.029 
(.053) 
.081 
(.052) 
 .030 
(.053) 
Log of nurses and 
midwives per 1,000 
people, lnurses 
  -.103 
(.079) 
   
Government 
effectiveness, gaf 
  -.233 
(.102)** 
   
Control of corruption, 
cc 
   -.078 
(.053)* 
-.117 
(.080) 
 
Voice and 
accountability, va 
     -.036 
(.052) 
Constant  13.396 
(.471)*** 
13.370 
(.473)*** 
 11.569 
(1.011)*** 
 12.979 
(.567)*** 
 13.897 
(.668)*** 
13.163 
(.604)*** 
Observations 148 148 54 97 97 148 
F-statistic 85.59 67.73 13.57 32.34 37.82 56.10 
R^2 0.665 0.665 0.579 0.663 0.300 0.668 
Note: heteroscedasticity robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance levels: *** - at the 1%,  
** - at 5%, * - at 10%. The fifth regression estimates coefficients for low and lower-middle-income 
economies in the classification of the World Bank World Development Report.  
 
Using regression specification 4 (Table 4.6), elasticity of DALYs lost to NDs by 
sanitation facilities is -0.51, by access to water is -1.01, and one unit improvement  in 
the control of corruption index reduces the DALYs lost by 0.83%. Increase in 
income and access to safe water appear to have a larger impact on the burden of 
neglected diseases than DALYs lost for all causes. A similar estimation for low and 
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lower-middle-income countries listed in the World Development Report (World 
Bank, 2005, p.291) gives elasticity of DALYs lost to NDs by GDP per capita at -0.9, 
by sanitation facilities at -0.36, by access to water at -0.69, and a one unit increase in 
the control of corruption decreases the DALYs by 0.45% (column 5, Table 4.6).  
 
Table 4.6. Regression results for logarithm of DALYs lost to neglected diseases  
in 2004, per 100,000 population 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Log GDP per capita 
by PPP, lgdp 
-1.031 
(.203)*** 
 -1.031 
(.207)*** 
-.096 
(.158) 
-.619 
(.202)*** 
  -.901   
(.188)*** 
-.817 
(.218)*** 
Log of rural 
improved sanitation, 
lsanita 
 -.459   
(.166)*** 
-.458    
(.168)*** 
-.271 
(.183) 
-.506 
(.160)*** 
-.356 
(.142)** 
-.453   
(.182)** 
Log of improved 
rural water source, 
lwater  
-1.131   
(.553)** 
-1.132 
(.556)** 
-1.001  
(.336)*** 
-1.008 
(.416)** 
-.685 
(.385)* 
-1.037 
(.499)** 
Log of rural 
population, % of 
total, lrural  
 .104 
(.265) 
.105 
(.265) 
.269 
(.362) 
.062 
(224) 
.140 
(.412) 
.137 
(.239) 
Log of public health 
expenditure, lhlgov 
 .009 
(.164) 
.475 
(.197)** 
 .148 
(124) 
.150 
(.134) 
 .211 
(.147) 
Log of nurses and 
midwives per 1,000 
people, lnurses 
  -.293 
(.199) 
   
Government 
effectiveness, gaf 
  -.944   
(.276)*** 
   
Control of corruption, 
cc 
   -.825 
(167)*** 
-.453 
(.268)* 
 
Voice and 
accountability, va 
     -.493 
(.175) 
Constant 20.88    
(1.96)*** 
20.86  
(1.94)*** 
10.83 
(2.78)*** 
 16.77   
(1.97)*** 
16.96   
(2.89)*** 
18.03 
(2.10)*** 
Observations 148 148 54 147 97 148 
F-statistic 76.84 62.77 16.21 111.45 32.34 65.66 
R^2 0.742 0.742 0.718 0.796 0.663 0.764 
Note: heteroscedasticity robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance levels: *** - at the 1%,  
** - at 5%, * - at 10%. The fifth regression estimates coefficients for low and lower-middle-income 
economies in the classification of the World Bank World Development Report.  
 
Improved access to water and the control of corruption appear to have a strong 
impact on the burden of NDs meaning that more committed national policies could 
make a difference. High corruption may signal weaker controls from civil society 
and a lack of development leadership that affects the organization and priority of 
health care.  
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However, governments of low income countries cannot eliminate NDs 
through national policies alone. They still need an efficient drug to be available, but 
low income countries lack capacities for modern pharmaceutical R&D, especially for 
pre-clinical research, which often requires very sophisticated technologies and 
research skills.  
 
4.2. Push and pull factors in existing schemes for neglected diseases 
 
Various reasons have been advocated by Kremer (2002) explaining why the 
pharmaceutical industry is not forthcoming in developing the necessary drugs such as 
(i) the small size of the markets for pharmaceuticals; (ii) a significant mismatch of 
medical conditions between people in developed and developing countries, 
especially in infectious and parasitic diseases; (iii) scarcity of qualified medics; (iv) 
inefficient drug procurement and misuse of drugs, which also leads to developing of 
drug resistant infections; (v) pharmaceutical regulation is sometimes driven by 
political agenda; (vi) limited intellectual property rights for pharmaceuticals.  
Two other reasons are emphasized by Berndt and Hurvitz (2005): a free rider 
problem, in which countries expect another country to take the risks and costs of a 
breakthrough in R&D for the common diseases; and once R&D costs are sunk, 
monopsonic powers used by governments to set lower prices for the drugs, which 
discourages pharmaceutical R&D from the outset. Neither the governments nor the 
pharmaceutical sector commit the essential costs and risks associated to the 
development of life saving drugs.  
In spite of these problems, there is some non-commercial and international 
public involvement in drug projects. Non-profit public-private partnerships have 
recently developed the majority of drugs for NDs (Moran, Ropars et al., 2005). These 
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partnerships usually involve some private subcontractors like pharmaceutical firms 
or clinical research organizations (CRO) and committed philanthropic organizations 
as a source of finance. Several organizations operate as virtual network-based R&D 
partnerships, e.g. TB Alliance, and the Drug for Neglected Disease Initiative created 
in 2003 in order to facilitate the networks of scientists working on neglected diseases 
in developing countries. International public organizations, mainly special programs 
supported by the WHO, such as the Program for Research and Training in Tropical 
Diseases established in 1975, but with some small funding. National public research 
institutions, e.g. vaccines developed for military personnel serving in developing 
countries. Four EU-based large pharmaceutical companies (GSK, AstraZeneca, 
Novartis, and Sanofi) established ND research units or institutes a few years ago, 
which run about one third of all ND drug projects.  
In recent years several new proposals have been offered and implemented to 
increase pharmaceutical R&D for the NDs, but efficiency and sustainability of these 
proposals is still debated. All proposals can be conventionally divided by using either 
push factors that encourage the supply side of R&D, or pull mechanisms, which 
increase or guarantee demand for the final product, and the mixture of the two. 
 
Pushing schemes  
Major proposed push schemes include R&D tax incentives, grants, and direct public 
funding or services for pharmaceutical companies. Hall and van Reenen (2000) 
reviewing a vast literature concluded that increased tax credit for R&D fully 
translates into additional R&D in the long run, but short run impacts are usually 
lower.  
Trouiller, Olliaro, et al. (2002, p.2193) propose requirements for the industry 
to invest some proportion of its revenue into neglected diseases. The Report of the 
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Commission on Macroeconomics and Health supports the establishment of a new 
Global Health Research Fund (GHRF), with disbursements of around $1.5 billion per 
year to support research on diseases which disproportionately affect the poor (Report 
of the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, 2001, p.14).  
Attaran and Granville (2004, p.187) point out that various R&D subsidies 
suffer a moral hazard problem, which fail to deliver the best possible outcome for a 
given subsidy. Kremer and Glennerster (2004, p.53) concluded that enhanced R&D 
tax credits have complicated administration, stimulate creative accounting and might 
be useless for biotechnology firms as they are often unprofitable. Finkelstein (2008, 
p.112) notes that small firms often push their drug candidates through clinical trials 
with questionable results, which raises issues as to whether only push incentives 
would be appropriate for small firms. 
Kremer (2002) emphasises that push programs are susceptible to moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems as donors cannot completely monitor 
researchers and cannot evaluate costs and probability of success for possible research 
projects. He gave an example of a malaria push program from the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) in the 1980s: ―Two out of three 
researchers diverted grant funds into their private accounts and were later indicted 
for theft and criminal conspiracy. The project director received kickbacks from the 
contract to purchase monkeys… USAID had spent $60 million on its malaria vaccine 
efforts with few results‖ (Kremer 2002, p.83). One may argue that this failure is 
specific to the USAID and that UN Agencies could do much better. Easterly and 
Pfutze (2008) rank 37 aid agencies by their transparency, selectivity, fragmentation 
of aid, overhead costs, and use of ineffective channels. They give an average rank of 
16 to USAID, whereas most UN Agencies were located at the bottom of the rankings. 
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Another example of the push scheme was the Children‘s Vaccine Initiative, 
which was founded in 1990/1991 and then closed down in 1999 without significant 
success. Murashkin (1996) warned that this initiative could fail if enormous multiple 
bureaucratic self-interested and politicized conflicts between sponsors of this 
initiative were not resolved.  Creation of one more global public organizations to 
fight neglected diseases might just add up to the list of inefficient aid agencies. The 
low efficiency of bureaucrats in business and in correctly picking winners is well 
known (World Bank, 1995). I am especially doubtful that bureaucratic machinery 
can supply efficient innovations.  
The work horse of the ND drug research appears to be public-private 
partnerships (PPPs), which are not-for-profit project-based organizations which are 
focused on managing funds and R&D for ND. PPPs can be organizationally flexible 
and possibly more cost-efficient than government organizations. According to 
Munos (2006), PPPs usually operate with a budget of below $50 million.  
Moran, Ropars et al. (2005, pp.7, 8, 14, 15, 20-21, 28, 30, 33, 37, 52, 59) 
provide the most extensive review of the PPPs: 
- As of December 2004, there were 63 active drug development projects for NDs and 
70% of these projects conducted in PPPs, another 25% are developed by large 
pharmaceutical firms alone, and 5% were WHO projects. Over 60% of PPPs were 
formed by small and medium size Western firms and almost three-quarters of PPP 
projects also embrace developing country firms.   
- PPPs are mainly supported by philanthropic organizations. Such organisations 
combined donated 79% of all funds for the period 2000-2004, whereas OECD 
governments contributed only 16%, and UN organizations (excluding the WHO) 
donated another 3%. Major philanthropic organizations include the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation, Médecins Sans Frontières, and the Rockefeller Foundation. 
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- PPPs accounting expenditures were just US$112 millions for more than 40 drug 
projects. This rather high cost-efficiency is due to its non-profit character, the use in-
kind contributions, and cheap clinical trials in developing countries. Most PPPs with 
small company partnerships exclude interest payments and overheads. 
From 1986 when the first PPP for health was created, until the end of 2003, 
91 such partnerships had been established, of which 78 were still in existence 
(Kaplan and Laing 2004, p.100). Moran, Ropars et al. (2005) conclude that PPPs are 
the perfect choice in terms of generating R&D for NDs as about half of drugs 
developed by PPPs are highly innovative and developed drugs for neglected diseases 
faster than the industry alone. PPPs require less external funding, entail lower risk 
and direct operational involvement of an outside donor, and can be adapted to the 
needs of specific developing countries. Mahoney, Krattiger et al. (2007, p.4009) 
point out the importance of the following components of PPPs success: effective 
governance, competent staff, and proper external review groups. 
However, it is not clear whether faster drug development time in PPPs is 
explained by their superior organization or by previous deficiency of public funding 
and low priority of NDs in private firms in 1990s. Some PPPs were inactive and not 
that successful. Most PPPs experience the following common problems (Sarewitz, 
Foladori et al., 2004, pp.72-83): 
- Patents on new products are often appropriated by pharmaceutical firms; as a result, 
prices for middle-income countries and for poor people in high income countries can 
be charged at high levels. 
- A lack of accountability for PPP results before all stakeholders. 
- The financial sustainability of a PPP is not guaranteed; corporations participating in 
PPPs might be driven by a marketing or public relations motivation without a 
commitment to the real objective. 
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Ten major intermediaries and product development partnerships received 
almost $0.5 billion in 2007 for neglected diseases (including HIV/AIDS), but Buruli 
ulcer, trachoma and rheumatic fever did not have any intermediaries or partnerships 
(Moran, Guzman et al. 2008, p.43). Ridley, Grabowski et al. (2006) argue that the 
PPP scheme suffers from asymmetric information.  Maurer (2006) suspects that PPPs 
maybe more willing to tolerate inefficient drug projects.  Trouiller, Olliaro et al. 
(2002) note that PPPs usually work with drug candidates at advanced phases of 
development and for diseases with a large potential commercial patient base such as 
tuberculosis and malaria only. 
Mrazek and Mossialos (2003) point out the following problems with PPPs: 
- PPPs often worked in parallel without proper collaboration, although the Global 
Forum for Health research supports information exchange through networks.  
- Some PPPs do not publish their budgets, outcomes, and governance structures.  
- PPPs do not always clearly set their priorities and selection criteria for projects. 
Ziemba (2005) criticizes PPPs for small representations from developing 
countries in their boards of directors or advisory boards, little coordination among 
PPPs, and deficiency of consultations with recipient countries. Hollis (2006, p.128) 
also notes that commercial firms might be tempted to channel public subsides or 
financing to other areas of their commercial research and can quite easily mislead 
their partners on the true costs of the research. Munos (2006) points out that the 
number of contributors to PPPs is small and some drug candidates are just revived 
projects from commercial firms, which had been previously declined for commercial 
reasons. Once such drug candidates are exhausted, R&D costs for PPPs might 
essentially increase. 
Moran, Ropars et al. (2005) recognize that most PPPs have a deficiency of 
funding that slows down the R&D process. Also most PPP staff often have no 
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pharmaceutical industry experience and this can cause some misunderstandings in 
regard to the needs of pharmaceutical companies (ibid, p.27). PPPs do not however 
fully alter the interest that the industry extends NDs and the best choice of PPP is far 
from clear (ibid, p.65). In addition, many small pharmaceutical firms lack knowledge 
of the conditions and regulations in developing countries and so require a local 
partner, especially in relation to distribution and manufacturing (ibid, p.66). Another 
problem is the lack of global coordination of their funding. For example, pneumonia 
and diarrhoeal illnesses obtained 13 times less PPP funding than HIV, malaria, and 
TB in 2007, while they contributed to 32% more global burden of diseases in 
developing countries (Moran, Guzman, et al, 2009: 145).  
 Another rather non-trivial push scheme is an open-source R&D, where 
contributions are made voluntarily by representatives from academia, public 
institutions, and pharmaceutical firms. Maurer, Rai et al. (2004) proposes donations 
by companies, universities, and individuals with subsequent free access to software, 
research tools, drug candidates, and databases based on licences that permit anyone 
to use information. 
Munos (2006) advocates an open-source component for knowledge-based 
works combined with a managed project approach and outsourcing for rule-based 
works. The best ideas are then selected and transformed into projects to be financed 
and outsourced with an open call for sponsors. Major stimuli are curiosity, charity, or 
reputation, and other non-monetary remuneration. The most vivid example of this is 
the Medicines for Malaria Venture as well as the Institute for One World Health. The 
crucial elements are the presence of committed partners, strong project leadership, 
and experience in drug discovery projects (Munos, 2006). However, Maurer, Rai et 
al. (2004) emphasize three major problems of virtual nonprofit pharmas: guessing 
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costs of private subcontractors, lack of upstream research as drug candidates are 
borrowed from elsewhere, and under funding.    
 
Pulling schemes  
The major conventional pull factor – patents – do not work well for NDs as existing 
purchasing power is not sufficient to attract commercial R&D. A strong pull scheme 
is proposed by Pogge (2006, pp.146-147) to establish a reward for new drugs in 
proportion to that particular drugs‘ contribution to a decrease in the global burden of 
disease. This scheme assumes a global public good strategy as a parallel alternative 
to the patent based approach to pharmaceutical innovation. This strategy can be 
offered to firms which would be willing to put their patents on essential (life saving) 
medicines into the public domain, in exchange for which they would be compensated 
from a global public fund. The reward would be in proportion to a realized impact on 
global health during what would have been the life of the patent. This would 
stimulate firms to produce cheaply and sell their essential drugs widely in order to 
enhance the impact on global health. Pogge‘s plan leaves non-essential medicine 
under current patent system. He assumes that this strategy will require $45-90 
billions of annual public contributions to the global fund. Finkelstein (2008) 
proposes a somewhat similar idea of an independent public non-profit drug 
development corporation, which would largely finance drug R&D in the US.  
The proposal of rewards based on therapeutic effect of Hollis (2006) and 
Pogge (2006), which foresee a sponsor estimating and paying annually for observed 
therapeutic benefits of drugs for neglected diseases would be difficult to realize due 
to the implied scale of financing, estimation difficulties, and lack of long term 
political commitments. However, Hollis (2007, p.85) assumes that annual $500 m 
would be a necessary payoff just for NDs. These proposals would encounter the 
 165 
same problems as many government programmes: corruption, methodological 
problems of estimating the reduction in the global disease burden, difficulties with 
collection and assessing of information across countries, establishment of proper 
international controls and deficiency of expertise etc.  
It is not clear who, why and how much should be contributed to the global 
fund and how the necessary volume of the fund should be optimized in the event of a 
budget deficit.  As Pogge‘s strategy essentially amounts to the public in developed 
countries subsidising patients in low income countries, questions of political 
feasibility might legitimately be raised. Attaran and Granville (2004) note that 
―international treaties [in health] are not legally enforceable‖. However, the idea of 
rewarding pharmaceutical innovators based on their realized contribution to the 
global health can potentially set the right incentives for drug R&D.  
The Office of Health Economics (2005) concluded that the following pull 
incentives for pharmaceutical companies are the most promising for neglected 
disease drug innovations:  
- transferable extension of intellectual property rights, which allow a company to 
obtain additional patent extensions on an own product in exchange for an ND drug; 
- transferable fast track approval for a product in exchange for an ND drug; 
- guaranteed advance purchase commitments (APCs), which can be most cost-
effective. 
I am further summarizing the criticism in the literature on these incentives 
with my evaluations. The extension of patent rights on (some) drugs in exchange for 
drugs for neglected diseases has been offered by the CEO  of Glaxo Jean-Paul 
Garnier (cited by Hollis (2006, p.131)). This scheme proposes large cross-subsidies, 
which will be indirectly paid by patients and health insurances mainly in developed 
countries. Only a part of the lost consumer surplus due to higher drug prices will be 
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transferred into more R&D, including neglected disease, and increased companies‘ 
profits.  
Hollis (2007) criticizes patent extensions as higher drug prices will be 
imposed on sick people without giving additional incentives to develop the best 
drugs.  If the current level of efficient patent life is sufficient to encourage 
innovations, such cross-subsidies are likely to create large distortions.  The extension 
of patents for commercial medicine in exchange for ND drugs is also lacking this 
result-driven incentive as pharmaceutical firms as they are unlikely to face a rigorous 
selection by final consumers of the drugs. 
The major pull incentive has been proposed in the form of advanced market 
commitments that promises to buy a drug with some pre-specified standards, 
especially vaccines, at a stipulated price and quantity. Because this proposal actually 
implies one purchase, I refer to this proposal as advanced purchase commitment 
(APC) following Light (2009). APC primarily target developing of vaccines for NDs.  
The pharmaceutical markets have been somewhat favourable towards the 
sales of disease treatment medicine rather than prevention drugs. Although vaccines 
might be the most efficient medicine, many pharmaceutical firms have scaled back or 
shut down their vaccine operations even in developed countries. Vaccines are not 
used often and therefore do not generate the same level of sales as other drugs. 
Although vaccines save millions every year – probably 4-5 times more than an 
average drug, the commercial market is still relatively small: in 1997, only two out of 
20 top pharmaceutical companies produced vaccines in their areas of research 
(Bartfai and Lees, 2006, pp.198, 268). Because of large economies of scale, the 
number of licensed vaccine manufacturers in the US reduced from 26 in 1967 to 12 
in 2004 with four dominant players (Milstein, Batson et al., 2005, p.1). As of mid-
2008, five major firms producing vaccines – all Big Pharma companies – account for 
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more than 80% of global vaccine revenue (World Health Organization 2009, p.27). 
Gregersen (2004) summarized that most recent vaccines are improvements or 
combinations of existing vaccines; the probability of success for a novel successful 
vaccine project is below 1%; it takes about 20 years to develop a new vaccine after 
publication of the corresponding new concept. 
The Center for Global Development initiative, chaired by M. Kremer, R. 
Levine, and A. Albright, has proposed the following practical APC plan for vaccines 
(Kremer, Barder, et al. 2005): 
- Establishment of an independent adjudication committee (IAC) with support of 
donors and the industry to identify medical parameters of a vaccine with a right to 
lower those parameters if necessary. 
- Sponsors would legally bind themselves to purchase the specified vaccine at some 
commercially attractive minimum price to immunize a fixed number of persons. The 
price is set per treated person and developing countries would pay an affordable co-
payment. The proposed minimum amount of purchase is about $3.1 billion in net 
present value (in 2004 dollars). This amount is estimated to represent adjusted 
revenue from a typically successful commercial new chemical entity drug. Berndt 
and Hurvitz (2005) propose that all products meeting the technical requirements 
should be granted roughly the same deal. 
- An inventor who agrees to this contract must also set a low price, preferably close 
to the marginal cost, for additional units of the vaccine, or put a production license 
into a public domain. However, sponsors would subsidize purchases of the vaccine 
by qualifying countries up to the specified amount so that there should be underlying 
demand for that particular vaccine from developing countries.  
 Berndt, Glennerster et al. (2007) propose to adjust the APC reward for (i) 
direct funding already received by the inventor from other sources, (ii) the progress 
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already achieved in vaccine development before launching the APC, (iii) 
technological complexity of specific vaccine. 
G8 countries agreed to pilot APC (Berndt and Hurvitz, 2005), and in 2007, 
one was launched for a vaccine to be developed against pneumococcal viruses. It 
started with a $1.5 billion promise from several countries and the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation for a later stage of development of the vaccine, and a similar 
scheme was proposed for malaria. GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and Pfizer Inc. made 
long-term commitments to supply new vaccines against pneumococcal disease. 
Another APC to treat malaria is expected to begin from 2016 and last for 11 years 
with a purchase commitment of US 2.3 billion. An important adjustment in these two 
APCs is that they are expected to have half of the funds directly invested into R&D 
(Grace 2006, p.26). 
 The proposed scheme has been extensively criticised by Light (2005), who 
points out that APC is a less efficient way than that of more direct research support: 
- The scheme makes a single purchase and does not sustain the market in the future 
or requires large funding to do that so that a sustainable growth of R&D is not 
guaranteed. In comparison, PPP drug discovery programmes usually require less 
funding, though APC can still be cost-effective for vaccines. 
- An inventing company has no clear idea about future returns from the vaccine as 
the co-payment from affected countries is uncertain and the inventor‘s share in the 
total purchase is not exactly defined when there are several inventors. Berndt, 
Glennerster et al. (2007) give the counter argument that in the 6 years after approval 
of the first vaccine there were only about 1.7 following commercial vaccines on 
average. They think that an original idea of $3.1 billion commitment could be 
expanded to $5.24 billion to include the expected reward for the second vaccine 
winner bid provided that the second product must have superior features. Though 
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$5.24 billion seems a large prize, it would be still cost-efficient in terms of costs per 
DALY saved.  
- The APC approach uses industry provided data to estimate the costs of R&D for a 
new commercial drug, whereas the costs for vaccine might be essentially lower. 
- The minimum quality standards of future vaccines can be reduced by a special 
committee so that the APC approach might remunerate some inventors even if the 
desired goals are not fully achieved. 
- Only large pharmaceutical firms have enough funds to participate in APC; small 
firms, especially from developing countries, might lack sufficient financial resources.  
Farlow (2005, pp.16-19) shares some of the Light‘s concerns and provides 
some of the most detailed criticism of the APC scheme: (i) difficulties in specifying 
vaccine characteristics in advance, (ii) granting essential discretion power to IAC, 
which creates uncertainty for firms‘ R&D and opens possibilities for lobbying and 
political pressure, (iii) imposing additional costs of capital for firms due to 
uncertainty and risks involved so that the majority of the AMC (APC) prize will be 
spent on capital costs rather than on R&D, (iv) potential crowding out of R&D from 
other research projects, for example, from non-profit partnerships, (v) high capital 
costs and lack of risk sharing favour participation of large companies, (vi) 
information constraints to set the AMC prize optimally as costs and technological 
changes in future are rather uncertain; this is important because if the level of the 
prize is set too low, it could increase risks of failure, if it is too high – the 
commitment wastes resources; (vii) firms might prefer just to satisfy the required 
minimum of vaccine characteristics, (viii) firms would prefer to keep their R&D in 
secrecy from rivals, which is counterproductive for the social R&D process, (ix) as 
intellectual property rights are kept by the inventor, future drug prices may be kept 
high.   
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There are additional concerns of the APC incentives in the literature:  
- Moran, Ropars et al. (2005, p.17) worry that the APC might increase the costs of 
R&D for the existing PPP for drug development. 
- Sonderholm (2010) suspects that companies can corrupt governments of developing 
countries to demand their products be developed through the APC.  
- The APC approach relies on commercial companies, but sole efforts of 
pharmaceutical firms often led to ND drugs, which were expensive and difficult for 
administration (Moran, Ropars et al., 2005, pp.43-44). 
- Danzon (2007, p.179) suspects that the APC approach could increase the delivery 
of vaccines that have already been in development, but it will take many years to 
stimulate basic research. 
- Hollis (2006, pp.129-130) states that the APC contract must provide a detailed and 
fixed minimum medical specification for each new drug, including the success rate in 
clinical trials, severity of side effects, administration techniques, and production 
costs. It is not clear, however, how to balance these characteristics against each other.  
- Maurer (2006) argues that APCs tend to overpay companies because there might be 
no good quality drugs developed for a specific time period and as actual cost of R&D 
can be 20-30% lower than the average one targeted by the commitment. 
The APC has other drawbacks: 
- Firms are not required to publish their R&D failures, which can give useful 
scientific information for eventual ‗could-be‘ success.  
- The cost-sharing mechanism might not be a good signal about public demand for a 
drug. For example, Cohen and Dupas (2010) have conducted an experiment in Kenya 
by distributing antimalarial insecticide-treated bed nets to pregnant women. They 
find no statistical evidence that cost-sharing affects usage of the nets, but it does 
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considerably reduce the demand for this life saving facility and argues for free 
distribution of the antimalarial nets due to large positive externalities.  
- The APC proposal (Center for Global development, 2005) points out the result of 
Acemoglu and Linn (2004), who used Poisson regressions for a number of new drugs 
entering a therapeutic class with demographic regressors. They estimated that ―a 1 
percent increase in the potential market size for a drug category leads to 
approximately a 4 percent growth in the entry of new nongeneric drugs‖ in the US. 
Light (2005) criticizes the assumptions of the theoretical model of Acemoglu and 
Linn such as infinitely lived individuals. However, those assumptions just simplify 
the analysis, but do not undermine the empirical result. For example, infinitely lived  
individuals are needed to assume complete intertemporal markets. 
With high elasticity of R&D by market size, the APC could be more efficient 
than direct financing. Such high elasticity could be rooted in expected permanent 
changes in the market size caused by demographic factors in the US, which is the 
world‘s largest and most profitable market. Application of this result to conditions of 
shallow and low margin markets of neglected diseases or to a temporal public 
program could be misleading. Medical needs do not properly translate into market 
demands in low income countries. For example, Lichtenberg (2005) concludes that 
the introduction of new drugs for a disease is strongly associated with the burden of 
disease in rich countries, but there is no such association in developing countries.  
Light (2005) points out at the alternative estimations for the US vaccine trials 
by Finkelstein (2004, p.543) who shows that ―for every $1 permanent increase in 
expected annual market revenue from vaccines against a particular disease, the 
pharmaceutical industry will spend an additional 6 cents annually in present 
discounted value on R&D for vaccines against that disease‖. A more optimistic 
estimation of Scherer (2009) for the elasticity of R&D by sales on new drugs is 
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closer to one. Hall (1992) find for a panel of the listed US manufacturing firms 
between 1973 and 1987 the elasticity of R&D by profit at 0.28 and detect negative 
association between R&D and leverage. Cameron (1996) summarizes a number of 
empirical studies on the output elasticity of R&D conducted from 1980 to 1995 and 
reports the elasticity to be in range from 0.06 to 0.45 at firm level with a typical 
elasticity between 0.05 to 0.1.  My estimations in section 3.2 of this dissertation 
show elasticity of R&D by cash flow at 0.36, which supports inelastic relationship of 
R&D with sales. 
- One of the key problems of APC is limited competition for the purchase 
commitment as small companies (Farlow, 2005), which need special consideration.  
Small companies will find it difficult to finance such risky R&D without 
milestone cash flows, but small firms are quite important. Villa, Compagni, et al. 
(2009) calculated that majority of new drugs approved under Orphan drug laws have 
been developed and produced by small and medium sized pharmaceutical firms that 
get rather small annual sales from $50 to $300 millions and a lower profitability than 
blockbuster drugs. Love (2003, p.10) cites the estimation of the Pharmaceutical 
Education and Research Institute for 117 drug development projects and concluded 
that it took just 7.1 years and $75.4 million in direct R&D costs per successful drug. 
An important conclusion of this survey is that small firms spent less than half of the 
large firm costs per successful drug so that the small firms tend to be cost-efficient. 
Hall (2002) points out that small and new innovative firms experience high 
costs of capital and even large firms prefer internal funds for the financing of R&D. 
Grace (2006, pp.11,15) refers to consultations with more than 50 pharmaceutical 
companies that reveal high concerns of biotech firms that APC does not address cash 
flow problems during the R&D. During these consultations senior executives of 
these companies pointed out that venture capitalists are looking for a significant 
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return in the medium run and it can take some time for big pharmaceutical 
companies to find and subcontract with a small biotech company. These 
consultations suggest that it is too risky for small biotech firms to finance phases II 
and III of clinical trials and small firms need assistance in dealing with health 
authorities in developing countries and some guarantees for purchases of final 
products. 
Berndt and Hurvitz (2005) propose that milestone payments can be made 
within the APC scheme, but if there is an efficient market for R&D contracts such 
payments are not necessary as proper subcontracts can be negotiated. However, the 
nature of R&D markets do not lead us be so optimistic about their efficiency, 
especially in the short run. R&D markets require essential search and information 
processing costs, which make R&D subcontracting markets inefficient. Pisano (2006, 
pp.142-143) points out that new firms in biotechnology are financially constrained 
and an unsuccessful project can ruin a small firm.  
To address the issue of cash flow, Brogan and Mossialos (2006) propose 
selling a call option, i.e. right to buy, which allows purchasing a future drug at a pre-
specified price in case of its successful development. The general problem of 
application of financial instruments to NDs is that the financial market is unlikely to 
work in determining prices of the instruments due to an extremely limited amount of 
potential buyers and sellers. High uncertainty of R&D process at the early stages and 
insufficient observations on success rates and quality of ND research make it quite 
challenging to estimate values of such options.  
 
Mixed schemes 
Orphan (rare) drug schemes offered by developed countries to treat their own 
population use both push and pull factors. The orphan drug laws have been adopted 
 174 
in the USA with 238 drugs already approved in the scheme; 94 drugs approved in the 
EU; 7 drugs approved and Australia and 33 drugs approved in Japan. The orphan 
schemes usually offer such push incentives as protocol assistance, fast-track approval, 
tax credits on clinical research, research grants, and a pull mechanism of market 
exclusivity for up to 7 years, which effectively extends the patent rights (Villa, 
Compagni, et al. 2009).  
For example, the Orphan Drug Act of 1983 stipulated the following 
incentives for rare diseases that affect less than 200,000 people in the US: the FDA 
assistance in drug applications, small research grants, 7-year exclusive marketing 
rights for the first drug in a class, tax credit for up to 50% of clinical testing 
expenditures (Schwitzer, 2006, pp.39, 256-257). The Orphan drug program in the US 
have been rather successful: for approximately 6,000 diseases designated as rare in 
the US, 326 drugs received FDA approval and 41 of these drugs were supported by 
the program grants; the vast majority of the drug candidates were sourced from 
academia and biotechnology companies (Cote, 2008). 
However, Trouiller, Olliaro et al. (2002) are rather sceptical about Orphan 
drug incentives as they act only for drugs charged with very high prices affordable 
for health insurance systems in developed countries. This explains why no drug for 
neglected diseases was developed through this scheme at that time. Mrazek and 
Mossialos (2003) state that if extended exclusivity periods are applied for NDs, high 
prices for new drugs would reduce access and usage of such drugs in developing 
countries. Yin (2008, p.1060) using DiD approach estimated the impact of Orphan 
Drug Act in the US on R&D and concluded that ―tax credits appear to have a more 
limited impact on private innovation in markets with smaller revenue potential‖. 
Danzon (2007) argues that granting such orphan status for neglected diseases 
in the US and EU would bring additional incentives through high prices charged to 
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the consumers in developed countries, e.g. for travellers to developing countries. 
According to the survey of Hotez (2008), the US had more than 110,000 cases of 
dengue fever, over 3,000 cases of Chagas disease, and 8,000 schistosomiasis cases. 
Many of these diseases are associated with US-Mexico border territories and African 
refugees. Malaria and human trypanosomiasis have already been given rare status 
(Villa, Compagni et al. 2009). Hotez (2009, p.405) also notes there is a high 
prevalence of 13-29% for trichomoniasis and toxocariasis among African Americans.  
One of the possible flaws of this orphan status approach is that patients with 
these diseases in developed countries can differ from patients in developing countries 
in nutrition, immunity, and cross-infection background. This difference could be 
significant so that drugs clinically tested on patients in developed countries might not 
be effective for patients in low income countries. Another problem is that the orphan 
drug schemes do not encourage competition. For the period 1983-2005 only one 
percent of drugs were allowed to enter the market for the same condition (Berndt, 
Glennerster et al. 2007). 
 Sustainable funding is one of the key problems for all schemes. In addition to 
ad-hoc philanthropy, some government expenditures, and donations, non-trivial 
schemes have been offered and implemented. One such proposal is a priority review 
voucher (Ridley, Grabowski et al., 2006), which grants a pharmaceutical company a 
right of an FDA priority review of any drug in exchange for an approved drug to 
treat a neglected disease. It assumed that the approved drugs for NDs must be 
superior to existing analogues and that patent rights for such drugs will be allocated 
in a public domain. Ridley, Grabowski et al. (2006) estimate that such a voucher 
might be valued at about $300 million or more by a company with a potential 
blockbuster drug candidate and such vouchers can be also auctioned to finance a 
scheme for R&D on neglected diseases. 
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The authors of this voucher proposal argue that: 
- consumers in developed countries would benefit from accelerated approval of drugs 
without compromising safety as reducing review times by authorities does not 
increase drug market withdrawal (Berndt, Gottschalk et al. 2005); 
- this scheme should not create a congestion as firms will be paying additional fee of 
$1 million to the FDA for additional labour involved in the drug review; 
- the proceeds from selling one or two priority reviews together with the tax credits 
offered by the Orphan Drug Act should be enough to finance a drug for a ND. 
This proposal has already been implemented into the US policy with the Food 
and Drug Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA) of 2007 that allows to a 
sponsor of a New Drug Application for a tropical disease to obtain a priority review 
voucher. This voucher is transferable, can be sold, and also guarantees FDA review 
of any other drug within 6 months of submission (Cote 2008). Moran, Ropars, et al. 
(2005) propose an auction of a right (options) for fast track priority reviews (fast 
track options – FTOs) of new commercial drugs by early involvement of the 
authorities in monitoring and advising on clinical trials. FTOs allow greater 
flexibility by separating of fund raising from R&D. 
If FTOs can increase the efficiency of the approval processes then I question 
why the government does not use them in the first place? If there is no congestion at 
the drug approval process, it would be welfare enhancing to provide FTOs as a 
source of government revenue while moving to an optimal drug review capacity for 
all drugs. 
Although the vouchers and FTOs could indeed be the most politically feasible 
way to raise funds as this does not imply explicit public expenditure, it can lead to 
essential distortions in the commercial pharmaceutical innovations. Me-too imitative 
drugs are likely to be pushed through this priority review scheme and this can create 
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essential distortions of incentives for the creation of pioneering and therapeutically 
advanced commercial drugs. The share of me-too drugs is already quite high.  Only 
14 percent of all new chemical entities were therapeutically superior to existing 
drugs for the period 1997-2006 (Prescrire International, 2007). 
Philipson and Dai (2003, p.46) argue that competition with newly patented 
drugs in the US reduces the first innovator sales greater than generic drugs. Bartfai 
and Lees (2006, pp.41-42,197) state that if a good drug target is found, other 
companies enter the market with their drugs addressing the same target often within a 
year undermining sales of the original innovator‘s drug. Increasing entrance of me-
too drugs in blockbuster sales facilitated by FTO or voucher schemes can reduce 
incentives to undertake large costs and risks associated with a pioneering 
pharmaceutical R&D. 
Another possible problem of the voucher and FTO schemes is that firms 
would rather minimize costs of developing medicine for neglected diseases through 
me-too drugs with insignificant therapeutic advantage over existing products or with 
more difficult administration in the filed conditions of low income countries. An 
indirect confirmation of this argument can be seen in historical trends: out of 13 
drugs for neglected diseases developed by the pharmaceutical industry for 1975-99, 
―12 had a low overall health value to developing country patients‖ (Grace 2006: 19).  
 
4.3. Evaluation of the schemes for neglected diseases: what is needed? 
 
The division of schemes by push and pull incentives is useful for the classification. 
However, the key is to reduce barriers for successful innovation, which, according to 
Pisano (2006) include risk management, integration of different competencies, and 
learning. He stresses that the vast majority of R&D projects fail and learning from 
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those failures, integrating knowledge from various disciplines, and parallel 
experimentation are absolutely essential.  
Tirole (1994, p.400) notes that too little attention is given to optimal 
incentives for R&D in economic literature in general so that very little is known 
about optimality of patent length, tax rates, or subsidies. Hsu and Schwartz (2008) 
evaluated some research incentives for developing countries‘ vaccines using such 
criteria as expected costs of R&D and price per treatment, probability of success, 
consumer surplus, expected vaccinations, and expected cost per person successfully 
vaccinated. Using an R&D option model with Brownian processes they concluded 
that (i) patent extension for such diseases is not an effective incentive, (ii) fixed cost-
sharing subsidies have low expected cost to the sponsor, but generate lower 
consumer surplus if granted patents for new drugs increase prices, (iii) the APC 
performs better than the cost-sharing subsidy, (iv) some unknown combination of an 
APC and a cost-sharing subsidy could deliver the best results. However, their model 
puts aside the inherent agency problems between sponsors, consumers, and 
innovators, and also assumes that the quality of vaccine is independent of incentives.  
Based on the review in section 4.2, I compare the major existing and 
proposed schemes for NDs (Table 4.7) and evaluate them according to 17 selected 
criteria grouped into four categories: efficiency, feasibility, fairness, and 
sustainability.  
Many schemes overcome participation constraint by implying some 
profitability to participating companies, but do not provide strong incentives to 
deliver quality drug to the lowest costs.  It seems that the best scheme for NDs is 
likely to be the proposal of Moran, Ropars, et al. (2005) with the industry support 
fund to facilitate to a network of PPPs.  
 
 179 
Table 4.7. Matrix of evaluation of new incentives for neglected diseases. 
Criteria Advanced 
purchase 
commitment 
(APC) 
Public-private 
partnerships 
(PPPs) 
Orphan 
drug  
designation  
The priority 
voucher and 
orphan 
designation 
 
The 
global 
public 
funding  
Patent 
extensions 
in exchange 
for ND 
drugs 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Efficiency: 
Rewards are 
based on cost-
efficacy and 
administration of 
new drugs 
 
possible no no possible possible  no 
Likelihood of 
distortions due to 
cross-subsidies 
low low low medium low very high 
Promotion of 
entry into R&D 
and production 
(competition) 
 
low high low medium possible medium 
Limitations on 
inflation of R&D 
costs 
Not cost 
driven 
medium Not cost 
driven 
Not cost 
driven 
medium Not cost 
driven 
Facilitation to 
information 
disclosure  
low medium low low high low 
Feasibility: 
Requirement of 
special binding 
international 
agreements 
yes not 
necessary 
not 
necessary 
not 
necessary 
yes yes 
Scale of required 
direct 
public/charity 
funding 
 
several 
billion 
dollars 
few hundred 
million 
dollars 
tens of 
millions 
no tens of 
billions 
dollars 
no 
Scale of public 
contributions 
from low-income 
countries 
Co-
payments 
based on 
income 
no no no possible no 
Complexities to 
administer a 
scheme 
medium medium low low high low 
Fairness: 
Tackling 
international 
free-rider 
problem 
 
(continued on the 
next page) 
yes no no no possible no 
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Criteria Advanced 
purchase 
commitment 
(APC) 
Public-private 
partnerships 
(PPPs) 
Orphan 
drug  
designation  
The priority 
voucher and 
orphan 
designation 
 
The 
global 
public 
funding  
Patent 
extensions 
in exchange 
for ND 
drugs 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Stockholders 
from affected 
countries as 
decision makers 
possible, but 
donor driven 
Possible, 
but donor 
driven 
no no possible no 
Constraining 
product prices in 
developing 
countries 
yes somewhat no no yes no 
Sustainability 
Long term self-
financing 
depends on 
donors 
depends on 
donors 
demand 
driven 
yes depends 
on 
donors 
yes 
Enabling public 
controls over 
project 
performance 
medium medium low low high no 
Capacity 
building of 
clinical 
experimentation 
in developing 
countries 
no medium low low high no 
Adaptability to 
adverse grant 
and technology 
shocks 
low  low medium medium low medium 
Incorporation of 
the full R&D 
cycle 
 
yes somewhat yes yes yes yes 
Note: the first four schemes have been already implemented.  
 
Based on the literature review, due to the nature of the drug discovery process, 
a robust R&D scheme for NDs will require: 
1. Long term R&D financing to attract and keep enough human capital in the 
ND research. It is clear that market demand for neglected diseases is insufficient to 
finance the R&D and a third party must pay for creation of the drugs. Because 
streamlining of cross-subsidies is a way to reduce dead weight losses, I argue that 
 181 
this third party finance should be direct contributions from charities and governments 
of developed and affected countries.  
R&D of neglected diseases was mostly financed by governments in the 
OECD for social solidarity and by charity organizations. However, BRIC countries 
(Brazil, Russia India, , and China) are capable of much larger financing of neglected 
diseases that affect their population, e.g. tuberculosis. Participation of the World 
Bank through loans is needed to monitor ND programs by governments of affected 
countries and to make credible long term financial commitment.  
Contributions of developing countries are assumed to be very small. However, 
drug R&D for neglected disease R&D is a long term international development 
project enabling the World Bank to finance it through target loans to developing 
countries. Such loans could alleviate the international free-rider problem and 
inconsistency of incentives pointed by authors of the APC proposal. Subsidies 
through access to cheap capital for drug development provided by the World Bank 
could significantly reduce the accounting cost of capital for the R&D.  This would 
give developing countries a voice to enhance monitoring, cooperation and enforce 
that R&D outcomes are tailored to developing countries‘ needs. Hotez, Molyneux et 
al. (2006) emphasize countries should themselves set appropriate policies and 
priorities and call for greater integration of international disease controls and specific 
disease programs.  
I also propose for the OECD or G-20 countries to commit 1% of their public 
pharmaceutical R&D on research in neglected diseases, especially on target selection 
and validation with an ultimate goal to facilitate to proof of concept studies POC. 
This 1% can generate at least a $200 million push incentive for upstream discovery 
of new drug candidates. This could generate 10-20 drug candidates for clinical trials 
each year, if the efforts are internationally coordinated.  
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2. Public subsidies to clinical experimentation. As commercial companies 
spend more than 70% of their drug development budget on failed compounds 
(Finkelstein 2008, p.66), clinical trial subsidies could improve expected profit for 
firms and, hence, attractiveness of R&D for neglected diseases.  Jayadev and Stiglitz 
(2009) propose public funding of clinical trials and health value-added pricing in the 
pharmaceutical industry to increase genuine innovations and reduce R&D costs for 
new drugs. They emphasize public nature of information coming from clinical trials, 
greater confidence in the quality of testing, avoidance of duplicative trials and 
reducing entry barriers for small firms.  
This public funding complemented with open transparent and low cost 
tenders for clinical trials could reduce costs of drug R&D. In fact, subsidization of 
clinical experimentation in developing countries can be quite productive. According 
to the FDA data on investigational new drug (IND) submissions (PAREXEL, p.185), 
shares of non-commercial INDs that are mainly filed by practising physicians in total 
INDs ranged from 72.9% to 85.6% for the period 1982-2003.  
3. The payoff to innovators must be based on global cost-effectiveness of a 
new drug determined through clinical trials in several developing countries as 
suggested by Kremer and Glennerster (2004), Pogge (2006), Hollis (2005, 2007) and 
others. PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2007) predicts that a cost-effectiveness analysis of 
new drugs will be required for drug approval by 2020.    
In terms of incentives, setting prices for drug innovators and consumers in 
developing countries must be separated in order to provide proper incentives for drug 
R&D and affordability of prices (Finkelstein, 2008). Generic manufacturers should 
be allowed to start production as soon as possible to supply developing countries 
with newly designed drugs for NDs. A detailed discussion of pricing for developing 
countries is considered by (Lanjouw and Jack, 2003).  
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A clear compensation plan for companies would encourage R&D incentives, 
preferably using some simple formulae with detailed calculation methodology to 
allow less discretion. For example, consider health maximizing social planner with a 
choice of two drugs. Suppose that the marginal utilities of each drug are 
approximated by DALYs (QALYs) saved per patient per treatment. Then utility 
maximizing social planner should set the ratio of prices to the ratio of marginal 
utility or DALYs saved per treatment by each drug. In this case, a price offered to an 
innovator of a new drug through an APC scheme (APC PRICE) could be estimated 
as a fixed proportion of a current comparable drug price (CPRICE) for low income 
countries multiplied by ratio of DALYs saved by newly developed drug by the 
scheme (DALYn) to DALYs saved by the current drug (DALYc): 
 
APC PRICE = K*DALYn/DALYc*CPRICE 
where K is some proportional coefficient set in advance through consultations with 
donors and pharmaceutical companies. DALYs can be replaced with quality-adjusted 
life year (QALYs) estimations based on independent and transparent clinical trials.   
Attaran and Granville (2004, pp.180-182) discuss methodological problems 
of traditional cost-effectiveness analysis such as DALY and years of life saved 
(YLS), including the variability of the value of a life saved and the underestimation 
of costs of a particular disease at the macroeconomic level in the long run. Although 
cost-effectiveness analysis of medicines suffer methodological difficulties 
(Drummond and Sculpher, 2005), Australia, Ontario (Canada), and a few European 
countries actively use this analysis in public drug reimbursements. The reward would 
be justified if there is a robust procedure to estimate cost-benefit effects for a new 
drug in field conditions. Sponsors could then pay for the net benefit of a drug based 
on clinical trials with existing drugs rather than with placebo. 
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4. There should be some partial compensation (insurance) for pharmaceutical 
companies in the event of research project failures provided that the project 
outcomes are promptly analysed and published. For example, Light (2009) criticizes 
the APC scheme for the neglect of product liability issues. Failures must also be 
appreciated as they can generate important knowledge for other projects, but should 
not stimulate the entry of non-performing innovators.   
5. Transparency and accountability.  All participating research proposals, 
clear selection criteria, and their milestone progress must be published whatever 
results are achieved. In exchange for public subsidies, participating PPPs should 
publish their research project selection criteria, budgeting, and governance. 
Finkelstein (2008, p.120) notes that pharmaceutical companies have a ―financial 
incentive to hide unfavourable study results from investors and the public‖. A good 
scheme must encourage provision of all scientific information and related materials 
to all qualified researchers. 
6. Network based research. The advantage of the PPPs network is that it 
allows greater competition of many parallel experiments based on rival ideas and 
drug candidates. Pharmaceutical companies increasingly follow more open 
innovation by outsourcing R&D, creating joint ventures, licensing research and 
working within large research networks. In 1999, a quarter of R&D spending was 
contracted via outsourcing contracts to CROs (Gassmann et al, 2008, pp.68, 72, 80). 
Outsourcing is widely used in the production of pharmaceuticals and is also 
increasingly utilized in drug development: more than 40% of all pharmaceutical 
R&D activities were outsourced in 2004 (Kalorama Information cited by Schwitzer 
(2006, p.68)). 
 An example of pharmaceutical project management is the virtual drug 
development company Protodigm established by Roche. Just ten employees of this 
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company managed the development of several drugs by choosing the most qualified 
subcontractor for each stage of R&D, including pre-clinical and clinical trials, 
production, drug registration and marketing (Gassmann et al, 2008, pp.144, 154, 156-
157).  Another pharmaceutical giant, Eli Lilly, posts dozens of scientific programs on 
a website and offers cash prizes for researchers who offer solutions (Kaplan, 2006, 
p.49).  
Callan and Gillespie (2007, p.165) propose extending global virtual networks 
by ―sharing drug-discovery tools, matching potential collaborators, databases, and 
with a common platform for management of intellectual property and 
administration‖. Virtual brokered drug-discovery networks might attract a wide 
range of contributors and provide access to industrial laboratories (Hopkins, Witty, et 
al. 2007).  
A project approach can help to employ appropriate incentives for each stage 
of the R&D project management cycle: 
- Basic research might start with grant research to validate drug targets in an animal 
model as an insufficient number of validated targets can be a critical bottleneck. A 
market price for such targets could be as low as a $0.25 million (Bartfai and Lees, 
2006, pp.229, 260). Target identification is essentially an academic problem where 
university and public research institutions specialists can help. At this stage, open 
calls for potential drug targets, and relatively small research grants for the academic 
community might have the highest impact.  
- Identification of drug candidates and their synthesis for the specified targets can be 
outsourced through procurement tenders. Preclinical tests of drug candidates for 
tropical diseases are better forecastable for clinical trials as the effect on infection is 
visible and pre-clinical trials costs are around $20 million for a drug candidate 
(Hopkins, Witty, et al. 2007).  
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- Clinical trials can be conducted with the help of specialist business clinical research 
organizations (CRO) in partnership with hospitals in developing countries.  There 
should be both training programs and tenders for clinical trials in developing 
countries. This could reduce the costs of drug R&D, create additional capacities for 
clinical studies and optimization of drug use in developing countries.    
 7. Coordination for innovators. Drug R&D research has economies of scale 
and scope in maintaining a diverse compound portfolio and in capturing knowledge 
spillovers between projects (Henderson and Cockburn, 1996). This suggests that 
some coordination and portfolio management of PPPs could be beneficial.   
Moran, Ropars et al. (2005) propose the creation of an Industry Research 
Facilitation Fund, which should provide R&D grants for NDs to the industry and 
academia through PPPs to a total amount of about $250 million per year. In these 
authors‘ view, the Fund should draw and execute long term plans of drug 
development, accredit PPPs, manage global drug portfolios, provide management 
support, conduct negotiations with the industry and governments, give technical 
advice, provide legal support, act as an information hub for all stakeholders, and 
provide other shared services to PPPs to avoid redundancy across the partnerships.  
Indeed, establishing such a coordination platform could be helpful as many 
services are common across all PPP projects and represent fixed costs. Performing 
such services through one hub can reduce fixed costs per project and, thus, contribute 
to lower R&D costs. Coordinated portfolio management could reduce the risks of 
failure through pooling of drug candidates with different success rates and costs and 
also to purchase a cheaper collective insurance for possible product liabilities. The 
Fund could support a technology trust to pool patents related to neglected diseases as 
advocated by (So 2008).  The platform could also negotiate an access to medical 
expertise and drug discovery tools, including chemical libraries at big pharmaceutical 
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companies, and advice on national academic grants for fundamental biomedical 
research on NDs.  
 
4.4. Own hybrid model for R&D through prize screening 
 
Detailed evaluations of drawbacks of the existing R&D schemes for NDs have 
revealed a need for a better design. This section is aimed at developing small and 
medium enterprise (SMEs) ‗friendly‘ schemes for neglected diseases that would 
tackle major problems of the PPP and APC schemes. The problems are moral 
hazards in the PPP scheme, and high capital costs and risks for small firms and lack 
of incentives for developing the highest possible drug quality in the APC scheme. 
PPPs could also benefit from long-term coordination of global R&D efforts on NDs, 
greater transparency and accountability of the management and partners and a global 
optimization of the portfolio of drug candidates. Though this proposal is primarily 
intended for NDs, it can be applied for orphan diseases with a very low purchasing 
power of consumers.  
 Small pharmaceutical and biotech companies have good potential to develop 
drugs for NDs as they can rapidly incorporate new ideas, facilitate competitive 
research and multiple parallel process of exploring different research strategies. 
Pammolli and Riccaboni (2007) estimated that almost 35% of all R&D projects on 
diseases relevant to Africa have been developed by start-up biotech companies, 
whereas public research organizations developed only 22.3% of all projects between 
1980 and 2004. Emphasizing the dominant role of small start-up companies in 
Orphan drug schemes around the world, Pammolli and Riccaboni (2007, p.154) 
concluded that ―small biotechnology companies show a higher propensity to operate 
in risky and small markets – for instance orphan and neglected therapeutic areas‖. 
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45% of all research projects for NDs under public-private partnerships were 
conducted by small companies, which are motivated by commercial reasons, and 
only a quarter of all projects were developed by multinational firms, which were 
mostly motivated by reputation and ethical concerns (Moran 2005).  About 150 small 
companies had research projects related to neglected diseases in 2007 (Moran, 
Guzman, et al, 2009: 144). 
Block and Keller (2009) find an increasing role of inter-organizational 
cooperation and public funding, whereas contribution of big corporations into 
leading innovations were decreasing for prize-winning innovations in the US 
between 1971 and 2006. Using the Pharmaprojects database, Adams and Brantner 
(2006, p.425) have found no empirical evidence that larger firms produce lower cost 
drugs and this can possibly be explained by outsourcing of such components as 
clinical trials to CROs. James Love (2003, p.10) cites the estimation of the 
Pharmaceutical Education and Research Institute (PERI) that small firms spent less 
than half of the large firms‘ costs per successful drug, which took just 7.1 years and 
$75.4 million in direct R&D costs per drug. However, Pisano (2006) doubts that cost 
of NMEs significantly differ by firm size.  
Clinical trials are expensive and routine, whereas pre-clinical drug discovery 
is a highly sophisticated research process (Gambardella 1995, p.15). Over three fifths 
of total R&D cost of developing and NME drug is attributed clinical trials (Paul, 
Mytelka, et al, 2010). Because clinical trials represent expensive routines and small 
pharmaceutical and biotech firms in developed countries have little knowledge about 
conditions in developing countries, my proposal is to contract out clinical trials 
through public or sponsored funding.  The establishment in 2003 of the European 
and Developing Countries Clinical Trials Partnership (EDCTP) for building capacity 
for the clinical trial (Kaplan and Laing 2004, p.102) is already a step in that direction.  
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Hall (2002) concludes that innovative firms experience high costs of capital 
and prefer internal funds for the financing of R&D due to asymmetric information, 
moral hazard, tax shields, and incomplete financial markets. Pisano (2006) points out 
that a few unsuccessful drug research projects can lead to bankruptcy for a small firm. 
Our model is designed to complement private discovery efforts and leverage the role 
of the disease-affected countries through World Bank loans. The model incorporates 
advanced features of existing schemes and is built on private inventors‘ and 
subcontractors‘ profit motivation combined with non-profit project management in a 
way that should result in significant cost savings – making this approach 2-3 times 
cheaper than the APC.  
This proposal is based on three components: outsourcing, non-profit 
management, and prize screening to reduce moral hazard problems. 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2009, p.6) predicts appearance of a new dominant model 
of pharmaceutical R&D, which consists of a network of organisations with a 
common purpose and infrastructure and a company, which will outsource most of its 
activities while managing a research portfolio.  
Outsourcing is a widespread practise in the industry as it allows greater 
flexibility and choice of the best available supplier for a particular service or material.  
Even big pharma companies get their drug candidates from other companies. According 
to PAREXEL (2004, p.36), the top ten pharmaceutical companies as measured by the 
number of products in development as of March 2004 had 42.8% of all their drug in 
R&D licenced-in; and the share of licenced-in products to total drugs under development 
varied from 35.3% for the National Institute of Health to 48.9% for Roche. According to 
Goldman Sachs, 20.7% of pharmaceutical R&D was outsourced in 2002, including 19% 
in the preclinical stage, 16% in phase I, 15% in phases II-III, and up to 95% in central 
 190 
laboratories. Proportion of clinical studies outsourced increased from 7.7% in 1995 to 
22.9% in 1999 (PAREXEL 2004, pp.26-28).  
It is well established that public enterprises usually underperform due to lack 
of incentives and moral hazard issues (e.g. The World Bank, 1985); but non-profit 
subcontractors perform relatively well (Weisbrod, 1988), and have actually 
outperformed private sectors in neglected diseases (Moran, Guzman, et al., 2005).  
Possible reasons are public, media, and private donors‘ controls and also public good 
features of discovery R&D. Hansmann (1986) argues that for-profit companies in 
public sector can divert public funds as the public sector does not have the incentives 
and skills to monitor such diversion while non profit organizations allow greater 
flexibility and encourage voluntary contribution. Brekke, Siciliani, et al (2011) show 
through several models that non-profits can be less cost-efficient than profit 
unconstrained firms, but deliver higher quality of services if they are altruistic 
enough due to lower incentives to shirk. Based on the meta analysis of 31 
observational studies since 1990, Eggleston, Shen, et al (2008) concluded that quality 
of services tend to be better in private non-profit American hospitals, though it 
depends on institutional context and data sources.  
Next subsection describes the model which combines advance market 
commitment, subsidized clinical trials, and rewards based on therapeutical 
contributions of new drugs through a prize screening mechanism. This is followed by 
model formalization through prize screening mechanism design and the estimations 
of the expected costs of the scheme for the case of tuberculosis. 
 
Description of the proposal 
The model is based on setting two prizes to promote high quality drugs. I assume that 
innovators know their drug candidate quality better than anybody else, which is 
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private information. The proposed scheme designs incentives to reveal quality 
information and encourage qualified innovators to self-select by participating.   The 
idea of the proposed hybrid public-private partnership (HPPP) is to (i) reward 
selected innovators for their drug candidates submitted to the Program after pre-
clinical discovery stages with a fixed prize to reduce liquidity cosntraints, (ii) then 
outsource and pay for clinical trials and evaluation of therapeutic quality of the drug 
candidates to independent professional organizations through competitive bids, (iii) 
assist and pay for drug approvals for successful drug candidates, and finally provide 
a second prize to innovators based on a formula for the evaluated quality of a 
successful drug in the phase III of clinical trials.  
The proposal consists of the following steps: 
1. In order to launch and supervise the HPPP a board of directors is formed 
from representatives of sponsors and recipient developing countries affected by NDs. 
The HPPP model calls for government funding and monitoring, but not for 
government management. The scheme is intended to engage both the government 
and the public of the affected countries and to address the free-rider problems of 
global R&D projects.  
The idea is that the affected countries should make affordable contributions 
into the Program, which can be leveraged through development loans. A reputable 
international development organization with a UN mandate such as the World Bank 
can provide special preferential loans to developing countries to finance this Program. 
Gostin and Mok (2009: 9) notice that  
―WHO … has failed to live up to the expectations in its leadership role… 
Without clear leadership, the current response to vital global health 
challenges has been ad hoc and highly fragmented‖.  
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In this regard, a greater involvement of the World Bank is needed due to its 
global mandate to fight poverty. The reputation, intellectual and financial resources 
of the World Bank could have the advantage of reassuring inventors that the Program 
financial commitments will be fulfilled and the Bank should sign a legally binding 
commitment for the HPPP. Some rich countries can sign co-sponsorship agreements 
to financially guarantee the Program liabilities before inventors in case of unforeseen 
circumstances.  Other donors would be more confident in pledging their resources 
and forming an alliance if the World Bank would take the leadership in the proposed 
Program and integrate it into own health projects.  The important issues of choices of 
diseases and the efficient level of their funding must be further resolved through the 
World Bank‘s development loans mechanism. The issue of efficient funding per 
specific disease is not resolved by all existing schemes. It requires additional 
research on impacts of the NDs on macroeconomic indicators, productivity, 
household incomes, human capital, with due considerations to profound ethical 
issues in the affected countries. 
2. In a competitive tender an operating non-profit virtual pharmaceutical 
company (NVC) with experience in management of pharmaceutical R&D and work 
in developing countries is selected by the board of directors for the Program period. 
The NVC is supposed to publish clear criteria for accepting a drug candidate into the 
Program, publicly explain their drug selection and trial financing decisions, promptly 
publish clinical trials results, monitor subcontracts based on competitive bids, and 
channel two payoffs to the winning firms.   
The board of directors selects through a competitive tender an operating non-
profit virtual pharmaceutical company (NVC) with experience in management of 
pharmaceutical R&D and work in developing countries. The NVC must publish clear 
criteria for the selection of a drug candidate into the Program, publicly explain their 
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drug selection and financing decisions, promptly publish clinical trials‘ results, 
monitor subcontracts based on competitive bids, and channel two payoffs to the 
winning firms. The advantage is that projects would be funded on a case-by-case 
basis in a transparent and outcome verifiable fashion rather than in a bulk public 
spending way. The board of directors is responsible for controlling that the project is 
not diverted by rent-seeking managers of the NVC and can change the managing 
company in case of problems.   
3. The NVC must periodically call for submission of drug candidates from all 
innovators having demonstrated a proof-of-concept or received investigational new 
drug (IND) status from recognized pharmaceutical regulation authorities. Such 
submission should include a drug candidate‘s results of preclinical pharmacology 
and toxicology tests; an estimation of expected costs of industrial production of the 
proposed drug for a specified scale; a specification for administration, stability, and 
storage conditions of a the drug; a commitment to issue a licence to conduct trials 
and put the production and distribution licence in the developing countries of the 
drug in public domain; an outline of the clinical development strategy; a consent that 
all results of clinical trials will be promptly published. The other intellectual property 
rights, especially possible applications of a new drug outside of neglected diseases in 
developing countries, are kept with the inventor and this can add an incentive to 
participate in the HPPP scheme.  
4. The NVC chooses an independent evaluator to conduct cost-benefit 
analysis of new successful drugs based on phase III clinical trials if a drug candidate 
passes this phase. Pogge (2006) and Hollis (2006) proposed to reward for new drugs 
in proportion to that particular drugs‘ contribution to a decrease in the global burden 
of disease. Due to difficulties of such estimations, this proposal is based on cost-
benefit analysis as a proxy for a drug quality. McGuire (2001) concludes that cost-
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efficiency analysis is a consistent tool in comparing alternative health products and it 
might work as a proxy for welfare maximization, especially when patients do not 
bear full costs of their health care or markets do not exist. 
The evaluator must develop or adopt a methodology for cost-benefit analysis 
to be approved and published by the board of directors. The evaluator must give an 
expected ratio of QALYs (DALYs) saved by the drug per $1 of drug manufacturing 
costs, which is referred further as drug quality. CROs and cost-benefit analysis of 
drugs are paid by the sponsors through the NVC. For each disease, a benchmarking 
drug or treatment and its quality, i.e. QALYs saved per $1 of costs must be estimated 
and announced before the selection of drug candidates into the Program.  
This proposal uses cost-benefit analysis instead of subsidy to sales as in the APC 
scheme. Sales of new drugs in conditions of high information asymmetry and 
corruption in developing countries might be a distorted indicator for social surplus of 
a drug.  
Using cost-benefit analysis as a basis for estimation of the second prize has a 
number of methodological issues. McGuire, et al (2004) point out difficulties with 
assigning correct weights and discounting factors to various cohorts of patients in 
QALY estimations, with selection of appropriate comparator treatment to establish 
marginal cost-efficiency of a new drug, with tracking that efficiency over time, and 
with extrapolations of results of clinical trials to patient population. Drummond 
(2007) notes that ten countries introduced cost-benefit analysis for national drug 
reimbursement policies and he concludes that such decision process is workable. The 
proposed model takes QALYs saved per unit cost of a new drug as a good proxy for 
pharmaceutical demand.  
5. The NVC recruits part-time pharmaceutical consultants to evaluate/review 
drug candidates, cost-benefit analysis of the drug candidates, clinical trials, and drug 
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approval process. All actions, bids, submissions, transactions, and decisions of the 
NVC must be promptly published on a website of the Program to encourage public 
monitoring. Volunteer evaluators are encouraged to participate through health 
forums facilitated by the Program.  
6. The NVC with the consultants select a pre-specified number of n drug 
candidates. Buxton, Drummond et al. (1997) recommend simplicity and transparency 
in economic evaluation of new drugs. Preclinical tests of drug candidates for tropical 
infectious diseases can serve as a good proxy for success in clinical trials while 
preclinical trials costs are around $20 million for a drug candidate (Hopkins, Witty et 
al. 2007). The selection should be based on a predetermined weighted average 
promising index of the expected candidate‘s manufacturing cost, performance 
indicators in the pre-clinical phase, projected storage conditions, and easiness of 
administration. The promising index is worked out by a consensus of consultants. 
The drug candidates with the highest promising index are selected for further fully 
subsidized proof-of-concept (POC) studies, and, after promising POC results, 
progress into clinical trials in developing countries sponsored by the donors.  
7. All selected by the NVC drug candidates are paid with a fixed amount, the 
first stage prize (F), in exchange for a licence for clinical trials, including phase IV 
trials, production, and distribution of the drug in developing countries.  The first 
payoff is given automatically after a new drug candidate is accepted into the Program 
as a pre-announced fixed prize. At this stage a drug candidate is not remunerated for 
its quality as it is unknown. This prize is intended to stimulate research of small 
companies and teams of researchers on NDs as they do not need to wait the end of 
clinical trials to get some cash flow. However, the amount of the first stage prize F is 
chosen below expected costs of proof-of-concept and pre-IND studies to discourage 
entrance of applicants with low quality drug candidates. Once a drug candidate is 
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admitted on pre-announced conditions into the Program, those conditions cannot be 
changed in future. These measures will reduce regulatory risks for participating 
inventors. According to DiMasi, Hansen et al (2003) clinical trials and opportunity 
costs of capital contribute more than 80% of total costs of drug development.  
Clinical trials are fully paid by sponsors and costs of capital for innovators are 
reduced through up-front payment of the first prize.  
8. The NVC contracts out clinical research organizations (CRO) through 
competitive bids to conduct clinical trials with the selected drug N candidates. This 
step follows Jayadev and Stiglitz (2009) proposal for public funding of clinical trials 
and health value-added pricing. Number N is chosen by budget constraints and by 
expected industrial practice attrition rates. CROs must submit monthly reports of 
clinical trials to be published by the NVC on the Program‘s web site. The NVC has 
right to stop and alter clinical trials of a drug candidate in case of a drug‘s non-
performance or safety concerns. A new drug candidate is tested against a pre-
announced typical existing drug or a therapy for a disease.  
Paul, Mytelka et al (2010, p.206-07) suggest using networked and partnered 
organization of pharmaceutical R&D and crucial role of drug portfolio selection and 
proof-of-concept (POC) studies to increase research productivity; cost of such 
studies can range from $6 to $22 million. Bonabeau, Bodick et al (2008) describe the 
successful Eli Lilly experience with an autonomous Chorus unit for early stage 
elimination of unpromising drug candidates through POC studies by running a 
network of experts with a small staff.  
Following these guidelines, the NVC may conduct POC studies for a drug 
candidate before contracting out for a full scale clinical trials. These trials must be 
transparent as they are used for the drug evaluation and estimation of the second 
prize.  Sculpher, Claxton et al. (2006) conclude that randomised controlled trials are 
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the key for cost-effectiveness analysis, though some synthesis and updated clinical 
data are also needed. These authors argue that patient population, period, research 
design and proper comparators must be specified for such analysis.   
9. A successful drug candidate after clinical trials is further facilitated with 
registration and then is paid with the second prize (S) in proportion to its estimated 
drug quality by pre-specified formula.  To reduce moral hazard on side of firms, 
drugs with quality below existing benchmarking drug or therapy for a disease must 
be rewarded with a zero second payment.  The NVC is paid bonuses per number of 
processed drug candidates to enhance management incentives to drop non-
performing candidates.  
 
Model formalization  
Formalization of a model for neglected diseases is difficult as it needs incorporation 
of many details of drug R&D. For example, the seminal report of the Center for 
Global Development (2005) does not contain a formalized model, but just the 
advanced purchase commitment proposal. My model follows the mechanism design 
literature (Salanie, 2005, Laffont and Martimort, 2002) with a discrete model of 
discrimination through rewards. The Principal, e.g. the board of the Program 
directors with the NVC, maximizes the quality of successful drugs given budgetary 
constraints by setting three major controls: the amount of the prizes F, S and number 
of drug candidates n. The amount of prizes, all formulae for their estimation, and 
selection criteria are pre-announced. The Principal sets the prizes to discriminate low 
quality drugs by setting incentive compatibility constraints for innovators while 
encouraging their participation in the Program. The drug innovators (the 
representative agent) maximize discounted net payoff from two prizes given their 
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own individual rationality or participation constraint that payoff is positive if the 
quality of the drug candidate is higher than an existing comparable drug or treatment.   
I assume that the efficiency of a drug candidate is easier to observe for the 
innovator (agent) rather than for the Principal. Though drug quality is not perfectly 
observable and even somewhat uncertain for innovators in pre-clinical studies, the 
incentives should promote submission of the most promising drugs and penalize sub-
standard drug candidates through negative expected net present value of prizes 
deducted by R&D costs for innovators. Targeting drug quality is also important for 
costs of the Program: ―using better preclinical screens to increase success rates from 
the current 21.5% to one in three could reduce capitalized total cost per approved 
drug by $221 million to $242 million… (and) reduces out-of-pocket clinical costs per 
approved drug by $57 million to $71 million‖ (DiMasi, 2004) . 
 There is a trade-off between setting high first prize to enable proper cash flow 
to innovators and reduction of incentives for submission of low quality drugs, the 
latter must be a priority for the sake of the social surplus. This would also encourage 
development of more predictive preclinical toxicology screening, which (Gilbert, 
Henske et al. 2003) could increase success rates and reduce expensive failures in the 
later stages of development. To simplify the model, I assume that a fixed number of 
T years required for a drug development, but R&D costs (R) and costs of clinical 
trials depend on drug quality θ.  
 Suppose benevolent sponsors have a current budget B to maximize QALYs 
saved from a particular disease. Sponsors can purchase B/p treatments of a drug 
priced at p per treatment. If one treatment saves D QALYs, sponsors can save D/pB 
= θ0B QALYs, where θ0 = D/p is quality of the drug defined as number of QALYs 
saved per unit price of the drug. Let sponsors invest C+R into R&D of a new drug 
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quality θ > θ0 with probability of success q in T years, where C is costs of clinical 
trials with registration, and R – pre-clinical R&D. This is a reasonable decision for 
risk neutral sponsors if discounted with some rate d the number of QALYs saved 
from the purchase and distribution of the new drug and some purchase in the amount 
of A of the current drug are greater than QALYs saved from purchase of the current 
drug: 
                    
      
 
⇒   
        
      
          
  (4.1) 
where r – discount rate of capital for sponsors, which increases the available budget 
of the sponsors to purchase the new drug in T-th year at e
rT
. The amount of A spent 
on purchasing of the current medicine is determined by sponsors‘ utility function, 
which requires a separate macroeconomic research.  
Inequality (4.1) shows that developing a new drug make sense for sponsors if 
its quality is significantly better than the quality of the existing drug as right hand 
side multipliers are all greater than one:  (B-A)/(B-A-C-R)>1, 1/q>1, and d>r 
assuming that sponsors‘ discount rate for QALYs is greater than discount rate for 
their capital. Inequality (1) can be used to set a threshold (benchmarking) drug 
quality for a public drug R&D Program:  
              
            
          
 
A rough estimation of this threshold is about l=5 assuming 3% discount rate on 
DALYs used by WHO (2008) in estimation of the global burden of diseases, 1% 
discount rate for the World Bank‘s development loans, T=10 years, and C+R<<B-A, 
and, according to DiMasi et al (2003), the average probability of success in clinical 
trials is q=0.23.  This means if a new drug‘s quality is less than 5 times better than 
that of the existing drug, sponsors might find it irrational to invest in its R&D. 
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Consider a simplified problem of risk neutral donors maximizing the QALYs 
saved from a possible new drug development and a current drug for the total drug 
purchase in amount of   in the proposed hybrid Program: 
   
      
                                      
                      
subject to  
firms‘ participation constraint:                 
incentive compatibility constraint 1:                 
incentive compatibility constraint 2:                             
where F, S(θ) – the first and the second prizes, V – expected profit of the 
representative firm outside of the Program, i.e. from commercial drug development; 
v – social value of one QALY; R – R&D expenditures of the firm at the pre-clinical 
stage.  The participation constraint states that the representative firm must obtain at 
least the same profit from participation in the Program than from an outside option of 
working on commercial drugs. The first incentive compatibility constraint states that 
the firm‘s payoff from a low quality drug, which is here assumed at the level of the 
currently available drug θ0, must not be a positive one to prevent entry of firms with 
a low drug quality candidate θ≤θ0.  
The second constraint requires that payoff for a better quality drug must be 
greater than the payoff from a drug candidate comparable to the current (benchmark) 
level. The constraint 2 is not binding as its right hand side is not positive, whereas its 
left hand side is positive according to the participation constraint. The participation 
constraint must be binding: assume it is not, then it is possible to increase the first 
and the second payment on an infinitesimal amount without violation of the 
constraint. But such an increase in the payments would diminish the objective 
function; hence, the objective function is not maximized when the constraint is not 
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binding. Similarly one must conclude that the incentive compatibility constraint 1 
must be binding. Therefore, the participation constraint is  
              
and the incentive compatibility constraint implies  
               
 
⇒ F=              
Normalizing the second payment for drug quality θ≤θ0 at zero as there is no sense for 
sponsors to pay for an inferior drug: S(θ0)=0, hence F =R(θ0). The first order 
condition is  
                      
Simplifying to C’(θ) =0, i.e. assuming that the costs of clinical trials are independent 
of drug quality, and taking into account differentiation of the participation condition: 
S’(θ)= R’(θ), then S’(θ)= Ave(r-d)T=k , where k is a parameter. The solution to this 
equation is linear function S = kθ +k0. Given that  
S(θ0)=0= kθ0 +k0 
 
⇒ k0 = - kθ0→ S=k(θ – θ0) 
i.e. the second optimal payoff must be in proportion to the marginal drug quality  
(θ –θ0).  
Consider now the risk-neutral firm problem of maximization of the payoff by θ: 
   
 
                   
                               
where t(θ) is time of pre-clinical R&D. The first order condition is  
                            
assuming t’(θ)>0 as time of research and pre-clinical R&D costs R’(θ)>0 are 
proportionate to drug quality and slope of R&D by drug quality R’(θ)  Frt’(θ)e-rt(θ), 
the first order condition can be expressed as 
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This implies that the firm chooses to invest in pre-clinical R&D with a related drug 
quality θ in proportion to qke-r(T)/(Fr). The Spence-Mirrlees condition of the single 
crossing holds as the second derivative of the payoff function by θ for the firms has a 
constant sign if  
Fr
2
[t’(θ)]2e-rt(θ) –      
has a constant sign. Therefore, the managing company can increase k (the second 
payoff) and reduce F (the first payoff) to enable targeting of higher drug quality as 
the firm‘s payoff increases in θ. The coefficient k must be set in consultations with 
the industry and sponsors. The NVC can also increase probability of success q by 
careful choosing of a portfolio of drug candidates.  
 
Calibration of the model 
I assume that the social value v of one QALY is approximately the annual national 
income per capita, which is roughly $2400 according to the IMF World Economic 
Outlook (2010) Database for African countries, and assuming r=3%, d=1%, T=10 
years: 
k =Ave
(r-d)T
 ~ 2930A 
i.e. reimbursement coefficient is generally proportional to the current purchases A of 
the benchmark drugs. The outside option for a small firm from, say, participation in 
the orphan drug development scheme can be approximated as the net present value of 
stream of profits from annual $400 million sales of a orphan drug for 15 years of 
effective patent life and exclusive marketing rights discounted at I=15% at the end of 
a year. I assume that a quarter of the sales is translated into net profit, i.e.  
  ∑ 
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According to my assumptions: F=R(θ0) ~ $10 m  and the second payment S ~ V-F 
=$585 m - $10 m = $575 m, where the first prize is chosen at the lower bound of pre-
clinical costs. These numbers are reasonable; for example, Kaplan and Laing (2004, 
p.101) summarize five sources of estimations come to the following ranges: direct 
preclinical development costs vary from $8.33 to $26.0 million, Phase I – from $0.6 
to $15.2 million, Phase II – from $1.15 to $23.5 million, Phase III – from $9.5 to 
$86.3 million.   
 Costs of clinical trials vary by disease. PAREXEL (2004, p.84) cites a study 
of DiMasi et al (2003) that expected out-of-pocket costs for anti-infective drug 
development was $23 million in phase I, $13 million in phase II, $52 million in 
phase III, and $2 million in long term animal tests. Let us consider the major ND – 
tuberculosis. According to the report of the Global Alliance for TB Drug 
Development (2001, pp.40,47,52-57) the out-of-pocket costs of the preclinical phase 
for a new anti-tuberculosis (TB) drug is about $5 million and preclinical safety 
studies can be accomplished in 82 weeks. The out-of-pocket costs of all clinical trials 
for a new anti-TB agent in developing countries such as India and South Africa 
would be about $9.9 million and would last 7-10 years. In a developed country, costs 
of phase I anti-TB drug trials were about $0.65 million, phase II – $3.4 million, 
phase III – $22.6 million, but for Uganda, similar costs are much lower: phase I - 
$0.16 million, phase II – $1.6 million, phase III – $8.2 million. 
In the case of tuberculosis in year 2000 prices, the first payment can be set at 
F=$5 m, the second payment to be set at about S ~ V-F =$585 m - $5 m = $580 m, 
though the second payment is set in proportion to the desired drug quality by 
adjusting the proportionality coefficient k. Estimated probabilities for an anti-
infective drug candidate is 0.661 for entering the phase II of trials and 0.382 for 
phase III (DiMasi 2003). This implies out-of-pocket expected costs of a TB drug 
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candidate clinical trials in Uganda at $0.16 m + 0.661*$1.6 m + 0.382*$8.2 m ~ $4.5 
m. Thus, total expected Program costs would be ($4.5 m +$585 m + $10 m) *1.2 = 
$719.4 m. The coefficient 1.2 includes 20% overhead costs, which are estimated at 
20-30% for a commercial NME research projects (Paul, Mytelka, et al. 2010) to run 
the Program administration and experts.   
Considering average durations and probabilities of success (Table 4.8), a firm 
might find it quite attractive to invest in pre-clinical studies that take approximately 
three years in a prospect of obtaining $5 m after 3 years and another $580 m at the 
end of the following seven years if a publicly desired drug against tuberculosis is 
developed. The firm does not pay for clinical trials, obtains cash flow with high 
probability in a few years after the discovery phase, and has incentives to enter the 
Program if it can deliver a competitive quality new drug. If such a drug is not 
developed out of a promising drug candidate, the Program pays only the first 
payment ($5 m) and clinical trials costs (about $10 m) and some overhead costs of 
maximum $1 m, which add up to about $16 m in case of the drug candidate failure.  
The Program shares risks, which ought to be paid.  
 
Table 4.8. Drug R&D phases: duration and success rates. 
Phase Average Duration, 
years 
Chance of reaching 
next stage
1 
Probability of being 
launched
2
 
Preclinical 2.8 0.4 0.103 
Phase I 1.2 0.75 0.184 
Phase II 2.3 0.48 0.281 
Phase III 2.3 0.64 0.658 
Submission    0.906 
Note: 1. Hambrecht and Quist estimates from the Tufts Center for the Study of  
Drug Development.  2. The Pharmaceutical R&D Compendium: CMR 
International/Scrip‘s Complete Guide to Trends in R&D, 2000.  
Source: adapted from PAREXEL (2004, p.183)  
 
So far I considered a representative firm with only one drug candidate. How 
many drug candidates should be called to achieve success with a 95% confidence 
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rate (i.e.        ? The Program can choose a complementary portfolio of drug 
candidates to increase the rate of success. Let us consider a simple case of n 
independent candidates with individual success rate q, which is the Bernoulli 
distribution with an expected number of successful drugs nq and variance nq(1-q). If 
the Program wants to reduce its overall failure rate with such n drug candidates to 
less than α; the probability of failure for n independent trials would be  
            
 
⇒    
      
        
 
An estimation for q could be the data of Grabowski (2002) who found that 
22% of compounds entering clinical trials obtain entry into the market. An 
alternative estimation of Paul, Mytelka, et al (2010, p.205) show that 9-11 drug 
candidates are needed to enter clinical trials to expect one NME approved, i.e. 
probability of successful passing of clinical trials is about 12%. However, this 
probability could be too low as more than a half of drug candidates are dropped due 
to financial and strategic considerations in commercial R&D (cited by Biancardi, 
2008, p.35). 
The assumed range of probabilities (Table 4.9) corresponds with the success 
rates from 12% to 33.3% for self-originated NCEs (DiMasi, 2001, p.301) for the 
therapeutic classes corresponding with neglected diseases, though, as DiMasi 
estimated, the success rates for acquired drug candidates are significantly higher.  
However, the benchmarking average success rate of 20% is lower than the average 
success rate for anti-infective drug candidates, which are estimated at 28% (Di-Masi 
2001).  Given a standard for the confidence level α=0.05, Table 4.9 shows the 
expected and confidence costs of the Program.  
In general, in 2000 prices for the tuberculosis HPPP is expected to run at 
average costs of $800 m and delivering two or three new quality drugs. The proposed 
 206 
Program should deliver at least one new quality drug at costs of $982 m assuming a 
20% success rate in clinical trials for a drug candidate. These costs of the proposed 
Program are higher than those of PPPs, but essentially lower than the ones estimated for 
the APC scheme. These costs are estimated for a commercial alternative option, which 
could be set lower in consultations with the industry experts. Given that the proposed 
Program targets high quality drugs and allocate production licences of new drugs in 
developing countries into the public domain, this scheme can compete with PPPs, which 
are considered to be the current work horse for NDs.  
 
Table 4.9. Expected costs of the Program for tuberculosis in year 2000 prices, US$ 
Probability 
of 
individual 
drug 
candidate 
success, q 
Minimum 
number of 
drug 
candidates to 
reduce the 
Program 
failure to less 
that 5%,  
  
      
        
 
Expected 
number of 
successful 
drugs, nq 
Expected 
costs of the 
Program, $, 
[n(F+C)+ 
S*nq]*1.2  
 
Expected 
costs per 
successful 
drug, 
expected 
costs of the 
Program 
divided by 
nq  
Expected 
costs with 
only one 
successful 
drug (if 
more than 
95% failure 
rate),  
[n(F+C)+ 
S]*1.2 
0.1 29 2.9 2610.0 900.0 1287.6 
0.15 19 2.85 2371.2 832.0 1083.6 
0.2 14 2.8 2234.4 798.0 981.6 
0.25 11 2.75 2138.4 777.6 920.4 
0.3 9 2.7 2062.8 764.0 879.6 
0.35 7 2.45 1848.0 754.3 838.8 
0.4 6 2.4 1792.8 747.0 818.4 
Note: assuming Bernoulli distribution, the second payment S=$580mln, the first 
payment F= $5 m, costs of clinical trials C = $10 m and 20% overhead costs.   
 
The advantages of the proposed hybrid scheme are: (i) a reduction of 
overpayments associated with the APC scheme as the information about drug quality 
is reasonably measured ex-post; (ii) prompt publication of the information about 
performance of all drug candidates; (iii) putting drugs‘ licences into the public 
domain for developing countries; this reduces drug prices and enables prompt 
manufacturing, (iv) explicite rewards for drug quality passed independent clinical 
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trials, (v) a large reduction of risks and costs of drug R&D for innovators, which 
encourages entry of small firms and academic research teams, (vi) the incorporation 
of developing country needs through representation in the board of directors.  
The scheme also helps in tackling moral hazard problems on the side of 
innovators. This problem can be severe for small companies that often continue to 
invest in developing of a new drug even if its performance is inadequate due to 
commitment from researchers and lack of alternative drug candidates (Comanor 
2007, p.60). Due to greater cost-efficiency of direct R&D financing, this Program 
can be run regularly to address drug resistant viruses and create robust incentives for 
the R&D. Maurer (2007, p.105) points out that repeat business enhances trust and 
reliability of incentives with inventors.  The Program also stimulates creation of the 
entity that focuses only on drug discovery as suggested by Maurer (2007), which 
allows better monitoring and punishment for non-performance than PPPs, which 
amalgamate many other functions.  HPPP increases global optimization of risks for a 
disease lacking in the uncoordinated PPPs.  
Potential problems of the proposal include: 
- Firms might have an incentive to overstate attributes of their drug candidate. 
The Program management should balance this by a right to contract out some 
independent tests on key characteristics of the drug candidate. Such tests are 
not normally expensive (up to 200,000€).  
- Difficulties with correct cost-benefit analysis of new drugs, which might 
imply some variation. The managing company and sponsors can be biased in 
seeking compensation to it lower limit or under lobbying pressure. Maurer 
(2007, p.98) points to such weaknesses of QALY-based estimations as an 
undervaluation of drugs for contagious disease, weak robustness of results 
between studies, and inferior measurement of incremental benefits of new 
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drugs. Pharmaco-economic assessment can be technically difficult and costly, 
especially if there is no therapeutic alternative (OECD Health Division 2008, 
p.18). However, this proposal is not looking for a perfect cost-benefit analysis, 
but rather hopes for an agreed workable methodology that can robustly 
compare two drugs through randomized clinical trials.  
- This scheme may not be easy to calculate a budget as future drug quality is 
uncertain. An alternative could be sharing fixed periodic prizes between new 
drugs developed for that period, but this might be unfair as better quality 
drugs developed in another period will receive a lower reward if more drugs 
are successful in the same period.  
However, the proposed HPPP model is better than the APC scheme as it 
reduces overpayments of R&D by remuneration for the measurable QALYs saved per 
successful drug above a benchmark. In addition, it facilitates greater entry of small 
innovators by providing advanced cash flows and by sharing costs and risks of drug 
development. The HPPP also has advantages over the PPPs by reducing moral hazards 
of innovators as the payment is done for the revealed drug quality, better global drug 
candidate portfolio management, transparency, and facilitation to information exchange 
and economies of scale.  
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Conclusion 
 
One of the contributions to the literature of this thesis is a comprehensive 
econometric policy evaluation of the short-term effects of the recent cost-
containment pharmaceutical reforms in five countries on six financial indicators 
related to firms‘ R&D. I use several DiD and matching DiD methods for robustness 
sake. Across all DiD estimations, I see consistently negative impacts of the reforms 
on R&D expenditures in Germany and no significant changes are found for the US. 
Investment perspectives as proxied by price-to-book ratio are the least affected by 
the reforms. The US and Denmark are countries where all matching DiD methods 
indicate positive impacts of the reform on R&D expenditures.  
In general I find that the R&D indicators tend to be unaffected by regulatory 
shocks. These findings challenge some opinions in the literature that cost-
containment reforms should have dramatically negative impacts on R&D in the 
industry. Possible explanations for this R&D persistency could be that (i) long term 
changes were not captured in the considered short panel data series, (ii) R&D 
represents the competitive advantage and companies might strategically maintain 
their R&D, (iii) possibilities to export to less regulated markets, (iv) firms adopt/find 
some loopholes in the regulations.  It seems possible to conduct cost-containment 
reforms without detrimental effects of R&D in the short run, at least in already 
heavily regulated markets. However, long-term effects are not warranted and remain 
to be seen.  
Using dynamic panel method approaches, I estimated that cash flow has a 
positive effect on firms‘ R&D across several subsamples of potentially financially 
constrained firms. The estimated elasticity of R&D to cash flow is 0.36 at median 
values and this effect is more significant for new firms and firms with less than 100 
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employees, whereas the cash flow sensitivity for large firms is statistically 
insignificant. Firms with low investment prospects as proxied by less than one price-
to-book ratio or by a lower dividend payout ratio have lower sensitivity of their R&D 
to cash flow.  Cash flow does not seem to play an important role in physical 
investment decisions; although the number of employees tends to positively affect 
investment to sales ratio. The dependence of R&D on cash flow for small and new 
firms suggests that some cash flow provisions may facilitate innovations of such 
companies.   
This empirical study expands previous country focused research of liquidity 
constraints for R&D and investment for pharmaceutical firms by considering several 
hundred firms from the pharmaceutical industry in 15 OECD countries, using 
dynamic panel specifications with a number of liquidity constraint indicators, 
controlling for country specific institutional and financial environments.  
I also attempt to evaluate a link between technical inefficiency and 
regulations in the industry for major drug producer countries. The estimations for the 
stochastic production frontiers are based on consideration of intangible and tangible 
assets, and the number of employees at firm level.  Using several specifications for 
the distribution of the technical inefficiency term, I find no conclusive evidence that 
technical inefficiency is associated with the stringency of pharmaceutical regulations 
or concentration of sales at the national level.  
I also check the hypothesis that companies do not adjust their R&D 
expenditures to sales based on the aggregate share of new molecular entities on the 
market. I run a Granger causality test, which suggests if a share of new molecular 
entities helps in the predicting of R&D expenditures with lags from 3 to 5 years. I 
failed to reject the null of no Granger causality between these series. 
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Finally, I am evaluating R&D incentives for neglected diseases, which is an 
important case of public and market failures to develop needed drugs. Using the OLS 
regressions with robust errors I find that GDP per capita, improved access to 
sanitation, safe water and control of corruption appear to be statistically significant 
factors in explaining burden of neglected diseases.  
I extensively analyse the drawbacks of the existing schemes for R&D on 
neglected diseases and find serious shortcomings for all of them. I select 17 criteria 
for drug development grouped into four categories: efficiency, feasibility, fairness, 
and sustainability and comprehensively evaluate all major incentives for neglected 
diseases. Public-private partnerships coordinated through a centralized service 
platform appear to have the highest potential to satisfy the selected criteria.  
My literature review summarizes the following needs for the drug R&D on 
neglected diseases: (i) long term R&D financing; I propose G20 countries to allocate 
to NDs a 1% share of their current spending on public pharmaceutical R&D, (ii) 
public subsidies to clinical experimentation, (iii) the payoff to innovators must be 
based on the global cost-effectiveness of a new drug (Hollis, 2005; Pogge, 2006), 
and I substantiate a simple formula for such comparison; (iv) R&D project insurance 
(Light, 2009), (v) transparency and accountability in exchange for public funds, (vi) 
network based research (Paul, et al. 2010; Pisano, 2006) to allow greater competition 
and portfolio management of parallel projects, (vii) coordination for innovators 
(Moran, Ropars, et al. 2005) through a common service platform.  
Based on these needs I have designed and formalized a hybrid model of 
public-private partnerships (HPPP) through the prize screening mechanism for R&D. 
This approach has several advantages over existing proposals: reduction of 
overpayments and moral hazards, better disclosure of information, production 
licences in developing countries put in the public domain, reduction of risks and 
costs that facilitate entry of small firms.  
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The contribution to the literature is that the proposed mechanism relies on the 
innovative effort of small firms, which play a major role in R&D efforts for NDs, by 
reducing entry barriers and moral hazard problems. The proposed mechanism aims to 
increase efficiency of the current public interventions through reducing possible 
overpayments for low quality drug R&D in the working APC scheme. HPPP can 
increase financial sustainability by leveraging resources through World Bank loans, 
transparency, and global coordination of drug candidate portfolio in comparison to 
the PPPs.  
Potential problems of the proposal include an incentive for firms with sunk 
R&D costs to overstate the attributes of their drug candidate. The Program 
management should balance this by a right to contract out some independent tests on 
key characteristics of a drug candidate. There could be practical difficulties with 
accurate cost-benefit analysis of new drugs and it is important to build a consensus in 
respect of methodology for this analysis. 
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Attachments 
 
Attachment 1. Rational approaches to drug discovery and 
promises of the biotechnological industry 
  
Rational drug design started to expand since the 1970s, especially with such methods 
as automated molecular synthesis and screening, X-ray crystallography, magnetic 
resonance imaging, progress in genetics, and computer simulated drug design 
(Scherer 2007). The rational drug discovery usually starts with identification and 
validation of a target – part of a cell or a biological process – that can be altered by a 
drug (chemical molecule or biotechnological product such as protein). A drug 
candidate initially studied in vitro in a laboratory on cells, tissues, or bacteria, and 
then it is tested in vivo on animals and men in clinical trials. In vivo trials on men 
require permission from health authorities. Pre-clinical R&D of a new chemical 
entity needs about 40 biologist-years and about the same number of chemist-years 
(Bartfai and Lees, 2006, pp.85, 89, 212).  
Firms use high-throughput screening with large libraries of chemicals to test 
target molecules by robots and computers performing analysis (Schacter 2006).  Pre-
clinical development includes establishing of cultures and microorganisms, 
development of stable formulations of a drug candidate, testing with a large variety 
of methods to estimate specificity, sensitivity, and limitations, measuring responses 
of biological materials, toxicology and safety studies (Kayser and Muller 2004).  
Drugs are first tested on animals such as worms, mice, pigs, dogs, and 
monkeys. Firms obtain Investigational New Drug Exemption (IND) to start clinical 
trials on humans: in stage I safety and toxicity of the drug is established, stage II – 
efficacy, and stage III evaluates dosage and side effects. After successful clinical 
trials, companies apply for New Drug Application (NDA) (Gambardella 1995). Each 
next phase of clinical trials becomes longer (Table A1.1).  
 
Table A1.1. Duration and major concerns of drug R&D by phases. 
 
Phase Duration in 
months 
Problems 
Phase I 12-18  Poor understanding of disease; high attrition of 
compounds 
Phase II 33 Ethical concerns regarding placebo-controlled trials; 
inefficient use of patients in dose ranging trials 
Phase III 35 High attrition, commercial efficacy 
Registration 12-18 Non-efficacious drugs, side effects emerge  
Source: IBM Business Consulting Services, Pharma 2010: The Threshold of Innovation 
(PAREXEL 2004, pp.144-148).  
 
The initial synthesis of 5-10,000 compounds and pre-clinical trials take three 
to six years, and take and leave about five compounds for clinical trials. The clinical 
trials (phases I-III) take another six to seven years with tests on volunteers (PhRMA, 
2008). An average drug development process is approximately six to seven years for 
phases I-III plus one or two years for official approval to market the drugs (Scherer 
2007). Attrition rates are increased if patients are not disciplined in taking drugs, or 
take competing medicine, or have the wrong diagnosis (Bartfai and Lees, 2006, 
pp.51-54).   
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Drugs usually bind receptors, which are proteins on surface of cells that 
trigger metabolism, but little is known about many receptors. As the result, ―the 
guidance offered by fundamental knowledge is typically very incomplete…a notable 
contribution of the new scientific discoveries is the prediction of failures rather than 
success… Companies still have to rely on, to a good extend, on trial and error‖ 
(Gambardella, 1995, pp. 29,32). Major drug targets investigated by 18 leading 
pharmaceutical companies in 1999 included enzymes (39.2%), GPC receptors 
(21.9%), channels (9.7%), factors and hormones (3.6%) (PAREXEL 2004, p.21). 
Molecular function of more than 41% of drug targets is not known yet. 
Medical chemists are crucial components of the drug discovery process at preclinical 
stage and such specialists are trained just in a few universities (Bartfai and Lees, 
2006, pp.96, 109, 112, 127). This represents critical human resources, which are not 
available in developing countries.  
 Recent shifts in drug R&D were towards (Gassmann et al, 2008, pp.36-47): 
- automated massive analyses of compound libraries, computer-based simulation;  
- automated high-throughput screening of hundreds of thousands compounds per day, 
which allows automatic testing of thousands chemical compounds; 
- combinatorial chemistry, which makes large number of compounds with systematic 
use of chemical blocks; 
- bioinformatics, that helps to store, analyse and model hundreds of gigabytes of 
bioinformation per day;  
- advances in proteomics, which deals with hundreds of thousands proteins 
functioning in organism as many drugs work via proteins or their receptors; 
- genomics that helps to identify genes involved in a disease, identify new targets and 
customize drugs for people with specific genotypes, which can reduce the number of 
failed drugs by clinical trials and prescription of drugs to only that group of people;  
- molecular (rational) design of drugs targeted at structures of proteins. 
Biotechnology allows industrialized target detection and validation, which 
can reduce R&D costs and shorten drug development. Biotechnology should help to 
design personalized medicine and it is expected that personalized genetic profiling of 
an individual will be cost less than $100. Such biotechnological branches as tissue 
engineering and stem cells are promising methods, but they are unlikely to develop 
into industrial applications in the coming years (Kayser and Muller 2004). 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers expects that in the next decade computer models of cells 
and organs will be widely used in pharmaceutical research and there will be greater 
use of biomarkers, which indicate genes (PWC, 2009, p.2). Pharmaceogenetics can 
significantly reduce sample size in clinical trials and improve safety by tailoring 
drugs to patients‘ genotype (Pirmohamed and Lewis, 2004, p.283).  
 
Promises of Biotech. There are large expectations regarding biotechnology 
and genomics discoveries that mainly contributed to the expansion of drug targets 
from 250 in 2001 to 600 in 2005, which can potentially boost new drugs. However, 
some of these expectations might not realize due to unknown quality and technical 
difficulties in reaching those new targets (Bartfai and Lees, 2006, pp. 95-96). 
Although many thousands of gens are detected, understanding of their work is still 
limited (Vogel, 2007). 
The new biotechnological revolution is developing since 1970s. It has started 
and is still mostly concentrated in the US, where sales and R&D expenditures in 
biotechnological industry are rapidly growing. Biotechs are often small firms 
established by university researchers with a few commercially perspective ideas and 
with help of venture capital (Pisano, 2006).  
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The biotech industry is more R&D intensive than pharmaceuticals in general 
– the ratio of the total R&D expenditures to revenue was over 42% (Table A1.2). The 
industry consistently generated losses in excess of $3.5 billion or more than 6% of 
their revenue. However these high ratios might indicate a lack of marketing 
capacities. 
 
Table A1.2. Major statistics for the U.S. biotechnology industry: 1994-2006. 
 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 
Sales 7.7 10.8 14.5 19.3 24.3 28.1 45.3 
Revenues 11.2 14.6 20.2 26.7 29.6 43.8 53.5 
R&D  7.0 7.9 10.6 14.2 20.5 19.6 22.9 
Net loss 3.6 4.6 4.1 5.6 9.4 6.8 3.5 
Number of 
public 
companies 
265 294 316 339 318 331 336 
Number of firms 1311 1287 1311 1379 1466 1346 1452 
Loss margin, % 
(losses/revenue) 32.14 31.51 20.30 20.97 31.76 15.53 6.54 
R&D/revenue, % 62.50 54.11 52.48 53.18 69.26 44.75 42.80 
Note: amounts are U.S. billion dollars. Financial data based primarily on fiscal-year financial 
statements of publicly traded companies. 
Source: Ernst & Young LLP, annual biotechnology industry reports, 1995–2006, adapted 
from Biotechnology Industry Organization, Guide to Biotechnology 2008, available at 
http://bio.org/speeches/pubs/er/BiotechGuide2008.pdf, accessed on March 6, 2011.  
Loss margins and R&D/revenue ratios are estimated. 
 
The biotech sector generated products that contribute from one-quarter to 
one-fifth of total pharmaceutical companies‘ sales and the majority of biotech 
companies have university linkages (Comanor, 2007). Biotechnology-produced 
drugs are forecast to gain about 15% of the pharmaceutical market by 2050 and drug 
productivity might increase (Kayser and Muller, 2004).  
In 2000, there were around 30,000 biotech patent applications; however, out 
of around 1,300 biotech corporations in the US with about 400 publicly traded, less 
than 4% achieved profitability until year the 2000 (Wolff, 2001, pp.15-16). 
According to the industry review by Pisano (2006), most firms in this sector generate 
commercial losses. Pisano comprehensively reviews the situation as follows:  
- If the industry‘s leading firm Amgen is excluded, the industry was unprofitable for 
more than two decades. The majority of biotechnology firms had only losses.  
- Biotechnology firms received the bulk of their financing from the stock market in 
spite of the losses. In 1999-2001, only about quarter of the biotech companies doing 
an initial public offer had a product in clinical development. This can be explained 
by expectations of high long run returns as the industry develops.  
- R&D productivity of biotech firms is not better on average. Cumulative R&D 
spending per new drug for established pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms had 
been about the same and ranged from 1 to 2 billion dollars in 1987-2004. 
- Limited knowledge of gene functions. The other problems of the biotech sector are 
risk management, knowledge integration from various rapidly developing disciplines 
and continuous learning from failures. The biotechnology sector is composed of 
highly specialized segments with distinct technological approaches and strategies.   
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Attachment 2. The description of the dataset of pharmaceutical firms 
 
The list of countries and territories in the database  
 
1. Argentina 25. Hungary 49. Philippines 
2. Australia 26. Iceland 50. Poland 
3. Austria 27. India 51. Portugal 
4. Bangladesh 28. Indonesia 52. Romania 
5. Belgium 29. Ireland 53. Russia 
6. Bermuda 30. Israel 54. Saudi Arabia 
7. Bosnia and Herzegovina 31. Italy 55. Serbia 
8. Brazil 32. Japan 56. Singapore 
9. Bulgaria 33. Jordan 57. Slovak Republic  
10. Canada 34. Korea Republic of 58. Slovenia 
11. Cayman Islands 35. Latvia 59. Spain 
12. Chile 36. Lithuania 60. Sri Lanka 
13. China 37. Luxembourg 61. Sweden 
14. Costa Rica 38. Macedonia 62. Switzerland 
15. Croatia 39. Malaysia 63. Taiwan 
16. Czech Republic 40. Mexico 64. Thailand 
17. Denmark 41. Moldova 65. Turkey 
18. Ecuador 42. Netherlands 66. Ukraine 
19. Egypt 43. New Zealand 67. United Arab Emirates 
20. Finland 44. Norway 68. United Kingdom 
21. France 45. Pakistan 69. USA 
22. Germany 46. Palestine 70. Vietnam 
23. Greece 47. Paraguay  
24. Hong Kong, Province of China 48. Peru  
 
List of all variables and their sources in the database: 
 
The governance indicators presented here reflect the statistical compilation of responses on the 
quality of governance given by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey as 
assembled in Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi (2008).  "Governance 
Matters VII: Governance Indicators for 1996-2007". World Bank Policy Research June 2008, 
available at www.govindicators.org  
regquality – Regulatory quality, percentile rank of the country  
pharspending – Total expenditure on pharmaceuticals and other non-durables, % of GDP, from 
OECD HEALTH DATA 2007, October 07.  
 
Indicators from the World Bank‘s World Development Indicators: 
nperfloan – Bank nonperforming loans to total gross loans (%)  
crtoprivate - Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)*  
healthpexp - Health expenditure, private (% of GDP)  
phealthexp - Out-of-pocket health expenditure (% of private expenditure on health)  
healthpcap - Health expenditure per capita (current US$)  
healthexp - Health expenditure, total (% of GDP)  
reserchers - Researchers in R&D (per million people)  
dcredit - Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of GDP)* 
bankuse - Firms using banks to finance investment (% of firms), available only for few years 
patent - Patent applications residents  
articles - Scientific and technical journal articles* 
tereduc - Labor force with tertiary education (% of total)  
gdpcon - GDP (constant 2000 US$)  
gdpc - GDP (current US$)  
deflator - GDP deflator (base year varies by country)  
gdpcapg - GDP per capita growth (annual %)  
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gdppercap - GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$)*  
m2gdp - Money and quasi money (M2) as % of GDP*  
rndexp - Research and development expenditure (% of GDP)  
cpi - Consumer price index (2000 = 100)  
cpiaenv - CPIA business regulatory environment rating (1=low to 6=high),  
available for few years  
cpiafin - CPIA financial sector rating (1=low to 6=high), available for few years  
cpiacor - CPIA transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector rating  
(1=low to 6=high), available for few years   
population - Population total  
manuf - Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP)  
manufg - Manufacturing, value added (annual % growth)  
chemicals - Chemicals (% of value added in manufacturing)  
tcontract - Time required to enforce a contract (days), available for few years  
cpiagov - CPIA property rights and rule-based governance rating (1=low to 6=high),  
available for few years  
cpiarights - Legal rights of borrowers and lenders index (0=less credit access to 10=more 
access)  
stocktrgdp - Stocks traded, total value (% of GDP)  
 
Indicators downloaded from ORBIS
TM
 database (Table A2.1): 
Year – Year, 1997-2007 
Firm – Name of the firm 
Country – country of the firm registration  
Countryn – number of the country in the list (see above) 
Fid – Firm identification number, from 1 to 2657 
Incorporation - Date of Incorporation 
Company – Company identification in Orbis database.  
Currency – Currency of the financial indicators 
Oprev - Operating Revenue 
Plbeftax - Profit or loss before tax 
Netinc - Profit or loss for period (net income) 
Cashflow – Cash flow 
Totas - Total assets 
Shfund - Shareholders funds 
Curatio - Current ratio 
Prmargin - Profit margin, % 
Retshfund - Return on shareholders funds,% 
Retcap - Return on capital employed,% 
Solvrat - Solvency ratio (%) 
Perat - Price earning ratio 
Employs – number of employees 
Fixast - Fixed assets 
Intfixas - Intangible fixed assets 
Tanfixas - Tangible fixed assets 
Ofixas - Other fixed assets 
Curas - Current assets 
Stocks – Stocks 
Debtors – Debtors 
Ocuras - Other Current Assets 
Cash - Cash & cash equivalent 
Capital – Owners‘ capital 
Oshfund - Other shareholders funds 
Ncurl - Non current liabilities 
Ltdebt - Long term debt 
Oncurl - Other non-current liabilities 
Cliab - Current liabilities 
Loans – Loans 
Creditors – Creditors 
  
247 
Ocliab - Other current liabilities 
Tshfl - Total shareholders‘ funds and liabilities  
Wcap - Working capital 
Netcuras - Net current assets 
Entval - Enterprise value 
Sales – Sales 
Cgs - Costs of goods sold 
Gprofit - Gross profit 
Operexp - Other operating expenses 
Ebit - Operating profit or loss before interest and tax 
Finrev - Financial revenue 
Finexp - Financial expenses 
Finpl - Financial profit or loss 
Plbtaxex – Profit or loss before tax and extr. Items 
Tax – Taxation 
Plaftax - Profit or loss after tax 
Eopl - Extr. and other profit or loss 
Export - Export turnover 
Mcosts - Material Costs 
Cempl - Costs of employees 
Deprec – Depreciation 
Interest - Interest paid 
Addval - Added value 
Ebitda – Earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation 
Tcuras - Total current assets 
Nsinv - Net stated inventory 
Fgoods - Finished goods 
Tcashainv - Total cash and short term investment 
Nprpleq - Net propety, plant and equipment 
Land – Land 
Tlanddep - Total Land Depreciation 
Bldgs - Buildings  
Tbuildep - Total buildings depreciation 
Plmach - Plant and machinery 
Plmachdep - Plant & Machinery Depreciation 
Traneq - Transportation Equipment 
Traneqdep - Transportation equipment depreciation 
Oprpleq - Other property plant and equipment 
Oprpleqdep - Other property plant and equipment depreciation 
Goodwill – Goodwill 
Investment - Investments 
Tcurliab - Total current liabilities 
Cltdebt - Current long term debt 
Tcreditor - Trade creditors 
Inctaxpay - Income tax payable 
Socexppay - Social expenditure payable 
Divpay - Dividends payable 
Tltdebt -Total long-term interest bearing debt 
Bloans - Bank loans 
Deftax - Deferred taxes 
Tliabdebt - Total liabilities and debt 
Tshequity - Total shareholders equity 
Retearn - Retained earnings 
Trev - Total revenues 
Nsales - Net sales 
Rde - Research and development expenses  
rdas – ratio of R&D to total assets, -rde/totas 
rdepe – R&D expenditures in Euro 
Tdepam - Total depreciation, amortization and depletion  
Oincafdep - Operating income after depreciation and amortization  
Frev - Financial revenue 
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Fexp - Financial expenses 
Fpl - Financial profit or loss 
Earnaftax - Earnings after tax 
Rshfund - Return on shareholder funds (%) 
Rcapemp - Return on capital employed (%) 
Rta - Return on total assets (%) 
Gmargin - Gross margin (%) 
Ebitdamar - EBITDA margin (%) 
Ebitmar - EBIT margin (%) 
Cashflt - Cash flow/turnover (%) 
Nasturn - Net assets turnover  
Intcov - Interest cover  
Stocktur - Stock turnover  
Colper - Collection period (days) 
Credper - Credit period (days) 
Cratio - Current ratio 
Lrat - Liquidity ratio 
Shlrat - Shareholders liquidity ratio 
Solvrat - Solvency ratio 
Gear - Gearing (%), total assets divided over equity 
Profemp - Profit per employee (thousand) 
Oprevemp - Operating revenue per employee (thousand) 
Costemp - Costs of employees/operating revenue (%) 
Avcostemp - Average cost of employee (thousand) 
Shfundemp - Shareholders funds per employee (thousand) 
Wcapemp - Working capital per employee (thousand) 
Mpye - Market price (year end) 
Mph - Market price (high) 
Mpl - Market price (low) 
Shout - Shares outstanding (thousand) 
Nomval - Nominal value 
Mcap - Market capitalisation (million) 
Cashpshare - Cash flow per share 
Oprpshare - Operating Profit per Share 
Divpshare - Dividends per share 
Bvalpshare - Book value per share 
Tanbvalsh - Tangible book value per share 
Ltliabsh - Long term liabilities per share 
Wcapsh - Working capital per share 
Perc - Price to earnings ratio (close) 
Eyc - Earnings yield (close) 
Pcashr - Price to cash flow ratio (close) 
Dyc - Dividend yield (close) 
Dpaysh - Dividend payout per share 
Pbookr - Price to book value ratio (close) 
Mcapshf - Market capitalisation to shareholders funds 
Beta – beta coefficient of CAPM model estimated by various methods. 
 
Table A.2.1. Summary of descriptive statistics of the variables in the dataset: 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Year 29227 2002 3.162332 1997 2007 
Firm text variable     
Fid 29227 1329 767.0229 1 2657 
Country text variable     
Countryn 29227 40.45277 23.15557 1 70 
Company 3432 3.58e+08 3.16e+08 2728 9.90e+08 
Incorporation  25344 1941.539 41.30826 1888 2007 
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Table A.2.1. continued 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Oprev 17297 3.25e+07 2.26e+08 -10197 2.40e+10 
Plbeftax 17693 2442475 2.10e+07 -4.01e+08 1.09e+09 
Netinc 17670 1590501 1.43e+07 -3.58e+08 6.77e+08 
Cashflow 15106 2366498 1.74e+07 -3.18e+08 8.28e+08 
Totas 17763 2.92e+07 3.61e+08 0 4.53e+10 
Shfund 17751 1.50e+07 2.51e+08 -3.55e+08 3.19e+10 
Curatio 17396 3.193064 5.670757 0 96.92 
Prmargin 14723 5.272064 20.05765 -99.91 99.35 
Retshfund 16449 9.235305 92.69287 -976.56 975.8 
Retcap 13243 9.709264 78.07865 -977.88 992.14 
Solvrat 17494 46.17734 30.20518 -99.99 100 
Perat 5692 11.32624 303.5138 -15236.14 6762.02 
Employs 12722 2888.207 13642.27 1 340000 
Fixast 17754 1.19e+07 2.45e+08 -226 3.20e+10 
Intfixas 17213 1819191 1.23e+08 -944876 1.61e+10 
Tanfixas 17403 6156699 2.92e+07 -98 1.02e+09 
Ofixas 17309 4219464 1.23e+08 -1.00e+07 1.59e+10 
Curas 17744 1.73e+07 1.30e+08 0 1.33e+10 
Stocks 17439 4359950 2.64e+07 -113001 2.21e+09 
Debtors 17496 7364268 4.67e+07 -1128000 4.96e+09 
Ocuras 17532 5824780 6.69e+07 -3.96e+07 6.10e+09 
Cash 16493 4444890 5.90e+07 -3631 4.98e+09 
Capital 17585 4478271 2.41e+08 -170964 3.19e+10 
Oshfund 17593 1.07e+07 6.80e+07 -3.87e+08 2.49e+09 
Ncurl 17581 3578176 2.56e+07 -47612 1.44e+09 
Ltdebt 16029 2493545 2.04e+07 -12004 1.02e+09 
Oncurl 15948 1413356 1.07e+07 -14355 6.31e+08 
Cliab 17630 1.08e+07 1.09e+08 -17056 1.34e+10 
Loans 16730 1881584 1.69e+07 -19 1.19e+09 
Creditors 17271 3617740 5.37e+07 -330 6.75e+09 
Ocliab 17007 5654730 4.93e+07 -116969 5.43e+09 
Tshfl 17745 2.92e+07 3.61e+08 -1 4.53e+10 
Wcap 17199 8241276 3.56e+07 -1.16e+08 1.37e+09 
Netcuras 17441 5731639 5.82e+07 -1.03e+09 2.75e+09 
Entval 5905 3.77e+07 2.84e+08 -1.65e+08 1.09e+10 
Sales 14562 3.25e+07 1.40e+08 -10211 6.07e+09 
Cgs 12688 2.41e+07 9.73e+07 -2.64e+08 2.91e+09 
Gprofit 12726 1.40e+07 7.01e+07 -4.07e+07 3.16e+09 
Operexp 13909 9691517 4.65e+07 -1.13e+07 2.09e+09 
Ebit 17561 1293373 2.36e+07 -7.64e+08 1.08e+09 
Finrev 15131 537128 6193586 -1.08e+07 3.78e+08 
Finexp 14012 738759.7 8673198 -3.98e+08 4.02e+08 
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Table A.2.1. continued 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Finpl 17557 261737 8779266 -3.57e+08 3.99e+08 
Plbtaxex 15529 2409348 2.09e+07 -4.01e+08 1.09e+09 
Tax 17176 795773.3 6687123 -4.67e+07 3.26e+08 
Plaftax 17406 1779212 1.59e+07 -3.58e+08 7.64e+08 
Eopl 12617 206207.3 8609233 -1.34e+08 3.32e+08 
Export 4396 1766311 1.32e+07 -1.30e+08 3.24e+08 
Mcosts 4315 3.23e+07 1.08e+08 -4041 2.07e+09 
Cempl 8030 2950047 1.25e+07 -8640000 5.79e+08 
Deprec 13145 715945.8 3860300 -2.47e+07 1.51e+08 
Interest 11863 405145.7 2895840 -211811 1.45e+08 
Addval 8829 4737266 3.14e+07 -8.31e+07 1.80e+09 
Ebitda 15301 2952501 2.27e+07 -1.17e+08 1.22e+09 
Tcuras 8135 1.55e+07 1.06e+08 0 3.65e+09 
Nsinv 6301 3809766 2.44e+07 0 1.09e+09 
Fgoods 4538 2275287 1.80e+07 -751 7.27e+08 
Tcashainv 8074 5711491 6.11e+07 0 1.87e+09 
Nprpleq 7983 6292396 3.11e+07 0 1.02e+09 
Land 3247 3951527 1.39e+07 0 2.10e+08 
Tlanddep 260 -85520.52 576669.7 -6855000 0 
Bldgs 5408 5135780 2.12e+07 0 3.68e+08 
Tbuildep 3714 -998150.3 4438884 -1.14e+08 35060 
Plmach 7201 5369586 2.75e+07 0 6.52e+08 
Plmachdep 3913 -3859231 1.69e+07 -4.63e+08 0 
Traneq 2594 750156.8 7745305 0 2.16e+08 
Traneqdep 2439 -436509.7 4383413 -1.34e+08 1 
Oprpleq 5539 1565992 1.14e+07 -1237 4.78e+08 
Oprpleqdep 3263 -736289 5037633 -1.56e+08 0 
Goodwill 2777 624423.3 3226769 -3425149 5.66e+07 
Investment 4308 3365464 2.06e+07 -1896121 3.56e+08 
Tcurliab 8141 6588935 3.74e+07 0 1.16e+09 
Tcreditor 7501 2159254 1.62e+07 0 5.54e+08 
Inctaxpay 4305 969405.9 6219852 -288439 1.52e+08 
Socexppay 2349 339952.6 3451338 -3374 1.13e+08 
Divpay 1771 181857.3 580555.8 -64 6824608 
Tltdebt 7122 2208150 2.04e+07 -12004 1.02e+09 
Bloans 4803 1304107 1.35e+07 0 6.07e+08 
Deftax 2538 864983 5033867 -497 1.25e+08 
Tliabdebt 8134 1.05e+07 6.29e+07 0 2.34e+09 
Tshequity 8141 1.52e+07 9.96e+07 -4.37e+07 3.00e+09 
Retearn 7845 9414032 8.19e+07 -2.02e+08 2.50e+09 
Trev 8201 2.07e+07 1.47e+08 -10197 6.07e+09 
Nsales 8066 2.10e+07 1.48e+08 -10211 6.07e+09 
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Table A.2.1. continued 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Rde 5220 -1384338 8758776 -1.93e+08 164 
Tdepam 7890 -574731 3996977 -1.51e+08 13260 
Oincafdep 8278 2899569 2.76e+07 -1.17e+08 1.08e+09 
Frev 6924 245490.4 2361466 -1443000 8.95e+07 
Fexp 7106 -407989.3 3454168 -1.45e+08 1075 
Earnaftax 7777 1694159 2.01e+07 -1.30e+08 7.64e+08 
Rshfund 16448 9.241866 92.69187 -976.56 975.8 
Rcapemp 13251 9.717031 78.05123 -977.88 992.14 
Rta 16985 1.751481 22.16542 -99.96 99.98 
Gmargin 11524 43.73636 25.57961 -92.89 100 
Ebitdamar 12986 8.892215 21.28789 -99.69 100 
Ebitmar 14819 5.997649 20.21635 -99.43 100 
Cashflt 12849 6.026422 19.9361 -99.88 99.9 
Nasturn 16156 6.513027 34.21725 0 997.5 
Intcov 12572 27.35796 99.19239 -99.89 998.12 
Stocktur 14011 16.38975 49.67549 0 996.51 
Colper 15250 82.44131 86.66673 0 998 
Credper 14771 57.30762 92.27739 0 1000 
Cratio 17395 3.192628 5.670628 0 96.92 
Lrat 17097 2.983632 11.29784 0 531.56 
Shlrat 14947 71.04335 413.0112 -9.61 9891 
Gear 15653 131.7408 494.3756 0 9556.58 
Profemp 12563 1112.818 15857.37 -1084345 670220 
Oprevemp 12337 16953.5 114904.1 0 4209376 
Costemp 8312 15.88792 13.95753 0 99.04 
Avcostemp 7048 394.4261 3689.914 0 88207 
Shfundemp 11905 11288.91 100344.7 0 7687638 
Wcapemp 12176 5014.821 22682.64 -64926 439438 
Tasemp 12603 19339.27 162516.2 1 8949856 
Mpye 5323 1325.354 8919.544 0 227000 
Mph 5709 1814.321 13479.16 .01 388000 
Mpl 5706 881.0772 6375.168 0 185000 
Shout 5753 199898.5 674172.9 0 1.04e+07 
Nomval 3067 246.5857 943.4548 .01 5000 
Mcap 5735 46728.05 327601.2 0 1.21e+07 
Cashpshare 5531 102.0074 718.3387 -7996.14 14617.52 
Oprpshare 5495 149.9852 1022.644 -13427.42 16936.25 
Divpshare 2025 237.695 3362.701 -.01 62500 
Bvalpshare 5744 984.2445 5838.223 -8348.31 102117.8 
Tanbvalsh 5310 981.9637 5795.556 -43389.74 102093.6 
Ltliabsh 5223 544.8803 8390.71 -6928.97 321292.4 
Wcapsh 5538 550.6026 3090.829 -14032.19 41816.04 
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Table A.2.1. continued 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Perc 5730 2737.114 9756.712 -6034.69 39172 
Eyc 5726 -139.0355 5382.238 -333333.3 4261.87 
Pcashr 5505 -.345911 388.9384 -17411.11 11600 
Dpaysh 1716 48.13916 173.0161 -902.56 5638.71 
Pbookr 5163 5.511991 34.74877 -715.48 2000 
Mcapshf 5666 1.563149 98.77893 -5504 2021.91 
beta 5530 .6150579 .5385517 -3.42 5.92 
Regquality 29190 77.72702 23.29095 14.15 100 
Pharspending 13064 1.471712 .342318 .6324 2.3652 
Nperfloan 19112 5.185574 6.696028 .2 34.9 
Crtoprivate 25648 111.9615 53.98427 2.457 326.983 
Healthpexp 13005 3.366705 2.359181 .589 8.393 
Phealthpexp 13005 66.84486 26.37398 16.5 100 
Healthpcap 13015 2394.977 1987.171 10 6657 
Healthexp 13015 8.879101 3.659038 1.8 24.1 
researchers 15665 2778.721 1478.072 41.167 7992.345 
Dcredit 25648 139.7948 79.24068 11.358 442.623 
Bankuse 850 13.8478 5.914879 2.61 74.73 
Patent 22465 54251.58 81881.27 8 384201 
Articles 23373 50068.57 65826.54 29 205320 
Tereduc 17029 31.357 12.12959 4.2 66.1 
Gdpcon 26037 2.44e+12 3.48e+12 1.26e+09 1.13e+13 
Gdpc 26078 2.61e+12 3.64e+12 1.17e+09 1.32e+13 
Deflator 26061 182.7933 4499.802 11.124 370071.9 
Gdpcapg 26030 3.282671 2.782291 -14.296 32.022 
Gdppercap 26037 19084.13 12788.61 300.379 54178.32 
m2gdp 16084 82.72476 48.5366 10.254 260.653 
Rndexp 21199 1.781113 .8072346 .046 5.04 
Cpi 26050 105.7449 20.46771 21.205 377.472 
Cpiaenv 366 3.467213 .2799538 2.5 4 
Cpiafin 366 3.855191 .3694688 3 4.5 
Cpiacor 366 3.31694 .3361139 2.5 3.5 
Population 26220 2.62e+08 4.07e+08 43000 1.31e+09 
Manuf 22624 19.59864 6.064923 3.416 35.048 
Manufg 20660 3.875134 4.81216 -16.382 31.867 
Chemicals 11920 10.86788 5.62342 .792 48.566 
Tcontract 13019 406.6984 292.1866 109 1442 
Cpiagov 366 3.333333 .3365145 2.5 3.5 
Cpiarights 5212 6.243093 2.293182 1 10 
Stocktrgdp 26014 91.031 76.34289 0 437.655 
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Attachment 3. The estimated translog production frontiers 
 
The idiosyncratic term is assumed to be normal. The distribution of the technical 
inefficiency term is indicated in the tables. The output is operating revenue. 
Note: linas = log(intangible fixed assets), ltanas = log(tangible fixed assets), lemp = 
log(number of employees),                ,                  , lemp         ,  
lein = lemp*linas, leas = lemp*ltanas, inas = linas*ltanas.  
 
Sigma_U - the estimated variance for the technical inefficiency term, Sigma_V - the 
variance for the idiosyncratic term, mu - the mean of the technical inefficiency term. 
 
Table A3.1. Estimated translog production frontiers: China and France 
 China France 
Factor Truncated 
normal 
Battese-Coelli 
time effects 
Truncated 
normal 
Battese-Coelli 
time effects 
linas .0743 
(.2231) 
.0470 
(.2252) 
.0478 
(.0384) 
.0532 
(.0383) 
ltanas .1663 
(.4555) 
.1421 
(.4634) 
.1659 
(.0782)** 
.1823 
(.0795)** 
lemp -1.9388 
(.5609)*** 
-1.8122 
(.5778)*** 
.7798 
(.1102)*** 
.7611 
(.1106)*** 
linas2 .0123 
(.0075)* 
.0110 
(.0076) 
.0045 
(.0023)** 
.0033 
(.0023) 
ltanas2 -.0049 
(.0347) 
-.0011 
(.0352) 
.0112 
(.0052)*** 
.0093 
(.0054)* 
lemp2 .1393 
(.0248)*** 
.1402 
(.0246)*** 
.0443 
(.0143)*** 
.0463 
(.0144)*** 
lein -.0338 
(.0306) 
-.0306031 
(.0309) 
-.0224 
(.0072)*** 
-.0232 
(.0072)*** 
leas .0462 
(.0515) 
.0332 
(.0534) 
-.0597 
(.0141)*** 
-.0581 
(.0142)*** 
inas -.0011 
(.0304) 
.0009 
(.0306) 
.0055 
(.0053) 
.0066 
(.0052) 
Time trend  .1047 
(.0843) 
.1416 
(.1308) 
.1135 
(.0159)*** 
.2349 
(.1033)** 
Time squared  -.0019 
(.0058) 
-.0013 
(.0059) 
-.0037 
(.0016)** 
-.0024 
(.0019) 
constant 18.0921 
(11.4036) 
17.9439 
(9.7773)* 
9.5082 
(.6501)*** 
12.35408 
(5.4901)** 
Sigma_U .5551 
(.0571) 
.5630 
(.0586) 
.9229 
(.1244) 
1.0178 
(.1377) 
Sigma_V .0566 
(.0053) 
.0564 
(.0050) 
.1122 
(.0056) 
.1108 
(.0055) 
mu 3.8982 
(11.1436) 
4.2677 
(9.8945) 
3.2772 
(.5952)*** 
7.3401 
(6.4063) 
Number of 
observations 
498 498 932 932 
Number of firms 231 231 126 126 
P-value for  
Wald chi2  
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table A3.2. Estimated translog production frontiers: Germany and Japan 
 Germany Japan 
Factor Truncated 
normal 
Battese-Coelli 
time effects 
Truncated 
normal 
Battese-Coelli 
time effects 
linas .0843 
(.0679) 
.0176 
(.0670) 
.4046 
(.0997)*** 
.4071 
(.1029)*** 
ltanas .0259 
(.1881) 
.1306 
(.1834) 
.7766 
(.2412)*** 
.7799 
(.2428)*** 
lemp .0385 
(.2151) 
.0631 
(.2089) 
-1.3715 
(.2682)*** 
-1.3736 
(.2689)*** 
linas2 .0283 
(.0054)*** 
.0256 
(.0053)*** 
.0068 
(.0053) 
.0067 
(.0053) 
ltanas2 -.0307 
(.0212) 
-.0423 
(.0207)** 
-.0269 
(.0105)*** 
-.0270 
(.0105)*** 
lemp2 .0122 
(.0186) 
.0044 
(.0183) 
-.0011 
(.0173) 
-.0007 
(.0178) 
lein -.0816 
(.0173)*** 
-.0834 
(.0169)*** 
-.0282 
(.0169384)* 
-.0284 
(.0171)* 
leas .1024 
(.0344)*** 
.1071 
(.0338)*** 
.1271 
(.0199)*** 
.1272 
(.0199)*** 
inas -.0013464 
(.0175088) 
.0114 
(.0172) 
-.0213 
(.0086)** 
-.0214 
(.0086)** 
Time trend  .0421 
(.0240)* 
.0252 
(.0261) 
-.0139 
(.0218) 
-.0116 
(.0322) 
Time squared  .0009 
(.0021) 
-.0008 
(.0022) 
.0024 
(.0017) 
.0025 
(.0017) 
constant 10.5604 
(.4986)*** 
10.5424 
(.4947)*** 
9.8018 
(2.1483)*** 
9.7220 
(2.2585)*** 
Sigma_U 2.8150 
(1.5467) 
3.0106 
(1.7132) 
.3416 
(.0791) 
.3407 
(.0789) 
Sigma_V .0682 
(.0051) 
.0657 
(.0048) 
.0327 
(.0031) 
.0329 
(.0031) 
mu .1283 
(1.2076) 
-.2443 
(1.3876) 
2.1267 
(.8369)** 
2.1167 
(.7587)*** 
Number of 
observations 
504 504 357 357 
Number of firms 120 120 75 65 
P-value for 
Wald chi2(11)  
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table A3.3. Estimated translog production frontiers: Spain and Switzerland 
 Spain Switzerland 
Factor Truncated 
normal 
Battese-Coelli 
time effects 
Truncated 
normal 
Battese-Coelli 
time effects 
linas .1521 
(.0730)** 
.1864 
(.0723)*** 
-.1743 
(.3056) 
-.3635 
(.2974) 
ltanas -.1534 
(.1665) 
-.2207 
(.1667) 
-1.3448 
(.9674) 
-1.4670 
(.7602)* 
lemp -.4166 
(.2012)** 
-.4372 
(.1937)** 
3.8069 
(1.0594)*** 
5.9859 
(1.0197)*** 
linas2 -.0087 
(.0031)*** 
-.0094 
(.0031)*** 
.0041 
(.0079) 
.0098 
(.0065) 
ltanas2 -.0079 
(.0082) 
-.0066 
(.0081) 
.1108 
 (.0891) 
.1127 
(.0681)* 
lemp2 -.2906 
(.0167)*** 
-.3040 
(.0167)*** 
-.1221 
(.1136) 
-.2693 
(.0768)*** 
lein .0931 
(.0109)*** 
.0931 
(.0108)*** 
.0334 
(.0299) 
.0336 
(.0265) 
leas .1865 
(.0164)*** 
.1934 
(.0161)*** 
-.1230 
(.1901) 
-.0927 
(.1416) 
inas -.0293 
(.0057)*** 
-.0302 
(.0057)*** 
-.0106 
(.0333) 
-.0013 
(.0303) 
Time trend  .1227 
(.0195)*** 
.0696 
(.0264)*** 
.0032 
(.0326) 
-.4689 
(.1542)*** 
(table A3.3 
continued) 
 
Time squared  
 
 
-.0039 
(.0021)* 
 
 
-.0049 
(.0021)** 
 
 
-.0003 
(.0034) 
 
 
.8327 
(2.4130)* 
constant 19.4753 
(1.2071)*** 
20.3224 
(1.2343)*** 
5.5658 
(3.4022) 
.8327 
(2.4130) 
Sigma_U 1.9110 
(.3581) 
1.6498 
(.3134) 
.6301 
(.2781) 
3.2042 
(1.6831) 
Sigma_V .0978 
(.0064) 
.0953 
(.0062) 
.0532 
(.0082) 
.0266 
(.0044) 
mu 3.2705 
(.3644)*** 
3.0965 
(.3770)*** 
2.2123 
(.6147)*** 
3.4512 
(1.1792)*** 
Number of 
observations 
553 553 104 104 
Number of firms 81 81 16 16 
P-value for 
Wald chi2(11)  
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table A3.4. Estimated translog production frontiers: the UK and the US 
 
 UK USA 
Factor Truncated 
normal 
Battese-Coelli 
time effects 
Truncated 
normal 
Battese-Coelli 
time effects 
linas -.2308 
(.0652)*** 
-.2729 
(.0613)*** 
.0435 
(.0549) 
.0539 
(.0557) 
ltanas -.0269 
(.0814) 
-.0343 
(.0774) 
.0176 
(.0993) 
.01401 
(.1001) 
lemp 1.8038 
(.1470)*** 
1.8215 
(.1418)*** 
.4684 
(.1218)*** 
.4527 
(.1225)*** 
linas2 .0152 
(.0032)*** 
.01514 
(.0030)*** 
.0113 
(.0053)** 
.0101 
(.0053)* 
ltanas2 .0391 
(.0062)*** 
.0371 
(.0057)*** 
.0003 
(.0118) 
-.0002 
(.0118) 
lemp2 -.0311 
(.0144)** 
-.0403 
(.0141)*** 
-.0366 
(.0113)*** 
-.0403 
(.0113)*** 
lein .0123 
(.0107) 
.0139 
(.0100) 
-.0102 
(.0129) 
-.0076 
(.0129) 
leas -.0815 
(.0144)*** 
-.0790 
(.0137)*** 
.0674 
(.0212)*** 
.0709 
(.0213)*** 
inas -.0057 
(.0089) 
-.0026 
(.0085) 
-.0141 
(.0115) 
-.0147 
(.0115) 
Time trend  .0658 
(.0195)*** 
-.2190 
(.0523)*** 
-.0214 
(.0219) 
.0043 
(.0291) 
Time squared  -.0012 
(.0019) 
.0025 
(.0021) 
.0066 
(.0021)*** 
.0067 
(.0021)*** 
constant 9.7875 
(18.0655) 
11.6662 
(.8617)*** 
9.0145 
(.6224)*** 
8.9781 
(.8169)*** 
Sigma_U 1.6470 
(.1776) 
1.4448 
(.1576) 
1.4295 
(.1507) 
1.4535 
(.1535) 
Sigma_V .1673 
(.0080) 
.1544 
(.0074) 
.3905 
(.0142) 
.3916 
(.0143) 
mu 6.6297 
(18.0586) 
5.9483 
(.4987)*** 
3.5721 
(.5074)*** 
3.7467 
(.7997)*** 
Number of 
observations 
1069 1069 1887 1887 
Number of 
firms 
190 190 297 297 
P-value for 
Wald chi2(11)  
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Attachment 4. Descriptive statistics and results for before-after and 
difference-in-difference estimations for the impacts of regulatory shocks 
 
 
Table A4.1.1. Descriptive statistics of the variables (before-after comparisons) 
 
Variable 
 
Description 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
rde 
Research and 
development expenses, 
million  
5217 1.385 8.761 0 193.10 
rdev R&D to revenue, rde/trev 4890 0.132 2.542 0 16.984 
trev Total revenues, million 8201 20.71 147.1 0.012 6071.1 
netinc Net income, million 17670 1.591 14.32 -358.1 677.2 
employs Number of employees 12722 2888.2 13642.3 1 340000 
sales Sales, million 14562 32.51 140.2 0.104 6070.1 
cashflow Cash flow, million 15106 2.366 17.40 -318.1 828.1 
entval Enterprise value, million 5905 37.70 284.1 165.2 1090.4 
export Export turnover, million 4396 1.766 13.22 130.1 324.2 
addval Added value, million 8829 4.737 31.41 -83.12 1802.1 
ebitda 
Earnings before interest, 
taxes, and depreciation, 
million 
15301 2.952 22.71 -117.1 122.1 
investment Investment, million 4308 3.365 20.61 0 356.1 
prmargin Profit margin, % 14723 5.272 20.058 -99.91 99.35 
retshfund 
Return on shareholders 
funds,% 
16449 9.235 92.693 -976.56 975.8 
retcap 
Return on capital 
employed, % 
13243 9.709 78.079 -977.88 992.14 
perat Price earning ratio 5692 11.326 303.514 -236.05 676.2 
mcap 
Market capitalisation, 
million 
5735 0.467 0.327 0.002 12.12 
divpshare Dividends per share 2025 13.827 66.058 0 794.68 
pbookr Price to book value ratio 5163 5.708 33.176 0 681.82 
gmargin Gross margin, % 11524 43.736 25.579 -92.89 99.99 
cashflt Cash flow to turnover, % 12849 6.026 19.936 -99.88 99.9 
mcapshf 
Market capitalisation to 
shareholders funds 
5666 4.702 16.109 0.01 676.41 
pcashr 
Price of stock to cash 
flow ratio 
5505 4.728 30.498 -243.13 188.55 
solvrat Solvency ratio, % 17494 46.177 30.205 -99.99 100 
Note: obs – number of observations.  
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Table A4.1.2. Descriptive statistics of the variables  
for the DiD estimations in chapter 2: Denmark. 
 
  The outcome variables 
  rdepe 
(R&D ) 
rdev 
(R&D  
to 
revenue) 
treve 
(revenue 
million 
Euros) 
gmargin 
(Gross 
margin, 
%) 
cashflowe 
(Cash  
flow, 
million 
Euros) 
pbookr 
(Price  
to book  
value) 
        
log of the 
outcome 
variable 
Mean 
St.dev 
min 
max 
10.15 
2.42 
2.89 
14.15 
-1.73 
1.32 
-5.24 
2.24 
11.90 
2.79 
4.32 
15.44 
3.52 
.94 
.79 
4.60 
11.76 
3.20 
2.90 
17.47 
1.23 
.78 
-.65 
3.29 
the outcome 
variable 
Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
Max 
139311 
229336 
18 
1406057 
.52 
1.36 
.01 
9.47 
0.90 
1.22 
0 
5.09 
43.93 
30.82 
-73.33 
100 
.234 
.804 
-7.43 
38.7 
4.78 
4.76 
0.52 
26.86 
treatment Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
Max 
.39 
.49 
0 
1 
.39 
.49 
0 
1 
.33 
.47 
0 
1 
.34 
.47 
0 
1 
.31 
.46 
0 
1 
.39 
.49 
0 
1 
Regulation,  
regquality 
Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
Max 
96.82 
1.83 
91.22 
99.51 
96.82 
1.89 
91.22 
99.51 
96.75 
1.84 
91.22 
99.51 
97.09 
1.63 
91.22 
99.51 
97.09 
2.21 
91.22 
99.51 
97.00 
1.80 
91.22 
99.51 
Patent 
applications 
Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
Max 
1601.51 
372.94 
787 
2378 
1597.81 
386.19 
787 
2378 
1593 
435.48 
787 
2569 
1427.76 
518.36 
787 
2569 
1773.36 
466.16 
787 
2569 
1588.81 
467.93 
787 
2569 
Pharm. 
expenditures, 
pharspending 
Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
Max 
.86 
.17 
.63 
1.28 
.87 
.17 
.63 
1.28 
.87 
.17 
.63 
1.28 
.85 
.13 
.63 
1.28 
.96 
.18 
.63 
1.28 
.89 
.17 
.66 
1.28 
Credit to 
private sector, 
crtoprivate 
Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
Max 
114.31 
45.77 
32.08 
171.03 
115.46 
44.17 
32.08 
171.03 
111.04 
44.72 
32.08 
171.03 
123.84 
36.85 
32.08 
171.03 
106.28 
43.02 
32.08 
171.03 
126.21 
33.13 
32.08 
171.03 
Population,  
million 
Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
Max 
5.36 
1.09 
3.67 
8.23 
5.36 
1.14 
3.67 
8.23 
5.36 
1.16 
3.67 
8.23 
4.83 
0.95 
3.67 
8.23 
5.44 
1.16 
3.67 
8.23 
5.44 
1.17 
3.67 
8.23 
Observations  86 79 96 255 317 69 
Firms  24 13 14 58 76 13 
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Table A4.1.3. Descriptive statistics of the variables  
for the DiD estimations in chapter 2: France. 
 
  rdepe 
(R&D ) 
rdev 
(R&D  
to 
revenue) 
treve 
(revenue 
million 
Euros) 
gmargin 
(Gross 
margin, 
%) 
cashflowe 
(Cash  
flow, 
million 
Euros) 
pbookr 
(Price  
to book  
value) 
        
log of the 
outcome 
variable 
Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
Max 
10.07 
2.73 
4.97 
14.68 
-1.71 
1.93 
-5.24 
2.47 
11.61 
2.33 
6.40 
16.58 
3.92 
.36 
2.86 
4.53 
10.07 
2.08 
4.76 
15.57 
1.13 
1.01 
-.65 
3.39 
the outcome 
variable 
Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
Max 
262620 
518282 
145 
2389000 
.49 
2.43 
0.01 
11.84 
9.75 
2.46 
0 
15.9 
52.35 
21.75 
-51.61 
93.5 
1.64 
0.91 
-3.29 
5.81 
5.49 
7.05 
.52 
29.8 
treatment Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
Max 
.11 
.34 
0 
1 
.12 
.34 
0 
1 
.12 
.34 
0 
1 
.13 
.34 
0 
1 
.13 
.34 
0 
1 
.13 
.34 
0 
1 
Regulations,  
regquality 
Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
Max 
91.93 
6.85 
80.98 
99.51 
92.24 
6.70 
80.98 
99.51 
88.83 
7.08 
80.98 
99.51 
88.82 
7.11 
80.98 
99.51 
88.22 
6.95 
80.98 
99.51 
88.57 
7.06 
80.98 
99.51 
Patent 
applications 
Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
Max 
5688.08 
5973.06 
787 
14230 
5458.35 
5903.84 
787 
14230 
8328.67 
6181.32 
787 
14230 
8416.52 
6168.78 
787 
14230 
8860.40 
6094.78 
787 
14230 
8596.53 
6124.09 
787 
14230 
Pharm. 
expenditures, 
pharspending 
Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
Max 
1.28 
.42 
.66 
1.87 
1.26 
.41 
.66 
1.87 
1.44 
.43 
.66 
1.87 
1.45 
.44 
.66 
1.87 
1.47 
.43 
.66 
1.87 
1.46 
.43 
.66 
1.87 
Credit to 
private sector, 
crtoprivate 
Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
Max 
97.94 
25.14 
55.68 
161.76 
98.24 
25.46 
55.68 
161.76 
95.35 
21.29 
53.11 
161.76 
94.47 
21.60 
53.11 
161.76 
94.67 
21.04 
53.11 
161.76 
94.32 
21.08 
53.11 
161.76 
Population, 
million 
Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
Max 
24.0 
26.3 
3.81 
60.5 
22.9 
26.2 
3.81 
60.5 
35.8 
27.3 
3.81 
60.5 
36.1 
27.3 
3.81 
60.5 
38.1 
26.9 
3.81 
60.5 
36.9 
27.1 
3.81 
60.5 
Observations  52 51 110 224 992 85 
Firms  11 11 20 50 182 18 
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Table A4.1.4. Descriptive statistics of the variables  
for the DiD estimations in chapter 2: Germany. 
 
  rdepe 
(R&D ) 
rdev 
(R&D  
to 
revenue) 
treve 
(revenue 
million 
Euros) 
gmargin 
(Gross 
margin, 
%) 
cashflowe 
(Cash  
flow, 
million 
Euros) 
pbookr 
(Price  
to book  
value) 
        
log of the 
outcome 
variable 
Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
Max 
10.33 
2.28 
4.60 
14.74 
-2.12 
1.71 
-6.49 
2.56 
12.15 
2.74 
6.24 
17.27 
3.89 
.59 
1.81 
4.60 
10.99 
2.43 
5.24 
15.29 
.73 
.96 
-2.21 
3.29 
the outcome 
variable 
Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
Max 
228800 
507534 
100 
2532000 
.54 
1.56 
0.01 
13.04 
2.31 
5.48 
0 
31.7 
56.05 
22.32 
6.13 
99.99 
.226 
.762 
-.329 
4.37 
2.77 
7.83 
-86.59 
26.86 
treatment Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
Max 
.36 
.48 
0 
1 
.36 
.48 
0 
1 
.38 
.49 
0 
1 
0.39 
0.49 
0 
1 
.37 
0.48 
0 
1 
38 
.49 
0 
1 
Regulations,  
regquality 
Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
Max 
93.26 
2.31 
90.73 
99.51 
93.26 
2.31 
90.73 
99.51 
93.26 
2.32 
90.73 
99.51 
93.30 
2.41 
90.73 
99.51 
93.25 
2.27 
90.73 
99.51 
93.26 
2.33 
90.73 
99.51 
Patent 
applications 
Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
Max 
40203.7 
17999.5 
787 
51414 
40203.7 
17999.5 
787 
51414 
39545.2 
18536.2 
787 
51414 
38725.3 
19132.8 
787 
51414 
39912.7 
18264.9 
787 
51414 
39480.8 
18571.2 
787 
51414 
Pharm. 
expenditures, 
pharspending 
Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
Max 
1.42 
.22 
.66 
1.62 
1.42 
.22 
.66 
1.62 
1.41 
.23 
.66 
1.62 
1.40 
.24 
.66 
1.62 
1.41 
.24 
.66 
1.62 
1.41 
.23 
.66 
1.62 
Credit to 
private sector, 
crtoprivate 
Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
Max 
113.21 
13.35 
55.68 
161.76 
113.21 
13.35 
55.68 
161.76 
113.39 
13.40 
53.11 
161.76 
112.74 
14.76 
53.11 
161.76 
113.55 
13.58 
53.11 
161.76 
113.06 
14.02 
53.11 
161.76 
Population, 
million 
Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
Max 
68.9 
29.5 
3.80 
82.5 
68.9 
29.5 
3.80 
82.5 
67.8 
30.4 
3.80 
82.5 
66.5 
31.7 
3.80 
82.5 
68.4 
29.9 
3.80 
82.5 
67.7 
30.4 
3.80 
82.5 
Observations  206 203 294 483 814 211 
Firms  42 41 54 171 282 44 
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Table A4.1.5. Descriptive statistics of the variables  
for the DiD estimations in chapter 2: Japan. 
 
  rdepe 
(R&D ) 
rdev 
(R&D  
to 
revenue) 
treve 
(revenue 
million 
Euros) 
gmargin 
(Gross 
margin, 
%) 
cashflowe 
(Cash  
flow, 
million 
Euros) 
pbookr 
(Price  
to book  
value) 
        
log of the 
outcome 
variable 
Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
Max 
11.05 
1.80 
4.33 
15.23 
-2.52 
.88 
-8.53 
.86 
13.56 
1.53 
9.20 
17.26 
4.07 
.30 
3.13 
4.59 
11.43 
1.77 
8.05 
15.87 
.42 
.68 
-1.27 
2.77 
the outcome 
variable 
Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
Max 
307233 
715811 
0 
4136472 
.11 
.18 
0 
2.37 
2.63 
5.32 
0 
31.5 
61.36 
16.79 
22.93 
99.4 
.50 
1.32 
-7.12 
7.84 
1.96 
1.76 
0.28 
16.07 
treatment Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
Max 
.44 
.49 
0 
1 
.44 
.49 
0 
1 
.44 
.49 
0 
1 
.45 
.49 
0 
1 
0.46 
.49 
0 
1 
0.49 
0.48 
0 
1 
Regulations,  
regquality 
Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
Max 
79.18 
8.90 
36.33 
97.56 
79.00 
8.82 
36.33 
97.56 
79.00 
8.82 
36.33 
97.56 
78.97 
8.81 
36.33 
97.56 
78.74 
8.71 
36.33 
97.56 
78.80 
8.15 
68.78 
97.56 
Patent 
applications 
Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
Max 
299874 
142185 
1643 
384201 
303664 
139015 
1643 
384201 
303664 
139015 
1643 
384201 
304616 
138101 
1643 
384201 
309995 
133369 
1643 
384201 
314579 
128377 
1643 
384201 
Pharm. 
expenditures, 
pharspending 
Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
max 
1.41 
.13 
1.05 
1.55 
1.42 
.13 
1.05 
1.55 
1.42 
.13 
1.05 
1.55 
1.42 
.13 
1.05 
1.55 
1.42 
.13 
1.05 
1.55 
1.42 
.12 
1.05 
1.55 
Credit to 
private sector, 
crtoprivate 
Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
Max 
189.44 
23.25 
153.97 
231.08 
189.78 
23.20 
153.97 
231.08 
189.78 
23.20 
153.97 
231.08 
189.78 
23.20 
153.97 
231.08 
190.12 
23.06 
153.97 
231.08 
179.60 
11.02 
153.97 
222.27 
Population Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
Max 
105 
46.6 
7.09 
128 
106 
45.6 
7.09 
128 
106 
45.6 
7.09 
128 
107 
45.3 
7.09 
128 
108 
43.7 
7.09 
128 
110 
42.2 
7.1 
128 
Observations  239 238 307 415 375 276 
Firms  47 47 55 87 72 79 
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Table A4.1.6. Descriptive statistics of the variables  
for the DiD estimations in chapter 2: USA. 
 
 
 
 rdepe 
(R&D ) 
rdev 
(R&D  
to 
revenue) 
treve 
(revenue 
million 
Euros) 
gmargin 
(Gross 
margin, 
%) 
cashflowe 
(Cash  
flow, 
million 
Euros) 
pbookr 
(Price  
to book  
value) 
        
log of the 
outcome 
variable 
Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
max 
9.40 
2.07 
.88 
14.98 
-1.36 
1.62 
-6.80 
2.87 
10.02 
2.91 
-.12 
17.99 
3.83 
.70 
-3.91 
4.60 
9.88 
2.34 
-.21 
16.26 
1.04 
.94 
-4.60 
3.52 
the outcome 
variable 
Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
max 
101110 
364228 
0 
3229695 
.74 
1.98 
0 
17.77 
8.54 
4.63 
0 
65.4 
52.40 
26.88 
-92.89 
100 
.978 
.725 
-.565 
1.15 
4.27 
4.47 
0.2 
34.1 
treatment Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
max 
.40 
0.49 
0 
1 
.40 
0.49 
0 
1 
.39 
0.49 
0 
1 
.37 
0.48 
0 
1 
0.37 
0.48 
0 
1 
.34 
.49 
0 
1 
Regulations,  
regquality 
Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
max 
93.61 
1.46 
91.71 
98.3 
93.61 
1.46 
91.71 
98.3 
93.61 
1.45 
91.71 
98.3 
93.82 
1.71 
91.71 
98.3 
93.80 
1.68 
91.71 
98.3 
92.94 
1.07 
91.71 
95.12 
Patent 
applications 
Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
max 
169389 
26269 
17938 
202776 
169389 
26269 
17938 
202776 
169321 
25930 
17938 
202776 
162897 
39652.5 
17938 
202776 
163349 
38495.1 
17938 
202776 
182850 
12201.7 
161786 
202776 
Pharm. 
expenditures, 
pharspending 
Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
max 
1.68 
.22 
1.07 
1.9 
1.68 
.22 
1.07 
1.9 
1.68 
.22 
1.07 
1. 
1.66 
.25 
1.07 
1.9 
1.66 
.24 
1.07 
1.9 
1.80 
.12 
1.54 
1.9 
Credit to 
private sector, 
crtoprivate 
Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
max 
177.88 
12.45 
119.95 
194.08 
177.88 
12.45 
119.95 
194.08 
177.71 
12.29 
119.95 
194.08 
175.38 
16.73 
119.95 
194.08 
175.42 
16.35 
119.95 
194.08 
182.18 
9.46 
169.07 
194.08 
Population, 
million 
Mean 
St.dev 
Min 
max 
285 
46.8 
58.5 
297 
285 
46.8 
58.5 
297 
285 
46.7 
58.5 
297 
276 
48.3 
58.5 
297 
277 
46.2 
58.5 
297 
118 
113 
58.5 
299 
Observations  2394 2139 3034 2180 3215 1686 
Firms  355 345 434 437 571 370 
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Twenty five major financial indicators have been considered in before and  
after reform comparisons. 
 
Table A.4.2. Results of the t-test for the before-after outcomes 
 
indicators diff  
D
en
m
ar
k
 
G
er
m
an
y
 
F
ra
n
ce
 
It
al
y
 
Ja
p
an
 
N
o
rw
ay
 
S
w
ed
en
 
U
S
A
 
 N obs 62 173 30 9 281 9 59 2459 
rde Ha: ≠ 0 0.172 0.708 0.311 0.510 0.876 0.749 0.134 0.071 
  Ha: > 0 0.086 0.646 0.155 0.745 0.562 0.626 0.067 0.035 
 N obs 54 172 29 9 281 9 57 2231 
rdev Ha: ≠ 0 0.092 0.547 0.375 0.343 0.524 0.043 0.387 0.638 
  Ha: > 0 0.954 0.274 0.187 0.828 0.738 0.022 0.807 0.319 
 N obs 59 225 97 17 316 19 87 3198 
trev Ha: ≠ 0 0.529 0.607 0.220 0.116 0.720 0.605 0.232 0.108 
  Ha: > 0 0.736 0.304 0.890 0.942 0.360 0.698 0.884 0.946 
 N obs 151 623 1231 20 452 233 237 3473 
netinc Ha: ≠ 0 0.122 0.664 0.098 0.825 0.464 0.014 0.365 0.021 
  Ha: > 0 0.061 0.668 0.951 0.587 0.232 0.993 0.183 0.989 
 N obs 143 532 1028  358 150 228 2983 
employs Ha: ≠ 0 0.057 0.003 0.111 NA 0.000 0.253 0.716 0.285 
  Ha: > 0 0.029 0.001 0.945   0.000 0.874 0.358 0.143 
 N obs 59 669 1207 20 448 19 237 3451 
sales Ha: ≠ 0 0.493 0.012 0.012 0.095 0.012 0.605 0.893 0.078 
  Ha: > 0 0.753 0.006 0.994 0.952 0.006 0.697 0.447 0.961 
 N obs 147 658 1142 17 376 188 234 3219 
cashflow Ha: ≠ 0 0.077 0.615 0.084 0.113 0.506 0.084 0.339 0.473 
  Ha: > 0 0.038 0.307 0.958 0.944 0.253 0.958 0.169 0.763 
 N obs 38 184 74  315 11 76 2164 
entval Ha: ≠ 0 0.717 0.404 0.361 NA 0.170 0.210 0.143 0.525 
  Ha: > 0 0.359 0.202 0.820   0.085 0.895 0.929 0.262 
 N obs   1090  86    
export Ha: ≠ 0 NA NA 0.011 NA 0.225 NA NA NA 
  Ha: > 0     0.995   0.113       
 N obs 86 626 1073  100 71 212  
addval Ha: ≠ 0 0.259 0.055 0.043 NA 0.097 0.888 0.440 NA 
  Ha: > 0 0.129 0.028 0.979   0.952 0.556 0.220   
 N obs 147 668 1227 17 363 188 234 3333 
ebitda Ha: ≠ 0 0.062 0.227 0.076 0.091 0.407 0.090 0.844 0.557 
  Ha: > 0 0.031 0.114 0.962 0.954 0.203 0.955 0.422 0.722 
 N obs 36 144 84 14 314 10 41 797 
investment Ha: ≠ 0 0.934 0.065 0.293 0.012 0.154 0.720 0.109 0.318 
  Ha: > 0 0.533 0.967 0.854 0.006 0.923 0.360 0.055 0.841 
 N obs 126 640 1174 17 449 157 192 1985 
prmargin Ha: ≠ 0 0.505 0.133 0.001 0.924 0.288 0.452 0.820 0.872 
  Ha: > 0 0.748 0.933 0.999 0.462 0.856 0.226 0.410 0.564 
 N obs 147 629 1150 19 445 223 233 2935 
retshfund Ha: ≠ 0 0.653 0.168 0.055 0.496 0.235 0.018 0.875 0.216 
  Ha: > 0 0.674 0.916 0.973 0.752 0.882 0.991 0.437 0.108 
 N obs 38 187 74  279 12 76 2155 
perat Ha: ≠ 0 0.694 0.531 0.433 NA 0.711 0.335 0.963 0.198 
  Ha: > 0 0.653 0.266 0.217   0.645 0.832 0.482 0.901 
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Table A.4.2. continued 
indicator diff  D
en
m
ar
k
 
G
er
m
an
y
 
F
ra
n
ce
 
It
al
y
 
Ja
p
an
 
N
o
rw
ay
 
S
w
ed
en
 
U
S
A
 
 N obs 92 652 1134 19 416 72 229 2131 
retcap Ha: ≠ 0 0.302 0.526 0.055 0.322 0.707 0.447 0.572 0.382 
  Ha: > 0 0.849 0.737 0.973 0.161 0.647 0.777 0.714 0.809 
 N obs 38 190 74  278 17 76 2188 
mcap Ha: ≠ 0 0.918 0.067 0.496 NA 0.844 0.967 0.566 0.059 
  Ha: > 0 0.459 0.033 0.752   0.422 0.483 0.717 0.030 
 N obs 21 95 56  245 7 16 462 
divpshare Ha: ≠ 0 0.032 0.111 0.074 NA 0.110 0.817 0.102 0.273 
  Ha: > 0 0.984 0.055 0.037   0.055 0.592 0.051 0.137 
 N obs 38 185 67  271 12 73 1845 
pbookr Ha: ≠ 0 0.428 0.198 0.404 NA 0.148 0.309 0.405 0.188 
  Ha: > 0 0.214 0.099 0.798   0.074 0.845 0.203 0.094 
 N obs 125 320 106 15 451 16 134 2221 
gmargin Ha: ≠ 0 0.001 0.356 0.224 0.691 0.102 0.900 0.264 0.086 
  Ha: > 0 0.000 0.178 0.888 0.345 0.051 0.450 0.868 0.957 
 N obs 125 619 1121 15 374 162 193 1953 
cashflt Ha: ≠ 0 0.658 0.106 0.186 0.565 0.111 0.482 0.456 0.672 
  Ha: > 0 0.671 0.947 0.907 0.718 0.945 0.241 0.772 0.664 
 N obs 37 185 73  271 17 76 2103 
pcashr Ha: ≠ 0 0.375 0.657 0.329 NA 0.870 0.997 0.578 0.417 
  Ha: > 0 0.813 0.328 0.164   0.435 0.498 0.711 0.208 
 N obs 149 687 1226 20 452 229 237 3177 
solvrat Ha: ≠ 0 0.009 0.115 0.016 0.620 0.000 0.345 0.609 0.064 
  Ha: > 0 0.005 0.058 0.992 0.690 0.999 0.827 0.695 0.032 
Note: the null Ho is that the difference between mean values before and after the reform is zero;  
diff = mean(after reforms) - mean(before reforms); t-test is for two-sample unequal variance.  
N obs - combined number of observations in two subsamples; p-values are indicated for each 
alternative hypotheses: Ha: the difference is not zero, Ha: the difference is greater than zero. 
 
Table A.4.3. Qualitative summary of the before-after evaluation based on t-test results 
 Countries Firms‘ financial indicators, which mean 
value increased after the reforms 
Firms‘ financial indicators, which 
mean value decreased 
Denmark rde*, rdev, divpshare  netinc*, employs, cashflow, ebitda, 
gmargin, solvrat 
Germany investment, prmargin*, retshfund*  employs, sales, addval, mcap, 
divpshare*, pbookr*, solvrat* 
France netinc, employs, sales, cashflow,  
export, addval, ebitda, prmargin, 
retshfund, retcap, cashflt*, solvrat  
divpshare  
Italy trev*, sales, cashflow*, cash*, ebitda*  investment  
Japan addval, investment*, solvrat employs, sales, entval, cashflt*, 
divpshare, pbookr*, gmargin*,  
Norway netinc, cashflow*, cash, ebitda, retshfund  rdev  
Sweden  rde*, cash*, entval*  investment*, divpshare*  
USA rde, trev*, netinc, sales, perat*, mcapshf* mcap, pbookr*, solvrat 
Note: the results are qualitative summary of the before-after t-test; * - at 10%-level, otherwise 5% 
significance level is considered. The variables‘ description is given in Table A4.1.1. 
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Table A4.4. DiD regression results for the outcome variables for companies in Denmark 
 
 rdepe rdev treve gmargin cashflowe pbookr 
 
Treatment  31095.97 
(175900.9) 
-2.29 
(2.92) 
-295206 
(624358.3) 
3.82 
(4.77) 
212681.8 
(1559315) 
0.601 
(5.376) 
Regquality -60607.97 
(94787.25) 
.07 
(.08) 
13702.64 
(183150.7) 
-.4485275 
(1.510605) 
68912.1 
(409418.5) 
.066 
(1.90) 
Patent -942.92 
(1648.579) 
.001 
(.001) 
2591.74 
(1154.93) 
.0040482 
(.0121035) 
-6980.27 
(3421.45)** 
-.022 
(.023) 
Pharspending -1709445 
(3022976) 
3.64 
(2.18) 
-1992659 
(3419167) 
-16.99642 
(41.07528) 
4305014 
(8672738) 
-36.21 
(69.77) 
Crtoprivate 749.72 
(3630.07) 
.001 
(.003) 
7735.99 
(8877.50) 
.0625681 
(.0630566) 
15585.33 
(15661.66) 
.22 
(.21) 
Population, 
million 
 
-2.81 
(2.47) 
0.948 
(2.07) 
-4.21 
(5.18) 
7.80 
(.0000385) 
-7.19 
(5.45) 
14.1 
(42.9) 
Constant 
(million) 
23.4 
(23.6) 
-14.77 
(17.66) 
19.81 
(41.72) 
57.63269 
(281.9839) 
40.1 
(67.3) 
-86.51 
(373.19) 
Year dummies included 
Number of 
observations 
86 79 
 
96 255 317 69 
Number of 
groups 
14 13 14 58 76 13 
R
2 
within 0.12 0.11 0.41 0.073 0.19 0.59 
R
2 
between 0.01 0.05 0.007 0.001 0.02 0.33 
F-statistics 1.35 0.57 2.32 1.21 3.18 17.99 
Rho .95 .95 .96 .82 .96 .95 
Note: robust standard errors are given in brackets; *** - 1% significance level,  
** - 5% significance level, * - 10% significance level.  
 
Table A4.5. DiD regression results for the outcome variables for companies in Germany 
 rdepe rdev treve gmargin cashflowe pbookr 
 
Treatment  -683595.7 
(320358.9)** 
-9.50 
(9.21) 
-1937881 
(1118202)* 
-3.67 
(4.99) 
-652626.4 
(548075.4) 
-2.75 
(16.61) 
Regquality 61610.13 
(115158) 
4.51 
(3.57) 
214893.3 
(392770.1) 
-.99 
(2.10) 
46380.44 
(229871.7) 
6.76 
(7.84) 
Patent -69.81737 
(53.24) 
.0004 
(.0004) 
-115.04 
(189.22) 
.0005 
(.001) 
-175.7645 
(116.1513) 
-.002 
(.004) 
Pharspending -2620706 
(2035718) 
122.64 
(93.35) 
-7375231 
(7416428) 
-9.423 
(26.47) 
-793735 
(4456214) 
_ 
Crtoprivate 13191.98 
(21508.36) 
-.07 
(.10) 
24603.39 
(60418.41) 
-.73 
(.63) 
-3921.501 
(38690.4) 
.016 
(3.74) 
Population -1.59 
(1.29) 
-.00005 
(.00004) 
-.97 
(3.82) 
.00002 
(.00003) 
1.2263 
(3.7837) 
0.000 
(.0002) 
Constant,  
million 
102.1 
(79.4) 
2576.8 
(2184.7) 
50.5 
(211.4) 
-692.9 
(1660.2) 
-81.0 
(247.2) 
-1046.8 
(8800.8) 
Year dummies included 
Number of 
observations 
206 203 294 483 814 211 
Number of 
groups 
42 41 54 171 282 44 
R
2 
within 0.45 0.12 0.20 0.05 0.10 0.13 
R
2 
between 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.01 .04 0.03 
F-statistics 2.92 0.34 3.19 0.61 0.95 0.73 
Rho .9999 .9999 .9988 .9995 .9993 .9825 
Note: robust standard errors are given in brackets; *** - 1% significance level,  
** - 5% significance level, * - 10% significance level.  
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Table A4.6. DiD regression results for the outcome variables for companies in France 
 
 
 
rdepe rdev treve gmargin cashflowe pbookr 
Treatment  3160.3  
(370802.9) 
-4.11 
(7.68) 
-703720.5 
(1101336) 
4.03 
(5.08) 
802987.8 
(1025255) 
19.28 
(20.69) 
Regquality 9060.33 
(15629.26) 
.15 
(.28) 
-68793.65 
(59352.22) 
-1.59 
(1.13) 
16744.42 
(393354.2) 
-.10 
(1.41) 
Patent -110.8306 
(362.8145) 
-.008 
(.006) 
-152.41 
(541.74) 
-.004 
(.007) 
-6107.1 
(3779.5) 
-.01 
(.02) 
Pharspending -405253.8 
(684985.1) 
-19.41 
(13.15) 
-4435455 
(2500567) 
-23.21 
(27.69) 
3707745 
(7560614) 
-17.05 
(77.07) 
Crtoprivate 1484.6 
(1649.3) 
.04 
(.02)* 
2085.39 
(6199.73) 
.03 
(.17) 
-28953.9 
(22084.7) 
.34 
(.23) 
Population .0175136 
(.1127676) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
.54 
(.44) 
.00001 
(0.00004) 
.5 
(1.7) 
-.000009 
(.000011) 
Constant, 
million 
-0.22 
(4.50) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-6.99 
(17.40) 
-14.71 
(98.99) 
39.2 
(27.7) 
426.07 
(664.85) 
Year dummies included 
Number of 
observations 
52 51 110 224 992 85 
Number of 
groups 
11 11 20 50 182 18 
R
2 
within 0.30 0.36 0.11 0.07 0.12 0.59 
R
2 
between 0.11 0.04 0.001 0.00 0.01 0.04 
F-statistics 4.59 0.43 0.72 1.55 3.25 20.39 
Rho .92 .99 .99 .99 .99 .99 
Note: robust standard errors are given in brackets; *** - 1% significance level,  
** - 5% significance level, * - 10% significance level.  
 
Table A4.7. DiD regression results for the outcome variables for companies in Italy 
 
 
 
rdepe rdev treve gmargin cashflowe pbookr 
Treatment  231684 
(216146.1)* 
-2.35 
(4.43) 
1563542 
(916973.4)* 
15.80 
(7.69)** 
-1130697 
(2456586) 
-3.17 
(6.44) 
Regquality 1631.8 
(10760.9) 
-.013 
(.055) 
-10484.99 
(38143.8) 
-1.291 
(1.33) 
814934.4 
(373258.8)** 
1.04 
(1.56) 
Patent - - - - - - 
Pharspending -182758.2 
(266477.1) 
2.94 
(2.06) 
-2677089 
(1538759)* 
-13.88 
(40.92) 
-6467305 
(9968896) 
31.78 
(42.92) 
Crtoprivate 970.3 
(1492.9) 
.007 
 (.007) 
2310.6 
(5870.2) 
.17 
(.19) 
2691.36 
(27923.87) 
.30 
(.22) 
Population .04 
(.04) 
0.0000008 
(.0000004) 
.10 
(.18) 
-.0000006 
(.0000116) 
-.68 
(3.10) 
.0000006 
(.0000006) 
Constant -649409.9 
(1021615) 
-15.58781 
(10.45019) 
1894197 
(6051232) 
215.26 
(211.11) 
-60500000 
(55100000) 
-233.68 
(227.41) 
Year dummies included 
Number of 
observations 
41 41 58 165 209 47 
Number of 
groups 
8 8 11 38 53 10 
R
2 
within 0.52 0.31 0.40 0.08 0.19 0.60 
R
2 
between 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.0002 0.05 0.05 
F-statistics 0.80 0.45 1.42 1.66 2.30 16.34 
Rho .99 .99 .98 .97 .96 .99 
Note: robust standard errors are given in brackets; *** - 1% significance level,  
** - 5% significance level, * - 10% significance level.  
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Table A4.8. DiD regression results for the outcome variables for companies in Japan 
 
 
 
rdepe rdev treve gmargin cashflowe pbookr 
Treatment  -1784172 
(743282.9)** 
-11.41 
(10.38) 
-5209563 
(3045581)* 
-5.15 
(13.10) 
-875472.7 
(812322.9) 
12.08 
(31.06) 
Regquality -43469.2 
(113922.9) 
-.83 
(.69) 
-100059.6 
(634403.8) 
.07 
(.26) 
-793482.2 
(682552.3) 
- 
Patent 25.5  
(114.7) 
-.0002 
(.0002) 
394.8 
(580.4) 
-.0003  
(.0004) 
83.7 
(434.1) 
-.005 
(.004) 
Pharspending - - - - - - 
Crtoprivate -86065.1 
(108887.1) 
.66  
(.55) 
-364329.2 
  (590737) 
.08  
(.30) 
-106510.7 
(512730.2) 
-1.71 
(1.40) 
Population .55 
(10.83) 
.00004 
(.00004) 
-10.3 
(56.6) 
.000009  
(.000029) 
28.6 
(46.9) 
-.0002   
(.0002) 
Constant,  
million 
-33.5 
(1120) 
-0.005 
(.004) 
1050 
(5240) 
-791.7 
(727.7) 
-2600 
(4310) 
.02 
(.17) 
Year dummies included 
Number of 
observations 
239 238 307 
 
415 375 276 
Number of 
groups 
47 47 55 87 72 79 
R
2 
within 0.19 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.08 
R
2 
between 0.06 0.13 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.02 
F-statistics 2.91 0.14 1.58 1.92 0.69 1.04 
Rho .98 .99 .99 .99 .99 .99 
Note: robust standard errors are given in brackets; *** - 1% significance level, ** - 5% significance 
level, * - 10% significance level.  
 
Table A4.9. DiD regression results for the outcome variables for companies in Norway 
 
 
 
rdepe rdev treve gmargin cashflowe pbookr 
Treatment  107014.8 
(133943.2) 
-18.62 
(10.81)* 
230964.4 
(571213.7) 
.002 
(5.51) 
-1346074 
(599072)** 
-20.43 
(15.99) 
Regquality 6420.3 
(7236.1) 
-.48 
(3149865) 
55896.4 
(57470.9) 
-1.99 
(1.93) 
-121151 
(125619.7) 
1.59 
(2.58) 
Patent -148.2 
(174.2) 
-.016 
(.011) 
1413.4 
(972.8) 
.001 
(.019) 
-3606.069 
(2509.83) 
-.03 
(.03) 
Pharspending -251007.2 
(401345.4) 
-23.27953 
(17.65) 
-818043.5 
(2387690) 
-9.63 
(44.11) 
-1200704 
(8890256) 
-36.10 
(87.29) 
Crtoprivate 582.1 
(2174.1) 
-.07 
(.09) 
11658.9 
(12931.7) 
.09 
(.37) 
102891.3 
(91617.11) 
.19 
(.43) 
Population .19 
(.42) 
.00002 
(.00002) 
-1.74 
(2.59) 
-.00001 
(.00008) 
-26.19538 
(16.63778) 
.00005 
(.0001) 
Constant, 
million 
-1.24 
(2.12) 
-.00001 
(.00009) 
2.59 
(12.7) 
.0003 
(.0004) 
153 
(95)* 
-327.6 
(664.9) 
Year dummies included 
Number of 
observations 
37 37 51 156 311 43 
Number of 
groups 
7 7 9 37 73 9 
R
2 
within 0.62 0.66 0.42 0.08 0.17 0.63 
R
2 
between 0.12 0.06 0.002 0.02 0.017 0.05 
F-statistics 5.20 11.14 0.93 1.76 2.52 16.07 
Rho .97 .99 .99 .82 .99 .97 
Note: robust standard errors are given in brackets; *** - 1% significance level,  
** - 5% significance level, * - 10% significance level.  
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Table A4.10. DiD regression results for the outcome variables for companies in Sweden 
 
 
 
rdepe rdev treve gmargin cashflowe pbookr 
Treatment  146243.6 
(156531) 
46.85 
(68.88) 
998328.9 
(731593.8) 
-5.62 
(7.17) 
-3182565 
(1272432)** 
-10.91 
(40.31) 
Regquality -5767.4 
(8401.4) 
8.91 
(10.39) 
-24877.5 
(36389.7) 
1.85 
(1.24) 
243540.8 
(249766.3) 
-14.07 
(15.26) 
Patent -38.16 
(61.2) 
.09 
(.11) 
-71.78 
(282.52) 
-.01 
(.009) 
 -3423.551 
(2240.102) 
.08 
(.11) 
Pharspending -120393.9 
(238839.8) 
206.78 
(241.46) 
-3375046  
(1493091)** 
-4.01 
(32.96) 
7746374  
(7798799) 
-83.56 
(169.72) 
Crtoprivate 18.9 
(669.0) 
.82 
(1.12) 
101.52 
(3991.69) 
.03 
(.10) 
-71020 
(70493.92) 
2.09 
(2.25) 
Population .12 
(.33) 
-.0001 
(.0002) 
1.04 
(1.39) 
.00006 
(.00004) 
-4.944281 
(14.11051) 
-.0006 
(.0007) 
Constant, 
million 
-1.64  
(2.52) 
-192.6 
(1881.6) 
-2.03 
(11.37) 
-452.01 
(303.03) 
20.8 
(112) 
.005 
(.06) 
Year dummies included 
Number of 
observations 
76 75 106 252 369 90 
Number of 
groups 
18 18 23 58 86 20 
R
2 
within 0.32 0.12 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.08 
R
2 
between 0.003 0.01 0.15 0.009 0.002 0.07 
F-statistics 5.24 0.08 1.39 1.24 2.58 5.57 
Rho .94 .80 .97 .98 .87 .99 
Note: robust standard errors are given in brackets; *** - 1% significance level,  
** - 5% significance level, * - 10% significance level.  
 
Table A4.11. DiD regression results for the outcome variables for companies in the US 
 
 
 
rdepe rdev treve gmargin cashflowe pbookr 
Treatment  -31296.9 
(36956.8) 
-20.09 
(18.94) 
-614038.9 
(520814.7) 
1.57 
(2.12) 
-14140.0 
(55089.9) 
-28.33 
(22.89) 
Regquality 22525.1 
(153830.5) 
-12.40901 
(6.904963)* 
63945.7 
(38382.6)* 
-.61 
(1.88) 
-92288.9 
(232605) 
3.00 
(2.71) 
Patent 23.6 
(28.2) 
.0017157 
(.0034861) 
-20.0 
(11.6)* 
.0004 
(.001) 
-23.0 
(43.6) 
.0001 
(.0003) 
Pharspending 1729245 
(3032414) 
468.6502 
(277.6139)* 
618275.5 
(1002144) 
.21 
(51.09) 
-4955942 
(4773059) 
_ 
Crtoprivate 3522.4 
(4005.9) 
-.218248 
(.1915449) 
-1535.4 
(1406.8) 
-.11 
(.09) 
-4526.9 
(6145.9) 
-.15 
(.13) 
Population -.06 
(.12) 
-.00002 
(.00002) 
.11 
(.06)** 
-.000002 
(.000005) 
.03 
(.18) 
-.000001 
(.000001) 
Constant 7.66 
(43.3) 
.006 
(.0004) 
-32. 
(15.5) 
631.2 
(1198.1) 
9688989 
(66700000) 
-91.93 
(463.9) 
Year dummies included 
Number of 
observations 
2394 2139 3034 2180 3215 1686 
Number of 
groups 
355 345 434 437 571 370 
R
2 
within 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.01 
R
2 
between 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.045 0.02 0.02 
F-statistics 7.69 1.03 4.7 0.84 1.22 4.08 
Rho 0.99 0.99 .96 0.99 .96 .67 
Note: robust standard errors are given in brackets; *** - 1% significance level,  
** - 5% significance level, * - 10% significance level.  
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Attachment 5.  Descriptive statistics and results of balancing tests for matching 
difference-in-difference estimations of R&D indicators 
 
 
Table A5.1. Descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviations) for the MDiD 
estimations: Germany and the US 
 
 USA Germany 
 Treated Untre-
ated 
On 
common 
support 
Treated Untre-
ated 
On 
common 
support 
R&D expenditures, 
million Euros  
.166 
.494 
.277 
.917 
.217 
.723 
.278 
.537 
.585 
1.343 
.525 
1.235 
R&D to revenue (rdev) .178 
.219 
.161 
.241 
.170 
.229 
.168 
.249 
.140 
.234 
.145 
.237 
R&D to assets (rdas) .093   
.088 
.084 
.083 
.089 
.086 
.088 
.073 
.073 
.082 
.076 
.080 
Revenue (treve), million 
Euros 
1.706 
6.474 
2.601 
8.173 
2.122 
7.322 
3.591 
6.639 
4.645 
9.625 
4.442 
9.124 
Cash flow (cashflowe), 
million Euros 
.227 
.836 
.390 
2.376 
.303 
1.732 
.563 
1.050 
.733 
3.253 
.700 
2.957 
Total assets (totase), 
million Euros 
2.236 
5.991 
3.233 
8.903 
2.699 
7.498 
4.867 
10.7 
6.223 
12.7 
5.962 
12.4 
Price-to-book ratio 
(pbookr) 
4.581 
8.063 
5.205 
6.621 
4.871 
7.430 
2.578 
1.814 
4.079 
6.887 
3.790 
6.263 
Gross margin 
(gmargin), % 
60.940 
19.506 
60.374 
19.889 
60.677 
19.675 
56.945 
19.889 
58.304 
20.805 
58.042 
20.599 
Profit margin (prmargin) -.236 
29.773 
-1.469 
31.694 
-.808 
30.669 
-2.183 
27.221 
-4.766 
29.685 
-4.268 
29.191 
Number of employees 
(employs) 
8279 
19417 
10286 
23923 
9211 
21638 
15117 
24695 
15907 
31482 
15755 
30249 
Rdev^2 .079 
.248 
.083 
.402 
.081 
.329 
.089 
.248 
.074 
.431 
.077 
.402 
Cashflowe^2, trillion .751 
4.16 
5.78 
57.2 
3.09 
39.2 
1.40 
3.86 
11.1 
80.7 
9.20 
72.6 
Gmargin^2 4093 
2310 
4039 
2377 
4068 
2340 
3630 
2059 
3830 
2328 
3791 
2276 
Prmargin^2 884 
1696 
1004 
1760 
940 
1726 
730 
1860 
899 
1713 
866 
1740 
Totase^2, trillion 40.8 
175 
89.5 
339 
63.5 
265 
137 
520 
200 
496 
188 
501 
Observations 468 406 874 48 201 249 
Firms 149 150 192 19 56 61 
Note: The first number is mean and the second one is standard deviation.  
‗Untreated‘ indicates statistics for unmatched observations; tables 2.12-2.14 in 
chapter 2 show statistics for the ‗Control‘ group of matched observations.   
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Table A5.2. Descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviations) for the MDiD 
estimations: France and Japan 
 
 France Japan 
 Treated Untre-
ated 
On 
common 
support 
Treated Untreat
ed 
On 
common 
support 
R&D expenditures, 
million Euros 
. 933 
1.686 
.653 
1.145 
.697 
1.235 
.119 
.221 
.635 
.116 
.245 
.640 
R&D to revenue (rdev) 1.354 
2.265 
.166 
.190 
.351 
.980 
.097 
.086 
.125 
.159 
.103 
.109 
R&D to assets (rdas) .154 
.124 
.071 
.065 
.083 
.082 
.056 
.030 
.070 
.062 
.060 
.041 
Revenue (treve), million 
Euros 
6.324 
11.7 
4.670 
7.728 
4.927   
8.387 
1.168 
1.824 
4.725 
7.848 
2.037 
4.439 
Cash flow (cashflowe), 
million Euros 
2.106    
3.743 
.991 
1.999 
1.163    
2.353 
.166 
.398 
.949   
1.867 
. 357 
1.036 
Total assets (totase), 
million Euros 
21.0 
37.7 
8.458 
14.17 
10.4 
19.8 
1.808  
3.205 
8.485 
14.5 
3.438 
8.154 
Price-to-book ratio 
(pbookr) 
4.235 
2.709 
5.739 
7.993 
5.505 
7.427 
1.608 
.910 
3.908   
6.775 
2.170    
3.560 
Gross margin 
(gmargin), % 
63.432 
40.313 
66.195 
20.158 
65.765 
24.051 
57.357   
17.723 
66.110 
17.347 
59.493  
17.997 
Profit margin (prmargin) 14.126 
4.179 
11.443 
20.382 
11.778 
19.116 
10.393 
11.889 
12.005 
13.894 
10.781 
12.392 
Number of employees 
(employs) 
24985 
44031 
20013  
29786 
20853 
32300 
2786 
3411 
20950 
32351 
6879 
17288 
Rdev^2 6.536 
17.417 
.063 
.195 
1.072 
7.037 
.017 
.067 
.040 
.186 
.022 
.109 
Cashflowe^2, trillion 17.2 
33.4 
4.91 
10.4 
6.81 
16.4 
.186 
.854 
4.33 
10.3 
1.20 
5.39 
Gmargin^2 5513 
2561 
4781 
2433 
4895 
2451 
3602 
1948 
4666   
2221 
3862 
2065 
Prmargin^2 214 
115 
538 
893 
498 
842 
248 
397 
334 
319 
269 
381 
Totase^2, trillion 174 
317 
268 
586 
497 
1430 
13.5 
53.6 
2.78 
5.99 
78.1  
319 
Observations 12 65 77 192 62 254 
Firms 5 13 17 47 36 54 
Note: The first number is the mean and the second one is the standard deviation.  
‗Untreated‘ indicates statistics for unmatched observations; tables 2.12-2.14 in 
chapter 2 show statistics for the ‗Control‘ group of matched observations.  
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Table A5.3. Descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviations) for the MDiD 
estimations: Denmark 
 
 Denmark 
 Treated Untreated On common 
support 
R&D expenditures, million Euros .179   
.221 
.592 
1.144 
.461 
.971 
R&D to revenue (rdev) .211 
.139 
.167 
.191 
.181 
.177 
R&D to assets (rdas) .132 
.043 
.070 
.066 
.089 
.066 
Revenue (treve), million Euros 1.232   
1.537 
4.296 
7.748 
3.328 
6.607 
Cash flow (cashflowe), million Euros .269 
.340 
.872 
1.984 
.675   
1.660 
Total assets (totase), 
million Euros 
1.501 
1.845 
7.971 
14.2 
5.928 
12.2 
Price-to-book ratio (pbookr) 4.602 
2.167 
5.535 
7.994 
5.240 
6.719 
Gross margin (gmargin), % 67.879 
14.921 
65.570 
20.270 
66.299 
18.697 
Profit margin (prmargin) 7.658 
25.801 
9.083 
21.572 
8.597 
22.958 
Number of employees (employs) 5734 
7376 
18214 
29874 
14008 
25325 
Rdev^2 .063 
.100 
.064 
.195 
.064 
.170 
Cashflowe^2, trillion .184 
.346 
4.63 
10.4 
3.18 
8.79 
Gmargin^2 4822 
1907 
4704 
2475 
4741 
2301 
Prmargin^2 701 
887 
539 
955 
594 
930 
Totase^2, trillion 5.55 
10.3 
262 
588 
181 
500 
Observations 30 65 95 
Firms 6 16 18 
Note: The first number is the mean and the second one is the standard deviation.  
‗Untreated‘ indicates statistics for unmatched observations; tables 2.12-2.14 in 
chapter 2 show statistics for the ‗Control‘ group of matched observations. 
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Bias reduction in matching estimations 
 
Description of the variables is given in Attachment 2. Two dependent variables are 
used – R&D expenditures and R&D intensity, i.e. the ratio of R&D expenditures to 
a firm‘s total revenue. Random uniform distribution sorting was applied to draw a 
random sample. 
 
 
Table A5.4. Bias reduction and p-values for the t-test for mean difference in 
matched samples of pharmaceutical firms in propensity score 10-neighbour 
estimations for R&D expenditures 
 
 Denmark Germany France Japan 
Variable Bias  
% 
reduc-
tion 
P-value 
for  
t-test 
Bias  
% 
reduc
tion 
P-value 
for  
t-test 
Bias  
% 
reduc
tion 
P-value 
for  
t-test 
Bias  
% 
reduc-
tion 
P-value 
for  
t-test 
 
Rdev 
 
60.0 
 
0.295 
 
-0.3 
 
0.630 
 
-40.1 
 
0.345 
 
-206.0 
 
0.068 
Treve 83.6 0.045 49.7 0.769 39.8 0.710 96.2 0.311 
Cashflowe 81.5 0.030 -15.9 0.446 21.6 0.449 95.7 0.205 
Totase 90.8 0.055 18.7 0.678 11.3 0.282 96.4 0.291 
Pbookr -88.5 0.187 90.0 0.695 75.0 0.851 97.3 0.689 
Gmargin 98.8 0.985 -26.6 0.724 -366.3 0.377 68.3 0.191 
Prmargin -3876.8 0.543 -45.5 0.521 64.6 0.830 21.6 0.223 
Employs 78.3 0.035 -6005.0 0.897 16.1 0.568 96.9 0.078 
Rdev^2 33.8 0.288 -184.4 0.614 -15.0 0.405 -451.1 0.156 
Cashflowe^2 97.2 0.036 95.2 0.549 16.8 0.323 97.2 0.041 
Gmargin^2 96.5 0.975 31.6 0.786 -491.4 0.378 74.9 0.271 
Prmargin^2 4.4 0.570 46.0 0.814 89.2 0.723 75.4 0.526 
Totase^2 98.8 0.051 27.1 0.668 7.8 0.141 97.4 0.063 
Untreated on 
common 
support 
48 212 48 48 
Treated on 
common 
support 
28 48 7 165 
Unmatched 
Pseudo R
2
  
0.729 0.158 1.000 0.297 
Matched 
Pseudo R
2
  
0.597 0.034 -1.992 0.118 
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Table A5.4 (continued). Bias reduction and p-values for the t-test for mean 
difference in matched samples of pharmaceutical firms in propensity score 
10-neighbour estimations for R&D expenditures 
 
 Italy Norway Sweden USA 
Variable Bias  
% 
reduc-
tion 
P-
value 
for  
t-test 
Bias  
% 
reduc-
tion 
P-value 
for  
t-test 
Bias  
% 
reduc-
tion 
P-value 
for  
t-test 
Bias  
% 
reduc-
tion 
P-
value 
for  
t-test 
 
Rdev 
 
27.2 
 
0.476 
 
-7.6 
 
0.117 
 
-1723.6 
 
0.483 
 
84.0 
 
0.851 
Treve 5.7 0.530 -160.3 0.576 53.8 0.266 68.6 0.496 
Cashflowe -20.9 0.515 5.0 0.635 93.3 0.344 87.7 0.730 
Totase 11.7 0.519 80.7 0.787 52.3 0.294 81.0 0.646 
Pbookr -254.7 0.730 -37.8 0.046 -317.7 0.124 56.5 0.588 
Gmargin -180.8 0.402 1.7 0.151 -752.1 0.531 -35.5 0.484 
Prmargin -52.0 0.560 -34.1 0.226 25.7 0.824 48.2 0.745 
Employs - - 68.1 0.788 58.0 0.217 98.2 0.980 
Rdev^2 44.8 0.443 -7.3 0.116 -653.7 0.346 98.0 0.994 
Cashflowe^2 -52.9 0.520 -1552.5 0.423 99.0 0.301 99.5 0.931 
Gmargin^2 -46.6 0.379 -3.4 0.103 -209.3 0.488 -113.9 0.376 
Prmargin^2 13.9 0.371 -32.7 0.038 74.6 0.877 92.2 0.939 
Totase^2 -6.1 0.529 77.7 0.551 42.7 0.304 91.9 0.740 
Untreated on 
common 
support 
49 16 51 416 
Treated on 
common 
support 
3 5 11 468 
Unmatched 
Pseudo R
2
  
1.000 1.000  0.285 0.032 
Matched 
Pseudo R
2
  
1.000 -7.469 -0.496 0.003 
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Table A5.5. Bias reduction and p-values for the t-test for mean difference in 
matched samples of pharmaceutical firms in propensity score 10-neighbour 
estimations for R&D intensity 
 
 Denmark Germany France Japan 
Variable Bias  
% 
reduc-
tion 
P-value 
for  
t-test 
Bias  
% 
reduc-
tion 
P-value 
for  
t-test 
Bias  
% 
reduc
tion 
P-value 
for  
t-test 
Bias  
% 
reduc
tion 
P-value 
for  
t-test 
 
Treve 
 
80.1 
 
0.011 
 
88.7 
 
0.949 
 
-18.5 
 
0.431 
 
95.6 
 
0.240 
Cashflowe 78.4 0.010 9.2 0.552 -11.2 0.260 94.6 0.111 
Totase 89.2 0.020 58.9 0.835 -6.9 0.188 95.4 0.178 
Pbookr -78.1 0.289 98.4 0.952 90.7 0.945 94.7 0.458 
Gmargin 10.5 0.270 93.7 0.986 -503.7 0.241 91.9 0.741 
Prmargin 17.8 0.989 -14.6 0.625 -16.4 0.403 95.2 0.941 
Employs 73.9 0.010 -18619.7 0.714 -22.1 0.396 96.2 0.030 
Rdev^2 6.0 0.156 -928.9 0.398 -19.7 0.387 -557.7 0.094 
Cashflowe^2 96.9 0.019 95.7 0.590 -4.6 0.200 97.2 0.040 
Gmargin^2 -7.9 0.424 94.9 0.983 -670.7 0.240 96.4 0.875 
Prmargin^2 -73.0 0.236 90.6 0.970 91.5 0.696 48.1 0.171 
Totase^2 98.6 0.024 41.3 0.731 -0.7 0.108 97.3 0.059 
Untreated on 
common 
support 
48 212 48 48 
Treated on 
common 
support 
28 48 7 165 
Unmatched 
Pseudo R
2
  
0.699 0.134 1.000 0.281 
Matched 
Pseudo R
2
  
0.604 0.051 0.967 0.112 
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Table A5.5 (continued). Bias reduction and p-values for the t-test for mean 
difference in matched samples of pharmaceutical firms in propensity score 
10-neighbour estimations for R&D intensity 
 
 Italy Norway Sweden USA 
Variable Bias  
% 
reduc-
tion 
P-value 
for  
t-test 
Bias  
% 
reduc-
tion 
P-value 
for  
t-test 
Bias  
% 
reduc-
tion 
P-value 
for  
t-test 
Bias  
% 
reduc
tion 
P-
value 
for  
t-test 
 
Treve 
 
94.9 
 
0.550 
 
-42.6 
 
0.758 
 
99.8 
 
0.879 
 
98.2 
 
0.971 
Cashflowe - - -59.3 0.612 99.2 0.620 92.0 0.830 
Totase 96.6 0.464 -37.6 0.359 99.2 0.649 96.0 0.925 
Pbookr - - 38.4 0.610 85.7 0.968 53.7 0.565 
Gmargin 28.4 0.528 19.5 0.273 -453.4 0.668 -43.1 0.471 
Prmargin 4.8 0.743 11.3 0.496 -53.9 0.624 38.6 0.703 
Employs - - 40.5 0.606 99.7 0.732 83.7 0.821 
Rdev^2 - - 7.8 0.183 39.8 0.295 -62.0 0.700 
Cashflowe^2 - - -740.2 0.788 100.0 0.586 97.3 0.660 
Gmargin^2 65.6 0.573 19.0 0.244 -45.0 0.740 -98.4 0.421 
Prmargin^2 60.3 0.522 24.0 0.358 64.0 0.813 46.7 0.617 
Totase^2 99.8 0.443 -59.8 0.387 99.9 0.396 98.5 0.951 
Untreated on 
common 
support 
83 16 51 416 
Treated on 
support 
4 5 11 468 
Unmatched 
Pseudo R
2
  
1.000 1.000 0.405 0.021 
Matched 
Pseudo R
2
  
1.000 1.000 1.000 0.003 
 
 
Table A5.6. Bias reduction and p-values for the t-test for mean difference in 
matched samples of pharmaceutical firms in propensity score kernel bi-weight 
estimations for R&D expenditures 
 
 Denmark Germany France Japan 
Variable Bias  
% 
reduc-
tion 
P- 
value 
for  
t-test 
Bias  
% reduc-
tion 
P-
value 
for  
t-test 
Bias  
% 
reduc-
tion 
P-
value 
for  
t-test 
Bias  
% 
reduc-
tion 
P- 
value 
for  
t-test 
 
Rdev 
 
7.2 
 
0.159 
 
64.6 
 
0.854 
 
-158.3 
 
0.692 
 
-107.7 
 
0.217 
Treve 91.8 0.126 36.8 0.704 - - 93.2 0.055 
Cashflowe 90.9 0.073 17.5 0.574 - - 94.9 0.115 
Totase 96.3 0.233 -7.7 0.578 99.0 0.540 94.5 0.092 
Pbookr -600.6 0.001 87.7 0.642 - - 96.8 0.639 
Gmargin -7.3 0.137 -40.3 0.697 - - 80.3 0.418 
Prmargin -2293.5 0.761 72.3 0.903 86.5 0.606 9.1 0.147 
Employs 89.8 0.065 -14387.6 0.739 90.2 0.390 96.0 0.016 
Rdev^2 17.7 0.462 -3.9 0.836 -83.8 0.560 -392.0 0.204 
Cashflowe^2 99.7 0.238 94.7 0.495 - - 96.9 0.021 
Gmargin^2 -60.2 0.197 8.7 0.715 - - 86.1 0.543 
Prmargin^2 -471.9 0.010 26.5 0.759 93.8 0.487 68.4 0.411 
Totase^2 100.0 0.799 -18.5 0.486 100.0 0.292 96.9 0.018 
Untreated on 
common 
support 
48 212 76 48 
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(Table A5.6 
continued) 
Denmark Germany France Japan 
Treated on 
common 
support 
14 46 7 165 
Unmatched 
Pseudo R
2
  
0.729 0.158 0.592 0.297 
Matched 
Pseudo R
2 
 
1.000 0.014 1.000 0.121 
 
Table A5.6 (continued). Bias reduction and p-values for the t-test for mean 
difference in matched samples of pharmaceutical firms in propensity score kernel 
bi-weight estimations for R&D expenditures 
 
 Italy Norway Sweden USA 
Variable Bias  
% 
reduc-
tion 
P-value 
for  
t-test 
Bias  
% 
reduc
tion 
P-value 
for  
t-test 
Bias  
% 
reduc-
tion 
P-value 
for  
t-test 
Bias  
% 
reduc
tion 
P-value 
for  
t-test 
 
Rdev 
 
92.8 
 
0.893 
 
88.3 
 
0.653 
 
63.1 
 
0.654 
 
81.9 
 
0.830 
Treve 99.3 0.955 - - 99.9 0.895 65.1 0.453 
Cashflowe 99.6 0.966 67.9 0.670 99.9 0.923 74.8 0.463 
Totase 99.6 0.942 78.3 0.855 100.0 0.986 63.1 0.355 
Pbookr - - - - - - 55.6 0.573 
Gmargin 60.2 0.873 - - -211.9 0.272 -36.9 0.483 
Prmargin - - - - 13.9 0.339 84.2 0.922 
Employs - - 97.8 0.996 99.8 0.823 78.9 0.766 
Rdev^2 - - - - 91.0 0.944 72.5 0.926 
Cashflowe^2 - - - - 100.0 0.599 97.6 0.648 
Gmargin^2 - - - - -102.4 0.323 -97.7 0.416 
Prmargin^2 - - - - 50.7 0.724 56.2 0.674 
Totase^2 - - 87.3 0.910 100.0 0.575 80.1 0.387 
Untreated on 
common 
support 
86 33 70 416 
Treated on 
common 
support 
3 5 5 468 
Unmatched 
Pseudo R
2
  
0.296 0.108 0.697 0.032 
Matched 
Pseudo R
2 
 
0.026 0.272 1.000 0.003 
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Table A5.7. Bias reduction and p-values: the t-test in mean difference for 
matched samples of pharmaceutical firms in propensity score kernel bi-weight 
estimations for R&D intensity 
 
 Denmark Germany France Japan 
Variable Bias  
% 
reduc-
tion 
P-value 
for  
t-test 
Bias  
% 
reduc-
tion 
P-value 
for  
t-test 
Bias  
% 
reduc
tion 
P-value 
for  
t-test 
Bias  
% 
reduc
tion 
P-
value 
for  
t-test 
Treve 97.9 0.795 97.3 0.985 97.3 0.798 94.1 0.121 
Cashflowe 97.4 0.728 70.8 0.822 - - 94.5 0.107 
Totase 99.2 0.856 89.9 0.947 99.9 0.966 94.7 0.125 
Pbookr -203.2 0.292 92.8 0.791 - - 98.1 0.811 
Gmargin -79.0 0.034 -19.9 0.728 -15.1 0.802 80.8 0.434 
Prmargin -7050.1 0.406 74.1 0.912 93.7 0.906 81.8 0.777 
Employs 97.4 0.787 -2668.8 0.945   95.9 0.019 
Rdev^2 46.1 0.397 -144.0 0.664 -47.2 0.911 0.3 0.470 
Cashflowe^2 99.5 0.420 97.7 0.727 - - 97.2 0.041 
Gmargin^2 -198.7 0.040 34.9 0.788 -36.3 0.789 86.9 0.568 
Prmargin^2 -135.8 0.205 89.3 0.967 98.1 0.898 68.4 0.390 
Totase^2 99.8 0.505 85.0 0.888 100.0 0.989 97.2 0.054 
Untreated on 
support 
48 212 90 48 
Treated on 
support 
10 46 7 165 
Unmatched R
2
  0.699 0.134 0.545 0.281 
Matched R
2
  1.000 0.008 0.132 0.094 
 
Table A5.7 (continued). Bias reduction and p-values: the t-test in mean difference 
for matched samples of pharmaceutical firms in propensity score kernel bi-weight 
estimations for R&D intensity 
 
 Italy Norway Sweden USA 
Variable Bias  
% 
reduc
tion 
P-value 
for  
t-test 
Bias  
% 
reduc-
tion 
P-value 
for  
t-test 
Bias  
% 
reduc-
tion 
P-value 
for  
t-test 
Bias  
% 
reduc
tion 
P-
value 
for  
t-test 
Treve 91.8 0.888 - - 99.5 0.794 77.2 0.633 
Cashflowe 91.0 0.890 56.8 0.556 98.9 0.553 89.3 0.769 
Totase 90.9 0.870 57.4 0.696 99.9 0.970 89.7 0.809 
Pbookr - - - - -449.7 0.171 65.5 0.675 
Gmargin 0.4 0.725 - - -556.3 0.641 96.9 0.987 
Prmargin - - - - -215.2 0.393 85.8 0.928 
Employs - - 19.2 0.829 99.3 0.583 70.5 0.678 
Rdev^2 - - - - -13.8 0.205 41.4 0.874 
Cashflowe^2 - - - - 100.0 0.925 99.1 0.884 
Gmargin^2 - - - - -143.4 0.631 72.8 0.911 
Prmargin^2 - - - - 83.0 0.902 84.5 0.879 
Totase^2 - - 70.6 0.757 100.0 0.564 95.7 0.866 
Untreated 
support 
86 33 51 416 
Treated on 
support 
3 5 7 468 
Unmatched R
2
  0.171 0.073 0.405 0.021 
Matched R
2 
 0.082 0.226 1.000 0.002 
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Attachment 6. Impacts of the reforms in Italy, Norway, and Sweden 
 
The analysed reforms (Table A6.1) include Sweden (2002) with mandatory generic 
substitution, Italy (2001) with reference pricing, and Norway (2003) with price 
indexation and greater generic substitution.  
 
Table A6.1. Pharmaceutical reform evaluation matrix 
The reform and its main characteristics Expected effects for the 
pharmaceutical industry 
Italy: international reference pricing was introduced in most 
provinces in 2000 and then enhanced in 2001 by demanding the 
cheapest price out of similar drugs in the regional market. A 
pharmacist can substitute a drug by a generic equivalent unless this is 
forbidden by a prescription Since January 2003 a new law was 
applied to patented drugs that set reimbursement prices at a similar 
level for all drugs in the same therapeutic class. However, the 
government introduced a small premium fund of 0.1% of the total 
pharmaceutical budget for domestically innovated drugs in 2001 
(Ghislandi, Krulichova et al. 2005). Although exceptions for some 
categories of patients are granted by regional authorities (Folino-
Gallo, Montilla et al, 2008). 
 
Lower cost-price margin 
for producers; higher co-
payments for patients. 
However, as international 
firms might be 
discouraged from sales in 
Italy, domestic firms got 
better conditions.   
Norway: The government introduced a new index pricing and 
reimbursement system to promote generic substitution of patented 
drugs in 2003. For drugs with the same active ingredient, a 
wholesaler price index is calculated quarterly based on observed 
market prices and pharmacies are reimbursed at this index ceiling 
(Kloster 2003). The retail (index) price cap was set at average of the 
three lowest producer prices, which expanded the market share for 
generic drugs (Dalen, 2006).  
 
The reference pricing 
system reduced prices for 
brand name drugs by 18-
19% (Brekke, Grasdal et 
al., 2008). Greater generic 
substitution reduces 
expected revenue from 
drug invention.  
Sweden: new reforms in October 2002 introduced mandatory generic 
substitution, a positive list for pharmaceuticals, and new government 
agency was established to overview the list. Pharmacists must 
provide the cheapest equivalent of available drugs unless it is 
forbidden by the prescription In June 1, 1999 patient co-payments 
were increased (Anderson 2006).  
Reduction of sales of me-
too drugs, reduced demand 
for branded drugs.  
 
The data are summarized in tables A6.2, A6.3. 
 
Table A6.2. Descriptive statistics of the outcome variables in Euro 
Country Number 
of firms 
R&D 
expen-
ditures 
Research 
intensity 
Revenue Cash 
flow, 
million 
Gross 
margin 
Price to 
book 
ratio 
Italy 
 
4 9 
23683.11 
12938.14 
9 
.19 
.23 
17 
379041.8 
277511.6 
17 
6.77 
16.67 
15 
51.91 
20.09 
11 
2.97 
1.08 
Norway 
 
35 9 
6642.8 
3441.3 
9 
3.98 
5.26 
19 
1277174 
2228523 
191 
0.026 
0.058 
16 
60.14 
25.67 
12 
6.73 
4.11 
Sweden 
 
38 68 
12087.1 
14663.1 
66 
14.94 
98.81 
101 
39310.79 
75617.47 
271 
0.133 
0.875 
158 
43.11 
29.31 
73 
3.93 
85.23 
Note: in each cell the first quantity is the number of observations, the second is the mean, and the third 
one the standard deviation -the numbers of observations for firms of a particular country vary due 
mainly to missing data for R&D expenditures.  
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Table A6.3. Descriptive statistics of the macroeconomic variables. 
Country Statistics Regulatory 
quality 
(regquality) 
Pharma-
ceutical  
Expenditures 
(phaspending) 
Patent 
applications 
of residents  
(patent) 
Domestic 
credit to  
private sector 
(% of GDP)  
(crtoprivate) 
Population 
total, million 
(population) 
Italy Observations 
Mean 
St.deviation 
10 
77.79 
2.20 
10 
1.77 
0.08 
10 
7079 
841.1659 
10 
77.20 
12.40 
10 
57.5 
0.73 
Norway Observations 
Mean 
St.deviation 
252 
89.09 
2.90 
252 
0.85 
0.05 
252 
1225.56 
97.57 
252 
81.13 
4.39 
252 
4.53 
0.08 
Sweden Observations 
Mean 
St.deviation 
252 
92.82 
2.74 
252 
1.13 
0.05 
252 
3514.63 
646.71 
252 
98.09 
19.18 
252 
8.93 
0.08 
 
Estimation results.  
a) The before-after estimations with the t-test using different sample variances. 
These estimations show that the reforms had no significant negative impact on R&D 
in Italy and Sweden. In spite of cost-containment reforms, companies in Italy and 
Norway increased their cash flow, and firms in Denmark and Sweden expanded their 
R&D expenditures. No country experienced decreasing R&D expenditures, but R&D 
intensity was lower only in Norway. 
 
Table A6.4. Results of before-after comparisons with t-test 
Indicators Hypotheses Italy Norway Sweden 
rdepe, N obs 9 9 59 
R&D  Ha: ≠ 0 0.510 0.749 0.134 
expenditure Ha: > 0 0.745 0.626 0.0668 
rdev, N obs 9 9 57 
R&D to   Ha: ≠ 0 0.343 0.043** 0.387 
revenue Ha: > 0 0.828 0.022** 0.807 
rdas, N obs 9 9 59 
R&D to  Ha: ≠ 0 0.421 0.432 0.368 
total assets Ha: > 0 0.211 0.784 0.184 
treve, N obs 17 19 87 
Total  Ha: ≠ 0 0.116 0.605 0.232 
revenue Ha: > 0 0.941 0.698 0.884 
gmargin, N obs 15 16 134 
Gross  Ha: ≠ 0 0.691 0.900 0.264 
margin Ha: > 0 0.345 0.450 0.868 
cashflowe, N obs 17 188 234 
Cash flow Ha: ≠ 0 0.113 0.084* 0.339 
  Ha: > 0 0.944 0.958 0.169 
pbookr N obs  12 73 
Price to  Ha: ≠ 0 NA 0.309 0.405 
book value Ha: > 0  0.845 0.203 
Note: Ho: diff = 0, where diff = mean (after reforms) - mean(before reforms); t-test is two-sample 
unequal variance t-test. N obs - combined number of observations; p-values are indicated for the 
following alternative hypotheses: Ha: is not 0 - the difference in mean values is not zero, Ha:>0 - the 
difference in mean values is greater than zero. Significance levels:* - 10%; ** - 5%; *** - 1%.  
 
b) DiD method in semi-log specification. Table A6.5 shows estimated coefficients 
for the treatment indicator in the semi-logarithmic specifications, which show that 
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the reforms caused a reduction to the R&D expenditures by 0.83% for French and by 
0.45% for Norwegian firms. In Norway, R&D intensity indicators have dipped: by 
2.3% for the ratio of R&D to revenue and by 0.58% for the R&D to assets. No 
significant changes are found for Sweden.  
 
Table A6.5. Summary of semi-log DiD estimations for the treatment coefficients 
Country 
 
log 
(rdepe) 
log 
(rdev) 
log 
(rdas) 
log 
(treve) 
log 
(gmargin) 
log 
(cashflowe) 
log 
(pbookr) 
Italy -.31 
(.30) 
-.61 
(.38) 
-.49 
(.29)* 
.49 
(.53) 
.19 
(.13) 
.40 
(.53) 
.71 
(.24)*** 
Norway -.45 
(.23)* 
-2.30 
(.55)*** 
-.58 
(.30)* 
1.33 
(.73)* 
-.005 
(.16) 
 .30 
(.28) 
.45 
(.45) 
Sweden  .18 
(.55) 
.17 
(1.08) 
-.23 
(.50) 
.008 
(.90) 
-.23 
(.18) 
.23 
(.33) 
.12 
(.62) 
Note: the dependent variable is in logarithm, independent variables are in levels.  
rdepe is R&D expenditures, rdev is ratio of R&D to revenue, rdas is ratio of R&D to assets, treve is 
total revenue, gmargin is gross margin, cashflowe is cash flow, pbookr is price to book ratio.  
Robust standard errors are given in brackets; significance levels: *** - 1%, ** - 5%, * - 10%. The 
estimations were performed by fixed effect panel regressions of these outcome variables on all 
macroeconomic variables (treatment dummy, regquality, pharspending, crtoprivate, population, 
patent) and year dummies. The regulatory quality variable was dropped in estimations for Italy to 
prevent multicollinearity with the treatment dummy.  
 
The increase of price to book value of Italian pharmaceutical firms might be 
associated with the protectionist character of the reform against foreign rivals, which 
could also partially explain the increase in the gross margin for Italian firms.  
 
c) The DiD estimations in the model with a correlated random trend (Table A6.6) 
account for the possibility of linear time trend in the outcome indicators. The ratio of 
R&D to assets decreased by almost 0.6% in Norway. 
All three DiD estimations detect negative impacts of the cost containment reforms on 
R&D in Norway and no significant changes are found for Sweden.  
 
Table A6.6. Summary results for the treatment coefficients 
in the correlated random trend DiD method. 
Country 
 
rdepe, 
thousand 
rdev treve 
thousand 
rdas gmargin cashflowe, 
thousand 
pbookr 
Italy -238.60 
(354.25) 
-2.73 
(4.67) 
-609.93 
(1260.84) 
-.01 
(.02) 
-2.86 
(3.11) 
-937.78 
(1134.32) 
11.77 
(8.93) 
Norway -323.02 
(354.89) 
-3.90 
(5.32) 
-279.21 
(781.04) 
-.20 
(.08)** 
2.15 
(5.09) 
-1399.21 
(1095.17) 
-6.39 
(18.22) 
Sweden -173.86 
(267.62) 
209.64 
(183.49) 
55.92 
(933.01) 
.10 
(.09) 
-10.01 
(7.92) 
5.17 
(842.73) 
36.43 
(97.96) 
Note: robust standard errors are given in brackets; significance levels: *** - 1%, ** - 5%, * - 10%. 
The estimations were performed by fixed effect panel regressions for the first differences of the 
outcome variables on the first differences of all macroeconomic variables (treatment dummy, 
regquality, pharspending, crtoprivate, population, patent), year dummies were included. Regulatory 
quality variable was dropped in estimations for Italy to prevent multicollinearity with the treatment 
dummy.  
 
d) In the MDiD estimators I use two major outcome variables – R&D expenditures 
and R&D intensity (the ratio of R&D expenditures to revenue of a firm) in one-to-
one nearest matching (Table A6.7), 10-neighbour matching (Table A6.8), and kernel 
bi-weighted methods (Table A6.9). 
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Table A6.7. The outcome of the average effects for one-to-one matched firms with 
replacement on R&D expenditures and R&D intensity. 
Country Variable ATT Treated Control LR test Pseudo R
2
 Obser-
vations 
     Unmat
ched 
Match
ed 
Unmat
ched 
Mat-
ched 
on  
support 
Italy R&D 
 
R&D 
intensity 
-77.92 
(-0.00) 
.054 
(0.32) 
21084.8 
 
.253 
21162.7 
 
.199 
11.15 
(0.025) 
8.26 
(0.041) 
3.00 
(0.557) 
4.09 
(0.252) 
 0.275 
 
0.204 
 
0.217 
 
0.295 
 
Untr: 103 
Treat: 5 
Norway R&D 
 
R&D 
intensity 
-30030 
(-1.91) 
-0.056 
(-1.43) 
 62032.7 
 
.332 
 92063.1 
 
0.326 
8.59 
(0.072) 
19.82 
(0.000) 
0.19 
(0.996)
0.10 
(0.992) 
0.219 
 
0.489 
 
0.013 
 
0.007 
 
Untr: 103 
Treat: 5 
Sweden R&D 
 
R&D 
intensity 
-625.2 
(-.03) 
-.198 
(-0.55) 
19299.1 
 
.189 
19924 
 
.387 
13.80 
(0.087) 
13.23 
(0.104) 
 7.80 
0.453 
2.56 
(0.959) 
0.232 
 
0.222 
 
 0.256 
 
0.084 
 
Untr: 55 
Treat: 11 
Note: t-statistics for average effect of treatment on treated (ATT) is reported in brackets.  
The averages for Treated and Control firms are reported. In the firms on common support column, 
Untr stands for the number of untreated, and Treat – for the number of treated firms on the common 
support. In brackets for pseudo R
2
 are shown corresponding p-values of the likelihood ratio test for 
the joint insignificance of all regressors before (unmatched column) and after the matching (matched 
column). P-values for the LR (likelihood ratio) tests are indicated in brackets.  
 
Table A6.8. The outcome of the average effects for 10-neighbour matched firms on 
R&D expenditures and R&D intensity. 
 
Country Variable ATT Treated Controls LR test Pseudo R
2
 Firms 
     Unmat
ched 
Mat-
ched 
Unmat
ched 
Mat-
ched 
on  
support 
Italy R&D 
 
R&D 
intensity 
6331.1 
(0.69) 
-0.439 
(-0.62) 
21084.8 
 
.253 
 14753.6 
 
0.692 
11.15 
(0.025) 
8.26 
(0.041) 
1.66 
(0.798) 
1.43 
(0.698) 
0.275 
 
0.204 
 0.120 
 
0.103 
Untr: 103 
Treat: 5 
Norway R&D 
 
R&D 
intensity 
-18227.4 
(-3.27) 
 -0.457 
(-0.47) 
62032.8 
 
.332 
 80260.2 
 
0.789 
 8.59 
(0.072) 
19.82  
(0.000) 
1.04 
(0.904) 
2.33 
(0.507) 
0.219 
 
0.489 
 
0.219 
 
0.168 
Untr: 103 
Treat: 5 
Sweden R&D 
 
R&D 
intensity 
-7080.8 
(-0.31) 
.0452 
(0.34) 
19299.1 
 
.1888 
26379.9 
 
.1436 
13.80 
(0.087) 
 13.23 
(0.10) 
0.99 
(0.998) 
4.72 
(0.787) 
 0.232 
 
0.222 
 
0.032 
 
0.155 
 
Untr: 51 
Treat: 11 
Note: t-statistics for average effect of treatment on treated (ATT) is reported in brackets.  
The averages for Treated and Control firms are reported. In the firms on common support column, 
Untr stands for the number of untreated, and Treat – for the number of treated firms on the common 
support. In brackets for pseudo R
2
 are shown corresponding p-values of the likelihood ratio test for 
the joint insignificance of all regressors before (unmatched column) and after the matching (matched 
column).  P-values for the LR (likelihood ratio) tests are indicated in brackets.    
 
The following observed covariates were used in the matching of the Swedish firms: 
R&D intensity, total revenue, cash flow, total assets, price to book ratio, gross and 
profit margins. For Italian and Norwegian firms, R&D intensity, total assets, and 
gross and profit margins were used as basis for the propensity score matching. The 
matching calculations for R&D intensity (R&D to revenue) included the same set of 
covariates for the same countries, but the R&D intensity was replaced by R&D 
expenditures. 
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Table A6.9. The outcome of the average effects for kernel bi-weighted matched 
firms on R&D expenditures and R&D intensity. 
Country Variable ATT Treated Controls LR test Pseudo R
2
 Firms 
     Unmat
ched 
Matched Unmat
ched 
Mat-
ched 
on  
support 
Italy R&D 
 
R&D 
intensity 
-66154.8 
(-0.30) 
-0.587 
(-1.22) 
 25648.8 
 
.253 
 91803.6 
 
0.840 
11.15 
(0.025) 
8.26 
(0.041) 
1.94 
(0.746) 
 0.79 
(0.852) 
0.275 
 
0.204 
0.175 
 
0.057 
Untr: 103 
Treat: 5 
Norway R&D 
 
R&D 
intensity 
-166760 
(-0.67) 
 -0.147 
(-1.83) 
65098 
 
.367 
231858 
 
 0.514 
 8.59 
(0.072) 
19.82  
(0.000) 
0.29 
(0.990) 
0.88 
(0.830) 
0.219  
 
0.489  
 
0.026 
 
0.106 
Untr: 103 
Treat: 5 
Sweden R&D 
 
R&D 
intensity 
-6673.6 
(-0.39) 
-.126 
(-0.93) 
 19289.7 
 
.189 
25963.4 
 
.315 
13.80 
(0.087) 
 13.23 
(0.10) 
1.78 
(0.987) 
2.83 
(0.945) 
0.232 
 
0.222 
 
0.064 
 
0.093 
Untr: 51 
Treat: 11 
Note: t-statistics for average effect of treatment on treated (ATT) is reported in brackets. The averages 
for Treated and Control firms are reported. In the firms on common support column, Untr stands for 
the number of untreated, and Treat – for the number of treated firms on the common support. In 
brackets for pseudo R
2
 are shown corresponding p-values of the likelihood ratio test for the joint 
insignificance of all regressors before (unmatch column) and after the matching (match column).  P-
values for the LR (likelihood ratio) tests are indicated in brackets.  
 
Unfortunately, due to the low number of observations for the treated firms on support, 
I could not draw any robust conclusions. Comparing the results for all three matching 
methods, one can see a consistency in the estimated effects for Norway - both R&D 
intensity and R&D expenditures decreased in Norway due to the reform. 
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Attachment 7. Alternative instruments for the dynamic panel estimations 
 
In addition to the year dummies as iv instruments and the lagged R&D to assets as 
GMM instruments, several additional instruments have been tested for the 
estimations in chapter 3 (Table A7.1). GMM assumes that sample moments 
asymptotically converge in probability to the population moments and instruments 
have zero correlation with errors. However, as indicated by Sargan test of 
overidentified restrictions or the difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of 
instruments, these instruments are not robust.  
 
Table A7.1. Regression results for R&D to assets ratio with different instruments 
  Difference 
GMM 
Difference 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
Additional IV instrument population  population regulatory 
quality 
Credit to 
private 
sector  
Additional GMM instrument Debt to 
assets 
Log of 
employees 
Cash flow Cash to 
assets 
R&D to assets, rdasn at t-1 -.0372 
(.0361) 
-.0447 
(.0302) 
.0388 
(.0539) 
.0292 
(.0412) 
Cash flow to assets, cashflta  at t-1 .5697*** 
(.1142) 
.5536*** 
(.0784) 
 .7816*** 
(.1006) 
.7229*** 
(.0931) 
Cash to assets, cashta at t-1 .1033 
(.1841) 
.2284 
(.1574) 
-.0721 
(.0783) 
-.0317 
(.1060) 
Sales to assets, saleta at t-1 -.0855 
(.0922) 
.2099*** 
(.0701) 
 -.1492 
(.0754) 
-.1964** 
(.0692) 
Price-to-book ratio, pbookr at t-1 .0084 
(.0054) 
.0038 
(.0038) 
 .0116** 
(.0049) 
.0082 
(.0071) 
Debt to assets, debta at t-1 -.1910 
(.1381) 
-.0888 
(.1348) 
 -.0161 
(.1174) 
-.0805 
(.1234) 
Logarithm of number of employs,  
lemp  
.0561 
(.0521) 
.0504 
(.0427) 
-.0325 
(.0133) 
.0207 
(.0670) 
Risk -.0019 
(.0122) 
.0083 
(.0174) 
-.0150 
(.0297) 
.0385* 
 (.0199) 
Regulatory quality, regquality  -.0027* 
(.0016) 
-.0040 
(.0027) 
-.0007 
(.0012) 
-.0094** 
(.0042) 
Credit to private sector,  
crtoprivate at t-1 
.0003 
(.0006) 
.0004 
(.0012) 
-.0005 
(.0004) 
 .0015 
(.0009) 
Population, at t-1 -0.0009 
(0.0017) 
-.0023 
(0.003) 
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
Intercept   .6609** 
(.2917) 
.5417* 
(.2918) 
Year and country dummies are included     
Arellano-Bond test AR(1) 0.004 0.001  0.001 0.001 
Arellano-Bond test AR(2) 0.400 0.359 0.532 0.750 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions, p-
value 
0.000 0.007 0.013 0.000 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions, p-
value 
0.885 0.848 0.365 0.632 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity 
of instrument subsets, p-value 
0.871 0.940 0.417  0.818 
Difference test of exogenous instruments 0.581 0.121 0.320 0.081 
Wald chi2  or F-test 131.62 146.91  167.05  248.30 
R2 (within)     
Number of firms 415 415 482 482 
Number of observations 1555 1555 2125 2125 
Note: t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Significance levels in a two-tailed test: *** at the 
1%, 0.01 level, ** - 5%, * - 10%. 
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I also test the alternative specification with R&D to assets lagged by two 
periods, but this term is not statistically significant (Table A7.2). This specification 
limits subsample considerations of cash constrained firms due to the relatively small 
sample size for R&D expenditures. 
 
 
Table A7.2. Regression results for R&D to assets ratio with different specifications 
 
 Difference 
GMM 
Difference 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
R&D to assets, rdasn at t-1 -.0073 
(.0759) 
-.0146 
(.0761) 
-.0134 
(.0750) 
-.0238 
(.0678) 
R&D to assets, rdasn at t-2 -.0322 
(.0662) 
-.0077 
(.0479) 
-.0273 
(.0443) 
-.0282 
(.0464) 
Cash flow to assets, cashflta  at t-1 .6311 *** 
(.2390) 
.6124*** 
(.1970) 
 .8092*** 
(.1951) 
.8680*** 
(.1777) 
Cash to assets, cashta at t-1 .1267 
(.3874) 
_ .2285 
(.4455) 
_ 
Sales to assets, saleta at t-1 -.0838 
(.2073) 
_  -.2827 
(.2144) 
-.3351** 
(.1594) 
Price-to-book ratio, pbookr at t-1 .0068 
(.0086) 
.0115 
(.0117) 
 .0075 
(.0095) 
.0072 
(.0108) 
Debt to assets, debta at t-1 -.0481 
(.1992) 
-.1271 
(.2322) 
.0074** 
(.2066) 
.0591 
(.1718) 
Logarithm of number of employs,  
lemp  
.1154 
(.1030) 
.0443 
(.1040) 
.0718 
(.0735) 
.0341 
(.0429) 
Risk .0270 
(.0343) 
_ .0199 
(.0460) 
 .0162 
(.0415) 
Regulatory quality, regquality  -.0108 
(.0182) 
-.0059 
(.0146) 
-.0069 
(.0160) 
-.0032 
(.0138) 
Credit to private sector,  
crtoprivate at t-1 
.0045 
(.0043) 
.0086 
(.0040)** 
-.0014 
(.0025) 
 -.0002 
(.0025) 
Population, at t-1 -0.0151 
(0.0128) 
.0256*** 
(0.0096) 
0.0000 
(0.0001) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
Intercept   .3588** 
(1.0588) 
.5417* 
(.2918) 
Year and country dummies are included     
Arellano-Bond test AR(1) 0.031 0.093 0.005 0.006 
Arellano-Bond test AR(2) 0.891 0.735 0.616 0.762 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions,  
p-value 
0.561 0.446 0.033 0.016 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions,  
p-value 
0.934 0.848 0.922 0.755 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity 
of instrument subsets, p-value 
0.937 0.883 0.842 0.824 
Difference test of exogenous instruments 0.654 0.890 0.807 0.400 
Wald chi2  or F-test 110.27 146.91 210.59 154.29 
R2 (within)     
Number of firms 396 415 460 462 
Number of observations 1481 1555 2016 2034 
Note: t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Significance levels in a two-tailed test: *** at the 
1%, 0.01 level, ** - 5%, * - 10%. 
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List of acronyms used 
 
APC - advanced purchase commitments  
Big Pharma – a dozen of the world‘s largest pharmaceutical companies 
CDER - Center for Drug Evaluation and Research of the Food and Drug 
Administration, the government agency responsible for drug evaluations, USA  
CPI – Consumer price index based on a fixed basket of goods  
DiD - difference-in-difference statistical evaluation method  
DNDi - Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative 
EFPIA – European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations that 
represents national pharmaceutical industry associations and companies 
EGMA - European Generic Medicines Association 
EMEA – European Medicine Evaluation Agency, the drug regulatory authority of the  
European Commission  
FDA – the Food and Drug Administration, the government drug regulation agency 
in the USA 
FTO - fast track options used by drug authorities to approve some medicine 
GDP - gross domestic product, a sum of annual value added produced by country 
residents 
GMM – generalized method of moments, a method of statistical estimations 
HIV/AIDS – human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome  
HPPP – hybrid public private partnership for drug R&D 
IMF – the International Monetary Fund 
IND – Investigational New Drug Exemption from the Food and Drug  
Administration to start clinical trials of a new drug 
IRFF – the Industry Research Facilitation Fund  
IRR – internal rate of return 
MA(r) – moving average stochastic process of order r 
MDiD – matched difference-in-difference statistical method  
MMV - Medicines for Malaria Venture 
NCE – new chemical entity, a drug with essentially different type of chemical 
structure  
NDs – most neglected diseases (defined by the WHO), a common name for diseases 
that might have a large number of patients in developing countries, but those patients 
do not represent enough purchasing power to attract commercial drug research 
NDA - New Drug Application is applied by companies after successful clinical trials  
NGO – non-government organization 
NVC – non-profit virtual R&D management company   
OECD – the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development  
OLS – ordinary least squared method of statistical estimations  
PhRMA – the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, an 
association of research pharmaceutical companies based in the USA 
PPP – public-private partnerships 
PWC – PriceWaterhouseCoopers, a major consulting and auditing company 
R&D – research and development 
Translog function - transcendental logarithmic (production) function 
UN – United Nations 
UNDP – United Nations Development Program 
WHO – the World Health Organization under the United Nations 
